Hillary misspeaks on AfPak

Hillary Clinton has made some interesting and fairly forthright statements on Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, most notably on Islamabad's use of proxies against hostile regimes in Kabul and New Delhi. (the interview was originally given to ABC but, not surprisingly, was quickly picked up by Indian media).

Of particular note is her seemingly candid assessment that similar use of proxies by the US against the Soviets during the 1980s had backfired, the less-than-subtle implication being that Pakistan should learn from American mistakes and not do likewise.

“Part of what we are fighting against right now, the United States created. We created the Mujahideen force against the Soviet Union [in Afghanistan]. We trained them, we equipped them, we funded them, including somebody named Osama bin Laden. And it didn't work out so well for us.”

It's an interesting statement: honest and circumspect. The one problem is that it isn't actually true.

While it is undoubtedly true that America's covert action towards the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s created blowback, her very specific claims that the US trained, equipped and funded Osama Bin Laden's network are not accurate, if we are to believe the evidence presented by Steve Coll in Ghost Wars. Coll states that Bin Laden (who at the time was a financier and not an operator) never received money from the US, or from Pakistan for that matter. Indeed, he had plenty of his own.

In fact, Coll's research makes it very clear that the US funnelled its cash and weapons through Pakistan - more specifically the ISI - rather than directly fund and equip mujahideen units, bearing in mind that this was after all a covert war. Over time the CIA would begin to directly supply certain mujahideen - notably Ahmed Shah Massoud - who were marginalised by the ISI but Coll presents no evidence that the US directly funded Arab jihadists generally, or Osama Bin Laden specifically.

However, the trade-off for running a covert war through Pakistan was that the ISI decided which muj received the money and arms. These were invariably the most radical Islamists in Afghanistan, as the ISI argued they were the more effective fighters. Not only did this empower the likes of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, it also meant that the ISI itself - and hardline elements within it - were empowered and emboldened to pursue their security interests through proxies in Afghanistan and in Kashmir, the result being the major instability we see across the region today.

In short, the US may not have directly supported Osama Bin Laden but they did help create a situation where he and other equally malign - if not more so - elements were radicalised and strengthened during the war against the Soviets and its aftermath.

Why is this distinction important? Taking Hillary Clinton's statement at face value, we might conclude that the US was simply careless and/or misguided in choosing the wrong ally against the Soviets. The truth is both more complex and more serious than that and it would be both deeply disappointing and (potentially) highly dangerous if that important lesson were lost.

<div align="justify"> Hillary Clinton has made some interesting and fairly forthright statements on Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, most notably on Islamabad's use of proxies against hostile regimes in Kabul and New Delhi. (the interview was originally given to ABC but, not surprisingly, was quickly picked up by <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article883765.ece">Indian media</a>).<br /><br />Of particular note is her seemingly candid assessment that similar use of proxies by the US against the Soviets during the 1980s had backfired, the less-than-subtle implication being that Pakistan should learn from American mistakes and not do likewise.<br /><span class="fullpost"><blockquote><em>“Part of what we are fighting against right now, the United States created. We created the Mujahideen force against the Soviet Union [in Afghanistan]. We trained them, we equipped them, we funded them, including somebody named Osama bin Laden. And it didn't work out so well for us.”</em></blockquote>It's an interesting statement: honest and circumspect. The one problem is that it isn't actually true.<br /><br />While it is undoubtedly true that America's covert action towards the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s created blowback, her very specific claims that the US trained, equipped and funded Osama Bin Laden's network are not accurate, if we are to believe the evidence presented by Steve Coll in <em>Ghost Wars</em>. Coll states that Bin Laden (who at the time was a financier and not an operator) never received money from the US, or from Pakistan for that matter. Indeed, he had plenty of his own.<br /><br />In fact, Coll's research makes it very clear that the US funnelled its cash and weapons through Pakistan - more specifically the ISI - rather than directly fund and equip <em>mujahideen </em>units, bearing in mind that this was after all a covert war. Over time the CIA would begin to directly supply certain <em>mujahideen </em>- notably Ahmed Shah Massoud - who were marginalised by the ISI but Coll presents no evidence that the US directly funded Arab jihadists generally, or Osama Bin Laden specifically.<br /><br />However, the trade-off for running a covert war through Pakistan was that the ISI decided which <em>muj </em>received the money and arms. These were invariably the most radical Islamists in Afghanistan, as the ISI argued they were the more effective fighters. Not only did this empower the likes of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, it also meant that the ISI itself - and hardline elements within it - were empowered and emboldened to pursue their security interests through proxies in Afghanistan and in Kashmir, the result being the major instability we see across the region today.<br /><br />In short, the US may not have directly supported Osama Bin Laden but they did help create a situation where he and other equally malign - if not more so - elements were radicalised and strengthened during the war against the Soviets and its aftermath.<br /><br />Why is this distinction important? Taking Hillary Clinton's statement at face value, we might conclude that the US was simply careless and/or misguided in choosing the wrong ally against the Soviets. The truth is both more complex and more serious than that and it would be both deeply disappointing and (potentially) highly dangerous if that important lesson were lost.<br /></div></span>

Realpolitik in Central Asia

The so-called regional dimension to the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan is largely taken to refer primarily to Pakistan and, by extension, India. This is understandable but Central Asia deserves more attention (beyond practical matters such as lines of communication and air bases) so I was interested to come across this report from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (dating from March this year).

Few strategic thinkers would argue with the assertion that "Washington’s AfPak policy needs to expand its field of vision to include Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan" but the question is how and for what purpose. We should be extremely cautious of seeking to support the COIN effort in Afghanistan without seriously considering potential repercussions.

Although very specific in its focus - namely the evolving threat of Central Asian jihadists - this report is coherent with much of the editorial commentary on the region in that it views the question through the AfPak prism, a prism which could very easily become a trap.

"We argue that the U.S. strategy to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda” in Afghanistan and Pakistan should be expanded to include Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Our thesis rests on the judgment that Central Asia’s jihadists pose a potentially grave threat to regional stability and international security. They operate in a geographically contiguous and increasingly interlinked environment that stretches from Pakistan’s safe havens up through the Ferghana Valley. Ongoing hostilities and deteriorating conditions in Afghanistan and Pakistan could transform what has been a relatively minor problem into a potent destabilizing factor in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The time to address this issue is now, before it metastasizes."

Instead of worrying that the Afghan conflict might spill over into Central Asia, we should perhaps be more concerned with severe unrest and growing militancy developing organically in that region and all as a result of the west turning a blind eye to government repression there just to secure some air bases - such as Manas and Termes - and supply routes for the campaign in Afghanistan.

These warnings are not new. For example, the scathing report of Craig Murray, formerly British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, on the Karimov regime - and US support for it - has been well-documented. In the words of Tahulbat Yuldashev, former Uzbek government official turned dissident: "Democracy in Uzbekistan has no financial support any more from the United States. It only cares about Afghanistan."

The following extract of the CSIS report shows just how problems may emerge organically in Central Asia, no matter the outcome in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

"The return of these [jihadist] fighters does not pose an existential threat to Central Asian stability — they lack popular support. But a militant influx could set off a destabilizing cycle of terrorist action and government overreaction amid deteriorating socioeconomic conditions in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan."

Incidentally, I find that extract to contain a glaring contradiction. If a destabilising cycle of terrorism, government repression and deteriorating socio-economic conditions - not to mention human rights violations - does not qualify as an existential threat then I'd be keen to know what does.

Today it is often said - rightly - that Pakistan is facing an existential threat. We should never forget that this threat began during the 1980s when the west supported a dictatorial regime in order to further its own interests in Afghanistan. There are some differences - the west was supporting Afghan insurgents then, not fighting them, and Pakistan was funding and arming jihadists, not clamping down on them - but the point remains that short-term expediency can unleash even worse consequences in the future.

In that vein, I find it especially disconcerting that the CSIS report outlines a number of key recommendations, all of which target the existing Islamist groups in Central Asia but none of which address the conditions which produce incubators of militant jihadists in places like the Ferghana valley.

Measure such as enhancing U.S. intelligence capacity on Central Asian target sets, launching a border interdiction initiative and focusing more attention on travel documents may address the symptoms of militant islamism in Central Asia but not the root causes.

The one exception is the recommendation to push to bring the counterterrorism legislation of Central Asian countries in line with EU directives and human rights laws. The EU reference is interesting and I'll return to that shortly.

The key question would appear to be to what extent should we balance short-term realpolitik against medium- to long-term consequences?

The fact is we should avoid that distinction as far as possible. Granted, this is not easy in practice but the war in Afghanistan is being fought, ostensibly, because the repressive regime in that country destabilised the region and harboured international terrorists. So what is the point if the measures we take produce the same effect elsewhere?

The international community must surely have the necessary mechanisms at its disposal to find a balance. For example, the European Union has an opportunity to - at last - play a meaningful role in western foreign policy. By encouraging, as far as possible, reform of institutions (police, judiciary) and promoting democracy and human rights through legislative reform (as mentioned above), the much-vaunted soft-power capacities of the EU would be a useful counterweight to the Afghan-based realpolitik of the US and other ISAF nations.

Thus the member nations of ISAF would, with one hand, do what is necessary for the campaign in Afghanistan and, with the other hand, seek to bring about a degree of positive influence in the same region.

The goal is simple - to prevent the storing up in Central Asia of similar and equally serious problems as those which continue to beset Afghanistan.

Even if that specific suggestion requires closer and more in-depth examination, the Central Asian question indisputably requires immediate attention and some kind of workable solution.

<div align="justify">The so-called regional dimension to the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan is largely taken to refer primarily to Pakistan and, by extension, India. This is understandable but Central Asia deserves more attention (beyond practical matters such as lines of communication and air bases) so I was interested to come across this <a href="http://csis.org/publication/ferghana-valley-south-waziristan">report </a>from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (dating from March this year).<br /><br />Few strategic thinkers would argue with the assertion that "Washington’s AfPak policy needs to expand its field of vision to include Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan" but the question is how and for what purpose. We should be extremely cautious of seeking to support the COIN effort in Afghanistan without seriously considering potential repercussions.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />Although very specific in its focus - namely the evolving threat of Central Asian jihadists - this report is coherent with much of the editorial commentary on the region in that it views the question through the AfPak prism, a prism which could very easily become a trap.<br /></div><blockquote>"<em>We argue that the U.S. strategy to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda” in Afghanistan and Pakistan should be expanded to include Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Our thesis rests on the judgment that Central Asia’s jihadists pose a potentially grave threat to regional stability and international security. They operate in a geographically contiguous and increasingly interlinked environment that stretches from Pakistan’s safe havens up through the Ferghana Valley. Ongoing hostilities and deteriorating conditions in Afghanistan and Pakistan could transform what has been a relatively minor problem into a potent destabilizing factor in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The time to address this issue is now, before it metastasizes</em>."</blockquote><div align="justify">Instead of worrying that the Afghan conflict might spill over into Central Asia, we should perhaps be more concerned with severe unrest and growing militancy developing organically in that region and all as a result of the west turning a blind eye to government repression there just to secure some air bases - such as Manas and Termes - and supply routes for the campaign in Afghanistan.<br /><br />These warnings are not new. For example, the scathing report of Craig Murray, formerly British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, on the Karimov regime - and US support for it - has been well-documented. In the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/5949217/Barack-Obama-courts-human-rights-abusers-in-Taliban-fight.html">words </a>of Tahulbat Yuldashev, former Uzbek government official turned dissident: "Democracy in Uzbekistan has no financial support any more from the United States. It only cares about Afghanistan."<br /><br />The following extract of the CSIS report shows just how problems may emerge organically in Central Asia, no matter the outcome in Afghanistan or Pakistan.<br /></div><blockquote><em>"The return of these [jihadist] fighters does not pose an existential threat to Central Asian stability — they lack popular support. But a militant influx could set off a destabilizing cycle of terrorist action and government overreaction amid deteriorating socioeconomic conditions in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan."</em></blockquote><div align="justify">Incidentally, I find that extract to contain a glaring contradiction. If a destabilising cycle of terrorism, government repression and deteriorating socio-economic conditions - not to mention human rights violations - does not qualify as an existential threat then I'd be keen to know what does.<br /><br />Today it is often said - rightly - that Pakistan is facing an existential threat. We should never forget that this threat began during the 1980s when the west supported a dictatorial regime in order to further its own interests in Afghanistan. There are some differences - the west was supporting Afghan insurgents then, not fighting them, and Pakistan was funding and arming jihadists, not clamping down on them - but the point remains that short-term expediency can unleash even worse consequences in the future.<br /><br />In that vein, I find it especially disconcerting that the CSIS report outlines a number of key recommendations, all of which target the existing Islamist groups in Central Asia but none of which address the conditions which produce incubators of militant jihadists in places like the Ferghana valley.<br /><br />Measure such as enhancing U.S. intelligence capacity on Central Asian target sets, launching a border interdiction initiative and focusing more attention on travel documents may address the symptoms of militant islamism in Central Asia but not the root causes.<br /><br />The one exception is the recommendation to push to bring the counterterrorism legislation of Central Asian countries in line with EU directives and human rights laws. The EU reference is interesting and I'll return to that shortly.<br /><br />The key question would appear to be to what extent should we balance short-term realpolitik against medium- to long-term consequences?<br /><br />The fact is we should avoid that distinction as far as possible. Granted, this is not easy in practice but the war in Afghanistan is being fought, ostensibly, because the repressive regime in that country destabilised the region and harboured international terrorists. So what is the point if the measures we take produce the same effect elsewhere?<br /><br />The international community must surely have the necessary mechanisms at its disposal to find a balance. For example, the European Union has an opportunity to - at last - play a meaningful role in western foreign policy. By encouraging, as far as possible, reform of institutions (police, judiciary) and promoting democracy and human rights through legislative reform (as mentioned above), the much-vaunted soft-power capacities of the EU would be a useful counterweight to the Afghan-based <em>realpolitik </em>of the US and other ISAF nations.<br /><br />Thus the member nations of ISAF would, with one hand, do what is necessary for the campaign in Afghanistan and, with the other hand, seek to bring about a degree of positive influence in the same region.<br /><br />The goal is simple - to prevent the storing up in Central Asia of similar and equally serious problems as those which continue to beset Afghanistan.<br /><br />Even if that specific suggestion requires closer and more in-depth examination, the Central Asian question indisputably requires immediate attention and some kind of workable solution.<br /></div></span>