Blog about current and historical issues in the field of security and defence.
The sovereign can no longer say, "You shall think as I do on pain of death;" but he says, "You are free to think differently from me, and to retain your life, your property, and all that you possess; but if such be your determination, you are henceforth an alien among your people."
(Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835)
Showing posts with label Counterinsurgency. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Counterinsurgency. Show all posts
There is a lot of noise on Afghanistan these days and not much of it seems balanced or reasoned. Jim Molan's article in the Australian Herald Sun at least asks some rational questions and attempts to encourage a reasoned debate.
When the article appeared last week I thought the notion that more troops would be requested was rather unlikely... and yet that is precisely what has happened this week as ISAF push hard to fill the strategic shortfall of international trainers for the Afghan National Security Forces.
However, the real value of this article lies not in the potential solutions Molan hints at but in his call for proper debate based on assessment of facts, as opposed to knee-jerk 'ideologically prejudiced' reactions which fail to consider the situation as it is and the options available to us.
"If there were to be a debate, then it needs to preceded by an open assessment of where the war is now, where the war is likely to go, and what Australia could do that might be of value... Any debate must primarily address what we should actually and physically do."
The article is specific to Australia but the principle can and should be applied to every ISAF nation individually and the international community collectively.
"There are now 21 very good reasons for re-examining what we are doing, what we should be doing and what we could achieve in Afghanistan."
In other words, that is no less than the fallen deserve.
Much has been said this week about the decision to create local defence units in Afghanistan, along similar lines (broadly speaking) to the Sunni militias - known as the Awakening - who turned against Al Qaida in Iraq and are recognised as being a major factor in the success of the US surge from 2006 onwards. Tom Ricks' take on this issue is one of the more level-headed and informed, given his knowledge of the surge in Iraq. He has described that campaign as a strategic military success but a political failure. This apparent paradox is largely down to the fact that, while working with and/or recruiting local (Sunni) militias helped improve security, it also weakened the (Shia) central government and the political and institutional development of the Iraqi State.
In Iraq that was a price the Americans were willing to pay. Given the increased nervousness in the US and elsewhere about the direction of the war in Afghanistan, it is not unreasonable to suggest that many (in the US and elsewhere) would be willing to pay that price again, a fact which will not be lost on Hamid Karzai.
Ricks however puts his finger on the dilemma - while arming local militias can provide sustainable security, it takes a long time. Time, as we all know, is the one thing the international community does not have in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai knows this too.
In that context, it will be extremely interesting to see if this issue crops up during next week's Kabul conference intended to symbolise greater Afghan ownership.
These local militias are probably not quite the kind of Afghan ownership that Karzai had in mind and his reaction to this initiative may well prove crucial.
As mentioned here last week, the Saville report into the events in Derry, Ireland, in January 1972 has been published after a twelve-year investigation.
Whenever the peace process in Northern Ireland has been mentioned on this blog (indeed it has been the subject of three separate posts) it has been with a view to discussing what lessons of that process may be applicable, directly or indirectly, to other conflict resolution situations elsewhere in the world.
It is with a similar principle in mind that the investigation into Bloody Sunday is of interest now - in other words, what warnings from that particular catastrophe should be heeded today? The Saville report concludes that there was "a serious and widespread loss of fire discipline among the soldiers of support company [1 Para]." No warning had been given to any civilians before the soldiers opened fire. None of the soldiers fired in response to attacks by petrol bombers or stone throwers. Some of those killed or injured were clearly fleeing or going to help those injured or dying. The report stops short, however, of using the term "unlawful killing", contrary to the Guardian report referred to here last week.
The report also exonerates the victims of any wrongdoing, stating that they were not posing a threat of causing death or serious injury. This is hugely significant, above all for the victims' families, as the original investigation into Bloody Sunday - the Widgery report of April 1972 - accused the marchers of being armed and of firing the first shots - an accusation completely refuted by the Saville report which states that the Army fired first.
So what lessons are to be drawn? What warnings are to be heeded?
In the first instance there are immediate political ramifications for the British government. Today's publication of the report poses an extremely delicate challenge for David Cameron, who has barely got his feet under the table in 10 Downing Street. Like almost all British Prime Ministers, with the possible exception of Tony Blair, Cameron does not take office intending to devote much time to Northern Ireland. Like almost all British Prime Ministers however, he has quickly found that the choice is not his to make.
Cameron's problem is twofold - firstly, the Tory Party which he leads (full name the Conservative and Unionist Party) has an electoral pact and very strong historical links with the Ulster Unionist Party, which has been very critical of the Saville report on the grounds that it is too expensive (£192m) and accords 'special treatment' to some victims of the Troubles but not to those killed by the IRA.
Moreover, as discussed here last week, the findings of the Saville report will inevitably put the Public Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland under pressure to prosecute the soldiers involved in the shootings and their commanders. This comes at a very important moment in the relationship between government and armed forces in Britain, in large part due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is in this context that David Cameron only last week called for a new "covenant" between the British people and the British Armed Forces.
Although it is not Cameron's decision to prosecute - or not - the guilty soldiers, the issue clearly will require some very careful handling by his administration, starting with his speech in the House of Commons the afternoon.
"The Government is ultimately responsible for the conduct of the armed forces. And for that, on behalf of the Government, indeed on behalf of our country, I am deeply sorry."
Cameron also that said that you do not defend the British Army by defending the indefensible. All in all, these are strong words and, although some would (rightly) argue that he had no choice but to react in this way, it seems that his initial handling of a potentially explosive issue has been good.
In terms of lessons or warnings, the penultimate sentence of the report encapsulates the incalculable damage incurred by the British Army's loss of control.
"What happened on Bloody Sunday strengthened the Provisional IRA, increased nationalist resentment and hostility towards the army and exacerbated the violent conflict of the years that followed."
This is a warning applicable to any counter-insurgency situation. If a State is supposed to hold the monopoly of legitimate violence, then any violence which it chooses to administer must be absolutely and unquestionably legitimate. If it is not then the legitimacy of the State itself is undermined. In a counter-insurgency situation, this can potentially be a fatal blow and all because of a loss of discipline by a company of soldiers.
NB: This entire issue is worth revisiting in the near future. For the time being, the report of the British Army into their forty-year engagement in Northern Ireland - known as Operation Banner - shows that conclusions drawn from that experience were applied elsewhere, with the caveat that few were "directly exportable". Be that as it may, the report should feature on the reading list of any study in modern counter-insurgency.
Turning to counterinsurgency, I would like to draw your attention to an essay by Lieutenant Colonel Ehsan Mehmood Khan, published in the Small Arms Journal. In this essay Khan compares the strategy of the Taliban to the theories of Von Clausewitz, Mao Tse-tung, T.E. Lawrence, David Galula and Querine Hanlon.
The key points:
"the tradition of Pashtunwali, the Pashtun Social Code, has been combined with Jihad thereby forming a formidable war ideology. This is serving as the nucleus around which everything else is knit and is thus the Centre of Gravity for Taliban Warfare. The constituents of operational environment may seek variants and may witness dip or rise in magnitude but till such time their ideology remains unbeaten, they may continue to fight."
"David Galula puts it that the counterinsurgent will not be able to rally the bulk of population so long as the population is convinced that the counterinsurgent the will, the means and the ability to win. This denotes that the population supports the one who will win.25 I think there are three more notions that the population may have to support a given side: who is ours; who will stay; and who is neither ours nor is to stay but supports rather than hurt our interest."
"What Mr. Henry Kissinger wrote at the end of the Vietnam War is relevant to the situation in Afghanistan today. He noted, “We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win. The [North Vietnamese] used their armed forces the way a bull-fighter uses his cape – to keep us lunging in areas of marginal political importance.”
Khan also gives following facts:
"According to a new map of Taliban presence in Afghanistan (Figure-1) issued by the London-based International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) in October 2009, Taliban have now permanent presence in 80% of Afghanistan, up from 72% in November 2008, According to ICOS, another 17% of Afghanistan is seeing ‘substantial’ Taliban activity.2 NATO’s unclassified briefing gives even clearer picture. Taliban have a shadow government in 33 out of 34 provinces of Afghanistan. Figure-2 shows the how Taliban Movement in Afghanistan moved from sway on 11 provinces in 2005 to 33 in 2009.3 In the words of Admiral Michael Mullen, Taliban [are] getting pretty effective at it [governance]. They have set up functional courts in some locations, assess and collect taxes, and even allow people to file formal complaints against local Talib leaders."
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