The Petraeus lobby

It is worth drawing attention to this article in the Washington Post, entitled 'Our best chance in Afghanistan'. The key messages are these:

- military progress in Afghanistan is undeniable (and we shouldn't worry about the seemingly increased insurgent presence in the north)
- Islamabad must do more to clear insurgent safe havens in Pakistan and Washington must put more pressure on Islamabad
- we should not rush transition
- counter-terrorism operations (SOF raids, drone strikes) are an integral part of COIN and we should not scale them back

However, the most interesting element of the article is the authors, Frederick and Kimberley Kagan. They are referred to as "independent military analysts who have conducted research for commanders in Afghanistan" which somewhat glosses over the fact that they work closely with General Petraeus and serve as his 'telescopes' - independent, out-of-the-box analysts whose insights reach from the political and strategic levels down to the ground truth at the tactical level.

That being the case, it is reasonable to suppose that Petraeus had some say in this article and that the main messages are in fact his own.

In that light, the description of US strategic goals in Afghanistan becomes especially noteworthy.

"From the Afghan border we have a unique vantage point on the groups that most directly threaten the American homeland and the stability of the entire nuclear-armed subcontinent... The ultimate goal of American strategy in the region must be ensuring that Afghanistan is sufficiently stable and friendly so that we can make the best use of that vantage point. The president's strategy gives us the best chance of doing that."

This is a clear statement that this war is not merely about chasing al Qaida operatives. This is about US geostrategic interests and about establishing a long-term physical presence in Afghanistan and in the wider region.

Furthermore, calling it the "president's strategy" is a subtle way of putting Obama on a hook and ensuring that he does not go back on his commitments. Rather less subtle is the forthright statement that President Obama must "make good on his words to American soldiers in Afghanistan last month: "We will prevail."

In short, the messages conveyed here equate to a clear statement of intent by General Petraeus. In this war, winning in Washington is as important as winning in Helmand and Kandahar.

<div align="justify">It is worth drawing attention to this article in the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/17/AR2010121707363.html">Washington Post</a>, entitled 'Our best chance in Afghanistan'. The key messages are these:</div><div align="justify"><br />- military progress in Afghanistan is undeniable (and we shouldn't worry about the seemingly increased insurgent presence in the north)<br />- Islamabad must do more to clear insurgent safe havens in Pakistan and Washington must put more pressure on Islamabad<br />- we should not rush transition<br />- counter-terrorism operations (SOF raids, drone strikes) are an integral part of COIN and we should not scale them back<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />However, the most interesting element of the article is the authors, Frederick and Kimberley Kagan. They are referred to as "independent military analysts who have conducted research for commanders in Afghanistan" which somewhat glosses over the fact that they work closely with General Petraeus and serve as his 'telescopes' - independent, out-of-the-box analysts whose insights reach from the political and strategic levels down to the ground truth at the tactical level.<br /><br />That being the case, it is reasonable to suppose that Petraeus had some say in this article and that the main messages are in fact his own.<br /><br />In that light, the description of US strategic goals in Afghanistan becomes especially noteworthy.<br /><blockquote>"<em>From the Afghan border we have a unique vantage point on the groups that most directly threaten the American homeland and the stability of the entire nuclear-armed subcontinent... The ultimate goal of American strategy in the region must be ensuring that Afghanistan is sufficiently stable and friendly so that we can make the best use of that vantage point. The president's strategy gives us the best chance of doing that</em>."</blockquote>This is a clear statement that this war is not merely about chasing <em>al Qaida</em> operatives. This is about US geostrategic interests and about establishing a long-term physical presence in Afghanistan and in the wider region.<br /><br />Furthermore, calling it the "president's strategy" is a subtle way of putting Obama on a hook and ensuring that he does not go back on his commitments. Rather less subtle is the forthright statement that President Obama must "make good on his words to American soldiers in Afghanistan last month: "We will prevail."<br /><br />In short, the messages conveyed here equate to a clear statement of intent by General Petraeus. In this war, winning in Washington is as important as winning in Helmand and Kandahar.<br /></div></span>

Hillary misspeaks on AfPak

Hillary Clinton has made some interesting and fairly forthright statements on Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, most notably on Islamabad's use of proxies against hostile regimes in Kabul and New Delhi. (the interview was originally given to ABC but, not surprisingly, was quickly picked up by Indian media).

Of particular note is her seemingly candid assessment that similar use of proxies by the US against the Soviets during the 1980s had backfired, the less-than-subtle implication being that Pakistan should learn from American mistakes and not do likewise.

“Part of what we are fighting against right now, the United States created. We created the Mujahideen force against the Soviet Union [in Afghanistan]. We trained them, we equipped them, we funded them, including somebody named Osama bin Laden. And it didn't work out so well for us.”

It's an interesting statement: honest and circumspect. The one problem is that it isn't actually true.

While it is undoubtedly true that America's covert action towards the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s created blowback, her very specific claims that the US trained, equipped and funded Osama Bin Laden's network are not accurate, if we are to believe the evidence presented by Steve Coll in Ghost Wars. Coll states that Bin Laden (who at the time was a financier and not an operator) never received money from the US, or from Pakistan for that matter. Indeed, he had plenty of his own.

In fact, Coll's research makes it very clear that the US funnelled its cash and weapons through Pakistan - more specifically the ISI - rather than directly fund and equip mujahideen units, bearing in mind that this was after all a covert war. Over time the CIA would begin to directly supply certain mujahideen - notably Ahmed Shah Massoud - who were marginalised by the ISI but Coll presents no evidence that the US directly funded Arab jihadists generally, or Osama Bin Laden specifically.

However, the trade-off for running a covert war through Pakistan was that the ISI decided which muj received the money and arms. These were invariably the most radical Islamists in Afghanistan, as the ISI argued they were the more effective fighters. Not only did this empower the likes of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, it also meant that the ISI itself - and hardline elements within it - were empowered and emboldened to pursue their security interests through proxies in Afghanistan and in Kashmir, the result being the major instability we see across the region today.

In short, the US may not have directly supported Osama Bin Laden but they did help create a situation where he and other equally malign - if not more so - elements were radicalised and strengthened during the war against the Soviets and its aftermath.

Why is this distinction important? Taking Hillary Clinton's statement at face value, we might conclude that the US was simply careless and/or misguided in choosing the wrong ally against the Soviets. The truth is both more complex and more serious than that and it would be both deeply disappointing and (potentially) highly dangerous if that important lesson were lost.

<div align="justify"> Hillary Clinton has made some interesting and fairly forthright statements on Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, most notably on Islamabad's use of proxies against hostile regimes in Kabul and New Delhi. (the interview was originally given to ABC but, not surprisingly, was quickly picked up by <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article883765.ece">Indian media</a>).<br /><br />Of particular note is her seemingly candid assessment that similar use of proxies by the US against the Soviets during the 1980s had backfired, the less-than-subtle implication being that Pakistan should learn from American mistakes and not do likewise.<br /><span class="fullpost"><blockquote><em>“Part of what we are fighting against right now, the United States created. We created the Mujahideen force against the Soviet Union [in Afghanistan]. We trained them, we equipped them, we funded them, including somebody named Osama bin Laden. And it didn't work out so well for us.”</em></blockquote>It's an interesting statement: honest and circumspect. The one problem is that it isn't actually true.<br /><br />While it is undoubtedly true that America's covert action towards the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s created blowback, her very specific claims that the US trained, equipped and funded Osama Bin Laden's network are not accurate, if we are to believe the evidence presented by Steve Coll in <em>Ghost Wars</em>. Coll states that Bin Laden (who at the time was a financier and not an operator) never received money from the US, or from Pakistan for that matter. Indeed, he had plenty of his own.<br /><br />In fact, Coll's research makes it very clear that the US funnelled its cash and weapons through Pakistan - more specifically the ISI - rather than directly fund and equip <em>mujahideen </em>units, bearing in mind that this was after all a covert war. Over time the CIA would begin to directly supply certain <em>mujahideen </em>- notably Ahmed Shah Massoud - who were marginalised by the ISI but Coll presents no evidence that the US directly funded Arab jihadists generally, or Osama Bin Laden specifically.<br /><br />However, the trade-off for running a covert war through Pakistan was that the ISI decided which <em>muj </em>received the money and arms. These were invariably the most radical Islamists in Afghanistan, as the ISI argued they were the more effective fighters. Not only did this empower the likes of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, it also meant that the ISI itself - and hardline elements within it - were empowered and emboldened to pursue their security interests through proxies in Afghanistan and in Kashmir, the result being the major instability we see across the region today.<br /><br />In short, the US may not have directly supported Osama Bin Laden but they did help create a situation where he and other equally malign - if not more so - elements were radicalised and strengthened during the war against the Soviets and its aftermath.<br /><br />Why is this distinction important? Taking Hillary Clinton's statement at face value, we might conclude that the US was simply careless and/or misguided in choosing the wrong ally against the Soviets. The truth is both more complex and more serious than that and it would be both deeply disappointing and (potentially) highly dangerous if that important lesson were lost.<br /></div></span>

Reclaiming hearts and minds in Pakistan

The BBC tells the story of Dr Mohammad Farooq Khan, who was shot dead by the Taliban in Swat last week. Dr Farooq ran a school - or more accurately a rehabilitation centre - for teenage boys who had previously served (voluntarily or otherwise) with the Taliban. See also this obituary and video tribute in the New York Times, also featuring Dr Farooq's mission statement in his own words.

Well worth reading and also worth asking the question - how many similar centres exist in Pakistan and Afghanistan and what is the international community doing to help them?

PS: See also this story about the Turi tribe in Kurram who expelled the Taliban from their small corner of the FATA.

<div align="justify">The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11506006">BBC</a> tells the story of Dr Mohammad Farooq Khan, who was shot dead by the Taliban in Swat last week. Dr Farooq ran a school - or more accurately a rehabilitation centre - for teenage boys who had previously served (voluntarily or otherwise) with the Taliban. See also this obituary and video tribute in the <a href="http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/a-moderate-voice-is-silenced-in-pakistan/#more-82549">New York Times</a>, also featuring Dr Farooq's mission statement in his own words.</div><div align="justify"> </div><div align="justify"></div><div align="justify"></div><div align="justify"><br />Well worth reading and also worth asking the question - how many similar centres exist in Pakistan and Afghanistan and what is the international community doing to help them?<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />PS: See also this <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11486528">story</a> about the Turi tribe in Kurram who expelled the Taliban from their small corner of the FATA.<br /></div></span>

Talking to the Taliban

Asia Times reports once again on the reconciliation process in Afghanistan, which at the moment appears to be little more than back-channel negotiations between the US and the Taliban through Saudi and Pakistani mediators.

If true, the assertions made by the Asia Times would appear to justify concerns previously expounded on this blog about the notion of talking to the Taliban.

"Taliban sources in the southern regions of Pakistan confirmed to Asia Times Online that while different Taliban groups had been approached, the Americans would prefer to talk to one of the major anti-US forces in Afghanistan, the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) led by former Afghan premier Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The HIA is likely to strike a deal with the Americans before the Taliban... In the Taliban camp, the activity in the HIA camp is viewed as a bid to divide the resistance."

In other words, there are many different factions and it appears very difficult to ascertain if any of them would be able to secure buy-in from all or most of the others if an agreement was reached. The Taliban can be forgiven for thinking this is an attempt at divide-and-conquer... as they are very probably right.

In the meantime, President Karzai has set up his own High Peace Council but since it is far from clear where they fit in to the US/Saudi/Pakistani process, he in turn can be forgiven for thinking that his position is being undermined once again.

<div align="justify"><a href="http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LI30Df01.html">Asia Times</a> reports once again on the reconciliation process in Afghanistan, which at the moment appears to be little more than back-channel negotiations between the US and the Taliban through Saudi and Pakistani mediators.<br /><br />If true, the assertions made by the <em>Asia Times </em>would appear to justify concerns previously expounded on this <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/08/talking-to-enemy.html">blog</a> about the notion of talking to the Taliban.<br /><span class="fullpost"><blockquote>"<em>Taliban sources in the southern regions of Pakistan confirmed to Asia Times Online that while different Taliban groups had been approached, the Americans would prefer to talk to one of the major anti-US forces in Afghanistan, the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) led by former Afghan premier Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The HIA is likely to strike a deal with the Americans before the Taliban... In the Taliban camp, the activity in the HIA camp is viewed as a bid to divide the resistance</em>."</blockquote>In other words, there are many different factions and it appears very difficult to ascertain if any of them would be able to secure buy-in from all or most of the others if an agreement was reached. The Taliban can be forgiven for thinking this is an attempt at divide-and-conquer... as they are very probably right.<br /><br />In the meantime, President Karzai has set up his own <a href="http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2010/09/2010928122241286855.html">High Peace Council</a> but since it is far from clear where they fit in to the US/Saudi/Pakistani process, he in turn can be forgiven for thinking that his position is being undermined once again.</div></span>

Karzai good, America bad

For all the varied western interpretations of the current situation in Afghanistan, this critique from former Indian diplomat M. K. Bhadrakumar (who counts Kabul and Islamabad among his postings) is strikingly different to any strand of western opinion.

Bhadrakumar's opinion of the role of Pakistan and the ISI in Afghan politics, more specifically the reconciliation process, is what one would probably expect from an Indian observer and, moreover, his opinion is one which would very likely find favour among many western observers too. What is different, however, is Bhadrakumar's view of Hamid Karzai who, far from being an American puppet, he depicts as their victim.

On the former point, Bhadrakumar is damning in his assessment of malign Pakistani influence, American doublespeak and their joint sabotage of Karzai's reintegration plan - most notably through the arrest of Taliban leader Mullah Baradar in Karachi early this year.

The bizarre operation was undertaken despite the CIA and the ISI being aware that in Mr. Baradar (who is credited with moderate views), Mr. Karzai had a key interlocutor and the two were at an advanced stage of negotiations regarding the Taliban's participation in the upcoming Loya Jirga in April, which, of course, would have become a defining moment of the war. The ISI's detention of Mr. Baradar can only be seen as a move to ensure that Mr. Karzai did not have any top-level interlocutor among the Taliban leadership and to drive home the message that any dealings between the Taliban and Kabul should be conducted through the “proper channels,” namely, Rawalpindi and Washington.

A frustrating aspect of this article is that Bhadrakumar does not explain this in greater detail, either by citing evidence that Baradar was in advanced negotiations with Karzai or by explaining why the US would sabotage Karzai in such a way.

The notion that the Pakistani authorities arrested Baradar, along with several other alleged members of the Quetta Shura, in order to install their own people in their place is hardly unique to Indian conspiracy theorists - it appeared for example on CNN and in the New York Times. In the same vein, Bhadrakumar's assertion that the ISI is playing a long game, willing to bet that Afghanistan's western-style, pluralist democratic system will not last and that eventually the Taliban will come out on top once again, is also not entirely alien to western audiences.

What is less comprehensible is Bhadrakumar's depiction of concerted American efforts to fatally undermine Hamid Karzai and have him replaced as the Afghan leader during last year's Presidential elections. For all the (very public) disagreements between Karzai and the international community, above all the US, the long-term investment in Karzai's political (and actual) survival is surely too great to be ignored. Moreover, if regime change truly is the objective, then who is being lined up to replace Karzai? The list of realistic candidates is not long.

Incidentally, Bhadrakumar alleges that "the U.S. does not want a strong Afghan leader in Kabul with an independent power base" but some informed westerners have previously argued for precisely this scenario.

There are clear reasons, therefore, to call into question's Bhadrakumar's belief that Karzai (along with his family) is the victim of American sniping and manipulation, which should not mean dismissing it altogether. However, where Bhadrakumar's case really starts to fall into place is when he touches (all too briefly) on regional geopolitics.

"The U.S. strategy will be to keep up the pressure on Mr. Karzai in the coming period even as the mother of all questions concerning the U.S. military presence is yet to be addressed. The Afghans will oppose a permanent U.S. military presence, while the Pentagon is bent on getting a status of forces agreement with the powers that be in Kabul so as to retain long-term access, which is needed to effectively pursue the containment strategy toward China."

That line of argument makes more sense - in fact, it would be very difficult to disagree with it - but it still warrants greater explanation and analysis. As interesting and thought-provoking as this article is, Bhadrakumar raises as many questions as answers on several issues, all worth revisiting in the very near future.

Post-scriptum: On a different note, the IWPR report that the Taliban have imposed a maximum price of $3,800 on brides (yes, you read that correctly), which has made one future groom very happy:

“Now my father-in-law can’t charge me too much because this Taleban order isn’t like one from the Karzai government - it’s a strict order which no one can disobey.”

Now that is how to win hearts and minds.

<div align="justify">For all the varied western interpretations of the current situation in Afghanistan, this <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article617763.ece?homepage=true">critique</a> from former Indian diplomat M. K. Bhadrakumar (who counts Kabul and Islamabad among his postings) is strikingly different to any strand of western opinion.<br /><br />Bhadrakumar's opinion of the role of Pakistan and the ISI in Afghan politics, more specifically the reconciliation process, is what one would probably expect from an Indian observer and, moreover, his opinion is one which would very likely find favour among many western observers too. What is different, however, is Bhadrakumar's view of Hamid Karzai who, far from being an American puppet, he depicts as their victim.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />On the former point, Bhadrakumar is damning in his assessment of malign Pakistani influence, American doublespeak and their joint sabotage of Karzai's reintegration plan - most notably through the arrest of Taliban leader Mullah Baradar in Karachi early this year.<blockquote><em>The bizarre operation was undertaken despite the CIA and the ISI being aware that in Mr. Baradar (who is credited with moderate views), Mr. Karzai had a key interlocutor and the two were at an advanced stage of negotiations regarding the Taliban's participation in the upcoming Loya Jirga in April, which, of course, would have become a defining moment of the war. The ISI's detention of Mr. Baradar can only be seen as a move to ensure that Mr. Karzai did not have any top-level interlocutor among the Taliban leadership and to drive home the message that any dealings between the Taliban and Kabul should be conducted through the “proper channels,” namely, Rawalpindi and Washington.</em></blockquote>A frustrating aspect of this article is that Bhadrakumar does not explain this in greater detail, either by citing evidence that Baradar was in advanced negotiations with Karzai or by explaining why the US would sabotage Karzai in such a way.<br /><br />The notion that the Pakistani authorities arrested Baradar, along with several other alleged members of the Quetta Shura, in order to install their own people in their place is hardly unique to Indian conspiracy theorists - it appeared for example on <a href="http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/02/16/capturing_the_talibans_second_in_command">CNN</a> and in the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/world/asia/23taliban.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=ISI%20no%20flirting&st=cse">New York Times</a>. In the same vein, Bhadrakumar's assertion that the ISI is playing a long game, willing to bet that Afghanistan's western-style, pluralist democratic system will not last and that eventually the Taliban will come out on top once again, is also not entirely alien to western audiences. <br /><br />What is less comprehensible is Bhadrakumar's depiction of concerted American efforts to fatally undermine Hamid Karzai and have him replaced as the Afghan leader during last year's Presidential elections. For all the (very public) disagreements between Karzai and the international community, above all the US, the long-term investment in Karzai's political (and actual) survival is surely too great to be ignored. Moreover, if regime change truly is the objective, then who is being lined up to replace Karzai? The list of realistic candidates is not long.<br /><br />Incidentally, Bhadrakumar alleges that "the U.S. does not want a strong Afghan leader in Kabul with an independent power base" but some informed westerners have previously <a href="http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4860080.ece">argued</a> for precisely this scenario.<br /><br />There are clear reasons, therefore, to call into question's Bhadrakumar's belief that Karzai (along with his family) is the victim of American sniping and manipulation, which should not mean dismissing it altogether. However, where Bhadrakumar's case really starts to fall into place is when he touches (all too briefly) on regional geopolitics. <blockquote><em>"The U.S. strategy will be to keep up the pressure on Mr. Karzai in the coming period even as the mother of all questions concerning the U.S. military presence is yet to be addressed. The Afghans will oppose a permanent U.S. military presence, while the Pentagon is bent on getting a status of forces agreement with the powers that be in Kabul so as to retain long-term access, which is needed to effectively pursue the containment strategy toward China."</em></blockquote>That line of argument makes more sense - in fact, it would be very difficult to disagree with it - but it still warrants greater explanation and analysis. As interesting and thought-provoking as this article is, Bhadrakumar raises as many questions as answers on several issues, all worth revisiting in the very near future.<br /><br /><strong>Post-scriptum:</strong> On a different note, the <a href="http://iwpr.net/report-news/taleban-try-hearts-and-minds-tactics">IWPR</a> report that the Taliban have imposed a maximum price of $3,800 on brides (yes, you read that correctly), which has made one future groom very happy:<blockquote>“<em>Now my father-in-law can’t charge me too much because this Taleban order isn’t like one from the Karzai government - it’s a strict order which no one can disobey</em>.”</blockquote>Now <em><strong>that</strong></em> is how to win hearts and minds.<br /></div></span>

Supplying Afghanistan

This study by the IISS provides an interesting snapshot of the bigger geostrategic picture surrounding the war in Afghanistan. It takes a look at supply lines leading to Afghanistan and asks how instability in Pakistan has forced ISAF to diversify and make considerably greater use of northern routes.

Whereas previously 80% of ISAF supplies went through Karachi (and then either to Kandahar via Chaman or to Kabul via the Khyber Pass) that figure has now fallen to 50% since the opening of the northern route in May 2009. Taken in isolation, that statistic is quite striking and would seem to be clear proof that incidents such as the torching of 50 ISAF trucks at a depot near Islamabad in June have had a significant impact on the war effort.

On the other hand, it should be noted that, even with this diversification of supply lines (which is basic common sense, whatever the circumstances), supplies through Peshawar and by extension the Khyber Pass have doubled this year alone, presumably matching the surge in troop numbers. Furthermore, it is also worth pointing out that some countries along the northern routes place caveats on the use of their territory and/or airspace, notably forbidding the transport of lethal cargo, so the importance of Pakistan to the ISAF logistical effort remains uncontested.

Looking at the map makes one wonder though - the US and NATO had to strike deals with all those countries along the northern route and it would be interesting to gain more insight into the financial and geopolitical implications of this. This is yet another example of how the war in Afghanistan is having a significant effect across a very large, important and unstable region.

The article even mentions that the US is looking into the possibility of opening a land route through China, all the way from its eastern seaboard. Aside from the physical challenge of hauling supplies across the Tibetan Himalayas and the Karakorum Range, one wonders what price China would demand for such a service.

<div align="justify"><a href="http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/august/northern-route-eases-supplies-to-us-forces-in-afghanistan/">This study</a> by the IISS provides an interesting snapshot of the bigger geostrategic picture surrounding the war in Afghanistan. It takes a look at supply lines leading to Afghanistan and asks how instability in Pakistan has forced ISAF to diversify and make considerably greater use of northern routes.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />Whereas previously 80% of ISAF supplies went through Karachi (and then either to Kandahar via Chaman or to Kabul via the Khyber Pass) that figure has now fallen to 50% since the opening of the northern route in May 2009. Taken in isolation, that statistic is quite striking and would seem to be clear proof that incidents such as the torching of 50 ISAF trucks at a depot near Islamabad in June have had a significant impact on the war effort.<br /><br />On the other hand, it should be noted that, even with this diversification of supply lines (which is basic common sense, whatever the circumstances), supplies through Peshawar and by extension the Khyber Pass have doubled this year alone, presumably matching the surge in troop numbers. Furthermore, it is also worth pointing out that some countries along the northern routes place caveats on the use of their territory and/or airspace, notably forbidding the transport of lethal cargo, so the importance of Pakistan to the ISAF logistical effort remains uncontested.<br /><br />Looking at the map makes one wonder though - the US and NATO had to strike deals with all those countries along the northern route and it would be interesting to gain more insight into the financial and geopolitical implications of this. This is yet another <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/05/realpolitik-in-central-asia.html">example</a> of how the war in Afghanistan is having a significant effect across a very large, important and unstable region.<br /><br />The article even mentions that the US is looking into the possibility of opening a land route through China, all the way from its eastern seaboard. Aside from the physical challenge of hauling supplies across the Tibetan Himalayas and the Karakorum Range, one wonders what price China would demand for such a service.<br /></div></span>

"AfPInd"

So according to Wikileaks, Pakistan is apparently supporting the Taliban. Grateful as we all are for that particular revelation, it seems to have kicked off a renewed round of discussion on the regional dimension to the conflict in Afghanistan, such as this article in the Washington Post which argues that the real problem in Afghanistan is Kashmir.

Many have made this argument before - Robert Fisk for example - and there is undoubtedly a degree of truth in the image of Afghanistan as a regional chessboard but there is a tendency to take that line of thought too far, as in the WP article.

"Fighting terrorists or fighting the Taliban -- or indeed, fighting in Afghanistan at all -- addresses symptoms rather than the disease in South Asia: the horrific, wasteful, tragic and dangerous six-decade confrontation between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

This confrontation ravages Afghanistan, where the Northern Alliance, which was organized to fight the Taliban, is backed by money and weapons from India, and militant groups among the southern Pashtuns are backed by Pakistan. It is a big part of why peace eludes the country, even though the Soviets left a generation ago."

That line of thought mirrors the current debate in the United States between those who argue that American presence needs only to be properly mobilised to bring about a decisive end to the conflict and those who argue that the American presence is the whole problem. Abu Muqawama recently addressed that particular debate and, to my mind, made a rather strong case against attaching excessive importance to the actions of external actors.

By that same token, is it realistic to think that improved relations between New Delhi and Islamabad - on that subject, see this interview with Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao - would lead to an exponential improvement in the security situation in Afghanistan?

The quote above would have us believe that the various sides in the Afghan civil war of the 1990s were nothing more than Indian and Pakistani proxies. That conflict saw greater destruction (notably of Kabul) and more horrific massacres than have been seen under both the Soviets and ISAF... and yet, taken to its logical conclusion, that overly simplistic rationale would have us believe that if the regional and global powers who have a stake in the Afghan conflict can come to an agreement, then we can all pack our bags and go home.

Just one question - has anyone asked the Taliban, or the Afghan people in general for that matter, what they think about all this?

<div align="justify">So according to Wikileaks, Pakistan is apparently supporting the Taliban. Grateful as we all are for that particular revelation, it seems to have kicked off a renewed round of discussion on the regional dimension to the conflict in Afghanistan, such as this <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/06/AR2010080602658.html">article</a> in the Washington Post which argues that the real problem in Afghanistan is Kashmir.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />Many have made this argument before - <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qm7gcQ-E9o4">Robert Fisk</a> for example - and there is undoubtedly a degree of truth in the image of Afghanistan as a regional chessboard but there is a tendency to take that line of thought too far, as in the WP article.<br /><blockquote>"<em>Fighting terrorists or fighting the Taliban -- or indeed, fighting in Afghanistan at all -- addresses symptoms rather than the disease in South Asia: the horrific, wasteful, tragic and dangerous six-decade confrontation between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. <br /><br />This confrontation ravages Afghanistan, where the Northern Alliance, which was organized to fight the Taliban, is backed by money and weapons from India, and militant groups among the southern Pashtuns are backed by Pakistan. It is a big part of why peace eludes the country, even though the Soviets left a generation ago</em>."</blockquote>That line of thought mirrors the current debate in the United States between those who argue that American presence needs only to be properly mobilised to bring about a decisive end to the conflict and those who argue that the American presence is the whole problem. Abu Muqawama <a href="http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2010/07/afghans.html">recently</a> addressed that particular debate and, to my mind, made a rather strong case <em>against </em>attaching excessive importance to the actions of external actors.<br /><br />By that same token, is it realistic to think that improved relations between New Delhi and Islamabad - on that subject, see this <a href="http://ibnlive.in.com/news/india-understands-pak-best-nirupama-rao/128440-2.html?from=tn">interview</a> with Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao - would lead to an exponential improvement in the security situation in Afghanistan?<br /><br />The quote above would have us believe that the various sides in the Afghan civil war of the 1990s were nothing more than Indian and Pakistani proxies. That conflict saw greater destruction (notably of Kabul) and more horrific massacres than have been seen under both the Soviets and ISAF... and yet, taken to its logical conclusion, that overly simplistic rationale would have us believe that if the regional and global powers who have a stake in the Afghan conflict can come to an agreement, then we can all pack our bags and go home.<br /><br />Just one question - has anyone asked the Taliban, or the Afghan people in general for that matter, what they think about all this?<br /></div></span>

"When goods do not cross borders, soldiers will."

Substitute 'soldiers' for 'Taliban' and Frédéric Bastiat accurately foresaw a major factor in the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan... although one might argue that many goods (notably AK-47s) do already cross the Afghan-Pakistani border and that the Durand line is not a real border anyway.

I'm beginning to wonder if there are any problems in the world today that were not caused by bespectacled English civil servants randomly drawing lines on maps from the safety of their dusty offices in Whitehall. However, that's another subject for another day.

It is perhaps with Bastiat's maxim in mind that the G8 have announced further measures to encourage cross-border trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The initiative aims to create local employment in the border regions and follows similar projects such as the Dubai Process (which began in January 2007).

I recently attended a conference where Amb. Randolph Mank, Canadian High Commissioner in Pakistan (Canada currently chairs the G8), described the Dubai Process in some detail. Essentially the idea is to bring together technical-level people and ask them what they need. It led to an agreement between Kabul and Islamabad to open their three (legal) crossing points seven days a week, up from the previous five days, as well as further discussions and/or agreements on customs, counter-narcotics, the movement of people and socio-economic development - namely, infrastructure for trade facilitation (road, rail etc) so that trade corridors may underpin reconstruction and reconciliation.

I'd be curious to learn what tangible impact these well-intentioned initiatives have actually had on the ground. It seems to me that such initiatives are not only complimentary but essential to the population-centric approach to counter-insurgency (see Frederik's recent post on that subject).

Moreover, I would argue - as many have before me - that we should not limit our efforts to the Afghan border with Pakistan. I can understand why that particular line in the sand would be the focus of the international community's attention but I think the same principles hold true around the entire perimeter of Afghanistan's territory. Given that country's historical position as a crossroads on the Silk Road, it seems perfectly logical to use geography as a stimulus for economic development. Translation: invest in road and rail links, as well as facilities such as cold storage, which can help Afghanistan become (once again) a major trade hub between Central Asia and/or China and the seaports on the Pakistani and Iranian coast.

Substitute 'soldiers' for 'Taliban' and Frédéric Bastiat accurately foresaw a major factor in the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan... although one might argue that many goods (notably AK-47s) do already cross the Afghan-Pakistani border and that the Durand line is not a real border anyway.<br /><br />I'm beginning to wonder if there are any problems in the world today that were <strong><u>not</u></strong> caused by bespectacled English civil servants randomly drawing lines on maps from the safety of their dusty offices in Whitehall. However, that's another subject for another day.<br /><br />It is perhaps with Bastiat's maxim in mind that the <a href="http://www.vancouversun.com/business/Cannon+announces+border+project+Afghanistan+Pakistan/2741188/story.html">G8 have announced </a>further measures to encourage cross-border trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The initiative aims to create local employment in the border regions and follows similar projects such as the Dubai Process (which began in January 2007).<br /><br />I recently attended a conference where Amb. Randolph Mank, Canadian High Commissioner in Pakistan (Canada currently chairs the G8), described the Dubai Process in some detail. Essentially the idea is to bring together technical-level people and ask them what they need. It led to an agreement between Kabul and Islamabad to open their three (legal) crossing points seven days a week, up from the previous five days, as well as further discussions and/or agreements on customs, counter-narcotics, the movement of people and socio-economic development - namely, infrastructure for trade facilitation (road, rail etc) so that trade corridors may underpin reconstruction and reconciliation.<br /><br />I'd be curious to learn what tangible impact these well-intentioned initiatives have actually had on the ground. It seems to me that such initiatives are not only complimentary but essential to the population-centric approach to counter-insurgency (see Frederik's recent post on that subject).<br /><br />Moreover, I would argue - as many have before me - that we should not limit our efforts to the Afghan border with Pakistan. I can understand why that particular line in the sand would be the focus of the international community's attention but I think the same principles hold true around the entire perimeter of Afghanistan's territory. Given that country's historical position as a crossroads on the Silk Road, it seems perfectly logical to use geography as a stimulus for economic development. Translation: invest in road and rail links, as well as facilities such as cold storage, which can help Afghanistan become (once again) a major trade hub between Central Asia and/or China and the seaports on the Pakistani and Iranian coast.

Progress in Pakistan?

This article from the Christian Science Monitor, which coincides with the vist of Pakistani army chief Ashfaq Kayani to Washington, suggests that Pakistan has finally started to take effective action against Al Qaida and Taliban militants based in its territory, from which they launch attacks against international forces in Afghanistan.

On the surface, this assertion appears to be true. The sustained military campaigns against militant strongholds in northwestern Pakistan last year have been followed up by the recent arrests of almost half the Quetta Shura, notably Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the alleged commander of Taliban operations inside Afghanistan.

However, if you scratch the surface then some important questions have to be raised about Pakistan's efforts.

Firstly, as regards the arrests of seven members of the Quetta Shura: last week Kai Eide, until recently head of the United Nations mission in Afghanistan, criticised the arrests on the grounds that they brought the 'secret' Dubai talks between the UN and the Taliban to an abrupt halt.

Question - did the Pakistani authorities simply make a tactical blunder? Or was the ISI removing Taliban leaders they no longer controlled in order to replace them with people they can control?

Both of those possibilities rest on the assumption that Eide's statement is true but, even though a number of his recent public statements seem to be an attempt to defend his performance as head of UNAMA, I can think of no reason why this wouldn't be the case. Be that as it may, given the track record of the ISI, I think we can be excused a certain degree of cynicism when analysing their actions. In other words, I remain to be convinced that these arrests truly reflect progress, beyond a marginal (and temporary) disruption of Taliban operations in Afghanistan.

Secondly, the CSM article cites Pakistan's moves against al Qaida operatives in the border areas as proof of Islamabad's (or Rawalpindi's) new-found vigour in assisting international forces. As hopefully most people have figured out by now (except the CSM apparently), the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan has little to do with al Qaida. More ominously, in the early years of the international presence in Afghanistan (2001-2004/5), a clear modus operandi of the ISI emerged: they would win international (primarily American) support and extract financial and material rewards by moving against al Qaida strongholds in FATA, for example. All the while, they continued to actively arm, train and support homegrown militants in the region of Quetta, which the latter would use as a springboard for their operations in Afghanistan. In other words, hand over the Arab jihadists, keep the Americans sweet and continue to support the Pashtun Taliban as part of Pakistan's ongoing geostrategic game.

I have no inside knowledge as to whether or not this continues to be the case - although the fact that, as highlighted in the article, Pakistan now wants something in return (ie. a civilian nuclear deal, just like India's) could point to a repetition of the same pattern. I would merely point out that for Pakistan to truly support international efforts in Afghanistan would require an unprecedented seachange in the deeply entrenched mindset(s) of the Pakistani military and intelligence community, not to mention an equally unprecedented degree of civilian control over the machinery of the State. The arrest of a few guys along the border doesn't prove anything.

NB: For an in-depth - and startling - analysis of Pakistan's policy towards and actions in Afghanistan, see 'Descent into Chaos' by Ahmed Rashid.

<a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2010/0323/Pakistan-increasingly-playing-ball-to-rein-in-Afghanistan-Taliban">This article </a>from the Christian Science Monitor, which coincides with the vist of Pakistani army chief Ashfaq Kayani to Washington, suggests that Pakistan has finally started to take effective action against Al Qaida and Taliban militants based in its territory, from which they launch attacks against international forces in Afghanistan.<br /><br />On the surface, this assertion appears to be true. The sustained military campaigns against militant strongholds in northwestern Pakistan last year have been followed up by the recent arrests of almost half the Quetta Shura, notably Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the alleged commander of Taliban operations inside Afghanistan.<br /><br />However, if you scratch the surface then some important questions have to be raised about Pakistan's efforts.<br /><br />Firstly, as regards the arrests of seven members of the Quetta Shura: last week Kai Eide, until recently head of the United Nations mission in Afghanistan, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/20/world/asia/20afghan.html?src=me">criticised the arrests</a> on the grounds that they brought the 'secret' Dubai talks between the UN and the Taliban to an abrupt halt.<br /><br />Question - did the Pakistani authorities simply make a tactical blunder? Or was the ISI removing Taliban leaders they no longer controlled in order to replace them with people they can control?<br /><br />Both of those possibilities rest on the assumption that Eide's statement is true but, even though a number of his recent public statements seem to be an attempt to defend his performance as head of UNAMA, I can think of no reason why this wouldn't be the case. Be that as it may, given the track record of the ISI, I think we can be excused a certain degree of cynicism when analysing their actions. In other words, I remain to be convinced that these arrests truly reflect progress, beyond a marginal (and temporary) disruption of Taliban operations in Afghanistan.<br /><br />Secondly, the CSM article cites Pakistan's moves against al Qaida operatives in the border areas as proof of Islamabad's (or Rawalpindi's) new-found vigour in assisting international forces. As hopefully most people have figured out by now (except the CSM apparently), the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan has little to do with al Qaida. More ominously, in the early years of the international presence in Afghanistan (2001-2004/5), a clear <em>modus operandi</em> of the ISI emerged: they would win international (primarily American) support and extract financial and material rewards by moving against al Qaida strongholds in FATA, for example. All the while, they continued to actively arm, train and support homegrown militants in the region of Quetta, which the latter would use as a springboard for their operations in Afghanistan. In other words, hand over the Arab jihadists, keep the Americans sweet and continue to support the Pashtun Taliban as part of Pakistan's ongoing geostrategic game.<br /><br />I have no inside knowledge as to whether or not this continues to be the case - although the fact that, as highlighted in the article, Pakistan now wants something in return (ie. a civilian nuclear deal, just like India's) could point to a repetition of the same pattern. I would merely point out that for Pakistan to truly support international efforts in Afghanistan would require an unprecedented seachange in the deeply entrenched mindset(s) of the Pakistani military and intelligence community, not to mention an equally unprecedented degree of civilian control over the machinery of the State. The arrest of a few guys along the border doesn't prove anything.<br /><br /><strong>NB:</strong> For an in-depth - and startling - analysis of Pakistan's policy towards and actions in Afghanistan, see <em>'Descent into Chaos'</em> by Ahmed Rashid.