The Petraeus lobby

It is worth drawing attention to this article in the Washington Post, entitled 'Our best chance in Afghanistan'. The key messages are these:

- military progress in Afghanistan is undeniable (and we shouldn't worry about the seemingly increased insurgent presence in the north)
- Islamabad must do more to clear insurgent safe havens in Pakistan and Washington must put more pressure on Islamabad
- we should not rush transition
- counter-terrorism operations (SOF raids, drone strikes) are an integral part of COIN and we should not scale them back

However, the most interesting element of the article is the authors, Frederick and Kimberley Kagan. They are referred to as "independent military analysts who have conducted research for commanders in Afghanistan" which somewhat glosses over the fact that they work closely with General Petraeus and serve as his 'telescopes' - independent, out-of-the-box analysts whose insights reach from the political and strategic levels down to the ground truth at the tactical level.

That being the case, it is reasonable to suppose that Petraeus had some say in this article and that the main messages are in fact his own.

In that light, the description of US strategic goals in Afghanistan becomes especially noteworthy.

"From the Afghan border we have a unique vantage point on the groups that most directly threaten the American homeland and the stability of the entire nuclear-armed subcontinent... The ultimate goal of American strategy in the region must be ensuring that Afghanistan is sufficiently stable and friendly so that we can make the best use of that vantage point. The president's strategy gives us the best chance of doing that."

This is a clear statement that this war is not merely about chasing al Qaida operatives. This is about US geostrategic interests and about establishing a long-term physical presence in Afghanistan and in the wider region.

Furthermore, calling it the "president's strategy" is a subtle way of putting Obama on a hook and ensuring that he does not go back on his commitments. Rather less subtle is the forthright statement that President Obama must "make good on his words to American soldiers in Afghanistan last month: "We will prevail."

In short, the messages conveyed here equate to a clear statement of intent by General Petraeus. In this war, winning in Washington is as important as winning in Helmand and Kandahar.

<div align="justify">It is worth drawing attention to this article in the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/17/AR2010121707363.html">Washington Post</a>, entitled 'Our best chance in Afghanistan'. The key messages are these:</div><div align="justify"><br />- military progress in Afghanistan is undeniable (and we shouldn't worry about the seemingly increased insurgent presence in the north)<br />- Islamabad must do more to clear insurgent safe havens in Pakistan and Washington must put more pressure on Islamabad<br />- we should not rush transition<br />- counter-terrorism operations (SOF raids, drone strikes) are an integral part of COIN and we should not scale them back<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />However, the most interesting element of the article is the authors, Frederick and Kimberley Kagan. They are referred to as "independent military analysts who have conducted research for commanders in Afghanistan" which somewhat glosses over the fact that they work closely with General Petraeus and serve as his 'telescopes' - independent, out-of-the-box analysts whose insights reach from the political and strategic levels down to the ground truth at the tactical level.<br /><br />That being the case, it is reasonable to suppose that Petraeus had some say in this article and that the main messages are in fact his own.<br /><br />In that light, the description of US strategic goals in Afghanistan becomes especially noteworthy.<br /><blockquote>"<em>From the Afghan border we have a unique vantage point on the groups that most directly threaten the American homeland and the stability of the entire nuclear-armed subcontinent... The ultimate goal of American strategy in the region must be ensuring that Afghanistan is sufficiently stable and friendly so that we can make the best use of that vantage point. The president's strategy gives us the best chance of doing that</em>."</blockquote>This is a clear statement that this war is not merely about chasing <em>al Qaida</em> operatives. This is about US geostrategic interests and about establishing a long-term physical presence in Afghanistan and in the wider region.<br /><br />Furthermore, calling it the "president's strategy" is a subtle way of putting Obama on a hook and ensuring that he does not go back on his commitments. Rather less subtle is the forthright statement that President Obama must "make good on his words to American soldiers in Afghanistan last month: "We will prevail."<br /><br />In short, the messages conveyed here equate to a clear statement of intent by General Petraeus. In this war, winning in Washington is as important as winning in Helmand and Kandahar.<br /></div></span>

Wikileaks as self-fulfilling prophesy

Much has already been said and written about Wikileaks, not just about the diplomatic cables themselves but indeed about the very notion of divulging such large amounts of sensitive information to the public.

The cable containing a list of vital US facilities has been described as the most controversial of all the leaked documents. Frankly, it's hard to disagree with Malcolm Rifkind, the former British Foreign Minister, that this degree of irresponsiblity borders on criminal.

However, it could be argued that there is another - perhaps greater - danger in releasing this kind of information into the public domain in that it will change peoples attitudes and probably not for the better.

Using the highly publicised example of Arab states urging the US to attack Iran, anyone with a basic knowledge of Middle Eastern politics will probably not be surprised. It is hardly a secret that Saudi Arabia sees Iran as its main rival in the region and vice-versa.

However, when these positions are laid out so starkly in the public domain, is there not a real risk that positions will harden on all sides? Will Iranian hardliners - and perhaps even the Iranian people - see enemies all around them and react like a cornered animal? Will Saudi Arabia, and the other Arab states involved, redouble their efforts to cut off the head of the snake in the fear that the snake will strike first? Will warmongers in the US and/or Israel attempt to use these Arab states to apply even more pressure on their governments and militaries and force them to strike Iran?

In short, by releasing these documents have Wikileaks made a military strike on Iran more likely? Have they created a self-fulfilling prophesy?

Did the people at Wikileaks ask themselves any of these questions before divulging all that information? If not, why not? If yes, then how do they justify their actions which can only cause heightened tensions and reduce the chances of a diplomatic solution?

The truth is that with information comes responsibility. Wikileaks obtain and release masses of information, apparently without thought to the consequences and certainly with no responsibility or accountability. Unlike investigative journalism for example, there are no corroborating facts, no second opinions, no explanations of context. They simply dump huge amounts of information for people to digest, usually through headlines and at-a-glance summaries.

This is not freedom of information or freedom of speech in any real sense and the consequences of such recklessness are not likely to be good.

<div align="justify">Much has already been said and written about Wikileaks, not just about the diplomatic cables themselves but indeed about the very notion of divulging such large amounts of sensitive information to the public.<br /><br />The cable containing a list of vital US facilities has been <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11923766">described</a> as the most controversial of all the leaked documents. Frankly, it's hard to disagree with Malcolm Rifkind, the former British Foreign Minister, that this degree of irresponsiblity borders on criminal.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />However, it could be argued that there is another - perhaps greater - danger in releasing this kind of information into the public domain in that it will change peoples attitudes and probably not for the better.<br /><br />Using the highly publicised <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/28/us-embassy-cables-saudis-iran">example</a> of Arab states urging the US to attack Iran, anyone with a basic knowledge of Middle Eastern politics will probably not be surprised. It is hardly a secret that Saudi Arabia sees Iran as its main rival in the region and vice-versa.<br /><br />However, when these positions are laid out so starkly in the public domain, is there not a real risk that positions will harden on all sides? Will Iranian hardliners - and perhaps even the Iranian people - see enemies all around them and react like a cornered animal? Will Saudi Arabia, and the other Arab states involved, redouble their efforts to cut off the head of the snake in the fear that the snake will strike first? Will warmongers in the US and/or Israel attempt to use these Arab states to apply even more pressure on their governments and militaries and force them to strike Iran?<br /><br />In short, by releasing these documents have Wikileaks made a military strike on Iran more likely? Have they created a self-fulfilling prophesy?<br /><br />Did the people at Wikileaks ask themselves any of these questions before divulging all that information? If not, why not? If yes, then how do they justify their actions which can only cause heightened tensions and reduce the chances of a diplomatic solution?<br /><br />The truth is that with information comes responsibility. Wikileaks obtain and release masses of information, apparently without thought to the consequences and certainly with no responsibility <em>or accountability</em>. Unlike investigative journalism for example, there are no corroborating facts, no second opinions, no explanations of context. They simply dump huge amounts of information for people to digest, usually through headlines and at-a-glance <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/29/wikileaks-embassy-cables-key-points">summaries</a>.<br /><br />This is not freedom of information or freedom of speech in any real sense and the consequences of such recklessness are not likely to be good.<br /></div></span>

Hillary misspeaks on AfPak

Hillary Clinton has made some interesting and fairly forthright statements on Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, most notably on Islamabad's use of proxies against hostile regimes in Kabul and New Delhi. (the interview was originally given to ABC but, not surprisingly, was quickly picked up by Indian media).

Of particular note is her seemingly candid assessment that similar use of proxies by the US against the Soviets during the 1980s had backfired, the less-than-subtle implication being that Pakistan should learn from American mistakes and not do likewise.

“Part of what we are fighting against right now, the United States created. We created the Mujahideen force against the Soviet Union [in Afghanistan]. We trained them, we equipped them, we funded them, including somebody named Osama bin Laden. And it didn't work out so well for us.”

It's an interesting statement: honest and circumspect. The one problem is that it isn't actually true.

While it is undoubtedly true that America's covert action towards the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s created blowback, her very specific claims that the US trained, equipped and funded Osama Bin Laden's network are not accurate, if we are to believe the evidence presented by Steve Coll in Ghost Wars. Coll states that Bin Laden (who at the time was a financier and not an operator) never received money from the US, or from Pakistan for that matter. Indeed, he had plenty of his own.

In fact, Coll's research makes it very clear that the US funnelled its cash and weapons through Pakistan - more specifically the ISI - rather than directly fund and equip mujahideen units, bearing in mind that this was after all a covert war. Over time the CIA would begin to directly supply certain mujahideen - notably Ahmed Shah Massoud - who were marginalised by the ISI but Coll presents no evidence that the US directly funded Arab jihadists generally, or Osama Bin Laden specifically.

However, the trade-off for running a covert war through Pakistan was that the ISI decided which muj received the money and arms. These were invariably the most radical Islamists in Afghanistan, as the ISI argued they were the more effective fighters. Not only did this empower the likes of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, it also meant that the ISI itself - and hardline elements within it - were empowered and emboldened to pursue their security interests through proxies in Afghanistan and in Kashmir, the result being the major instability we see across the region today.

In short, the US may not have directly supported Osama Bin Laden but they did help create a situation where he and other equally malign - if not more so - elements were radicalised and strengthened during the war against the Soviets and its aftermath.

Why is this distinction important? Taking Hillary Clinton's statement at face value, we might conclude that the US was simply careless and/or misguided in choosing the wrong ally against the Soviets. The truth is both more complex and more serious than that and it would be both deeply disappointing and (potentially) highly dangerous if that important lesson were lost.

<div align="justify"> Hillary Clinton has made some interesting and fairly forthright statements on Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, most notably on Islamabad's use of proxies against hostile regimes in Kabul and New Delhi. (the interview was originally given to ABC but, not surprisingly, was quickly picked up by <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article883765.ece">Indian media</a>).<br /><br />Of particular note is her seemingly candid assessment that similar use of proxies by the US against the Soviets during the 1980s had backfired, the less-than-subtle implication being that Pakistan should learn from American mistakes and not do likewise.<br /><span class="fullpost"><blockquote><em>“Part of what we are fighting against right now, the United States created. We created the Mujahideen force against the Soviet Union [in Afghanistan]. We trained them, we equipped them, we funded them, including somebody named Osama bin Laden. And it didn't work out so well for us.”</em></blockquote>It's an interesting statement: honest and circumspect. The one problem is that it isn't actually true.<br /><br />While it is undoubtedly true that America's covert action towards the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s created blowback, her very specific claims that the US trained, equipped and funded Osama Bin Laden's network are not accurate, if we are to believe the evidence presented by Steve Coll in <em>Ghost Wars</em>. Coll states that Bin Laden (who at the time was a financier and not an operator) never received money from the US, or from Pakistan for that matter. Indeed, he had plenty of his own.<br /><br />In fact, Coll's research makes it very clear that the US funnelled its cash and weapons through Pakistan - more specifically the ISI - rather than directly fund and equip <em>mujahideen </em>units, bearing in mind that this was after all a covert war. Over time the CIA would begin to directly supply certain <em>mujahideen </em>- notably Ahmed Shah Massoud - who were marginalised by the ISI but Coll presents no evidence that the US directly funded Arab jihadists generally, or Osama Bin Laden specifically.<br /><br />However, the trade-off for running a covert war through Pakistan was that the ISI decided which <em>muj </em>received the money and arms. These were invariably the most radical Islamists in Afghanistan, as the ISI argued they were the more effective fighters. Not only did this empower the likes of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, it also meant that the ISI itself - and hardline elements within it - were empowered and emboldened to pursue their security interests through proxies in Afghanistan and in Kashmir, the result being the major instability we see across the region today.<br /><br />In short, the US may not have directly supported Osama Bin Laden but they did help create a situation where he and other equally malign - if not more so - elements were radicalised and strengthened during the war against the Soviets and its aftermath.<br /><br />Why is this distinction important? Taking Hillary Clinton's statement at face value, we might conclude that the US was simply careless and/or misguided in choosing the wrong ally against the Soviets. The truth is both more complex and more serious than that and it would be both deeply disappointing and (potentially) highly dangerous if that important lesson were lost.<br /></div></span>

Talking to the Taliban

Asia Times reports once again on the reconciliation process in Afghanistan, which at the moment appears to be little more than back-channel negotiations between the US and the Taliban through Saudi and Pakistani mediators.

If true, the assertions made by the Asia Times would appear to justify concerns previously expounded on this blog about the notion of talking to the Taliban.

"Taliban sources in the southern regions of Pakistan confirmed to Asia Times Online that while different Taliban groups had been approached, the Americans would prefer to talk to one of the major anti-US forces in Afghanistan, the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) led by former Afghan premier Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The HIA is likely to strike a deal with the Americans before the Taliban... In the Taliban camp, the activity in the HIA camp is viewed as a bid to divide the resistance."

In other words, there are many different factions and it appears very difficult to ascertain if any of them would be able to secure buy-in from all or most of the others if an agreement was reached. The Taliban can be forgiven for thinking this is an attempt at divide-and-conquer... as they are very probably right.

In the meantime, President Karzai has set up his own High Peace Council but since it is far from clear where they fit in to the US/Saudi/Pakistani process, he in turn can be forgiven for thinking that his position is being undermined once again.

<div align="justify"><a href="http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LI30Df01.html">Asia Times</a> reports once again on the reconciliation process in Afghanistan, which at the moment appears to be little more than back-channel negotiations between the US and the Taliban through Saudi and Pakistani mediators.<br /><br />If true, the assertions made by the <em>Asia Times </em>would appear to justify concerns previously expounded on this <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/08/talking-to-enemy.html">blog</a> about the notion of talking to the Taliban.<br /><span class="fullpost"><blockquote>"<em>Taliban sources in the southern regions of Pakistan confirmed to Asia Times Online that while different Taliban groups had been approached, the Americans would prefer to talk to one of the major anti-US forces in Afghanistan, the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) led by former Afghan premier Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The HIA is likely to strike a deal with the Americans before the Taliban... In the Taliban camp, the activity in the HIA camp is viewed as a bid to divide the resistance</em>."</blockquote>In other words, there are many different factions and it appears very difficult to ascertain if any of them would be able to secure buy-in from all or most of the others if an agreement was reached. The Taliban can be forgiven for thinking this is an attempt at divide-and-conquer... as they are very probably right.<br /><br />In the meantime, President Karzai has set up his own <a href="http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2010/09/2010928122241286855.html">High Peace Council</a> but since it is far from clear where they fit in to the US/Saudi/Pakistani process, he in turn can be forgiven for thinking that his position is being undermined once again.</div></span>

The African front

I recently wrote about the ongoing debate in Uganda over the country's participation in AMISOM, the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia. This article in the Guardian argues that Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda, has less than altruistic reasons for sending Ugandan troops to Somalia and that he is quite happy to be used as an American pawn in the war on terror.

The argument goes that, through Ugandan participation in AMISOM, Museveni's regime is seeking to portray itself as a responsible member of the international community in order to i/ divert attention from its military interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and its alleged human rights abuses against rebels in northern Uganda and ii/ maintain the flow of western aid into the country (amounting to one third of the government's annual budget), not to mention US military training and logistical support, despite the widespread corruption of the regime.

On top of this, since al-Shabaab bombed Kampala in July and killed over 70 people, the government has introduced extremely restrictive security measures. In the words of the Kampala police chief:

“We are sounding a warning. No gathering of more than five people, even if it is in your compound, should be held without clearance from the Inspector General of Police. People intending to hold wedding parties, music galas, football matches and road processions should notify the IGP first.”

From a wider perspective, the article takes a swipe at Washington, insinuating that the US is content to turn a blind eye to all this as Uganda is proving a useful proxy in the war on terror through its engagement in Somalia. Aside from a brief reference to DynCorp (which equips and trains the peacekeeping force in Somalia with State Department funding), there is little attempt to delve into the detail of what the US is doing in Somalia (or Africa generally) or to construct an argument as to why intervention in Somalia is such an inherently bad idea.

As a matter of fact, African leaders at last week's UN General Assembly argued for more western intervention in Somalia and Africa more generally. Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, President of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (which physically controls only a small corner of Mogadishu), said progress was being made in many areas but that ultimately the solution to both terrorism and piracy lies in greater international engagement on land, notably by training national security forces and providing support to AMISOM. In other words, don't just send ships to patrol the Gulf of Aden, help us build a proper State.

Mwai Kibaki, President of Kenya, went so far as to claim that the deteriorating security situation in Somalia poses a "threat to international peace and security greater than in any other conflict in the world" and that more opportunities should not be lost through benign neglect.

Specifically, Kibaki exhorted the United Nations and the international community to to support the appointment of an eminent high-level personality for Somalia, effectively deploy 2,000 troops and review the current mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to enhance its peace enforcement capacity. He also urged the world to fully support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan ahead of the secession referendum in January.

In other words, more engagement not less. Taking swipes at the US is not going to help anybody here. This is precisely the time when the international community should be seeking to engage constructively in Africa and with so much attention fixed on Afghanistan there is an opportunity for other actors, notably the European Union, to step up to the plate. The EU has already begun to set up its Somalia Training Mission - ironically based in Uganda - but, if Messrs Sharif and Kibaki are to be believed, much more needs to be done.

The best way to avoid Africa - and specifically Somalia - becoming a full-blown front in the 'war on terror' would be to engage properly now. In Afghanistan, the golden hours were wasted and the west has consequently found itself fighting a full-blown counter-insurgency campaign. We should hope that the wider international community will have the foresight to avoid repeating that mistake in Africa.

<div align="justify">I recently <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/09/african-parallels.html">wrote</a> about the ongoing debate in Uganda over the country's participation in AMISOM, the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia. This <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/sep/25/ugandas-proxy-war-on-terror">article</a> in the <em>Guardian</em> argues that Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda, has less than altruistic reasons for sending Ugandan troops to Somalia and that he is quite happy to be used as an American pawn in the war on terror.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />The argument goes that, through Ugandan participation in AMISOM, Museveni's regime is seeking to portray itself as a responsible member of the international community in order to i/ divert attention from its military interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and its alleged human rights abuses against rebels in northern Uganda and ii/ maintain the flow of western aid into the country (amounting to one third of the government's annual budget), not to mention US military training and logistical support, despite the widespread corruption of the regime.<br /><br />On top of this, since <em>al-Shabaab </em>bombed Kampala in July and killed over 70 people, the government has introduced extremely restrictive security measures. In the words of the Kampala police chief:<blockquote><em>“We are sounding a warning. No gathering of more than five people, even if it is in your compound, should be held without clearance from the Inspector General of Police. People intending to hold wedding parties, music galas, football matches and road processions should notify the IGP first.”</em></blockquote>From a wider perspective, the article takes a swipe at Washington, insinuating that the US is content to turn a blind eye to all this as Uganda is proving a useful proxy in the war on terror through its engagement in Somalia. Aside from a brief reference to DynCorp (which equips and trains the peacekeeping force in Somalia with State Department funding), there is little attempt to delve into the detail of what the US is doing in Somalia (or Africa generally) or to construct an argument as to why intervention in Somalia is such an inherently bad idea.<br /><br />As a matter of fact, African leaders at last week's UN General Assembly argued for <em>more </em>western intervention in Somalia and Africa more generally. <a href="http://gadebate.un.org/View/SpeechView/tabid/85/smid/411/ArticleID/173/Default.aspx">Sharif Sheikh Ahmed</a>, President of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (which physically controls only a small corner of Mogadishu), said progress was being made in many areas but that ultimately the solution to both terrorism and piracy lies in greater international engagement <em>on land</em>, notably by training national security forces and providing support to AMISOM. In other words, don't just send ships to patrol the Gulf of Aden, help us build a proper State.<br /><br /><a href="http://gadebate.un.org/View/SpeechView/tabid/85/smid/411/ArticleID/108/Default.aspx">Mwai Kibaki</a>, President of Kenya, went so far as to claim that the deteriorating security situation in Somalia poses a "threat to international peace and security greater than in any other conflict in the world" and that more opportunities should not be lost through benign neglect.<br /><br />Specifically, Kibaki exhorted the United Nations and the international community to to support the appointment of an eminent high-level personality for Somalia, effectively deploy 2,000 troops and review the current mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to enhance its peace enforcement capacity. He also urged the world to fully support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan ahead of the secession referendum in January.<br /><br />In other words, more engagement not less. Taking swipes at the US is not going to help anybody here. This is precisely the time when the international community should be seeking to engage constructively in Africa and with so much attention fixed on Afghanistan there is an opportunity for other actors, notably the European Union, to step up to the plate. The EU has already begun to set up its <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/100607%20Fact%20sheet%20EUTM%20-%20version%205_EN.pdf">Somalia Training Mission</a> - ironically based in Uganda - but, if Messrs Sharif and Kibaki are to be believed, much more needs to be done.<br /><br />The best way to avoid Africa - and specifically Somalia - becoming a full-blown front in the 'war on terror' would be to engage properly now. In Afghanistan, the golden hours were wasted and the west has consequently found itself fighting a full-blown counter-insurgency campaign. We should hope that the wider international community will have the foresight to avoid repeating that mistake in Africa.<br /></div></span>

Two Big Questions

In response to Prof. Stephen Walt's post on the five big questions for the future, I commented the following:

As a matter of fact, the EU overtook the US already in terms of population (450 million to 320 million) and GDP (16 trillion to 14 trillion). Of course, whereas the US is a nation state, the EU is a ...let's say... a nameless beast.

However, bearing in mind the size of China or India, it is fair to say that the sheer size is not the decisive factor. So why is the US dominating the world?

First, because the US spends roughly a quarter of its budget on the military (EU average less than 2%).

Second, the world commodities, particularly Oil, are traded in US Dollars. Because of that, every nation needs dollars, which in turn stabilizes the dollar and allows the US government to borrow large amounts of money.

Hence my two biggies:

1) Will the political class in the US accept that the US is not capable of keeping the defence budget as high as it currently is? Will it accept a drastic cut, which will lead to the consequence of the US losing influence in the world? Will the US democracy survive a decline? Will some US politician gather the hundreds of thousands of Veterans and march against Washington? (Prof. Galtung wrote an interesting piece about this option)

2) When will the emerging powers of the world refuse to trade in US dollars? When will the BRIC and France go ahead with their project of an alternative world lead currency? How will the US react to this move?

In response to Prof. Stephen Walt's post on <a href="http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/12/five_big_questions#comment-268671">the five big questions for the future</a>, I commented the following:<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />As a matter of fact, the EU overtook the US already in terms of population (450 million to 320 million) and GDP (16 trillion to 14 trillion). Of course, whereas the US is a nation state, the EU is a ...let's say... a nameless beast.<br /><br />However, bearing in mind the size of China or India, it is fair to say that the sheer size is not the decisive factor. So why is the US dominating the world?<br /><br />First, because the US spends roughly a quarter of its budget on the military (EU average less than 2%).<br /><br />Second, the world commodities, particularly Oil, are traded in US Dollars. Because of that, every nation needs dollars, which in turn stabilizes the dollar and allows the US government to borrow large amounts of money.<br /><br />Hence my two biggies:<br /><br />1) Will the political class in the US accept that the US is not capable of keeping the defence budget as high as it currently is? Will it accept a drastic cut, which will lead to the consequence of the US losing influence in the world? Will the US democracy survive a decline? Will some US politician gather the hundreds of thousands of Veterans and march against Washington? (Prof. Galtung wrote an interesting piece about this option)<br /><br />2) When will the emerging powers of the world refuse to trade in US dollars? When will the BRIC and France go ahead with their project of an alternative world lead currency? How will the US react to this move?<br /></span>

Open Saudi skies for Israel (?)

The enemy of my enemy is my friend... and his bombers shall have open skies to attack my enemy's nuclear facilities.

The Times reports that Saudi Arabia has been conducting tests to stand down its air defences and allow Israeli bombers through unharmed. Granting Israeli jets free passage through a narrow corridor of northern Saudi airspace would considerably reduce the distance of the bombing run.

The Kingdom has officially denied this claim, calling it "slanderous and false" and reiterating its "position of opposition and rejection of the violation of its sovereignty and the use of its airspace or territory by anyone to attack any country".

According to The Times, the four main targets are said to be the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Qom, the gas storage development at Isfahan and the heavy-water reactor at Arak. These targets lie up to 2,250km from Israel, which is the outer limit of their bombers’ range, even with aerial refuelling. An air strike would involve multiple waves of bombers, presumably crossing Jordan, northern Saudi Arabia and Iraq - which would require at least tacit approval from Washington for the strike.

The article quotes a US defence source who claims that the understanding between Israel and Saudi Arabia has been done with the agreement of the US State Department.

An interesting aspect of this issue is the regional dimension - the article refers to a claim by 'Israeli intelligence sources' that Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan are just as concerned (to put it mildly) as Israel and the west over the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran.

If this story is true - and we should not consider it a foregone conclusion - then it raises many questions. Is a strike on Iran a question of when not if? Is the ongoing diplomatic effort genuinely intended to bring about a peaceful resolution to the issue or is it merely a smokescreen intended to convince the world that a military solution is the only solution? If the diplomatic effort is genuine then at what point do we decide that it is not working and an air strike is the only solution?

Also, to what extent is Israel doing this at its own behest or as a US (and Saudi) proxy? What would be the repercussions of using Israel as a blunt instrument, diplomatically or otherwise?

<div align="justify">The enemy of my enemy is my friend... and his bombers shall have open skies to attack my enemy's nuclear facilities.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article7148555.ece">The Times</a> reports that Saudi Arabia has been conducting tests to stand down its air defences and allow Israeli bombers through unharmed. Granting Israeli jets free passage through a narrow corridor of northern Saudi airspace would considerably reduce the distance of the bombing run.<br /><br />The Kingdom has officially <a href="http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=2010061375182">denied</a> this claim, calling it "slanderous and false" and reiterating its "position of opposition and rejection of the violation of its sovereignty and the use of its airspace or territory by anyone to attack any country".<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />According to The Times, the four main targets are said to be the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Qom, the gas storage development at Isfahan and the heavy-water reactor at Arak. These targets lie up to 2,250km from Israel, which is the outer limit of their bombers’ range, even with aerial refuelling. An air strike would involve multiple waves of bombers, presumably crossing Jordan, northern Saudi Arabia and Iraq - which would require at least tacit approval from Washington for the strike.<br /><br />The article quotes a US defence source who claims that the understanding between Israel and Saudi Arabia has been done with the agreement of the US State Department.<br /><br />An interesting aspect of this issue is the regional dimension - the article refers to a claim by 'Israeli intelligence sources' that Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan are just as concerned (to put it mildly) as Israel and the west over the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran.<br /><br />If this story is true - and we should not consider it a foregone conclusion - then it raises many questions. Is a strike on Iran a question of when not if? Is the ongoing diplomatic effort genuinely intended to bring about a peaceful resolution to the issue or is it merely a smokescreen intended to convince the world that a military solution is the only solution? If the diplomatic effort is genuine then at what point do we decide that it is not working and an air strike is the only solution?<br /><br />Also, to what extent is Israel doing this at its own behest or as a US (and Saudi) proxy? What would be the repercussions of using Israel as a blunt instrument, diplomatically or otherwise?<br /></div></span>

Israel, Bin Laden and Alaskan rabbits

Michael Scheuer, a retired CIA agent, didn't pull any punches during his speech to a town-hall meeting this week, raising a considerable number of questions.

The main thrust of Scheuer's speech was that the United States should return to the Founding Fathers' foreign policy (ie. self-defence) which, in practice, entails withdrawing from the Middle East "to the greatest extent compatible with our national interest."

The two questions here are i/ what is the greatest extent possible and ii/ how can this withdrawal be achieved in practical terms?

On Israel, Scheuer doesn't miss the mark either. "The idea that 300 million Americans are bound to bleed because God gave a group of people a deed to a plot of land 3,000 years ago is quite mad."

Given recent and ongoing debates, one wonders if either a growing number of people share his view or, alternatively, people always thought this way but now feel able to speak out. The question in both cases is why is this and what will it mean?

On Bin Laden, Scheuer says there is next to no chance of ever catching him - a particularly striking comment given that Scheuer was previously head of the CIA unit charged with hunting him down. The question here is would it really make much difference if Bin Laden was ever caught?

On Afghanistan, defeat is not an option but the means (ie. troop numbers) to win are not there. On Iran, a first-strike would only provoke terrorist attacks on US soil.

Finally, the US must achieve energy independence or face going to war for oil (I thought they already did) and must prioritise this over other considerations. In simple terms - "Demands for protection for Arctic rabbits, Gulf shrimp or the sunny beaches of California at the cost of dead Marines or soldiers should be ignored."

Michael Scheuer, a retired CIA agent, didn't pull any punches during his speech to a <a href="http://www.buffalonews.com/2010/04/19/1024450/former-bin-laden-tracker-calls.html">town-hall meeting</a> this week, raising a considerable number of questions.<br /><br />The main thrust of Scheuer's speech was that the United States should return to the Founding Fathers' foreign policy (ie. self-defence) which, in practice, entails withdrawing from the Middle East "to the greatest extent compatible with our national interest."<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />The two questions here are i/ what is the greatest extent possible and ii/ how can this withdrawal be achieved in practical terms?<br /><br />On Israel, Scheuer doesn't miss the mark either. "The idea that 300 million Americans are bound to bleed because God gave a group of people a deed to a plot of land 3,000 years ago is quite mad."<br /><br />Given recent and ongoing debates, one wonders if either a growing number of people share his view or, alternatively, people always thought this way but now feel able to speak out. The question in both cases is why is this and what will it mean?<br /><br />On Bin Laden, Scheuer says there is next to no chance of ever catching him - a particularly striking comment given that Scheuer was previously head of the CIA unit charged with hunting him down. The question here is would it really make much difference if Bin Laden was ever caught?<br /><br />On Afghanistan, defeat is not an option but the means (ie. troop numbers) to win are not there. On Iran, a first-strike would only provoke terrorist attacks on US soil.<br /><br />Finally, the US must achieve energy independence or face going to war for oil (I thought they already did) and must prioritise this over other considerations. In simple terms - "Demands for protection for Arctic rabbits, Gulf shrimp or the sunny beaches of California at the cost of dead Marines or soldiers should be ignored."<br /><br /></span><span class="fullpost"></span>

Lessons from Ireland - the 'out of the box' theory

Arguably the most interesting lesson from the Northern Ireland peace process is the role of the United States as an 'out of the box' player, a deus ex machina.

Whereas previously the US had been little more than a place for the IRA to procure high-grade weapons (both legally and illegally), when Bill Clinton was elected President in 1992 this changed - for two reasons:

Firstly, as the first non-veteran to become President since 1945, Clinton brought a post-Cold War vision in which the State Department's hands-off policy on Northern Ireland - in deference to Britain's role as America's most important military ally - no longer held sway.

Secondly, Clinton the uber-politician was very aware of the unavoidable influence of Irish-America at the polls.

It was in that context that a number of prominent Irish-Americans launched an energetic lobbying campaign. One of their number, Jim Reilly, a former top executive with IBM, is credited with the 'out of the box' theory which best sums up US involvement in Northern Ireland during the 1990s.

According to Reilly, all the parties to the conflict in Northern Ireland were frozen in the same box and any move was immediately countered by a check-mating move from the other side. The introduction of an 'out of the box' player would completely change the dynamic inside the box.

So it proved. Without going into the finer details here, constructive US involvement - notably granting visas to Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams and veteran IRA member Joe Cahill - showed the republican movement that politics could open doors and subsequently led to IRA ceasefires in 1996-96 and from 1997 onwards, ultimately leading to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.

I must add a caveat at this stage. London and Dublin had increasingly worked together over the previous years, even decades, to build a conflict resolution process and the triangular Belfast-London-Dublin dynamic was already an improvement on the confrontational IRA vs London dynamic. So while Washington's involvement helped to change the dynamic and open up new possibilities for political settlement, this was only possible thanks to the solid foundations which had already been laid over many years in Belfast, London and Dublin.

American involvement in Northern Ireland, although partly motivated by genuine good intentions, was not entirely devoid of the interests of national security. Many US policy-makers were concerned about the implications of the resources that Britain committed long-term to the north of Ireland. In simple terms, they wondered how long Britain would be able to endure the conflict without compromising its commitments elsewhere.

However, self-interest is to be expected. Interests - be they strategic, economic or whatever else - have to be accounted for when considering to what extent the 'out of the box' theory is applicable to other conflicts.

An obvious question is why American involvement elsewhere during the Clinton administration - or since - did not necessarily result in similarly positive effects as in Northern Ireland. Much of that has to do with the long-standing connections between America and Ireland, between America and Britain and, above all, the efforts and intentions of the Irish-American lobby. Much of that also has to do with the American interests at stake in other given situations.

Conclusion - if the US role as an 'out of the box' player in Northern Ireland is to serve as an example for a potentially successful approach to conflict resolution elsewhere then two key pre-conditions must be established:

i/ the 'out of the box' player is ideally regarded as impartial and reliable, or at the very least each party to the conflict must believe it to be in their best interest to cooperate with the 'out of the box' player;

ii/ that the 'out of the box' player sees a peaceful resolution to the conflict as being in its own best interests.

Arguably the most interesting lesson from the Northern Ireland peace process is the role of the United States as an 'out of the box' player, a <em>deus ex machina</em>.<br /><br />Whereas previously the US had been little more than a place for the IRA to procure high-grade weapons (both legally and illegally), when Bill Clinton was elected President in 1992 this changed - for two reasons:<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />Firstly, as the first non-veteran to become President since 1945, Clinton brought a post-Cold War vision in which the State Department's hands-off policy on Northern Ireland - in deference to Britain's role as America's most important military ally - no longer held sway.<br /><br />Secondly, Clinton the uber-politician was very aware of the unavoidable influence of Irish-America at the polls.<br /><br />It was in that context that a number of prominent Irish-Americans launched an energetic lobbying campaign. One of their number, Jim Reilly, a former top executive with IBM, is credited with the 'out of the box' theory which best sums up US involvement in Northern Ireland during the 1990s.<br /><br />According to Reilly, all the parties to the conflict in Northern Ireland were frozen in the same box and any move was immediately countered by a check-mating move from the other side. The introduction of an 'out of the box' player would completely change the dynamic inside the box.<br /><br />So it proved. Without going into the finer details here, constructive US involvement - notably granting visas to Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams and veteran IRA member Joe Cahill - showed the republican movement that politics could open doors and subsequently led to IRA ceasefires in 1996-96 and from 1997 onwards, ultimately leading to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.<br /><br />I must add a caveat at this stage. London and Dublin had increasingly worked together over the previous years, even decades, to build a conflict resolution process and the triangular Belfast-London-Dublin dynamic was already an improvement on the confrontational IRA vs London dynamic. So while Washington's involvement helped to change the dynamic and open up new possibilities for political settlement, this was only possible thanks to the solid foundations which had already been laid over many years in Belfast, London and Dublin.<br /><br />American involvement in Northern Ireland, although partly motivated by genuine good intentions, was not entirely devoid of the interests of national security. Many US policy-makers were concerned about the implications of the resources that Britain committed long-term to the north of Ireland. In simple terms, they wondered how long Britain would be able to endure the conflict without compromising its commitments elsewhere.<br /><br />However, self-interest is to be expected. Interests - be they strategic, economic or whatever else - have to be accounted for when considering to what extent the 'out of the box' theory is applicable to other conflicts.<br /><br />An obvious question is why American involvement elsewhere during the Clinton administration - or since - did not necessarily result in similarly positive effects as in Northern Ireland. Much of that has to do with the long-standing connections between America and Ireland, between America and Britain and, above all, the efforts and intentions of the Irish-American lobby. Much of that also has to do with the American interests at stake in other given situations.<br /><br />Conclusion - if the US role as an 'out of the box' player in Northern Ireland is to serve as an example for a potentially successful approach to conflict resolution elsewhere then two key pre-conditions must be established:<br /><br />i/ the 'out of the box' player is ideally regarded as impartial and reliable, or at the very least each party to the conflict must believe it to be in their best interest to cooperate with the 'out of the box' player;<br /><br />ii/ that the 'out of the box' player sees a peaceful resolution to the conflict as being in its own best interests.<br /></span>

Hard question needed in Brussels: are you sure?

As a reply to Patrick's post I would like to make some comments regarding the 'EU-global player' debate. I just wrote an article about this issue but it's in German so I won't post it here. But here are the main points:

The EU consists of Member States (MS) with totally different foreign policy goals and priorities: some Eastern European MS are still worried about their territorial integrity, particularly after the Russia-Georgia crisis. The UK tends to follow the US in matters related to foreign policy. And other MS would like to deepen the relationship with Russia for energy reasons and are generally hesitant to engage in out-of-area operations. I think it is fair to say that it is very unlikely that those divers interests can be captured in a consistent foreign policy agenda. To prove my point: the European Security Strategy offers a great analysis of the current geopolitical situation. But it falls short of developing a strategy, identifying geoplitical goals and targets and where the EU wants to be in 20 years.

Foreign policy issues the EU will probably not manage to formulate common interests. As Patrick pointed rightly out, in trade and commerce realted issues, those common interests have alreday been formulated. Not shy of taking on the mighty US when it comes down to Bananas, steel or distorting practices of US companies, the EU has an agenda and uses its weight to defend its interests. This indicates that in fields where the EU has stakes, they will act. It does not act in fields where the common interests are not identified.

Apart form the diverse interests there is also simply no need for the EU to get its acts together. That is because the US persues a foreign policy that is to a large extent in the EU's interest. And since the US bears the burden and the European voters are reluctant to spend money on defence or military operations, the EU MS keep the US more or less happy with small troop contributions to its operations.

Although the defence expenditures increased in absolute numbers between 1999 and 2009 from 163 billion US $ to 210 billion US $, it actually shrank as percentage of the national budgets from 2,1 % to 1,7% in the same period of time. The effects of the financial crisis on the national bugets will further decrease these numbers.

To sum up:
The EU will not beef up her power projection capabilities because

1. the EU couldn't agree on what to do with it anyway
   
2. there is no need because the US will continue to bear the burden and defend our interests anyway
3. the voters in the EU are not convinced that we are threatened and therefore will not vote for an increase of the defence budget

I think the hard questions are not needed in Brussels but in Washington.

As a reply to Patrick's post I would like to make some comments regarding the 'EU-global player' debate. I just wrote an article about this issue but it's in German so I won't post it here. But here are the main points:<br /><br />The EU consists of Member States (MS) with totally different foreign policy goals and priorities: some Eastern European MS are still worried about their territorial integrity, particularly after the Russia-Georgia crisis. The UK tends to follow the US in matters related to foreign policy. And other MS would like to deepen the relationship with Russia for energy reasons and are generally hesitant to engage in out-of-area operations. I think it is fair to say that it is very unlikely that those divers interests can be captured in a consistent foreign policy agenda. To prove my point: the European Security Strategy offers a great analysis of the current geopolitical situation. But it falls short of developing a strategy, identifying geoplitical goals and targets and where the EU wants to be in 20 years.<br /><br />Foreign policy issues the EU will probably not manage to formulate common interests. As Patrick pointed rightly out, in trade and commerce realted issues, those common interests have alreday been formulated. Not shy of taking on the mighty US when it comes down to Bananas, steel or distorting practices of US companies, the EU has an agenda and uses its weight to defend its interests. This indicates that in fields where the EU has stakes, they will act. It does not act in fields where the common interests are not identified.<br /><br />Apart form the diverse interests there is also simply no need for the EU to get its acts together. That is because the US persues a foreign policy that is to a large extent in the EU's interest. And since the US bears the burden and the European voters are reluctant to spend money on defence or military operations, the EU MS keep the US more or less happy with small troop contributions to its operations.<br /><br />Although the defence expenditures increased in absolute numbers between 1999 and 2009 from 163 billion US $ to 210 billion US $, it actually shrank as percentage of the national budgets from 2,1 % to 1,7% in the same period of time. The effects of the financial crisis on the national bugets will further decrease these numbers.<br /><br />To sum up:<br />The EU will not beef up her power projection capabilities because<br /><ol><li>the EU couldn't agree on what to do with it anyway<br /></li><li>there is no need because the US will continue to bear the burden and defend our interests anyway</li><li>the voters in the EU are not convinced that we are threatened and therefore will not vote for an increase of the defence budget</li></ol>I think the hard questions are not needed in Brussels but in Washington.

"This is starting to get dangerous for us"

In case you missed Marc Perry's report on Gen. David Petraeus briefing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Michael Mullen on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in December, here is the link.

Petraeus outlined that "America was not only viewed as weak, but its military posture in the region was eroding" and that "Israeli intransigence on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was jeopardizing U.S. standing in the region". Mullen's and Biden's trip to Israel have to be seen as efforts to urge Israel to put their issues in the wider perspective of the region, argues Perry. After the announcement of the construction of more houses in the Occupied Territories, Biden then came to tell Netanjahu that "this is starting to get dangerous for us. What you're doing here undermines the security of our troops who are fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan." Perry quotes here an article in the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronot.

Perry sums up: "America's relationship with Israel is important, but not as important as the lives of America's soldiers. Maybe Israel gets the message now."

UPDATE: John Mearsheimer published an article on the issue.

NB:
Pertaeus further requested that the the Occupied Territories would be made part of his area of responsibility (CENTCOM), which was denied by the White House and subsequently also by Petraeus himself. Currently, Israel and the Occupied Territories are part of European Command (EUCOM). This change would have big implications, because the US training mission of the Palestinian Authority (PA) under Gen. Keith D. Dayton would then fall under Pertaeus command. Noam Chomsky compared this training mission with the population control efforts that the US so successfully implemented during the US occupation of the Philippines. A proof of the success of the mission could be the lack of any kind of demonstration in the West Bank during the Israeli operation "Cast Lead".

In case you missed Marc Perry's report on Gen. David Petraeus briefing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Michael Mullen on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in December, here is the <a href="http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/14/the_petraeus_briefing_biden_s_embarrassment_is_not_the_whole_story">link</a>.<br /><br />Petraeus outlined that "America was not only viewed as weak, but its military posture in the region was eroding" and that "Israeli intransigence on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was jeopardizing U.S. standing in the region". Mullen's and Biden's trip to Israel have to be seen as efforts to urge Israel to put their issues in the wider perspective of the region, argues Perry. After the announcement of the construction of more houses in the Occupied Territories, Biden then came to tell Netanjahu that "this is starting to get dangerous for us. What you're doing here undermines the security of our troops who are fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan." Perry quotes here an article in the Israeli newspaper <span style="font-style: italic;">Yedioth Ahronot</span>.<br /><br />Perry sums up: "America's relationship with Israel is important, but not as important as the lives of America's soldiers. Maybe Israel gets the message now."<br /><br />UPDATE: John Mearsheimer published an <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2010/03/17/john-mearsheimer/taking-sides/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=3206">article</a> on the issue.<br /><br />NB:<br />Pertaeus further requested that the the Occupied Territories would be made part of his area of responsibility (CENTCOM), which was denied by the White House and subsequently also by Petraeus <a href="http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/03/16/petraeus-denies-centcom-levant-grab/">himself</a>. Currently, Israel and the Occupied Territories are part of European Command (EUCOM). This change would have big implications, because the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/world/middleeast/27palestinians.html">US training mission</a> of the Palestinian Authority (PA) under Gen. Keith D. Dayton would then fall under Pertaeus command. Noam Chomsky <a href="http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20090607.htm">compared</a> this training mission with the population control efforts that the US so successfully implemented during the US occupation of the Philippines. A proof of the success of the mission could be the lack of any kind of demonstration in the West Bank during the Israeli operation "Cast Lead".