Perception is reality

As we approach the end of the year and as the Americans release their Strategic Review of the campaign in Afghanistan, many will take stock and examine what (genuine) progress has really been made as a result of the west's reinforced COIN strategy.

Small Wars Journal features an interesting critique of COIN in which the interviewee, Colonel Gian Gentile, who served two tours in Iraq and is a visiting fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, takes issue with certain premises of COIN, or not so much COIN itself but the perceptions surrounding it... which is an important distinction to make.

The most striking example of this is when Gentile takes issue with "the idea that better tactics can rescue a failed policy and strategy". Many people would undoubtedly agree that such an idea is deeply flawed [insert compulsory Sun Tzu quote here] but Gentile touches on an important problem by stating that "we see this narrative playing itself out in how contemporary memory has been created toward the Iraq War and it shapes action and the creation of the perception of progress today in Afghanistan".

Had Gentile just held that thought, he may well have exposed the truth of the matter but instead Gentile misses the target - although only just - with his next sentence.

"When General David Petraeus talks of the "right inputs finally being in place" he betrays a deep seated adherence to the COIN narrative that better generals and reinvented armies can rescue failed strategy and policy. Unfortunately, upon inspection history demolishes this myth."

There is a considerable argument to be made that this is not 'myth' at all but in fact 'the creation of perception', the intended perception being that COIN worked in Iraq and is working in Afghanistan.

On the former, Tom Ricks concluded in The Gamble that the surge succeeded tactically (in improving security) but fell short strategically (failure to achieve an Iraqi political settlement). Given the extensive contribution of David Petraeus (and his cohorts) to that book and given the intellect of the man it is unthinkable that he will not have seriously reflected on those conclusions. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that he would have factored this into his thinking with regard to Afghanistan and even concluded that a similar scenario could play out there also. Indeed, when we look at the tactics and measures employed by Petraeus since he replaced Stan McChrystal in July, it is reasonable to conclude that he has decided that 'tactical success/strategic shortfall' is the most realistic of all potential desired outcomes (ie. the best we can hope to achieve) and is actively executing the campaign on that basis.

The most striking tactical example is the extensive - and rapid - formation of 'Afghan Local Police' units. Although Petraeus has never directly compared these to the Sons of Iraq, it is reasonable to make precisely that link given how often he uses the Iraq campaign as a point of reference. However, while many (e.g. Ricks) have pointed out that while the Awakening militias were clearly a major factor in the perceived success of COIN and the surge in Iraq, the variables on the ground in Afghanistan are very different.

The Sunni Awakening militias in Iraq turned against foreign jihadists as a result of the latter's brutal and indiscrimate methods and, furthermore, these militias had relatively strong command and control set-ups. In contrast, the village militias in Afghanistan are intended to protect against the Taliban who, despite the presence of some foreigners fighting among them, are very much an indigenous organisation firmly rooted in Afghan - primarily Pashtun - society and territory. Furthermore, these local police units are nominally under the control of the Ministry of the Interior but, in a country where tribal structures have been badly fragmented by thirty years of war, there are no obvious checks and balances at the village level. There is therefore a real danger that these 'local police' units could very quickly start to function as the private militias of the local warlord and, according to the New York Times, that already appears to be the case in some areas.

That is not a recipe for long-term stability but perhaps it is not intended to be. Perhaps this is simply a means of dissipating the strength of the insurgency in the villages, weakening their supply chains and reducing their pool of potential recruits. The long-term effects for the country - and the State - of Afghanistan may not be good but if the Afghan Local Police facilitate a number of tactical victories for ISAF across the country, then they will have achieved their goal (from a strictly western perspective).

Another example is the incredible intensity of Special Forces operations against mid-level Taliban commanders, which has caused a fair amount of debate among coindinistas and others over the difference, if any, between counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.

However, this concerted SOF campaign is arguably more significant in the context of reconciliation and reintegration. While reintegration of low-level Taliban foot soldiers is ongoing at the same time as high-level, back-channel discussions are (apparently) ongoing in (apparently) an attempt to 'reconcile' the Taliban leadership, operational-level Taliban commanders are being killed and captured in significant numbers. It has been previously been argued on this blog that serious negotiation with the Taliban - in a conflict resolution sense of the term - is just not feasible and recent farcical episodes such as the involvement of an imposter certainly do nothing to alter that perception.

In short, at the same as we are seeking to 'reintegrate' low-level foot-soldiers and pursuing less than convincing discussions with the high-level leadership, we are kinetically targetting the mid-level commanders in an attempt to break the operational back of the Taliban. Is the objective really, as is claimed, for ISAF and the Afghan government to be in a position of strength when the (apparently) inevitable political process of reconciliation begins in earnest? Or is it in fact intended to hit the Taliban hard enough for them to do the smart thing and lay low for a while, allowing us to declare victory and go home?

So, again, we could argue that these tactical measures are intended to achieve a good enough level of operational success (ie. relative short-term security and stability) to be portrayed as a victory to our publics back home. The second part is achieved through an aggressive strategic communications campaign, aimed at politicians and publics alike and backed up by semi-convincing proof like, for example, this week's US strategic review. Bloggers, academics and rogue journalists may pick holes in these arguments but the point is that the vast majority of people on the home front (for 'people' read 'voters') constitute a very receptive audience.

While Americans and Europeans alike struggle through a financial crisis (not to mention that many European nations have never figured out why they went to Afghanistan to begin with), the notion that we've won in Afghanistan and can begin to draw-down is not going to be a hard sell - quite the opposite in fact. Of course, in reality many western troops will remain and large amounts of western money will continue to be spent for some time yet. However, another lesson from Iraq is that this doesn't really matter as all these problems will very quickly disappear from the front pages.

Gentile is right to warn against placing too much faith in "the idea that better tactics can save a failed strategy or policy" (and Ricks is probably right to assert that Gentile represents the silent majority of Army officers who are less than content with the Petraeus cult) but only from a purely military perspective. In the grander scheme of things, in a political and highly mediatised context, it is absolutely possible to 'rescue' a failed strategy or policy with better, or different tactics, both on the battlefield and on the airwaves and it is reasonable to assert that this is what will happen to the campaign in Afghanistan.

<div align="justify"></div><p align="justify">As we approach the end of the year and as the Americans release their Strategic Review of the campaign in Afghanistan, many will take stock and examine what (genuine) progress has really been made as a result of the west's reinforced COIN strategy.<br /></p><div align="justify"></div><div align="justify"><a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/625-manea.pdf">Small Wars Journal</a> features an interesting critique of COIN in which the interviewee, Colonel Gian Gentile, who served two tours in Iraq and is a visiting fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, takes issue with certain premises of COIN, or not so much COIN itself but the perceptions surrounding it... which is an important distinction to make.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />The most striking example of this is when Gentile takes issue with "the idea that better tactics can rescue a failed policy and strategy". Many people would undoubtedly agree that such an idea is deeply flawed <em>[insert compulsory Sun Tzu quote here]</em> but Gentile touches on an important problem by stating that "we see this narrative playing itself out in how contemporary memory has been created toward the Iraq War and it shapes action and the creation of the perception of progress today in Afghanistan".<br /><br />Had Gentile just held that thought, he may well have exposed the truth of the matter but instead Gentile misses the target - although only just - with his next sentence. </div><blockquote><em>"When General David Petraeus talks of the "right inputs finally being in place" he betrays a deep seated adherence to the COIN narrative that better generals and reinvented armies can rescue failed strategy and policy. Unfortunately, upon inspection history demolishes this myth."<br /></em></blockquote><div align="justify">There is a considerable argument to be made that this is not 'myth' at all but in fact 'the creation of perception', the intended perception being that COIN worked in Iraq and is working in Afghanistan.<br /><br />On the former, Tom Ricks concluded in <em>The Gamble</em> that the surge succeeded tactically (in improving security) but fell short strategically (failure to achieve an Iraqi political settlement). Given the extensive contribution of David Petraeus (and his cohorts) to that book and given the intellect of the man it is unthinkable that he will not have seriously reflected on those conclusions. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that he would have factored this into his thinking with regard to Afghanistan and even concluded that a similar scenario could play out there also. Indeed, when we look at the tactics and measures employed by Petraeus since he replaced Stan McChrystal in July, it is reasonable to conclude that he has decided that 'tactical success/strategic shortfall' is the most realistic of all potential desired outcomes (ie. the best we can hope to achieve) and is actively executing the campaign on that basis.<br /><br />The most striking tactical example is the extensive - and rapid - formation of 'Afghan Local Police' units. Although Petraeus has never directly compared these to the Sons of Iraq, it is reasonable to make precisely that link given how often he uses the Iraq campaign as a point of reference. However, while many (e.g. Ricks) have pointed out that while the Awakening militias were clearly a major factor in the perceived success of COIN and the surge in Iraq, the variables on the ground in Afghanistan are very different.<br /><br />The Sunni Awakening militias in Iraq turned against foreign jihadists as a result of the latter's brutal and indiscrimate methods and, furthermore, these militias had relatively strong command and control set-ups. In contrast, the village militias in Afghanistan are intended to protect against the Taliban who, despite the presence of some foreigners fighting among them, are very much an indigenous organisation firmly rooted in Afghan - primarily Pashtun - society and territory. Furthermore, these local police units are nominally under the control of the Ministry of the Interior but, in a country where tribal structures have been badly fragmented by thirty years of war, there are no obvious checks and balances at the village level. There is therefore a real danger that these 'local police' units could very quickly start to function as the private militias of the local warlord and, according to the <em><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/world/asia/16kunduz.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss">New York Times</a></em>, that already appears to be the case in some areas.<br /><br />That is not a recipe for long-term stability but perhaps it is not intended to be. Perhaps this is simply a means of dissipating the strength of the insurgency in the villages, weakening their supply chains and reducing their pool of potential recruits. The long-term effects for the country - and the State - of Afghanistan may not be good but if the Afghan Local Police facilitate a number of tactical victories for ISAF across the country, then they will have achieved their goal (from a strictly western perspective).<br /><br />Another example is the incredible intensity of Special Forces operations against mid-level Taliban commanders, which has caused a fair amount of <a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/200-exum.pdf">debate</a> among <em>coindinistas</em> and others over the difference, if any, between counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.</div><div align="justify"><br />However, this concerted SOF campaign is arguably more significant in the context of reconciliation and reintegration. While reintegration of low-level Taliban foot soldiers is ongoing at the same time as high-level, back-channel discussions are (apparently) ongoing in (apparently) an attempt to 'reconcile' the Taliban leadership, operational-level Taliban commanders are being killed and captured in significant numbers. It has been previously been argued on this <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/08/talking-to-enemy.html">blog</a> that serious negotiation with the Taliban - in a conflict resolution sense of the term - is just not feasible and recent farcical episodes such as the involvement of an imposter certainly do nothing to alter that perception.<br /><br />In short, at the same as we are seeking to 'reintegrate' low-level foot-soldiers and pursuing less than convincing discussions with the high-level leadership, we are kinetically targetting the mid-level commanders in an attempt to break the operational back of the Taliban. Is the objective really, as is claimed, for ISAF and the Afghan government to be in a position of strength when the (apparently) inevitable political process of reconciliation begins in earnest? Or is it in fact intended to hit the Taliban hard enough for them to do the smart thing and lay low for a while, allowing us to declare victory and go home?</div><br /><div align="justify">So, again, we could argue that these tactical measures are intended to achieve a good enough level of operational success (ie. relative short-term security and stability) to be portrayed as a victory to our publics back home. The second part is achieved through an aggressive strategic communications campaign, aimed at politicians and publics alike and backed up by semi-convincing proof like, for example, this week's US strategic review. Bloggers, academics and rogue journalists may pick holes in these arguments but the point is that the vast majority of people on the home front (for 'people' read 'voters') constitute a very receptive audience.</div><br /><div align="justify"></div><div align="justify">While Americans and Europeans alike struggle through a financial crisis (not to mention that many European nations have never figured out why they went to Afghanistan to begin with), the notion that we've won in Afghanistan and can begin to draw-down is not going to be a hard sell - quite the opposite in fact. Of course, in reality many western troops will remain and large amounts of western money will continue to be spent for some time yet. However, another lesson from Iraq is that this doesn't really matter as all these problems will very quickly disappear from the front pages.</div><br /><div align="justify"></div><div align="justify">Gentile is right to warn against placing too much faith in "the idea that better tactics can save a failed strategy or policy" (and Ricks is probably right to <a href="http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/15/so_youre_deploying_to_afghanistan_exums_recommendations_more_ii">assert</a> that Gentile represents the silent majority of Army officers who are less than content with the Petraeus cult) but only from a purely military perspective. In the grander scheme of things, in a political and highly mediatised context, it is absolutely possible to 'rescue' a failed strategy or policy with better, or different tactics, both on the battlefield and on the airwaves and it is reasonable to assert that this is what will happen to the campaign in Afghanistan.</div></span>

Reclaiming hearts and minds in Pakistan

The BBC tells the story of Dr Mohammad Farooq Khan, who was shot dead by the Taliban in Swat last week. Dr Farooq ran a school - or more accurately a rehabilitation centre - for teenage boys who had previously served (voluntarily or otherwise) with the Taliban. See also this obituary and video tribute in the New York Times, also featuring Dr Farooq's mission statement in his own words.

Well worth reading and also worth asking the question - how many similar centres exist in Pakistan and Afghanistan and what is the international community doing to help them?

PS: See also this story about the Turi tribe in Kurram who expelled the Taliban from their small corner of the FATA.

<div align="justify">The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11506006">BBC</a> tells the story of Dr Mohammad Farooq Khan, who was shot dead by the Taliban in Swat last week. Dr Farooq ran a school - or more accurately a rehabilitation centre - for teenage boys who had previously served (voluntarily or otherwise) with the Taliban. See also this obituary and video tribute in the <a href="http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/a-moderate-voice-is-silenced-in-pakistan/#more-82549">New York Times</a>, also featuring Dr Farooq's mission statement in his own words.</div><div align="justify"> </div><div align="justify"></div><div align="justify"></div><div align="justify"><br />Well worth reading and also worth asking the question - how many similar centres exist in Pakistan and Afghanistan and what is the international community doing to help them?<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />PS: See also this <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11486528">story</a> about the Turi tribe in Kurram who expelled the Taliban from their small corner of the FATA.<br /></div></span>

Measuring success in Afghanistan

That's the real question after all - how do we measure success in Afghanistan? The Rand Corporation have provided a tool to do just that in the shape of an in-depth report on sources of success in counterinsurgency campaigns, entitled Victory has a Thousand Fathers.

Among the key findings, as summarised on the US Army and US Marine Corps COIN blog, are the following:
- The balance of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ practices perfectly predicts outcomes.
- Repression wins phases of a campaign, but usually not the campaign itself.
- Tangible support trumps popular support.
- Poor beginnings do not necessarily lead to poor endings.

As the USA/USMC blog states, the Rand report is not a completely infallible tool but it does add a degree of scientific analysis to the existing body of knowledge on COIN - which as a subject and, above all, as a practice is notoriously difficult to quantify in anything like a scientific manner.

That being the case, purely out of intellectual curiousity I have conducted a little experiment. The very last page of the report shows a scorecard of Good vs Bad COIN practices and factors and I have graded the current campaign in Afghanistan using that scorecard.

I have done so without fully reading the report and using only my own knowledge and perceptions (professional, anecdotal and random) of the current situation in Afghanistan. In other words, I am using the scorecard to quantify my perception of the war in Afghanistan. At a later stage, I will repeat the exercise having actually thoroughly read the report and having fully researched each individual point in order to confirm (or not) my assessment of each criterion named in the scorecard.

The objective right now is, I repeat, to measure my perception of the campaign because, as we all know, perception is reality and public support for the ISAF mission will stand or fall based on people's perceptions and not the reality.

So, without further ado...

SCORECARD OF GOOD VERSUS BAD COIN PRACTICES AND FACTORS

Good factors

1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors
(Score 1 if sum of a through g is at least 2 positive responses)
a. COIN force and government actions consistent with messages (delivering on promises) NO
b. COIN force maintains credibility with population in the area of conflict (includes expectation management) ??
c. Messages/themes coherent with overall COIN approach ??
d. COIN force avoids creating unattainable expectations NO
e. Themes and messages coordinated for all involved government agencies NO
f. Earnest IO/PSYOP/strategic communication/messaging effort NO
g. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained NO

2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors
(Score 1 if sum of a through j is at least 3 positive responses)
a. Flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly decreased, remains dramatically reduced, or largely absent ??
b. Important external support to insurgents significantly reduced ??
c. Important internal support to insurgents significantly reduced ??
d. Insurgents’ ability to replenish resources significantly diminished YES
e. Insurgents unable to maintain or grow force size NO
f. COIN force efforts resulting in increased costs for insurgent processes ??
g. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent recruiting ??
h. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent materiel acquisition YES
i. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent intelligence YES
j. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent financing ??

3. Government realizes at least two government legitimacy factors
(Score 1 if sum of a through e is at least 2 positive responses)
a. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict NO
b. Government leaders selected in a manner considered just and fair by majority of population in area of conflict NO
c. Majority of citizens in the area of conflict view government as legitimate NO
d. Government provides better governance than insurgents in area of conflict NO
e. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control NO

4. Government realizes at least one democracy factor
(Score 1 if sum of a through d is at least 1 positive response)
a .Government a functional democracy NO
b. Government a partial or transitional democracy YES
c. Free and fair elections held NO
d. Government respects human rights and allows free press YES

5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor
(Score 1 if at least 1 positive response)
a. Intelligence adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on COIN force’s terms YES
b. Intelligence adequate to allow COIN force to disrupt insurgent processes or operations YES

6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas (Score 1 if YES) YES

7. Government/state is competent NO

8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force ??

9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict YES

10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force YES

11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces ??

12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas YES

13. COIN force has and uses uncontested air dominance YES

14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control ??

15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control ??

Total positive score (Sum of 1–15) 8 points

So far, not a bad score for ISAF although what this shows us is that the military side is fine but the civilian side - above all strategic communications and the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government - still presents enormous challenges as little progress would appear to have been made. So basically we haven't learned anything new here.

Bad Factors

1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression
(Score 1 if at least 1 positive response)
a. COIN force employs escalating repression NO
b. COIN force employs collective punishment NO

2. Primary COIN force is an external occupier YES

3. COIN force or government actions contribute to substantial new grievances claimed by insurgents YES

4. Militias work at cross-purposes with COIN force/government NO

5. COIN force resettles/removes civilian populations for population control NO

6. COIN force collateral damage perceived by population in area of conflict as worse than insurgents’ NO

7. In area of conflict, COIN force perceived as worse than insurgents NO

8. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics NO

9. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents NO

10. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated NO

11. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustainment NO

12. COIN force and government have different goals/level of commitment YES

Total negative score (Sum of 1–12) 3 points

FINAL SCORE (Good minus Bad) 8 - 3 = 5 points

Key:
Total > 5 = History says, “You are on the path to victory.”
Total < 0 = History says, “You are in trouble.”
Total between 0 and 5 = History is equivocal: “Do you feel lucky?”

Conclusion: History says ISAF is almost on the path to victory, at least based on my assessments of each specific criterion and I'm sure many people would challenge these. Interestingly, I have arrived at essentially the same conclusion that I had before beginning the exercise, a conclusion (or an opinion) which my many previous posts on Afghanistan have outlined in some detail.

However, while the results would seem to give cause for optimism, I would add some caveats to this scorecard.

Firstly, the large number of question marks is due to the fact that I was simply unable to answer some questions. The two reasons for this were i/ that I do not have access to intelligence on, for example, insurgent financing and external support (and if I did I wouldn't reveal it, this blog is not Wikileaks); and ii/ I think it is simply impossible to establish the real views of the Afghan population, for example on the credibility of the Kabul government. Opinion polls are never completely accurate, even less so if the people responding risk their lives by speaking out against the Taliban. On top of that, the very concept of government (as we know it) barely exists in some remote areas of Afghanistan so the question is too generic (and too western) to be truly useful in an Afghan context.

A second caveat would be that I have tried to lean towards the worst-case scenario and be very miserly in handing out positive responses (I accept that here I'm slightly undermining the original intention to base this scorecard on perception and not reality). So for example, although the government does provide better governance than insurgents in some areas of the conflict, this is not the case in all areas. So no points here. By the same token, I don't believe ISAF contributes to substantial new grievances and although the Afghan government has done so on occasions and in certain places, this is not a universal picture. However, neither ISAF nor the Afghan government have fully resolved old grievances so, for that reason, they don't win any points.

In other words, where the question requires a black or white response I have chosen black. This is important because it could be that the score is actually better than I have made out.

A third caveat would be that this scorecard is a study of COIN based on a great many examples, whereas I'm specifically looking at Afghanistan. I doubt whether many Afghans, especially in rural areas, are really concerned about whether or not the government allows a free press. So although that counts as a positive on the scorecard, it may not count as a positive in reality.

Fourth and final caveat: history may be leaning in favour of an ISAF victory but, again, the report is not Afghanistan-specific. The evidence is drawn from around 30 case studies of insurgencies from all over the world. The three case studies from Afghanistan all registered as a victory for insurgents. In other words, there is a difference between world history and Afghan history.

In summary, the war in Afghanistan is not the disaster that many people believe it to be. It would seem to be going in the right direction - according to the criteria used here - and it could be that ISAF is very close to taking a decisive grip on the initiative, at least tactically, if the numerous question marks can be converted into points gained - although those specific criteria (ie. governance) are probably the hardest to achieve.

However, in addition to the caveats I outlined, I have to identify what I perceive to be actual problems with the study bearing in mind that I have deliberately not yet read it.

Firstly, I have referred to the so-called reconciliation process in Afghanistan on several previous occasions but the scorecard makes no mention of anything along these lines, any kind of criteria for a political settlement between the government and/or COIN force and their insurgent opponents. I find this to be a glaring omission given that the received wisdom is that there is no such thing as a decisive conventional victory in a COIN scenario and, therefore, some kind of political settlement with the insurgency must be reached.

Secondly, the scorecard suggests that the military aspect of the ISAF campaign is going fine but that the governance side is not. Of course we knew this already but we also know that victory - I mean a real victory, not a PR victory - is not possible unless achieved on all fronts. The study does not take this into account: instead, the COIN force wins simply by amassing a total of more than 5 points. In reality, or at least in Afghanistan, the COIN force must not just reach a certain amount of points but must score them across all categories.

I would therefore take issue with Rand's first key finding, that 'the balance of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ practices perfectly predicts outcomes', as I think there's more to it than simple arithmetic. Perhaps this finding makes sense in most of the other case studies but in Afghanistan today the picture is of ISAF scoring many points against insurgents but none with the Karzai government and that just isn't good enough.

Finally, most of the criteria in the scorecard are from the tactical level. This kind of methodology makes it very easy to conclude that we're winning because we're scoring tactical points, all the while losing sight of the bigger strategic and political picture. It is fashionable these days to quote Sun Tzu (especially among people who haven't actually read his book - myself included) and one of his most famous maxims is applicable here: "Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory; tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat."

In conclusion, I have tried to apply the scorecard to the current COIN campaign in Afghanistan which is much larger in scale and in geostrategic importance than all of the case studies in the report... except of course the Soviet Union's COIN campaign in Afghanistan. Even though I cannot claim to have learned anything new or had my perceptions changed in any way, I find the scorecard to be a semi-useful tool in highlighting certain strengths and weaknesses of a COIN campaign and certainly a very interesting intellectual exercise.

<div align="justify">That's the real question after all - how do we measure success in Afghanistan? The Rand Corporation have provided a tool to do just that in the shape of an in-depth report on sources of success in counterinsurgency campaigns, entitled <a href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG964.pdf">Victory has a Thousand Fathers</a>.<br /><br />Among the key findings, as summarised on the US Army and US Marine Corps COIN <a href="http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/blog/blogs/coin/archive/2010/09/28/victory-has-a-thousand-fathers-rand-study.aspx">blog</a>, are the following:<br />- The balance of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ practices perfectly predicts outcomes.<br />- Repression wins phases of a campaign, but usually not the campaign itself.<br />- Tangible support trumps popular support.<br />- Poor beginnings do not necessarily lead to poor endings.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />As the USA/USMC blog states, the Rand report is not a completely infallible tool but it does add a degree of scientific analysis to the existing body of knowledge on COIN - which as a subject and, above all, as a practice is notoriously difficult to quantify in anything like a scientific manner.<br /><br />That being the case, purely out of intellectual curiousity I have conducted a little experiment. The very last page of the report shows a scorecard of Good vs Bad COIN practices and factors and I have graded the current campaign in Afghanistan using that scorecard.<br /><br />I have done so without fully reading the report and using only my own knowledge and perceptions (professional, anecdotal and random) of the current situation in Afghanistan. In other words, I am using the scorecard to quantify my <em>perception </em>of the war in Afghanistan. At a later stage, I will repeat the exercise having actually thoroughly read the report and having fully researched each individual point in order to confirm (or not) my assessment of each criterion named in the scorecard.<br /><br />The objective right now is, I repeat, to measure my perception of the campaign because, as we all know, perception is reality and public support for the ISAF mission will stand or fall based on people's perceptions and not the reality.<br /><br />So, without further ado...<br /><br /><strong>SCORECARD OF GOOD VERSUS BAD COIN PRACTICES AND FACTORS</strong><br /><br /><strong>Good factors</strong><br /><br /><strong>1.</strong> COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors <br /><em>(Score 1 if sum of a through g is at least 2 positive responses)</em><br />a. COIN force and government actions consistent with messages (delivering on promises) <strong>NO</strong><br />b. COIN force maintains credibility with population in the area of conflict (includes expectation management) <strong>??</strong> <br />c. Messages/themes coherent with overall COIN approach <strong>??</strong><br />d. COIN force avoids creating unattainable expectations <strong>NO</strong> <br />e. Themes and messages coordinated for all involved government agencies <strong>NO</strong> <br />f. Earnest IO/PSYOP/strategic communication/messaging effort <strong>NO</strong><br />g. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained <strong>NO</strong><br /><br /><strong>2. </strong>COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors<br /><em>(Score 1 if sum of a through j is at least 3 positive responses)</em> <br />a. Flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly decreased, remains dramatically reduced, or largely absent <strong>??</strong><br />b. Important external support to insurgents significantly reduced <strong>??</strong><br />c. Important internal support to insurgents significantly reduced <strong>??</strong> <br />d. Insurgents’ ability to replenish resources significantly diminished <strong>YES</strong> <br />e. Insurgents unable to maintain or grow force size <strong>NO</strong><br />f. COIN force efforts resulting in increased costs for insurgent processes <strong>??</strong><br />g. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent recruiting <strong>??</strong><br />h. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent materiel acquisition <strong>YES</strong> <br />i. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent intelligence <strong>YES</strong> <br />j. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent financing <strong>??</strong><br /><br /><strong>3. </strong>Government realizes at least two government legitimacy factors <br /><em>(Score 1 if sum of a through e is at least 2 positive responses)</em> <br />a. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict <strong>NO</strong><br />b. Government leaders selected in a manner considered just and fair by majority of population in area of conflict <strong>NO</strong><br />c. Majority of citizens in the area of conflict view government as legitimate <strong>NO</strong><br />d. Government provides better governance than insurgents in area of conflict <strong>NO</strong><br />e. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control <strong>NO</strong><br /><br /><strong>4. </strong>Government realizes at least one democracy factor<br /><em>(Score 1 if sum of a through d is at least 1 positive response)</em> <br />a .Government a functional democracy <strong>NO </strong><br />b. Government a partial or transitional democracy <strong>YES </strong><br />c. Free and fair elections held <strong>NO</strong><br />d. Government respects human rights and allows free press <strong>YES</strong><br /><br /><strong>5. </strong>COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor<br /><em>(Score 1 if at least 1 positive response)</em> <br />a. Intelligence adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on COIN force’s terms <strong>YES</strong><br />b. Intelligence adequate to allow COIN force to disrupt insurgent processes or operations <strong>YES</strong><br /><br /><strong>6.</strong> COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas <em>(Score 1 if YES)</em> <strong>YES</strong><br /><br /><strong>7. </strong>Government/state is competent <strong>NO </strong><br /><br /><strong>8. </strong>COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force <strong>??</strong> <br /><br /><strong>9. </strong>COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict <strong>YES </strong><br /><br /><strong>10. </strong>Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force <strong>YES</strong><br /><br /><strong>11. </strong>Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces <strong>??</strong> <br /><br /><strong>12. </strong>COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas <strong>YES</strong><br /><br /><strong>13. </strong>COIN force has and uses uncontested air dominance <strong>YES</strong><br /><br /><strong>14. </strong>COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control <strong>??</strong><br /><br /><strong>15. </strong>Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control <strong>??</strong><br /><br />Total positive score (Sum of 1–15) <strong>8 points </strong><br /><br />So far, not a bad score for ISAF although what this shows us is that the military side is fine but the civilian side - above all strategic communications and the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government - still presents enormous challenges as little progress would appear to have been made. So basically we haven't learned anything new here.<br /><br /><strong>Bad Factors</strong><br /><br /><strong>1. </strong>COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression<br /><em>(Score 1 if at least 1 positive response)</em> <br />a. COIN force employs escalating repression <strong>NO </strong><br />b. COIN force employs collective punishment <strong>NO </strong><br /><br /><strong>2.</strong> Primary COIN force is an external occupier <strong>YES </strong><br /><br /><strong>3.</strong> COIN force or government actions contribute to substantial new grievances claimed by insurgents <strong>YES </strong><br /><br /><strong>4.</strong> Militias work at cross-purposes with COIN force/government <strong>NO </strong><br /><br /><strong>5.</strong> COIN force resettles/removes civilian populations for population control <strong>NO</strong><br /><br /><strong>6.</strong> COIN force collateral damage perceived by population in area of conflict as worse than insurgents’ <strong>NO </strong><br /><br /><strong>7.</strong> In area of conflict, COIN force perceived as worse than insurgents <strong>NO</strong><br /><br /><strong>8.</strong> COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics <strong>NO</strong><br /><br /><strong>9. </strong>COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents <strong>NO </strong><br /><br /><strong>10.</strong> Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated <strong>NO</strong><br /><br /><strong>11. </strong>COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustainment <strong>NO </strong><br /><br /><strong>12.</strong> COIN force and government have different goals/level of commitment <strong>YES</strong><br /><br />Total negative score (Sum of 1–12) <strong>3 points</strong><br /><br /><strong>FINAL SCORE (Good minus Bad) 8 - 3 = 5 points</strong> <br /><br />Key: <br />Total > 5 = History says, “You are on the path to victory.” <br />Total < 0 = History says, “You are in trouble.” <br />Total between 0 and 5 = History is equivocal: “Do you feel lucky?”<br /><br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> History says ISAF is <em>almost </em>on the path to victory, at least based on my assessments of each specific criterion and I'm sure many people would challenge these. Interestingly, I have arrived at essentially the same conclusion that I had before beginning the exercise, a conclusion (or an opinion) which my many previous posts on Afghanistan have outlined in some detail.<br /><br />However, while the results would seem to give cause for optimism, I would add some caveats to this scorecard.<br /><br />Firstly, the large number of question marks is due to the fact that I was simply unable to answer some questions. The two reasons for this were i/ that I do not have access to intelligence on, for example, insurgent financing and external support (and if I did I wouldn't reveal it, this blog is not Wikileaks); and ii/ I think it is simply impossible to establish the real views of the Afghan population, for example on the credibility of the Kabul government. Opinion polls are never completely accurate, even less so if the people responding risk their lives by speaking out against the Taliban. On top of that, the very concept of government (as we know it) barely exists in some remote areas of Afghanistan so the question is too generic (and too western) to be truly useful in an Afghan context.<br /><br />A second caveat would be that I have tried to lean towards the worst-case scenario and be very miserly in handing out positive responses (I accept that here I'm slightly undermining the original intention to base this scorecard on perception and not reality). So for example, although the government does provide better governance than insurgents in <em>some </em>areas of the conflict, this is not the case in <em>all </em>areas. So no points here. By the same token, I don't believe ISAF contributes to substantial new grievances and although the Afghan government has done so on occasions and in certain places, this is not a universal picture. However, neither ISAF nor the Afghan government have fully resolved old grievances so, for that reason, they don't win any points.<br /><br />In other words, where the question requires a black or white response I have chosen black. This is important because it could be that the score is actually <em>better </em>than I have made out.<br /><br />A third caveat would be that this scorecard is a study of COIN based on a great many examples, whereas I'm specifically looking at Afghanistan. I doubt whether many Afghans, especially in rural areas, are really concerned about whether or not the government allows a free press. So although that counts as a positive on the scorecard, it may not count as a positive in reality.<br /><br />Fourth and final caveat: history may be leaning in favour of an ISAF victory but, again, the report is not Afghanistan-specific. The evidence is drawn from around 30 case studies of insurgencies from all over the world. The three case studies from Afghanistan all registered as a victory for insurgents. In other words, there is a difference between world history and Afghan history.<br /><br />In summary, the war in Afghanistan is not the disaster that many people believe it to be. It would seem to be going in the right direction - according to the criteria used here - and it could be that ISAF is very close to taking a decisive grip on the initiative, at least tactically, if the numerous question marks can be converted into points gained - although those specific criteria (ie. governance) are probably the hardest to achieve.<br /><br />However, in addition to the caveats I outlined, I have to identify what I perceive to be actual problems with the study <em>bearing in mind that I have deliberately not yet read it</em>.<br /><br />Firstly, I have referred to the so-called reconciliation process in Afghanistan on several previous occasions but the scorecard makes no mention of anything along these lines, any kind of criteria for a political settlement between the government and/or COIN force and their insurgent opponents. I find this to be a glaring omission given that the received wisdom is that there is no such thing as a decisive conventional victory in a COIN scenario and, therefore, some kind of political settlement with the insurgency must be reached.<br /><br />Secondly, the scorecard suggests that the military aspect of the ISAF campaign is going fine but that the governance side is not. Of course we knew this already but we also know that victory - I mean a real victory, not a PR victory - is not possible unless achieved on all fronts. The study does not take this into account: instead, the COIN force wins simply by amassing a total of more than 5 points. In reality, or at least in Afghanistan, the COIN force must not just reach a certain amount of points but must score them across all categories. <br /><br />I would therefore take issue with Rand's first key finding, that 'the balance of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ practices perfectly predicts outcomes', as I think there's more to it than simple arithmetic. Perhaps this finding makes sense in most of the other case studies but in Afghanistan today the picture is of ISAF scoring many points <em>against </em>insurgents but none <em>with </em>the Karzai government and that just isn't good enough.<br /><br />Finally, most of the criteria in the scorecard are from the tactical level. This kind of methodology makes it very easy to conclude that we're winning because we're scoring tactical points, all the while losing sight of the bigger strategic and political picture. It is fashionable these days to quote Sun Tzu (especially among people who haven't actually read his book - myself included) and one of his most famous maxims is applicable here: "Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory; tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat."<br /><br />In conclusion, I have tried to apply the scorecard to the current COIN campaign in Afghanistan which is much larger in scale and in geostrategic importance than all of the case studies in the report... except of course the Soviet Union's COIN campaign in Afghanistan. Even though I cannot claim to have learned anything new or had my perceptions changed in any way, I find the scorecard to be a semi-useful tool in highlighting certain strengths and weaknesses of a COIN campaign and certainly a very interesting intellectual exercise. <br /></div></span>

Talking to the Taliban

Asia Times reports once again on the reconciliation process in Afghanistan, which at the moment appears to be little more than back-channel negotiations between the US and the Taliban through Saudi and Pakistani mediators.

If true, the assertions made by the Asia Times would appear to justify concerns previously expounded on this blog about the notion of talking to the Taliban.

"Taliban sources in the southern regions of Pakistan confirmed to Asia Times Online that while different Taliban groups had been approached, the Americans would prefer to talk to one of the major anti-US forces in Afghanistan, the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) led by former Afghan premier Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The HIA is likely to strike a deal with the Americans before the Taliban... In the Taliban camp, the activity in the HIA camp is viewed as a bid to divide the resistance."

In other words, there are many different factions and it appears very difficult to ascertain if any of them would be able to secure buy-in from all or most of the others if an agreement was reached. The Taliban can be forgiven for thinking this is an attempt at divide-and-conquer... as they are very probably right.

In the meantime, President Karzai has set up his own High Peace Council but since it is far from clear where they fit in to the US/Saudi/Pakistani process, he in turn can be forgiven for thinking that his position is being undermined once again.

<div align="justify"><a href="http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LI30Df01.html">Asia Times</a> reports once again on the reconciliation process in Afghanistan, which at the moment appears to be little more than back-channel negotiations between the US and the Taliban through Saudi and Pakistani mediators.<br /><br />If true, the assertions made by the <em>Asia Times </em>would appear to justify concerns previously expounded on this <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/08/talking-to-enemy.html">blog</a> about the notion of talking to the Taliban.<br /><span class="fullpost"><blockquote>"<em>Taliban sources in the southern regions of Pakistan confirmed to Asia Times Online that while different Taliban groups had been approached, the Americans would prefer to talk to one of the major anti-US forces in Afghanistan, the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) led by former Afghan premier Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The HIA is likely to strike a deal with the Americans before the Taliban... In the Taliban camp, the activity in the HIA camp is viewed as a bid to divide the resistance</em>."</blockquote>In other words, there are many different factions and it appears very difficult to ascertain if any of them would be able to secure buy-in from all or most of the others if an agreement was reached. The Taliban can be forgiven for thinking this is an attempt at divide-and-conquer... as they are very probably right.<br /><br />In the meantime, President Karzai has set up his own <a href="http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2010/09/2010928122241286855.html">High Peace Council</a> but since it is far from clear where they fit in to the US/Saudi/Pakistani process, he in turn can be forgiven for thinking that his position is being undermined once again.</div></span>

Talking to the enemy

Jonathan Powell, former Chief of Staff to Tony Blair, has featured on this blog on more than one occasion, each time on the subject of conflict resolution - more specifically its methodology (if such a thing exists) and the importance of talking to the enemy.

This week he is to be found arguing - not for the first time - in favour of dialogue with the Taliban and al Qaida.

It is hard to object with much of Powell says here, above all because his argument is based on his long-standing personal experience in Northern Ireland, contacts with mediators in other late 20th century conflict zones and a pragmatic look at history.

"There seems to be a pattern to the west's behaviour when we face terrorist campaigns. First we fight them militarily, then we talk to them, and eventually we treat them as statesmen. That is what Britain did with Menachem Begin and the Irgun in Israel, with Jomo Kenyatta and the Mau Mau in Kenya and with Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus."

While there are many differences between these three cases alone, there is one common thread that runs through them and countless other 'terrorist' groups - it was once heresy to even suggest talking to these people but talk to them we (eventually) did.

I would hope that's a given for any serious student of history but for anyone who argues that it is morally reprehensible to talk to the likes of the Taliban and al Qaida, I would simply answer that we (the west) have talked and in fact actively supported worse characters than them in most parts of the world.

I don't therefore have any problems with Jonathan Powell's argument on moral grounds. My question is this - is it practical?

One could argue that talking to extremists is more than just practical, it is necessary. For example, as Powell realised in Northern Ireland, only extremes can build a lasting peace because there will be nobody left to outflank them. The British and Irish governments original intention was to build peace from the centre (ie. the moderate nationalist and unionist parties) and, while this was enough to reach a settlement, it was not enough to implement it. Only the extremes could do that.

That was the case in Northern Ireland but that lesson is not easily applicable to other situations, such as Afghanistan. We are obliged to keep in mind the basic question - is it practical? - and it is here that we must raise doubts on the notion of talking to the Taliban.

On a previous occasion (in 2008), Powell stated that:

"It's very difficult for democratic governments to do - talk to a terrorist movement that's killing your people," he said. "[But] if I was in government now I would want to have been talking to Hamas, I would be wanting to communicate with the Taliban; and I would want to find a channel to al-Qaida."

This is where I have a problem. Powell gives three examples of organisations which bear almost no resemblance to each other whatsoever. Say what you like about Hamas but they have a hierarchy, clear political objectives and unity of effort within the ranks. On that basis, you have some kind of starting point for negotiation.

Al Qaida, on the other hand, has none of those elements. Who would we talk to? What would we talk about? Even if we could find a credible interlocutor from among their ranks, there is no way he could win over the multitude of disparate al Qaida - or 'al Qaida inspired' - cells strung out across the world and bring them into a process of negotiation. Talking to al Qaida is simply a non-starter and I am amazed that Powell would compare them to Hamas.

The case of the Taliban is more complex and, of course, very topical. Much of what I have just said about al Qaida applies to them also. Who would we talk to? The most obvious answer here is Mullah Omar and/or the Quetta Shura but would they carry the entire movement with them?

The apparent generational divide within the new Taliban has featured on this blog before. As far as I can tell, amid all the ongoing talk of reconciliation and reintegration, nobody has thought to ask if we are dealing with one organisation or several, or if we are dealing with a leadership that truly controls its rank-and-file.

Even if they do - and that is a big 'if' - does Mullah Omar, who presumably has spent much of the past nine years in hiding, have a clear understanding of the domestic politics within Afghanistan and of the regional and global dimensions to this conflict? In my recent post on the alleged talks between Ankara and the Kurdish Workers' Party, I raised similar concerns about Abdullah Ocalan. To be credible, an interlocutor has to understand his own movement and the environment in which it resides.

Next question - what do we talk about? Do the Taliban have negotiable aims that the whole movement agrees on? On this issue, Powell raises some very pertinent issues:

"For the IRA, as long as the objective was "troops out", little discussion was needed. The same is true in Afghanistan. The Taliban will need to move beyond the single demand that foreign forces must leave first, and consider what they really want to achieve. What changes do they want in the Afghan constitution? What sort of power sharing should there be between the Pushtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and other minorities? How would they demonstrate that they had separated themselves from al-Qaida? What attitude would they take to women's rights and girls' education? They probably haven't thought these questions through themselves, but opening a channel would help them to start elaborating answers. And experience from other conflicts suggests this can take a long time."

All good points but I would add to them by saying that the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara and other minorities must be consulted and their fears must be allayed. That is paramount, assuming that it is even possible. Memories of inter-ethnic massacres during the 1990s civil war - notably in Mazar-e-Sharif between the Taliban and the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras - will not have been forgotten.

The fact that very few people have asked these questions must raise some concerns about the increasing chatter on reconciliation. Reintegration is different and, although still problematic, it does seem to have been more thought out than reconciliation. Until the Afghan government and the international community have asked hard questions about the very notion of talking to - and ultimately reconciling with - the Taliban, then we could perhaps be forgiven for thinking this smacks of a smokescreen as we start edging towards the exit door in Afghanistan.

<div align="justify">Jonathan Powell, former Chief of Staff to Tony Blair, has featured on this blog on more than one occasion, each time on the subject of conflict resolution - more specifically its <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/04/lessons-from-ireland-bicycle-theory.html">methodology</a> (if such a thing exists) and the importance of talking to the enemy.<br /><br />This week he is to be found arguing - not for the first time - in favour of dialogue with the Taliban and al Qaida.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />It is hard to object with much of Powell says <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/aug/08/talking-to-the-taliban-negotiations-end-war">here</a>, above all because his argument is based on his long-standing personal experience in Northern Ireland, contacts with mediators in other late 20th century conflict zones and a pragmatic look at history.<br /><blockquote><em>"There seems to be a pattern to the west's behaviour when we face terrorist campaigns. First we fight them militarily, then we talk to them, and eventually we treat them as statesmen. That is what Britain did with Menachem Begin and the Irgun in Israel, with Jomo Kenyatta and the Mau Mau in Kenya and with Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus."</em></blockquote>While there are many differences between these three cases alone, there is one common thread that runs through them and countless other 'terrorist' groups - it was once heresy to even suggest talking to these people but talk to them we (eventually) did.<br /><br />I would hope that's a given for any serious student of history but for anyone who argues that it is morally reprehensible to talk to the likes of the Taliban and al Qaida, I would simply answer that we (the west) have talked and in fact actively supported worse characters than them in most parts of the world.<br /><br />I don't therefore have any problems with Jonathan Powell's argument on moral grounds. My question is this - is it practical? <br /><br />One could argue that talking to extremists is more than just practical, it is necessary. For example, as Powell realised in Northern Ireland, only extremes can build a lasting peace because there will be nobody left to outflank them. The British and Irish governments original intention was to build peace from the centre (ie. the moderate nationalist and unionist parties) and, while this was enough to reach a settlement, it was not enough to implement it. Only the extremes could do that.<br /><br />That was the case in Northern Ireland but that lesson is not easily applicable to other situations, such as Afghanistan. We are obliged to keep in mind the basic question - is it practical? - and it is here that we must raise doubts on the notion of talking to the Taliban.<br /><br />On a previous occasion (in 2008), Powell <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/mar/15/uksecurity.alqaida">stated</a> that:<br /><blockquote><em>"It's very difficult for democratic governments to do - talk to a terrorist movement that's killing your people," he said. "[But] if I was in government now I would want to have been talking to Hamas, I would be wanting to communicate with the Taliban; and I would want to find a channel to al-Qaida."</em></blockquote>This is where I have a problem. Powell gives three examples of organisations which bear almost no resemblance to each other whatsoever. Say what you like about Hamas but they have a hierarchy, clear political objectives and unity of effort within the ranks. On that basis, you have some kind of starting point for negotiation.<br /><br />Al Qaida, on the other hand, has none of those elements. Who would we talk to? What would we talk about? Even if we could find a credible interlocutor from among their ranks, there is no way he could win over the multitude of disparate al Qaida - or 'al Qaida inspired' - cells strung out across the world and bring them into a process of negotiation. Talking to al Qaida is simply a non-starter and I am amazed that Powell would compare them to Hamas.<br /><br />The case of the Taliban is more complex and, of course, very topical. Much of what I have just said about al Qaida applies to them also. Who would we talk to? The most obvious answer here is Mullah Omar and/or the Quetta Shura but would they carry the entire movement with them?<br /><br />The apparent generational divide within the new Taliban has featured on this <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/05/who-are-young-taliban.html">blog</a> before. As far as I can tell, amid all the ongoing talk of reconciliation and reintegration, nobody has thought to ask if we are dealing with one organisation or several, or if we are dealing with a leadership that truly controls its rank-and-file.<br /><br />Even if they do - and that is a big 'if' - does Mullah Omar, who presumably has spent much of the past nine years in hiding, have a clear understanding of the domestic politics within Afghanistan and of the regional and global dimensions to this conflict? In my recent <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/07/how-to-talk-to-kurds.html">post</a> on the alleged talks between Ankara and the Kurdish Workers' Party, I raised similar concerns about Abdullah Ocalan. To be credible, an interlocutor has to understand his own movement and the environment in which it resides.<br /><br />Next question - what do we talk about? Do the Taliban have negotiable aims that the whole movement agrees on? On this issue, Powell raises some very pertinent issues:<br /><blockquote><em>"For the IRA, as long as the objective was "troops out", little discussion was needed. The same is true in Afghanistan. The Taliban will need to move beyond the single demand that foreign forces must leave first, and consider what they really want to achieve. What changes do they want in the Afghan constitution? What sort of power sharing should there be between the Pushtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and other minorities? How would they demonstrate that they had separated themselves from al-Qaida? What attitude would they take to women's rights and girls' education? They probably haven't thought these questions through themselves, but opening a channel would help them to start elaborating answers. And experience from other conflicts suggests this can take a long time."</em></blockquote>All good points but I would add to them by saying that the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara and other minorities <strong>must</strong> be consulted and their fears must be allayed. That is paramount, assuming that it is even possible. Memories of inter-ethnic massacres during the 1990s civil war - notably in Mazar-e-Sharif between the Taliban and the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras - will not have been forgotten.<br /><br />The fact that very few people have asked these questions must raise some concerns about the increasing chatter on reconciliation. Reintegration is different and, although still problematic, it does seem to have been more thought out than reconciliation. Until the Afghan government and the international community have asked hard questions about the very notion of talking to - and ultimately reconciling with - the Taliban, then we could perhaps be forgiven for thinking this smacks of a smokescreen as we start edging towards the exit door in Afghanistan.<br /></div></span>

Foreign Fighters in Afghanistan

Patrick and I talked about the scale of the jihadi network in Central Asia. There is some literature about the subject available, with a general consensus that Uzbeks and Tadjiks and even Bosnians and Germans joined the ranks of the Taliban. Whether the network extends to Chechnya seems not to be quite clear. In this article, however, a Canadian "veteran infantryman" points out that Chechen fighters are the toughest enemy confronting the Canadians in Afghanistan.

As nationalities who are involved in the insurgency he mentions Egyptians, Saudis, Pakistanis, and Yemenites. "Asked whether he had personally encountered foreigners on the battlefield, the sergeant (...) replied with a grin and classic military jargon: “I have not interacted verbally with them.” Remains the question how he could determine the insurgent's nationality.

Canada's top ranking general confirms that more and more foreigners are joining the fight. He explains it with the improved living conditions of the Afghans who would prefer to stay home. "This may be because less people from Afghanistan are joining the fight. They are not getting the numbers they need here. They are not regenerating forces. What is their pool? It is not extremists but people who feel they don’t have a choice. And that pool is reducing."

If this depiction is accurate, it could indicate that McChrystal's strategy change bears some fruit.

Patrick and I talked about the scale of the jihadi network in Central Asia. There is some literature about the subject available, with a general consensus that Uzbeks and Tadjiks and even <a href="http://static.rnw.nl/migratie/www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/afg070926mc-redirected">Bosnians</a> and <a href="http://www.jihadica.com/guest-post-the-story-of-eric-breininger/">Germans</a> joined the ranks of the Taliban. Whether the network extends to Chechnya seems not to be quite clear. In this <a href="http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/story.html?id=7f941b15-0bd4-4fc0-9ae8-052b75b4c2da">article</a>, however, a Canadian "veteran infantryman" points out that Chechen fighters are the toughest enemy confronting the Canadians in Afghanistan. <br /><span class="fullpost"><br />As nationalities who are involved in the insurgency he mentions Egyptians, Saudis, Pakistanis, and Yemenites. "Asked whether he had personally encountered foreigners on the battlefield, the sergeant (...) replied with a grin and classic military jargon: “I have not interacted verbally with them.” Remains the question how he could determine the insurgent's nationality.<br /><br />Canada's top ranking general confirms that more and more foreigners are joining the fight. He explains it with the improved living conditions of the Afghans who would prefer to stay home. "This may be because less people from Afghanistan are joining the fight. They are not getting the numbers they need here. They are not regenerating forces. What is their pool? It is not extremists but people who feel they don’t have a choice. And that pool is reducing."<br /><br />If this depiction is accurate, it could indicate that McChrystal's strategy change bears some fruit. <br /></span>

Taliban video of attack on an ANA outpost in Nuristan

By watching Taliban videos, one can learn much about the enemy that ISAF is fighting in Afghanistan.

In this video, the Taliban show a coordinated attack on a Afghan National Army outpost. No US or other coalition forces are to be seen; however, an A-10 and at least one Attack-Helicopter show up on the scene.

The attack is coordinated and engages the outpost from two sides. One group provides fire support with mortars, recoilless guns and RPGs, whereas the infantry attack is launched on the other side of the outpost.

Throughout the video, no wounded or killed ANA soldiers are to be seen, although the attack seems to be successful. The Taliban occupy the outpost and capture ammunition, weapons and some pick-ups.

At 7:20 of part 3, the Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers surrender.

In part 5 the Taliban commander and his fighters arrive in a village and are being greeted by the villagers.

In Mudjahedin-ideology, martyrs die with a smile on their faces because they are happy to go to Paradise. That's why the faces of the killed Taliban are shown in detail in part 6. It is remarkable that in this Taliban propaganda video no dead enemies, but plenty of dead Taliban are featured. In Western propaganda quite the opposite is the case.

Why is that?

In the ideology of the Mudjahedin, the martyr (Shahid) wages Jihad for the glory of God. In return, God grants the Shahid access to the highest rank of Paradise. So when a Shahid dies, he fulfilled his part of the deal and can expect to go to the highest rank of Paradise, which explains the smile of some of the faces of the ones killed.

Whereas Mudjahedin fight for this selfish and apparently appealing ideology, ISAF troops fight to defeat terrorism at best but more commonly to stabilise a far away country (lets disregard for a moment that most of the ISAF troops are professionals and volunteers who fight for other reasons, such as for a living or because they signed a contract etc.).

Why is this important?

Sending soldiers to war requires to provide them with a strong motivation, such as nationalism, protection of their family, fight against a perceived threat etc. Is the cause of the mission unclear or not convincing, the moral erodes. In Vietnam, the consequence was alcohol and drug abuse. The consequence for the lack of a cause in Afghanistan has to be seen. But the widespread Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome could be one of them.

By watching Taliban videos, one can learn much about the enemy that ISAF is fighting in Afghanistan.<br /><br />In this <a href="http://theunjustmedia.com/clips/afgha/may10/Takbeer%20Ki%20Awaaz.htm">video</a>, the Taliban show a coordinated attack on a Afghan National Army outpost. No US or other coalition forces are to be seen; however, an A-10 and at least one Attack-Helicopter show up on the scene.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />The attack is coordinated and engages the outpost from two sides. One group provides fire support with mortars, recoilless guns and RPGs, whereas the infantry attack is launched on the other side of the outpost.<br /><br />Throughout the video, no wounded or killed ANA soldiers are to be seen, although the attack seems to be successful. The Taliban occupy the outpost and capture ammunition, weapons and some pick-ups. <br /><br />At 7:20 of part 3, the Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers surrender.<br /><br />In part 5 the Taliban commander and his fighters arrive in a village and are being greeted by the villagers.<br /><br />In Mudjahedin-ideology, martyrs die with a smile on their faces because they are happy to go to Paradise. That's why the faces of the killed Taliban are shown in detail in part 6. It is remarkable that in this Taliban propaganda video no dead enemies, but plenty of dead Taliban are featured. In Western propaganda quite the opposite is the case.<br /><br />Why is that? <br /><br />In the ideology of the Mudjahedin, the martyr (Shahid) wages Jihad for the glory of God. In return, God grants the Shahid access to the highest rank of Paradise. So when a Shahid dies, he fulfilled his part of the deal and can expect to go to the highest rank of Paradise, which explains the smile of some of the faces of the ones killed.<br /><br />Whereas Mudjahedin fight for this selfish and apparently appealing ideology, ISAF troops fight to defeat terrorism at best but more commonly to stabilise a far away country (lets disregard for a moment that most of the ISAF troops are professionals and volunteers who fight for other reasons, such as for a living or because they signed a contract etc.).<br /><br />Why is this important?<br /><br />Sending soldiers to war requires to provide them with a strong motivation, such as nationalism, protection of their family, fight against a perceived threat etc. Is the cause of the mission unclear or not convincing, the moral erodes. In Vietnam, the consequence was alcohol and drug abuse. The consequence for the lack of a cause in Afghanistan has to be seen. But the widespread Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome could be one of them.<br /></span>

Who are the (young) Taliban?

According to Newsweek, there is a clear generational divide within the Taliban. Young fighters apparently have nothing but contempt for older leaders based in Pakistan and are not afraid to show it.

This article makes for an interesting follow-up to the report by Anne Stenersen (largely based on Antonio Giustozzi's book Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop) which Frederik posted recently.

Amidst all the talk of reconciliation and reintegration, this article raises two questions:

1/ What is the point of reconciling with a leadership that does not control its rank-and-file?

2/ How do you reintegrate young fighters who have never been integrated into anything... and who apparently don't want to be?

<div align="justify">According to <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/id/237575">Newsweek</a>, there is a clear generational divide within the Taliban. Young fighters apparently have nothing but contempt for older leaders based in Pakistan and are not afraid to show it.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />This article makes for an interesting follow-up to the report by Anne Stenersen (largely based on Antonio Giustozzi's book <em>Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop</em>) which Frederik posted recently.<br /><br />Amidst all the talk of reconciliation and reintegration, this article raises two questions:<br /><br />1/ What is the point of reconciling with a leadership that does not control its rank-and-file?<br /><br />2/ How do you reintegrate young fighters who have never been integrated into anything... and who apparently don't want to be?<br /></div></span>

How the West was won

Some consider the Native Americans of the Great Plains to have been among the most effective guerrilla fighters in history... and yet they were eventually beaten.

While this episode of history was not one which western civilisation can regard with much pride, there may be some interesting lessons here which could perhaps be applied in a modern counter-insurgency campaign, such as Afghanistan.

These musings are intended to precede a more in-depth - and perhaps more scientific - look at the much-vaunted reconciliation and reintegration efforts currently underway in Afghanistan. I'll write more on that early next week but for now I wanted to look at one historical episode which provides food-for-thought - and not direct parallels - on this particular issue.

Obviously some of the factors in the defeat of the Plains nations cannot be transplanted to Afghanistan: there are no buffalo herds to eradicate and its more than a little unlikely that white settlers will drive into Helmand province in horse-drawn wagons in the pursuit of manifest destiny. These factors were probably more important than the military campaign as they undermined the entire way of life of the nomadic Plains nations.

A further factor must be acknowledged: whereas in Afghanistan one civilian casualty is one too many (although unfortunately it doesn't always work out that way), the US Army had no such restraints when fighting the nations of the Plains, as illustrated most infamously by Custer's massacre of a Cheyenne village at the Washita river in 1868.

Those three factors are (very obviously) entirely irrelevant to the situation in Afghanistan. However, there were two factors in the defeat of the Lakota specifically that might be integrated into a counter-insurgency strategy.

Drown them in baby milk

The fighting strength of the Lakota was sapped by the numbers of young men who, with their families, eschewed the old way of life and instead lived on hand-outs from soldiers living in what we would now call Forward Operating Bases, such as Fort Laramie on the Oregon Trail. These people were dubbed the 'Laramie Loafers' and they posed a major problem for the Lakota as i/ they reduced what was already a small pool of young men who could take up arms and ii/ they sapped the morale of those who chose to follow the old way of life.

Drowning insurgents in baby milk (ie. throwing money and material goods at them in order to undermine their motivation to fight) is hardly a new suggestion. I believe this particular metaphor first appeared in Vietnam but the method is as old as time. The example of the Laramie Loafers shows that such an approach can have a big impact.

The modern 'equivalent' in Afghanistan would be to simply provide jobs for people in Afghanistan. It is often said that many Taliban foot-soldiers only joined the insurgency because they would make more money there than elsewhere. Therefore, in simple terms the theory is that by creating licit sources of income (ie. anything other than joining the Taliban and/or growing poppies), many of the rank-and-file would drop their weapons and return home peacefully.

I can see the sense in such a theory and it may well have some impact in its implementation. The question is to what extent and will this be enough to irreversibly weaken the insurgency? That remains to be seen and I would have some questions (and doubts) here, notably concerning the received wisdom that most Taliban fighters are simply in it for the money.

Certain well-respected observers - I'm thinking of Ahmed Rashid and Robert Fisk - have highlighted the origins of the Taliban in the poverty-stricken refugee camps to which Afghans fled in great numbers (3.5m in Pakistan, 1m in Iran) during the Soviet occupation. Fisk argues that the extreme austerity of the Taliban regime stemmed from the fact that, in the refugee camps and madrasas, poverty was all they knew. In similar vein, Rashid describes the Taliban in these terms:

"These boys were a world apart from the Mujaheddin I had got to know during the 1980s - men who could recount their tribal and clan lineages, remembered their abandoned farms and valleys with nostalgia and recounted legends and stories from Afghan history... They were literally the orphans of the war, the rootless and the restless, the jobless and the economically deprived with little self-knowledge. They admired war because it was the only occupation they could possibly adapt to. Their simple belief in a messianic, puritan Islam which had been drummed into them by simple village mullahs was the only prop they could hold on to and which gave their lives some meaning."

I will look at this in greater detail next week. Suffice to say for now that it might not be a foregone conclusion to drown people in baby milk if their basic worldview rejects wealth and material possessions.

Divide and conquer

Another factor in sapping both the fighting strength and the morale of the Lakota was the lack of unity within their ranks. Factions did not so much emerge along tribal lines (the Lakota nation was composed of several sub-groups) as around individuals. Most notably, the personal antipathy of the Oglala leader Red Cloud and the Brulé leader Spotted Tail towards the famous warrior Crazy Horse was a factor which prevented young warriors from rallying behind him and mounting a concerted and organised resistance campaign.

These differences were skilfully exploited by the US Army, or more accurately by their civilian agents, who rewarded the older chiefs with material goods and political recognition (Red Cloud was received at the White House several times by President Ulysses Grant). Red Cloud did not take part in the escalating guerrilla campaign led by Crazy Horse and the Hunkpapa medicine man Sitting Bull. Red Cloud's weight among the people split the fighting strength of the Lakota, in terms of numbers, logistic support and morale.

In this vein, Anne Stenersen argues that, instead of negotiating directly with the Taliban leadership, it would be more realistic to weaken the Taliban's coherence by negotiating with - and offering incentives to - low-level commanders and tribal leaders in Afghanistan (see report posted here by Frederik on 27 April). The wide variety of actors that make up the 'opposing militant forces' (the official ISAF term) is a strength that could be turned into a weakness "if properly and systematically exploited."

I can understand the thinking behind this and hopefully I've shown, using one specific historical example, that such an approach can serve a purpose when fighting an insurgency. However, next week I'll raise some questions (and doubts) about the practical implementation of reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan.

Some consider the Native Americans of the Great Plains to have been among the most effective guerrilla fighters in history... and yet they were eventually beaten.<br /><br />While this episode of history was not one which western civilisation can regard with much pride, there may be some interesting lessons here which could perhaps be applied in a modern counter-insurgency campaign, such as Afghanistan.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />These musings are intended to precede a more in-depth - and perhaps more scientific - look at the much-vaunted <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/05/afghanistan-taliban-leaders-offered-exile-peace-plan/print">reconciliation and reintegration</a> efforts currently underway in Afghanistan. I'll write more on that early next week but for now I wanted to look at one historical episode which provides food-for-thought - and not direct parallels - on this particular issue.<br /><br />Obviously some of the factors in the defeat of the Plains nations cannot be transplanted to Afghanistan: there are no buffalo herds to eradicate and its more than a little unlikely that white settlers will drive into Helmand province in horse-drawn wagons in the pursuit of manifest destiny. These factors were probably more important than the military campaign as they undermined the entire way of life of the nomadic Plains nations.<br /><br />A further factor must be acknowledged: whereas in Afghanistan one civilian casualty is one too many (although unfortunately it doesn't always work out that way), the US Army had no such restraints when fighting the nations of the Plains, as illustrated most infamously by Custer's massacre of a Cheyenne village at the Washita river in 1868.<br /><br />Those three factors are (very obviously) entirely irrelevant to the situation in Afghanistan. However, there were two factors in the defeat of the Lakota specifically that might be integrated into a counter-insurgency strategy.<br /><br /><strong>Drown them in baby milk</strong><br /><br />The fighting strength of the Lakota was sapped by the numbers of young men who, with their families, eschewed the old way of life and instead lived on hand-outs from soldiers living in what we would now call Forward Operating Bases, such as Fort Laramie on the Oregon Trail. These people were dubbed the 'Laramie Loafers' and they posed a major problem for the Lakota as i/ they reduced what was already a small pool of young men who could take up arms and ii/ they sapped the morale of those who chose to follow the old way of life.<br /><br />Drowning insurgents in baby milk (ie. throwing money and material goods at them in order to undermine their motivation to fight) is hardly a new suggestion. I believe this particular metaphor first appeared in Vietnam but the method is as old as time. The example of the Laramie Loafers shows that such an approach can have a big impact.<br /><br />The modern 'equivalent' in Afghanistan would be to simply provide jobs for people in Afghanistan. It is often said that many Taliban foot-soldiers only joined the insurgency because they would make more money there than elsewhere. Therefore, in simple terms the theory is that by creating licit sources of income (ie. anything other than joining the Taliban and/or growing poppies), many of the rank-and-file would drop their weapons and return home peacefully.<br /><br />I can see the sense in such a theory and it may well have some impact in its implementation. The question is to what extent and will this be enough to irreversibly weaken the insurgency? That remains to be seen and I would have some questions (and doubts) here, notably concerning the received wisdom that most Taliban fighters are simply in it for the money.<br /><br />Certain well-respected observers - I'm thinking of Ahmed Rashid and Robert Fisk - have highlighted the origins of the Taliban in the poverty-stricken refugee camps to which Afghans fled in great numbers (3.5m in Pakistan, 1m in Iran) during the Soviet occupation. Fisk argues that the extreme austerity of the Taliban regime stemmed from the fact that, in the refugee camps and madrasas, poverty was all they knew. In similar vein, Rashid describes the Taliban in these terms:<br /><blockquote>"<em>These boys were a world apart from the Mujaheddin I had got to know during the 1980s - men who could recount their tribal and clan lineages, remembered their abandoned farms and valleys with nostalgia and recounted legends and stories from Afghan history... They were literally the orphans of the war, the rootless and the restless, the jobless and the economically deprived with little self-knowledge. They admired war because it was the only occupation they could possibly adapt to. Their simple belief in a messianic, puritan Islam which had been drummed into them by simple village mullahs was the only prop they could hold on to and which gave their lives some meaning</em>."</blockquote>I will look at this in greater detail next week. Suffice to say for now that it might not be a foregone conclusion to drown people in baby milk if their basic worldview rejects wealth and material possessions.<br /><br /><strong>Divide and conquer</strong><br /><br />Another factor in sapping both the fighting strength and the morale of the Lakota was the lack of unity within their ranks. Factions did not so much emerge along tribal lines (the Lakota nation was composed of several sub-groups) as around individuals. Most notably, the personal antipathy of the Oglala leader Red Cloud and the Brulé leader Spotted Tail towards the famous warrior Crazy Horse was a factor which prevented young warriors from rallying behind him and mounting a concerted and organised resistance campaign.<br /><br />These differences were skilfully exploited by the US Army, or more accurately by their civilian agents, who rewarded the older chiefs with material goods and political recognition (Red Cloud was received at the White House several times by President Ulysses Grant). Red Cloud did not take part in the escalating guerrilla campaign led by Crazy Horse and the Hunkpapa medicine man Sitting Bull. Red Cloud's weight among the people split the fighting strength of the Lakota, in terms of numbers, logistic support and morale.<br /><br />In this vein, Anne Stenersen argues that, instead of negotiating directly with the Taliban leadership, it would be more realistic to weaken the Taliban's coherence by negotiating with - and offering incentives to - low-level commanders and tribal leaders in Afghanistan (see <a href="http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00136/00359_136353a.pdf">report </a>posted here by Frederik on 27 April). The wide variety of actors that make up the 'opposing militant forces' (the official ISAF term) is a strength that could be turned into a weakness "if properly and systematically exploited."<br /><br />I can understand the thinking behind this and hopefully I've shown, using one specific historical example, that such an approach can serve a purpose when fighting an insurgency. However, next week I'll raise some questions (and doubts) about the practical implementation of reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan.<br /></span>

Who are the Taliban?

I would like to draw your attention to a study by Anne Stenersen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. She seeks to understand who the Taliban are, what they do fight for and how they see themselves.

There is not much debate going on about the enemy that we are fighting in Afghanistan. Governments and NATO usually refer to ISAF as a stabilisation mission to strengthen the Karzai-Government. But only rarely questions about our enemy are discussed. For instance, the Mullah Omar's negotiation offer and his peace proposal was hardly ever discussed publicly.

But how can we defeat an enemy that we don't understand? Sun Tzu famously said: "Know yourself, know your enemy - a thousand battles, a thousand victories". I think we are falling short of knowing our enemy and that might be one of the reasons why we have a hard time winning. Stenersen's paper sheds some light and explains what we are up against.

I would like to draw your attention to a <a href="http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00136/00359_136353a.pdf">study</a> by Anne Stenersen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. She seeks to understand who the Taliban are, what they do fight for and how they see themselves.<br /><br />There is not much debate going on about the enemy that we are fighting in Afghanistan. Governments and NATO usually refer to ISAF as a stabilisation mission to strengthen the Karzai-Government. But only rarely questions about our enemy are discussed. For instance, the Mullah Omar's negotiation offer and his peace proposal was hardly ever discussed publicly.<br /><br />But how can we defeat an enemy that we don't understand? Sun Tzu famously said: "Know yourself, know your enemy - a thousand battles, a thousand victories". I think we are falling short of knowing our enemy and that might be one of the reasons why we have a hard time winning. Stenersen's paper sheds some light and explains what we are up against.

A Mudjahideen's tale

The Taliban complain for quite a while now that the narrative of the war in Afghanistan is dominated by the interpretation of Western media outlets. In order to counter that trend, some Mujahideen started their own history writing project. This piece (part I, part II) is the first product of the effort that I'm aware of. It tells the story of Jalaluddin Haqqani and his emergence as one of the most prominent isurgency leaders in the pre-Soviet and Soviet phase of the Afghanistan war. Today, he is the leader of the Haqqani-Network that is loosely affiliated with the Shura Council of Mullah Omar. Well, nobody really knows how close the ties between these two organisations are. Anyway, it's a fascinating read for everybody who likes legends - and beyond that for everybody who seeks to understand what the Taliban think of themselves.

The Taliban complain for quite a while now that the narrative of the war in Afghanistan is dominated by the interpretation of Western media outlets. In order to counter that trend, some Mujahideen started their own history writing project. This piece (<a href="http://theunjustmedia.com/Islamic%20Perspectives/March10/Jalal%20al-Din%20Haqqani,%20a%20Legend%20in%20the%20History%20of%20the%20Afghanistan%20Jihad.htm">part I</a>, <a href="http://theunjustmedia.com/Islamic%20Perspectives/April10/Jalaluddin%20Haqqani%20A%20Legend%20of%20the%20Afghanistan%20Jihad,%20Part%20II.htm">part II</a>) is the first product of the effort that I'm aware of. It tells the story of Jalaluddin Haqqani and his emergence as one of the most prominent isurgency leaders in the pre-Soviet and Soviet phase of the Afghanistan war. Today, he is the leader of the Haqqani-Network that is loosely affiliated with the Shura Council of Mullah Omar. Well, nobody really knows how close the ties between these two organisations are. Anyway, it's a fascinating read for everybody who likes legends - and beyond that for everybody who seeks to understand what the Taliban think of themselves.<br /><br /><span class="fullpost"><br /><br /></span>

Fighting an enemy who does not exist

In this article, Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA's Bin Laden unit, turns against the perception in many Western media outlets that Al Qaeda attacks us because they hate what we are and what we stand for. "This contention is a fantasy." This simplistic interpretation of the motivation of terrorists would not be accurate and misrepresent the intentions of the enemy we are fighting all over the world.

Al Qaeda and affiliates have a clear motivation for their attacks on our societies. They are: unconditional support for Israel, the presence of Western troops in Muslim lands and the continuous killing of Muslims all over the world.

Those reasons have been identified by the 9/11 commission and various experts on terrorist groups. Sending our troops into battle against an enemy who irrationally hates us is misleading our soldiers, writes Scheuer. Furthemore, "the current slate of U.S. foreign policies toward the Islamic world generates the basic and most compelling and uniting motivation for our Islamist enemies." Here, European foreign policy could easily be added.

"If we fail to understand that motivation, America cannot shape a war-fighting strategy to either defend those policies or defeat the tenacious, talented, religiously motivated, and growing foe our soldiers, Marines, and CIA officers are now losing to in the field."

We send our troops into war against an enemy that they do not only not understand, but we keep deceiving them about the nature of this very enemy. By doing so, we do not only shed our blood, or Muslim blood, we do also embark on a mission that we cannot win.

In this <a href="http://thehill.com/special-reports-archive/699-homeland-security-january-2010/75531-when-troops-and-cia-officers-die-for-a-fantasy">article</a>, Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA's Bin Laden unit, turns against the perception in many Western media outlets that Al Qaeda attacks us because they hate what we are and what we stand for. "This contention is a fantasy." This simplistic interpretation of the motivation of terrorists would not be accurate and misrepresent the intentions of the enemy we are fighting all over the world.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />Al Qaeda and affiliates have a clear motivation for their attacks on our societies. They are: unconditional support for Israel, the presence of Western troops in Muslim lands and the continuous killing of Muslims all over the world.<br /><br />Those reasons have been identified by the 9/11 commission and various experts on terrorist groups. Sending our troops into battle against an enemy who irrationally hates us is misleading our soldiers, writes Scheuer. Furthemore, "the current slate of U.S. foreign policies toward the Islamic world generates the basic and most compelling and uniting motivation for our Islamist enemies." Here, European foreign policy could easily be added.<br /><br /><blockquote>"If we fail to understand that motivation, America cannot shape a war-fighting strategy to either defend those policies or defeat the tenacious, talented, religiously motivated, and growing foe our soldiers, Marines, and CIA officers are now losing to in the field."</blockquote>We send our troops into war against an enemy that they do not only not understand, but we keep deceiving them about the nature of this very enemy. By doing so, we do not only shed our blood, or Muslim blood, we do also embark on a mission that we cannot win.<br /></span>

The Afghan patient

"Rather than describing Afghanistan with the language of war and battles, we have come to think of the country as an ailing patient - in many ways analogous to a weakened person under attack by an aggressive infection."

General Caldwell, commander of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, and Captain Hagerott make novel use of medical terminology to describe the current situation in Afghanistan.

In a nutshell, the doctor (ie. the international community) misdiagnosed the patient, didn't administer strong enough medicine, the infection grew stronger and now we need to administer a very strong dose of medicine to combat the infection and allow the patient's immune system to build up its strength.

Full article in Foreign Policy.

NB: Interesting to see another NATO and/or US official going outside the official channels for an on-the-record statement about the war in Afghanistan. This article can't be compared with Maj-Gen Flynn's CNAS report on intelligence failures in terms of content and repercussions... but is this now a recurring pattern/tactic in the war for public opinion?

<em>"Rather than describing Afghanistan with the language of war and battles, we have come to think of the country as an ailing patient - in many ways analogous to a weakened person under attack by an aggressive infection."</em><br /><br />General Caldwell, commander of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, and Captain Hagerott make novel use of medical terminology to describe the current situation in Afghanistan.<br /><br />In a nutshell, the doctor (ie. the international community) misdiagnosed the patient, didn't administer strong enough medicine, the infection grew stronger and now we need to administer a very strong dose of medicine to combat the infection and allow the patient's immune system to build up its strength.<br /><br />Full article in <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/07/curing_afghanistan?page=0,0">Foreign Policy</a>.<br /><br /><strong>NB:</strong> Interesting to see another NATO and/or US official going outside the official channels for an on-the-record statement about the war in Afghanistan. This article can't be compared with Maj-Gen Flynn's CNAS report on intelligence failures in terms of content and repercussions... but is this now a recurring pattern/tactic in the war for public opinion?

The ongoing Debate in Germany

On Friday, three German soldiers have been killed and 7 wounded in a day of intense fighting with insurgents 40 km south of Kunduz. Here is an account of what we know so far about the events:

At 13.04, a patrol of the 1st Company, 373 Airborne Battalion, stopped to clear the road of IEDs in the Chahar Darreh district. It turned out to be an ambush by 30 to 40 insurgents (Al Jazeera spoke of 200) who opened fire. Until the end of the fighting at about 1700, seven German soldiers were wounded.



At 14.50, the reinforcements sent from the camp in Kunduz suffer an IED attack that leaves four soldiers wounded. During the ensuing gunfight, US helicopters evacuated the wounded. It was reported that one of the dismounting soldiers triggered the IED and the others were wounded during the dismounting operation.

At 15.35, the insurgents launch an attack on the police station of Chaher Darreh, which lasts until 1640. No German troop involvement in this fighting.

The 2nd Company, 372 Airborne Battalion, reinforced by 'Marder' Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV), is sent to replace the 1st Company. On the way, a unmarked car approached the convoy. After the car failed to stop and warning shots were fired, one 'Marder' engages the car with its 20 mm cannon and kills all five or six (?) passengers. As it turns out, the men in civil were Afghan National Army soldiers.

By chance an army camera team was present during the fighting. Here is the clip.

In Germany, the war in Afghanistan is very unpopular. According to the latest poll, 70% of the Germans oppose the war. After such a bloody day, politicians, pundits and ex-officers rush to comment on what is wrong and how the situation for the troops could be improved. The government declares unisono that the mission in Afghanistan is crucial to German interests and that Germany will not pull out any time soon. In fact, there is no political party that demands an immediate withdrawal. See an earlier post of mine on this issue.

The criticism is mainly about the lack of 'Dingo' Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) for training purposes in Germany. This issue came up because it was reported that three casualties were wounded during the dismounting, which could not sufficiently be trained during the pre-deployment training in Germany. With my personal experience I would argue that dismounting of any vehicle is pretty similar, provided that the hatches are at the same side. Of course it is a problem that the army doesn't have the funds to 'train as you fight', but I doubt that the casualties would have been avoided if the 'Dingos' were available in Germany.

The incoming Wehrbeauftragter des Deutschen Bundestages, something like the rapporteur of the armed forces to the German Parliament, asked for 'Leopard' Main Battle Tanks (MBT) to be deployed. His reasoning is that the big gun would scare off insurgents and provide better force-protection. Well, this demand has been rejected by the armed forces and I totally agree. MBTs are not suited to fight an insurgency and their vulnerability against IEDs can thoroughly be studied on youtube.

However, I agree with the need for combat helicopters. Currently, the Germans only have some eight transport helicopters in Afghanistan and, therefore, rely entirely on US close air support. However, after the recent incident that left between 40 and 120 Afghans killed when to trucks were bombed, the German officers shy off from requesting air support. The fear of ending up in jail back in Germany would probably hinder ground troops to call for gunships and hinder gunship pilots of engaging targets on the ground. This dilemma calls for a solution. I will address it in a future post.

There is also a shortage of drones and other surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, as the former Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr, something like the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, pointed out. He also said that the politicians in Germany have no clue about the conditions the army operates in. I think that this statement is pretty undisputed.

On Friday, three German soldiers have been killed and 7 wounded in a day of intense fighting with insurgents 40 km south of Kunduz. Here is an account of what we know so far about the events:<br /><br />At 13.04, a patrol of the 1st Company, 373 Airborne Battalion, stopped to clear the road of IEDs in the Chahar Darreh district. It turned out to be an ambush by 30 to 40 insurgents (Al Jazeera spoke of 200) who opened fire. Until the end of the fighting at about 1700, seven German soldiers were wounded.<br /><br /><span class="fullpost"><br /><br />At 14.50, the reinforcements sent from the camp in Kunduz suffer an IED attack that leaves four soldiers wounded. During the ensuing gunfight, US helicopters evacuated the wounded. It was reported that one of the dismounting soldiers triggered the IED and the others were wounded during the dismounting operation.<br /><br />At 15.35, the insurgents launch an attack on the police station of Chaher Darreh, which lasts until 1640. No German troop involvement in this fighting.<br /><br />The 2nd Company, 372 Airborne Battalion, reinforced by 'Marder' Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV), is sent to replace the 1st Company. On the way, a unmarked car approached the convoy. After the car failed to stop and warning shots were fired, one 'Marder' engages the car with its 20 mm cannon and kills all five or six (?) passengers. As it turns out, the men in civil were Afghan National Army soldiers.<br /><br />By chance an army camera team was present during the fighting. Here is the <a href="http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=c90_1270037293">clip</a>.<br /><br />In Germany, the war in Afghanistan is very unpopular. According to the latest poll, 70% of the Germans oppose the war. After such a bloody day, politicians, pundits and ex-officers rush to comment on what is wrong and how the situation for the troops could be improved. The government declares unisono that the mission in Afghanistan is crucial to German interests and that Germany will not pull out any time soon. In fact, there is no political party that demands an immediate withdrawal. See an earlier post of mine on this issue.<br /><br />The criticism is mainly about the lack of 'Dingo' Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) for training purposes in Germany. This issue came up because it was reported that three casualties were wounded during the dismounting, which could not sufficiently be trained during the pre-deployment training in Germany. With my personal experience I would argue that dismounting of any vehicle is pretty similar, provided that the hatches are at the same side. Of course it is a problem that the army doesn't have the funds to 'train as you fight', but I doubt that the casualties would have been avoided if the 'Dingos' were available in Germany.<br /><br />The incoming <span style="font-style: italic;">Wehrbeauftragter des Deutschen Bundestages</span>, something like the rapporteur of the armed forces to the German Parliament, asked for 'Leopard' Main Battle Tanks (MBT) to be deployed. His reasoning is that the big gun would scare off insurgents and provide better force-protection. Well, this demand has been rejected by the armed forces and I totally agree. MBTs are not suited to fight an insurgency and their vulnerability against IEDs can thoroughly be studied on youtube.<br /><br />However, I agree with the need for combat helicopters. Currently, the Germans only have some eight transport helicopters in Afghanistan and, therefore, rely entirely on US close air support. However, after the recent incident that left between 40 and 120 Afghans killed when to trucks were bombed, the German officers shy off from requesting air support. The fear of ending up in jail back in Germany would probably hinder ground troops to call for gunships and hinder gunship pilots of engaging targets on the ground. This dilemma calls for a solution. I will address it in a future post.<br /><br />There is also a shortage of drones and other surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, as the former <span style="font-style: italic;">Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr</span>, something like the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, pointed out. He also said that the politicians in Germany have no clue about the conditions the army operates in. I think that this statement is pretty undisputed.<br /></span>

'You have the watches, we have the time. We are born here. We will die here. We aren't going anywhere.'

Turning to counterinsurgency, I would like to draw your attention to an essay by Lieutenant Colonel Ehsan Mehmood Khan, published in the Small Arms Journal. In this essay Khan compares the strategy of the Taliban to the theories of Von Clausewitz, Mao Tse-tung, T.E. Lawrence, David Galula and Querine Hanlon.

The key points:

• "the tradition of Pashtunwali, the Pashtun Social Code, has been combined with Jihad thereby forming a formidable war ideology. This is serving as the nucleus around which everything else is knit and is thus the Centre of Gravity for Taliban Warfare. The constituents of operational environment may seek variants and may witness dip or rise in magnitude but till such time their ideology remains unbeaten, they may continue to fight."
• "David Galula puts it that the counterinsurgent will not be able to rally the bulk of population so long as the population is convinced that the counterinsurgent the will, the means and the ability to win. This denotes that the population supports the one who will win.25 I think there are three more notions that the population may have to support a given side: who is ours; who will stay; and who is neither ours nor is to stay but supports rather than hurt our interest."
• "What Mr. Henry Kissinger wrote at the end of the Vietnam War is relevant to the situation in Afghanistan today. He noted, “We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win. The [North Vietnamese] used their armed forces the way a bull-fighter uses his cape – to keep us lunging in areas of marginal political importance.”
  

Khan also gives following facts:

"According to a new map of Taliban presence in Afghanistan (Figure-1) issued by the London-based International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) in October 2009, Taliban have now permanent presence in 80% of Afghanistan, up from 72% in November 2008, According to ICOS, another 17% of Afghanistan is seeing ‘substantial’ Taliban activity.2 NATO’s unclassified briefing gives even clearer picture. Taliban have a shadow government in 33 out of 34 provinces of Afghanistan. Figure-2 shows the how Taliban Movement in Afghanistan moved from sway on 11 provinces in 2005 to 33 in 2009.3 In the words of Admiral Michael Mullen, Taliban [are] getting pretty effective at it [governance]. They have set up functional courts in some locations, assess and collect taxes, and even allow people to file formal complaints against local Talib leaders."

Turning to counterinsurgency, I would like to draw your attention to an <a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/03/a-strategic-perspective-on-tal/">essay</a> by Lieutenant Colonel Ehsan Mehmood Khan, published in the Small Arms Journal. In this essay Khan compares the strategy of the Taliban to the theories of Von Clausewitz, Mao Tse-tung, T.E. Lawrence, David Galula and Querine Hanlon.<br /><br />The key points:<br /><ul><li>"the tradition of Pashtunwali, the Pashtun Social Code, has been combined with Jihad thereby forming a formidable war ideology. This is serving as the nucleus around which everything else is knit and is thus the Centre of Gravity for Taliban Warfare. The constituents of operational environment may seek variants and may witness dip or rise in magnitude but till such time their ideology remains unbeaten, they may continue to fight."</li><li>"David Galula puts it that the counterinsurgent will not be able to rally the bulk of population so long as the population is convinced that the counterinsurgent the will, the means and the ability to win. This denotes that the population supports the one who will win.25 I think there are three more notions that the population may have to support a given side: who is ours; who will stay; and who is neither ours nor is to stay but supports rather than hurt our interest."</li><li>"What Mr. Henry Kissinger wrote at the end of the Vietnam War is relevant to the situation in Afghanistan today. He noted, “We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win. The [North Vietnamese] used their armed forces the way a bull-fighter uses his cape – to keep us lunging in areas of marginal political importance.”<br /></li></ul>Khan also gives following facts:<br /><blockquote>"According to a new map of Taliban presence in Afghanistan (Figure-1) issued by the London-based International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) in October 2009, Taliban have now permanent presence in 80% of Afghanistan, up from 72% in November 2008, According to ICOS, another 17% of Afghanistan is seeing ‘substantial’ Taliban activity.2 NATO’s unclassified briefing gives even clearer picture. Taliban have a shadow government in 33 out of 34 provinces of Afghanistan. Figure-2 shows the how Taliban Movement in Afghanistan moved from sway on 11 provinces in 2005 to 33 in 2009.3 In the words of Admiral Michael Mullen, Taliban [are] getting pretty effective at it [governance]. They have set up functional courts in some locations, assess and collect taxes, and even allow people to file formal complaints against local Talib leaders."</blockquote>

Progress in Pakistan?

This article from the Christian Science Monitor, which coincides with the vist of Pakistani army chief Ashfaq Kayani to Washington, suggests that Pakistan has finally started to take effective action against Al Qaida and Taliban militants based in its territory, from which they launch attacks against international forces in Afghanistan.

On the surface, this assertion appears to be true. The sustained military campaigns against militant strongholds in northwestern Pakistan last year have been followed up by the recent arrests of almost half the Quetta Shura, notably Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the alleged commander of Taliban operations inside Afghanistan.

However, if you scratch the surface then some important questions have to be raised about Pakistan's efforts.

Firstly, as regards the arrests of seven members of the Quetta Shura: last week Kai Eide, until recently head of the United Nations mission in Afghanistan, criticised the arrests on the grounds that they brought the 'secret' Dubai talks between the UN and the Taliban to an abrupt halt.

Question - did the Pakistani authorities simply make a tactical blunder? Or was the ISI removing Taliban leaders they no longer controlled in order to replace them with people they can control?

Both of those possibilities rest on the assumption that Eide's statement is true but, even though a number of his recent public statements seem to be an attempt to defend his performance as head of UNAMA, I can think of no reason why this wouldn't be the case. Be that as it may, given the track record of the ISI, I think we can be excused a certain degree of cynicism when analysing their actions. In other words, I remain to be convinced that these arrests truly reflect progress, beyond a marginal (and temporary) disruption of Taliban operations in Afghanistan.

Secondly, the CSM article cites Pakistan's moves against al Qaida operatives in the border areas as proof of Islamabad's (or Rawalpindi's) new-found vigour in assisting international forces. As hopefully most people have figured out by now (except the CSM apparently), the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan has little to do with al Qaida. More ominously, in the early years of the international presence in Afghanistan (2001-2004/5), a clear modus operandi of the ISI emerged: they would win international (primarily American) support and extract financial and material rewards by moving against al Qaida strongholds in FATA, for example. All the while, they continued to actively arm, train and support homegrown militants in the region of Quetta, which the latter would use as a springboard for their operations in Afghanistan. In other words, hand over the Arab jihadists, keep the Americans sweet and continue to support the Pashtun Taliban as part of Pakistan's ongoing geostrategic game.

I have no inside knowledge as to whether or not this continues to be the case - although the fact that, as highlighted in the article, Pakistan now wants something in return (ie. a civilian nuclear deal, just like India's) could point to a repetition of the same pattern. I would merely point out that for Pakistan to truly support international efforts in Afghanistan would require an unprecedented seachange in the deeply entrenched mindset(s) of the Pakistani military and intelligence community, not to mention an equally unprecedented degree of civilian control over the machinery of the State. The arrest of a few guys along the border doesn't prove anything.

NB: For an in-depth - and startling - analysis of Pakistan's policy towards and actions in Afghanistan, see 'Descent into Chaos' by Ahmed Rashid.

<a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2010/0323/Pakistan-increasingly-playing-ball-to-rein-in-Afghanistan-Taliban">This article </a>from the Christian Science Monitor, which coincides with the vist of Pakistani army chief Ashfaq Kayani to Washington, suggests that Pakistan has finally started to take effective action against Al Qaida and Taliban militants based in its territory, from which they launch attacks against international forces in Afghanistan.<br /><br />On the surface, this assertion appears to be true. The sustained military campaigns against militant strongholds in northwestern Pakistan last year have been followed up by the recent arrests of almost half the Quetta Shura, notably Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the alleged commander of Taliban operations inside Afghanistan.<br /><br />However, if you scratch the surface then some important questions have to be raised about Pakistan's efforts.<br /><br />Firstly, as regards the arrests of seven members of the Quetta Shura: last week Kai Eide, until recently head of the United Nations mission in Afghanistan, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/20/world/asia/20afghan.html?src=me">criticised the arrests</a> on the grounds that they brought the 'secret' Dubai talks between the UN and the Taliban to an abrupt halt.<br /><br />Question - did the Pakistani authorities simply make a tactical blunder? Or was the ISI removing Taliban leaders they no longer controlled in order to replace them with people they can control?<br /><br />Both of those possibilities rest on the assumption that Eide's statement is true but, even though a number of his recent public statements seem to be an attempt to defend his performance as head of UNAMA, I can think of no reason why this wouldn't be the case. Be that as it may, given the track record of the ISI, I think we can be excused a certain degree of cynicism when analysing their actions. In other words, I remain to be convinced that these arrests truly reflect progress, beyond a marginal (and temporary) disruption of Taliban operations in Afghanistan.<br /><br />Secondly, the CSM article cites Pakistan's moves against al Qaida operatives in the border areas as proof of Islamabad's (or Rawalpindi's) new-found vigour in assisting international forces. As hopefully most people have figured out by now (except the CSM apparently), the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan has little to do with al Qaida. More ominously, in the early years of the international presence in Afghanistan (2001-2004/5), a clear <em>modus operandi</em> of the ISI emerged: they would win international (primarily American) support and extract financial and material rewards by moving against al Qaida strongholds in FATA, for example. All the while, they continued to actively arm, train and support homegrown militants in the region of Quetta, which the latter would use as a springboard for their operations in Afghanistan. In other words, hand over the Arab jihadists, keep the Americans sweet and continue to support the Pashtun Taliban as part of Pakistan's ongoing geostrategic game.<br /><br />I have no inside knowledge as to whether or not this continues to be the case - although the fact that, as highlighted in the article, Pakistan now wants something in return (ie. a civilian nuclear deal, just like India's) could point to a repetition of the same pattern. I would merely point out that for Pakistan to truly support international efforts in Afghanistan would require an unprecedented seachange in the deeply entrenched mindset(s) of the Pakistani military and intelligence community, not to mention an equally unprecedented degree of civilian control over the machinery of the State. The arrest of a few guys along the border doesn't prove anything.<br /><br /><strong>NB:</strong> For an in-depth - and startling - analysis of Pakistan's policy towards and actions in Afghanistan, see <em>'Descent into Chaos'</em> by Ahmed Rashid.