The sovereign can no longer say, "You shall think as I do on pain of death;" but he says, "You are free to think differently from me, and to retain your life, your property, and all that you possess; but if such be your determination, you are henceforth an alien among your people."

(Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835)
Showing posts with label Ireland. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ireland. Show all posts

Tuesday, 7 September 2010

ETA declare a ceasefire... again.

For the second time in four years (and the fourth time overall), the armed Basque separatist group ETA have announced a ceasefire... or rather they have announced that they will "not carry out armed actions."

There is little political substance in their statement and certainly nothing new, although one can almost admire their audacity for claiming that "ETA has contributed to proposals for cooperative actions and resolutions of the conflict."

The immediate reaction in Spain and elsewhere is that ETA are calling a ceasefire because they have no choice, because they are too weak to do otherwise and that this announcement is simply window-dressing to make it seem like they retain the initiative.

Indeed, the basic facts speak for themselves. When Mikel Karrera Sarbe - a.k.a Ata - was arrested in May this year, he became the sixth suspected ETA leader to have been arrested since November 2008. ETA has tried (and supposedly failed) to move its support and logistics infrastructure from France to Portugal. They provoked outrage (and the ire of Nicolas Sarkozy) by killing a French policeman in March this year. Quite simply, ETA had nowhere else to go.

An interesting aspect to this story is the claim by Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams that Irish republicans played an important role in persuading ETA to put down their guns. While it is hard to ascertain just how influential Irish voices were in the Basque decision-making process, Adams does make a very necessary point about the role of the Spanish government:
"There is also a heavy responsibility on the Spanish government to grasp this opportunity for peace and progress. It needs to be farsighted, to think strategically and to ignore those voices that seek a resolution in terms of victory and defeat."
Unfortunately that seems highly unlikely given the initial reaction from Madrid in the shape of Interior Minister Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba:
"Eta kills in order to impose itself, so that means one cannot dialogue. Eta has stopped because it cannot do anything ... and also in order to rebuild itself."
While the second part of the statement is undoubtedly true, the first reflects a deeply ingrained mindset within the Spanish State - regardless of which political party happens to be in power. By way of contrast, when the British government was accused by the SDLP (moderate Irish nationalist party) of only talking to the political wings of Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups because they had guns, Jonathan Powell responded "and your point is?"

Having said that, Pérez did no more than articulate the feelings of probably a large majority of Spaniards so, purely from a political point of view, he arguably couldn't have said anything else.

However, it is to be hoped that behind the scenes the Spanish State will indeed be astute enough to take a long-term, strategic approach to this opportunity. For example, if it is indeed true, as alleged, that ETA are merely calling a temporary ceasefire in order to regroup then now is exactly the time, during their period of inactivity, to try and reintegrate ETA militants and their support base (what's left of it) into mainstream society and political life, as I have argued before. Above all, Madrid must positively respond to the Basque left and legalise those parties which do genuinely seek political solutions through peaceful, democratic means and always have done.

This entails 'legalising' the very concept of Basque nationalism, which historically has been an existential non-starter for the Spanish State which has too often sought to taint all Basque nationalists with ETA's violence. However this is very definitely a "democratic minimum" for a political process and the best way to render ETA completely irrelevant and seal their defeat. If Madrid fails to seize this opportunity, then their statements in response to ETA's announcement will very likely become a self-fulfilling prophesy.

PS: Anybody puzzled by the face-masks and berets on display can find answers here.

Tuesday, 15 June 2010

Bloody Sunday - conclusions and lessons



As mentioned here last week, the Saville report into the events in Derry, Ireland, in January 1972 has been published after a twelve-year investigation.

Whenever the peace process in Northern Ireland has been mentioned on this blog (indeed it has been the subject of three separate posts) it has been with a view to discussing what lessons of that process may be applicable, directly or indirectly, to other conflict resolution situations elsewhere in the world.

It is with a similar principle in mind that the investigation into Bloody Sunday is of interest now - in other words, what warnings from that particular catastrophe should be heeded today?

The Saville report concludes that there was "a serious and widespread loss of fire discipline among the soldiers of support company [1 Para]." No warning had been given to any civilians before the soldiers opened fire. None of the soldiers fired in response to attacks by petrol bombers or stone throwers. Some of those killed or injured were clearly fleeing or going to help those injured or dying. The report stops short, however, of using the term "unlawful killing", contrary to the Guardian report referred to here last week.

The report also exonerates the victims of any wrongdoing, stating that they were not posing a threat of causing death or serious injury. This is hugely significant, above all for the victims' families, as the original investigation into Bloody Sunday - the Widgery report of April 1972 - accused the marchers of being armed and of firing the first shots - an accusation completely refuted by the Saville report which states that the Army fired first.

So what lessons are to be drawn? What warnings are to be heeded?

In the first instance there are immediate political ramifications for the British government. Today's publication of the report poses an extremely delicate challenge for David Cameron, who has barely got his feet under the table in 10 Downing Street. Like almost all British Prime Ministers, with the possible exception of Tony Blair, Cameron does not take office intending to devote much time to Northern Ireland. Like almost all British Prime Ministers however, he has quickly found that the choice is not his to make.

Cameron's problem is twofold - firstly, the Tory Party which he leads (full name the Conservative and Unionist Party) has an electoral pact and very strong historical links with the Ulster Unionist Party, which has been very critical of the Saville report on the grounds that it is too expensive (£192m) and accords 'special treatment' to some victims of the Troubles but not to those killed by the IRA.

Moreover, as discussed here last week, the findings of the Saville report will inevitably put the Public Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland under pressure to prosecute the soldiers involved in the shootings and their commanders. This comes at a very important moment in the relationship between government and armed forces in Britain, in large part due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is in this context that David Cameron only last week called for a new "covenant" between the British people and the British Armed Forces.

Although it is not Cameron's decision to prosecute - or not - the guilty soldiers, the issue clearly will require some very careful handling by his administration, starting with his speech in the House of Commons the afternoon.

"The Government is ultimately responsible for the conduct of the armed forces. And for that, on behalf of the Government, indeed on behalf of our country, I am deeply sorry."

Cameron also that said that you do not defend the British Army by defending the indefensible. All in all, these are strong words and, although some would (rightly) argue that he had no choice but to react in this way, it seems that his initial handling of a potentially explosive issue has been good.

In terms of lessons or warnings, the penultimate sentence of the report encapsulates the incalculable damage incurred by the British Army's loss of control.

"What happened on Bloody Sunday strengthened the Provisional IRA, increased nationalist resentment and hostility towards the army and exacerbated the violent conflict of the years that followed."

This is a warning applicable to any counter-insurgency situation. If a State is supposed to hold the monopoly of legitimate violence, then any violence which it chooses to administer must be absolutely and unquestionably legitimate. If it is not then the legitimacy of the State itself is undermined. In a counter-insurgency situation, this can potentially be a fatal blow and all because of a loss of discipline by a company of soldiers.

NB: This entire issue is worth revisiting in the near future. For the time being, the report of the British Army into their forty-year engagement in Northern Ireland - known as Operation Banner - shows that conclusions drawn from that experience were applied elsewhere, with the caveat that few were "directly exportable". Be that as it may, the report should feature on the reading list of any study in modern counter-insurgency.

Friday, 11 June 2010

Bloody Sunday report imminent

The Saville enquiry into the Bloody Sunday massacre will publish its findings on Tuesday, twelve years after the enquiry began. According to The Guardian, the report will conclude that the fatal shooting of fourteen unarmed civilians by the British Army in Derry in 1972 was "unlawful". The British government has described the Guardian's claim as speculation.

Until the findings are actually published on Tuesday, it would perhaps be premature to draw any firm conclusions. For the time being, suffice to say that the repercussions could potentially be considerable.

If the Guardian has its story right then the Public Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland will be under heavy pressure to put soldiers in the dock for manslaughter or even murder - and this the day after David Cameron promised a "new covenant" with the Armed Forces.

It remains to be seen what will happen on Tuesday but the anonymous unionist MP who described the report as a "hand-grenade with the pin pulled out" may not be too far from the truth.

NB: For anyone unfamiliar with the events of Bloody Sunday, the excellent CAIN web service must be the first port of call.

Friday, 30 April 2010

Lessons from Ireland - the bicycle theory

When riding a bicycle, if you stop pedalling then the bicycle falls over. Conclusion - if you want to go somewhere you have to keep pedalling.

The same is true of a process of conflict resolution, according to Jonathan Powell, formerly Chief of Staff to Tony Blair and the latter's main adviser/negotiator on the Northern Ireland peace process.

Powell wrote a book, called 'Great Hatred, Little Room' (from a poem by W.B. Yeats), about his decade-long experience. Aside from being a highly-readable account of personalities and anecdotes, it also provides a few salient points which I would like to draw out for my third and final post on the lessons we can learn from the peace process in Northern Ireland.

- talking is not a reward to be withdrawn but a basic necessity for any peace process. Moreover, to make peace you must talk to your enemies, not just to your friends. That might seem obvious but look at other past or ongoing processes and you quickly discover that this pre-condition is far from a foregone conclusion.

- in that vein, they realised that only extremes can build peace as there is nobody left to outflank them. NB: the original intention was to build peace from the moderate parties in the centre and, while this was enough to reach a settlement, it was not enough to implement it. Only the extremes could do that.

- maintain strategic focus, do not get distracted by tactical games.

- ambiguity in negotiations is complicated and needs careful handling. Although almost always necessary at the beginning, 'constructive ambiguity' must be squeezed out (painfully and over time) as a durable peace cannot rest on an ambiguous understanding.

- widen the focus when you reach an absolute impasse.

- the stage of a breakthrough agreement is exactly the moment to redouble your efforts and try to implement (ie. sell) the agreement to both/all sides.

- dealing with criminality is not easy, as it can be a (local) cultural phenomenon. The trick is to force a divorce between those who opt for crime and those who opt for a political path.

- on hearts and minds, by investing effort/money/jobs into the water in which your enemies swim (metaphor c/o Mao Zedong) you can reduce pressure in a conflict.

Powell is careful to state very clearly that Northern Ireland was a unique, a sui generis, situation and that we should be very careful about drawing parellels with other process of conflict resolution (for example in the Middle East where George Mitchell is now the US Special Envoy just as he was previously in Northern Ireland - see my first post on this subject).

To that end, Powell highlights certain underlying factors which created the conditions for reaching - and implementing, albeit extremely slowly - a peace settlement in Ireland.

- a generational change in the leadership of i/ Irish Republicans, ii/ in London and Dublin and iii/ the 'securocrats' within the British State (military and intelligence) apparatus
- the Celtic Tiger economic boom in Ireland
- 911, which showed Irish Republicans that their brand of physical force was simply outdated
- the US factor (see previous post on the 'out of the box' theory)

Above all, he states very clearly that conflict resolution can only succeed when both/all sides have realised that they cannot win.

However, it is for those reasons that in these three posts I have been careful to consider Northern Ireland as a case study for a 'methodology' (for want of a better word) of conflict resolution, and not a blueprint. Lessons therefore refers to process and I'd be interested to see to what extent people think some of these lessons could, or should, be applied elsewhere.

"Out of Ireland have we come, great hatred, little room, maimed us at the start. I carry from my mother's womb a fanatic heart." (W.B. Yeats)

Monday, 12 April 2010

Lessons from Ireland - the 'out of the box' theory

Arguably the most interesting lesson from the Northern Ireland peace process is the role of the United States as an 'out of the box' player, a deus ex machina.

Whereas previously the US had been little more than a place for the IRA to procure high-grade weapons (both legally and illegally), when Bill Clinton was elected President in 1992 this changed - for two reasons:

Firstly, as the first non-veteran to become President since 1945, Clinton brought a post-Cold War vision in which the State Department's hands-off policy on Northern Ireland - in deference to Britain's role as America's most important military ally - no longer held sway.

Secondly, Clinton the uber-politician was very aware of the unavoidable influence of Irish-America at the polls.

It was in that context that a number of prominent Irish-Americans launched an energetic lobbying campaign. One of their number, Jim Reilly, a former top executive with IBM, is credited with the 'out of the box' theory which best sums up US involvement in Northern Ireland during the 1990s.

According to Reilly, all the parties to the conflict in Northern Ireland were frozen in the same box and any move was immediately countered by a check-mating move from the other side. The introduction of an 'out of the box' player would completely change the dynamic inside the box.

So it proved. Without going into the finer details here, constructive US involvement - notably granting visas to Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams and veteran IRA member Joe Cahill - showed the republican movement that politics could open doors and subsequently led to IRA ceasefires in 1996-96 and from 1997 onwards, ultimately leading to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.

I must add a caveat at this stage. London and Dublin had increasingly worked together over the previous years, even decades, to build a conflict resolution process and the triangular Belfast-London-Dublin dynamic was already an improvement on the confrontational IRA vs London dynamic. So while Washington's involvement helped to change the dynamic and open up new possibilities for political settlement, this was only possible thanks to the solid foundations which had already been laid over many years in Belfast, London and Dublin.

American involvement in Northern Ireland, although partly motivated by genuine good intentions, was not entirely devoid of the interests of national security. Many US policy-makers were concerned about the implications of the resources that Britain committed long-term to the north of Ireland. In simple terms, they wondered how long Britain would be able to endure the conflict without compromising its commitments elsewhere.

However, self-interest is to be expected. Interests - be they strategic, economic or whatever else - have to be accounted for when considering to what extent the 'out of the box' theory is applicable to other conflicts.

An obvious question is why American involvement elsewhere during the Clinton administration - or since - did not necessarily result in similarly positive effects as in Northern Ireland. Much of that has to do with the long-standing connections between America and Ireland, between America and Britain and, above all, the efforts and intentions of the Irish-American lobby. Much of that also has to do with the American interests at stake in other given situations.

Conclusion - if the US role as an 'out of the box' player in Northern Ireland is to serve as an example for a potentially successful approach to conflict resolution elsewhere then two key pre-conditions must be established:

i/ the 'out of the box' player is ideally regarded as impartial and reliable, or at the very least each party to the conflict must believe it to be in their best interest to cooperate with the 'out of the box' player;

ii/ that the 'out of the box' player sees a peaceful resolution to the conflict as being in its own best interests.

Tuesday, 6 April 2010

Lessons from Ireland - key principles

I have long opined that the process of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland provides certain lessons which can be applied to other conflict situations elsewhere in the world - nonetheless taking into account the simple truth that each situation is unique and specific. There are many facets of the Irish peace process that I could highlight but, for now, I'll focus on the basic principles that must exist, according to US Senator George Mitchell, for any settlement to work.

Mitchell, the former Democrat Senator for Maine and House Majority Leader, was nominated in 1999 for the Nobel Peace Prize as a result of his work in Northern Ireland. Appointed in 1996 by the British and Irish governments as an impartial referee, Senator Mitchell chaired multi-party talks and set a deadline for 9 April 1998 for reaching an agreement. At the start of the final session, he said that they would not be leaving the room before without an agreement. Although the talks over-ran by 17 hours, the negotiations were successful and the Good Friday Agreement came into being in April 1998.

Senator Mitchell has stated that while all societies and all conflicts, like all humans, are distinct and that there is no magic formula for conflict resolution, certain principles arise from the story of Northern Ireland.

1/ All conflicts are created and sustained by human beings and thus all conflicts can be ended by human beings.

2/ There must be a clear and determined policy not to yield to violence. Specifically, there must not be a pre-condition that negotiations will end if violence flares up, as this simply invites men of violence to wreck attempts at a peaceful resolution.

3/ There must be a genuine willingness to understand opposing points of view and enter into principled compromise.

4/ It must be acknowledged that implementing an agreement is as hard as, if not harder than, reaching an agreement (as subsequent developments in Northern Ireland demonstrated all too plainly) and that this must be accepted, prepared for and dealt with accordingly.

It would be interesting to examine to what extent these principles hold true in other conflict situations, notably in the Middle East, where the same George Mitchell is currently the US President's Special Representative, and in Afghanistan and Pakistan where reconciliation and reintegration are currently high on the west's agenda.