Winning hearts and minds - lesson 1

Under the code-name Operation Christmas, the Colombian Army are erecting giant Christmas trees in FARC-held territory in an attempt to persuade the guerrillas to demobilise.

A novel idea (and the Colombian government have in fact had some success in demobilising/reintegrating rank-and-file FARC members over the past few years) but probably not one which could be replicated in, say, Afghanistan... for obvious reasons.

<div align="justify">Under the code-name <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12025086">Operation Christmas</a>, the Colombian Army are erecting giant Christmas trees in FARC-held territory in an attempt to persuade the guerrillas to demobilise.<br /><br />A novel idea (and the Colombian government have in fact had some success in demobilising/reintegrating rank-and-file FARC members over the past few years) but probably not one which could be replicated in, say, Afghanistan... for obvious reasons.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br /></div></span>

Talking to the Taliban

Asia Times reports once again on the reconciliation process in Afghanistan, which at the moment appears to be little more than back-channel negotiations between the US and the Taliban through Saudi and Pakistani mediators.

If true, the assertions made by the Asia Times would appear to justify concerns previously expounded on this blog about the notion of talking to the Taliban.

"Taliban sources in the southern regions of Pakistan confirmed to Asia Times Online that while different Taliban groups had been approached, the Americans would prefer to talk to one of the major anti-US forces in Afghanistan, the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) led by former Afghan premier Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The HIA is likely to strike a deal with the Americans before the Taliban... In the Taliban camp, the activity in the HIA camp is viewed as a bid to divide the resistance."

In other words, there are many different factions and it appears very difficult to ascertain if any of them would be able to secure buy-in from all or most of the others if an agreement was reached. The Taliban can be forgiven for thinking this is an attempt at divide-and-conquer... as they are very probably right.

In the meantime, President Karzai has set up his own High Peace Council but since it is far from clear where they fit in to the US/Saudi/Pakistani process, he in turn can be forgiven for thinking that his position is being undermined once again.

<div align="justify"><a href="http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LI30Df01.html">Asia Times</a> reports once again on the reconciliation process in Afghanistan, which at the moment appears to be little more than back-channel negotiations between the US and the Taliban through Saudi and Pakistani mediators.<br /><br />If true, the assertions made by the <em>Asia Times </em>would appear to justify concerns previously expounded on this <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/08/talking-to-enemy.html">blog</a> about the notion of talking to the Taliban.<br /><span class="fullpost"><blockquote>"<em>Taliban sources in the southern regions of Pakistan confirmed to Asia Times Online that while different Taliban groups had been approached, the Americans would prefer to talk to one of the major anti-US forces in Afghanistan, the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) led by former Afghan premier Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The HIA is likely to strike a deal with the Americans before the Taliban... In the Taliban camp, the activity in the HIA camp is viewed as a bid to divide the resistance</em>."</blockquote>In other words, there are many different factions and it appears very difficult to ascertain if any of them would be able to secure buy-in from all or most of the others if an agreement was reached. The Taliban can be forgiven for thinking this is an attempt at divide-and-conquer... as they are very probably right.<br /><br />In the meantime, President Karzai has set up his own <a href="http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2010/09/2010928122241286855.html">High Peace Council</a> but since it is far from clear where they fit in to the US/Saudi/Pakistani process, he in turn can be forgiven for thinking that his position is being undermined once again.</div></span>

ETA declare a ceasefire... again.

For the second time in four years (and the fourth time overall), the armed Basque separatist group ETA have announced a ceasefire... or rather they have announced that they will "not carry out armed actions."

There is little political substance in their statement and certainly nothing new, although one can almost admire their audacity for claiming that "ETA has contributed to proposals for cooperative actions and resolutions of the conflict."

The immediate reaction in Spain and elsewhere is that ETA are calling a ceasefire because they have no choice, because they are too weak to do otherwise and that this announcement is simply window-dressing to make it seem like they retain the initiative.

Indeed, the basic facts speak for themselves. When Mikel Karrera Sarbe - a.k.a Ata - was arrested in May this year, he became the sixth suspected ETA leader to have been arrested since November 2008. ETA has tried (and supposedly failed) to move its support and logistics infrastructure from France to Portugal. They provoked outrage (and the ire of Nicolas Sarkozy) by killing a French policeman in March this year. Quite simply, ETA had nowhere else to go.

An interesting aspect to this story is the claim by Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams that Irish republicans played an important role in persuading ETA to put down their guns. While it is hard to ascertain just how influential Irish voices were in the Basque decision-making process, Adams does make a very necessary point about the role of the Spanish government:

"There is also a heavy responsibility on the Spanish government to grasp this opportunity for peace and progress. It needs to be farsighted, to think strategically and to ignore those voices that seek a resolution in terms of victory and defeat."

Unfortunately that seems highly unlikely given the initial reaction from Madrid in the shape of Interior Minister Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba:

"Eta kills in order to impose itself, so that means one cannot dialogue. Eta has stopped because it cannot do anything ... and also in order to rebuild itself."

While the second part of the statement is undoubtedly true, the first reflects a deeply ingrained mindset within the Spanish State - regardless of which political party happens to be in power. By way of contrast, when the British government was accused by the SDLP (moderate Irish nationalist party) of only talking to the political wings of Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups because they had guns, Jonathan Powell responded "and your point is?"

Having said that, Pérez did no more than articulate the feelings of probably a large majority of Spaniards so, purely from a political point of view, he arguably couldn't have said anything else.

However, it is to be hoped that behind the scenes the Spanish State will indeed be astute enough to take a long-term, strategic approach to this opportunity. For example, if it is indeed true, as alleged, that ETA are merely calling a temporary ceasefire in order to regroup then now is exactly the time, during their period of inactivity, to try and reintegrate ETA militants and their support base (what's left of it) into mainstream society and political life, as I have argued before. Above all, Madrid must positively respond to the Basque left and legalise those parties which do genuinely seek political solutions through peaceful, democratic means and always have done.

This entails 'legalising' the very concept of Basque nationalism, which historically has been an existential non-starter for the Spanish State which has too often sought to taint all Basque nationalists with ETA's violence. However this is very definitely a "democratic minimum" for a political process and the best way to render ETA completely irrelevant and seal their defeat. If Madrid fails to seize this opportunity, then their statements in response to ETA's announcement will very likely become a self-fulfilling prophesy.

PS: Anybody puzzled by the face-masks and berets on display can find answers here.

<div align="justify"> For the second time in four years (and the fourth time overall), the armed Basque separatist group ETA have <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11191498">announced</a> a ceasefire... or rather they have announced that they will "not carry out armed actions."<br /><br />There is little political substance in their statement and certainly nothing new, although one can almost admire their audacity for claiming that "ETA has contributed to proposals for cooperative actions and resolutions of the conflict."<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />The immediate reaction in Spain and elsewhere is that ETA are calling a ceasefire because they have no choice, because they are too weak to do otherwise and that this announcement is simply window-dressing to make it seem like they retain the initiative.<br /><br />Indeed, the basic facts speak for themselves. When Mikel Karrera Sarbe - a.k.a <em>Ata</em> - was arrested in May this year, he became the sixth suspected ETA leader to have been arrested since November 2008. ETA has tried (and supposedly failed) to move its support and logistics infrastructure from France to Portugal. They provoked outrage (and the ire of Nicolas Sarkozy) by killing a French policeman in March this year. Quite simply, ETA had nowhere else to go.<br /><br />An interesting aspect to this story is the <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/sep/06/eta-ceasefire-basque-group-political-shift">claim</a> by <em>Sinn Féin </em>President Gerry Adams that Irish republicans played an important role in persuading ETA to put down their guns. While it is hard to ascertain just how influential Irish voices were in the Basque decision-making process, Adams does make a very necessary point about the role of the Spanish government:<blockquote>"<em>There is also a heavy responsibility on the Spanish government to grasp this opportunity for peace and progress. It needs to be farsighted, to think strategically and to ignore those voices that seek a resolution in terms of victory and defeat</em>."</blockquote>Unfortunately that seems highly unlikely given the initial reaction from Madrid in the shape of Interior Minister Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba:<blockquote>"<em>Eta kills in order to impose itself, so that means one cannot dialogue. Eta has stopped because it cannot do anything ... and also in order to rebuild itself</em>."</blockquote>While the second part of the statement is undoubtedly true, the first reflects a deeply ingrained mindset within the Spanish State - regardless of which political party happens to be in power. By way of contrast, when the British government was accused by the SDLP (moderate Irish nationalist party) of only talking to the political wings of Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups because they had guns, Jonathan Powell responded "and your point is?"<br /><br />Having said that, Pérez did no more than articulate the feelings of probably a large majority of Spaniards so, purely from a political point of view, he arguably couldn't have said anything else.<br /><br />However, it is to be hoped that behind the scenes the Spanish State will indeed be astute enough to take a long-term, strategic approach to this opportunity. For example, if it is indeed true, as alleged, that ETA are merely calling a temporary ceasefire in order to regroup then now is exactly the time, during their period of inactivity, to try and reintegrate ETA militants and their support base (what's left of it) into mainstream society and political life, as I have argued <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/05/policework-or-politics.html">before</a>. Above all, Madrid must positively respond to the Basque left and legalise those parties which do genuinely seek political solutions through peaceful, democratic means and always have done.<br /><br />This entails 'legalising' the very concept of Basque nationalism, which historically has been an existential non-starter for the Spanish State which has too often sought to taint all Basque nationalists with ETA's violence. However this is very definitely a <a href="http://www.deia.com/2010/09/07/politica/euskadi/la-izquierda-abertzale-pide-al-gobierno-su-legalizacion-porque-es-uno-de-los-minimos-democraticos-para-el-proceso-">"democratic minimum"</a> for a political process and the best way to render ETA completely irrelevant and seal their defeat. If Madrid fails to seize this opportunity, then their statements in response to ETA's announcement will very likely become a self-fulfilling prophesy.<br /><br /><strong>PS:</strong> Anybody puzzled by the face-masks and berets on display can find answers <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/06/eta-ceasefire-statement">here</a>.<br /></div></span>

Talking to the enemy - post scriptum

The BBC has an interesting story on alleged back-channel communications between dissident Irish Republicans and the British and Irish governments respectively. The claim was made by Sinn Féin chief negotiator Martin McGuinness, who must be considered a credible source given his own considerable experience of just this kind of back-channel communication. Having said that, it would be interesting to know why he chose to reveal this as I'm not quite sure what purpose he is serving in doing so.

I just wanted to highlight this briefly as an illustration of some points I made earlier this week. The Continuity IRA would be just the organisation who, according to the notions I expounded in my previous post, would not really be worth talking to on account of their lack of political nous.

However, this news raises a point which I probably should have dwelled on more in my previous post. The IRA in the early 1970s also had zero political nous - their entire political manifesto was 'Brits Out'. Some have argued that the political path on which the republican movement would eventually embark began at the Cheyne Walk talks in London in July 1972, which Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness attended and at which they realised that armed struggle alone would not be enough to achieve their objectives.

[NB: Peter Taylor's books Provos and Brits gives an in-depth and highly informative account of these initial talks. Ed Moloney's A Secret History of the IRA gives an excellent account of the way in which Adams and McGuinness would subsequently lead the republican movement down a political path.]

In short, by opening dialogue with armed groups you might be able to get them to think differently about their position, their methods and their objectives. That would have to be the aim of these back-channel contacts with dissident republicans, as Martin McGuinness has said. Incidentally, I think this quote answers the earlier question as to why he chose to reveal these talks - he's trying to put public pressure on dissidents to accept the inevitable, that the armed struggle is long over and to stop stirring up trouble which might hinder the perceived mainstream republicans from achieving their political goals.

"That suggests to me that these groups are recognising that at some stage they are going to have to wake up and smell the roses in terms of their inability to destroy the peace process," he said."

Ordinarily, the success of this kind of outreach would depend on many factors - for example, the leadership of the armed group itself, the background of the government negotiators (who must also be politically aware) - but it could be a worthwhile enterprise, albeit one that usually does not bear fruit immediately and the IRA are a prime example of precisely that.

Of course, this outreach must be done in such a way that it is easy deniable - note the strenuous British and Irish denials in the article, e.g. "it has never been our practice to speak to these people" - and indeed, according to some people mentioned in the article, these contacts have been very indirect and carried out by people from government bodies representing the intelligence agencies. In other words, this is not an official government policy.

However, the comparative lack of public or political outcry (aside from the occasional blustery comment from unionist politicians) perhaps shows to what extent people have accepted that talking to the enemy is a necessary and inevitable part of any kind of peace process.

<div align="justify">The BBC has an interesting <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-10953368">story</a> on alleged back-channel communications between dissident Irish Republicans and the British and Irish governments respectively. The claim was made by Sinn Féin chief negotiator Martin McGuinness, who must be considered a credible source given his own considerable experience of just this kind of back-channel communication. Having said that, it would be interesting to know why he chose to reveal this as I'm not quite sure what purpose he is serving in doing so.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />I just wanted to highlight this briefly as an illustration of some <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/08/talking-to-enemy.html">points</a> I made earlier this week. The Continuity IRA would be just the organisation who, according to the notions I expounded in my previous post, would not really be worth talking to on account of their lack of political nous.<br /><br />However, this news raises a point which I probably should have dwelled on more in my previous post. The IRA in the early 1970s also had zero political nous - their entire political manifesto was 'Brits Out'. Some have argued that the political path on which the republican movement would eventually embark began at the Cheyne Walk talks in London in July 1972, which Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness attended and at which they realised that armed struggle alone would not be enough to achieve their objectives.<br /><br /><strong>[NB: </strong>Peter Taylor's books <em>Provos </em>and <em>Brits </em>gives an in-depth and highly informative account of these initial talks. Ed Moloney's <em>A Secret History of the IRA</em> gives an excellent account of the way in which Adams and McGuinness would subsequently lead the republican movement down a political path.<strong>]</strong><br /><br />In short, by opening dialogue with armed groups you might be able to get them to think differently about their position, their methods and their objectives. That would have to be the aim of these back-channel contacts with dissident republicans, as Martin McGuinness has said. Incidentally, I think this quote answers the earlier question as to why he chose to reveal these talks - he's trying to put public pressure on dissidents to accept the inevitable, that the armed struggle is long over and to stop stirring up trouble which might hinder the perceived mainstream republicans from achieving their political goals.<br /><blockquote>"<em>That suggests to me that these groups are recognising that at some stage they are going to have to wake up and smell the roses in terms of their inability to destroy the peace process," he said</em>."</blockquote>Ordinarily, the success of this kind of outreach would depend on many factors - for example, the leadership of the armed group itself, the background of the government negotiators (who must also be politically <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/07/how-to-talk-to-kurds.html">aware</a>) - but it could be a worthwhile enterprise, albeit one that usually does not bear fruit immediately and the IRA are a prime example of precisely that.<br /><br />Of course, this outreach must be done in such a way that it is easy deniable - note the strenuous British and Irish denials in the article, e.g. "it has never been our practice to speak to these people" - and indeed, according to some people mentioned in the article, these contacts have been very indirect and carried out by people from government bodies representing the intelligence agencies. In other words, this is not an official government policy.<br /><br />However, the comparative lack of public or political outcry (aside from the occasional blustery comment from unionist politicians) perhaps shows to what extent people have accepted that talking to the enemy is a necessary and inevitable part of any kind of peace process.<br /></div></span>

Talking to the enemy

Jonathan Powell, former Chief of Staff to Tony Blair, has featured on this blog on more than one occasion, each time on the subject of conflict resolution - more specifically its methodology (if such a thing exists) and the importance of talking to the enemy.

This week he is to be found arguing - not for the first time - in favour of dialogue with the Taliban and al Qaida.

It is hard to object with much of Powell says here, above all because his argument is based on his long-standing personal experience in Northern Ireland, contacts with mediators in other late 20th century conflict zones and a pragmatic look at history.

"There seems to be a pattern to the west's behaviour when we face terrorist campaigns. First we fight them militarily, then we talk to them, and eventually we treat them as statesmen. That is what Britain did with Menachem Begin and the Irgun in Israel, with Jomo Kenyatta and the Mau Mau in Kenya and with Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus."

While there are many differences between these three cases alone, there is one common thread that runs through them and countless other 'terrorist' groups - it was once heresy to even suggest talking to these people but talk to them we (eventually) did.

I would hope that's a given for any serious student of history but for anyone who argues that it is morally reprehensible to talk to the likes of the Taliban and al Qaida, I would simply answer that we (the west) have talked and in fact actively supported worse characters than them in most parts of the world.

I don't therefore have any problems with Jonathan Powell's argument on moral grounds. My question is this - is it practical?

One could argue that talking to extremists is more than just practical, it is necessary. For example, as Powell realised in Northern Ireland, only extremes can build a lasting peace because there will be nobody left to outflank them. The British and Irish governments original intention was to build peace from the centre (ie. the moderate nationalist and unionist parties) and, while this was enough to reach a settlement, it was not enough to implement it. Only the extremes could do that.

That was the case in Northern Ireland but that lesson is not easily applicable to other situations, such as Afghanistan. We are obliged to keep in mind the basic question - is it practical? - and it is here that we must raise doubts on the notion of talking to the Taliban.

On a previous occasion (in 2008), Powell stated that:

"It's very difficult for democratic governments to do - talk to a terrorist movement that's killing your people," he said. "[But] if I was in government now I would want to have been talking to Hamas, I would be wanting to communicate with the Taliban; and I would want to find a channel to al-Qaida."

This is where I have a problem. Powell gives three examples of organisations which bear almost no resemblance to each other whatsoever. Say what you like about Hamas but they have a hierarchy, clear political objectives and unity of effort within the ranks. On that basis, you have some kind of starting point for negotiation.

Al Qaida, on the other hand, has none of those elements. Who would we talk to? What would we talk about? Even if we could find a credible interlocutor from among their ranks, there is no way he could win over the multitude of disparate al Qaida - or 'al Qaida inspired' - cells strung out across the world and bring them into a process of negotiation. Talking to al Qaida is simply a non-starter and I am amazed that Powell would compare them to Hamas.

The case of the Taliban is more complex and, of course, very topical. Much of what I have just said about al Qaida applies to them also. Who would we talk to? The most obvious answer here is Mullah Omar and/or the Quetta Shura but would they carry the entire movement with them?

The apparent generational divide within the new Taliban has featured on this blog before. As far as I can tell, amid all the ongoing talk of reconciliation and reintegration, nobody has thought to ask if we are dealing with one organisation or several, or if we are dealing with a leadership that truly controls its rank-and-file.

Even if they do - and that is a big 'if' - does Mullah Omar, who presumably has spent much of the past nine years in hiding, have a clear understanding of the domestic politics within Afghanistan and of the regional and global dimensions to this conflict? In my recent post on the alleged talks between Ankara and the Kurdish Workers' Party, I raised similar concerns about Abdullah Ocalan. To be credible, an interlocutor has to understand his own movement and the environment in which it resides.

Next question - what do we talk about? Do the Taliban have negotiable aims that the whole movement agrees on? On this issue, Powell raises some very pertinent issues:

"For the IRA, as long as the objective was "troops out", little discussion was needed. The same is true in Afghanistan. The Taliban will need to move beyond the single demand that foreign forces must leave first, and consider what they really want to achieve. What changes do they want in the Afghan constitution? What sort of power sharing should there be between the Pushtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and other minorities? How would they demonstrate that they had separated themselves from al-Qaida? What attitude would they take to women's rights and girls' education? They probably haven't thought these questions through themselves, but opening a channel would help them to start elaborating answers. And experience from other conflicts suggests this can take a long time."

All good points but I would add to them by saying that the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara and other minorities must be consulted and their fears must be allayed. That is paramount, assuming that it is even possible. Memories of inter-ethnic massacres during the 1990s civil war - notably in Mazar-e-Sharif between the Taliban and the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras - will not have been forgotten.

The fact that very few people have asked these questions must raise some concerns about the increasing chatter on reconciliation. Reintegration is different and, although still problematic, it does seem to have been more thought out than reconciliation. Until the Afghan government and the international community have asked hard questions about the very notion of talking to - and ultimately reconciling with - the Taliban, then we could perhaps be forgiven for thinking this smacks of a smokescreen as we start edging towards the exit door in Afghanistan.

<div align="justify">Jonathan Powell, former Chief of Staff to Tony Blair, has featured on this blog on more than one occasion, each time on the subject of conflict resolution - more specifically its <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/04/lessons-from-ireland-bicycle-theory.html">methodology</a> (if such a thing exists) and the importance of talking to the enemy.<br /><br />This week he is to be found arguing - not for the first time - in favour of dialogue with the Taliban and al Qaida.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />It is hard to object with much of Powell says <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/aug/08/talking-to-the-taliban-negotiations-end-war">here</a>, above all because his argument is based on his long-standing personal experience in Northern Ireland, contacts with mediators in other late 20th century conflict zones and a pragmatic look at history.<br /><blockquote><em>"There seems to be a pattern to the west's behaviour when we face terrorist campaigns. First we fight them militarily, then we talk to them, and eventually we treat them as statesmen. That is what Britain did with Menachem Begin and the Irgun in Israel, with Jomo Kenyatta and the Mau Mau in Kenya and with Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus."</em></blockquote>While there are many differences between these three cases alone, there is one common thread that runs through them and countless other 'terrorist' groups - it was once heresy to even suggest talking to these people but talk to them we (eventually) did.<br /><br />I would hope that's a given for any serious student of history but for anyone who argues that it is morally reprehensible to talk to the likes of the Taliban and al Qaida, I would simply answer that we (the west) have talked and in fact actively supported worse characters than them in most parts of the world.<br /><br />I don't therefore have any problems with Jonathan Powell's argument on moral grounds. My question is this - is it practical? <br /><br />One could argue that talking to extremists is more than just practical, it is necessary. For example, as Powell realised in Northern Ireland, only extremes can build a lasting peace because there will be nobody left to outflank them. The British and Irish governments original intention was to build peace from the centre (ie. the moderate nationalist and unionist parties) and, while this was enough to reach a settlement, it was not enough to implement it. Only the extremes could do that.<br /><br />That was the case in Northern Ireland but that lesson is not easily applicable to other situations, such as Afghanistan. We are obliged to keep in mind the basic question - is it practical? - and it is here that we must raise doubts on the notion of talking to the Taliban.<br /><br />On a previous occasion (in 2008), Powell <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/mar/15/uksecurity.alqaida">stated</a> that:<br /><blockquote><em>"It's very difficult for democratic governments to do - talk to a terrorist movement that's killing your people," he said. "[But] if I was in government now I would want to have been talking to Hamas, I would be wanting to communicate with the Taliban; and I would want to find a channel to al-Qaida."</em></blockquote>This is where I have a problem. Powell gives three examples of organisations which bear almost no resemblance to each other whatsoever. Say what you like about Hamas but they have a hierarchy, clear political objectives and unity of effort within the ranks. On that basis, you have some kind of starting point for negotiation.<br /><br />Al Qaida, on the other hand, has none of those elements. Who would we talk to? What would we talk about? Even if we could find a credible interlocutor from among their ranks, there is no way he could win over the multitude of disparate al Qaida - or 'al Qaida inspired' - cells strung out across the world and bring them into a process of negotiation. Talking to al Qaida is simply a non-starter and I am amazed that Powell would compare them to Hamas.<br /><br />The case of the Taliban is more complex and, of course, very topical. Much of what I have just said about al Qaida applies to them also. Who would we talk to? The most obvious answer here is Mullah Omar and/or the Quetta Shura but would they carry the entire movement with them?<br /><br />The apparent generational divide within the new Taliban has featured on this <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/05/who-are-young-taliban.html">blog</a> before. As far as I can tell, amid all the ongoing talk of reconciliation and reintegration, nobody has thought to ask if we are dealing with one organisation or several, or if we are dealing with a leadership that truly controls its rank-and-file.<br /><br />Even if they do - and that is a big 'if' - does Mullah Omar, who presumably has spent much of the past nine years in hiding, have a clear understanding of the domestic politics within Afghanistan and of the regional and global dimensions to this conflict? In my recent <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/07/how-to-talk-to-kurds.html">post</a> on the alleged talks between Ankara and the Kurdish Workers' Party, I raised similar concerns about Abdullah Ocalan. To be credible, an interlocutor has to understand his own movement and the environment in which it resides.<br /><br />Next question - what do we talk about? Do the Taliban have negotiable aims that the whole movement agrees on? On this issue, Powell raises some very pertinent issues:<br /><blockquote><em>"For the IRA, as long as the objective was "troops out", little discussion was needed. The same is true in Afghanistan. The Taliban will need to move beyond the single demand that foreign forces must leave first, and consider what they really want to achieve. What changes do they want in the Afghan constitution? What sort of power sharing should there be between the Pushtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and other minorities? How would they demonstrate that they had separated themselves from al-Qaida? What attitude would they take to women's rights and girls' education? They probably haven't thought these questions through themselves, but opening a channel would help them to start elaborating answers. And experience from other conflicts suggests this can take a long time."</em></blockquote>All good points but I would add to them by saying that the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara and other minorities <strong>must</strong> be consulted and their fears must be allayed. That is paramount, assuming that it is even possible. Memories of inter-ethnic massacres during the 1990s civil war - notably in Mazar-e-Sharif between the Taliban and the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras - will not have been forgotten.<br /><br />The fact that very few people have asked these questions must raise some concerns about the increasing chatter on reconciliation. Reintegration is different and, although still problematic, it does seem to have been more thought out than reconciliation. Until the Afghan government and the international community have asked hard questions about the very notion of talking to - and ultimately reconciling with - the Taliban, then we could perhaps be forgiven for thinking this smacks of a smokescreen as we start edging towards the exit door in Afghanistan.<br /></div></span>

How to talk to the Kurds?

The Economist reports on increased tension in the Kurdish populated areas of Turkey and Iraq. This is not a new problem but any increase in tension - and potentially violence - would come at a very difficult time for the Turkish government and the AKP ruling party.

From an international perspective, the concern has always been that Turkey - which has the second-largest standing army in NATO - could become too distracted by its campaign against Kurdish guerrillas to fulfil its international commitments. Having said that, while Turkish troops play important roles in ISAF, KFOR and EUFOR Althea, in terms of numbers their contributions are not (proportionately) among the most significant.

There are other - very real - possibilities which could arise from increased tension and/or violence between the Turkish Army and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). There is the fear of increased conflict between Turkey and Kurds across the border in Iraq, just as the US is drawing down its presence in Iraq. Moreover, as the Economist article points out, any PKK resurgence would leave Prime Minister Erdogan in a very difficult position.

As next July’s parliamentary elections draw nearer, Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is unlikely to risk nationalist ire by openly talking to a group deemed by Turkey and its Western allies to be terrorists. On the other hand, as Mr Erdogan knows, abandoning reform in favour of war will only strengthen the hand of his opponents within the army. He is, as an old Turkish saying goes, holding a stick with shit at both ends.

That is reason enough for the international community to be concerned at this potential development - and also reason enough for the international community to encourage and/or pressure Turkey to solve this as reasonably and effectively as possible, admittedly not an easy task.

On that subject, there are some questions to raise. The article states that secret talks have been going on with Abdullah Ocalan. While it may well be true that he retains huge support and affection from the rank-and-file, the fact remains that he has been in solitary confinement for eleven years. How can he be expected to have a clear understanding of the situation on the ground as it is now? Does he know the mood among the Kurdish rank-and-file (a different generation from the one he knew)? Does he know the key players on his side and on the Turkish side? Does he know the public mood in Turkey, notably in the context of next year's elections?

Furthermore, these secret talks have apparently been led by security and intelligence operatives and the PKK have - understandably and rightly - stated that they want to talk to politicians.

One could make a comparison to the discussions held in Algiers in 1989 between ETA and the Spanish government. ETA were represented by Antonio Etxebeste, who was released from prison for the occasion. The Spanish government was represented by the Interior Minister, José Luis Corcuera, but also by Rafael Vera, director of State security, who was said to have close links to the government black ops unit known as the GAL. Vera had previously participated in discussions with ETA, also in Algiers, accompanied by Jorge Argote, a lawyer who had defended men accused of torturing ETA prisoners, and Jesus Martinez Torres, chief of intelligence for the national police, who was suspected of actually having participated in torture.

With interlocutors like that, it is no surprise that the talks went nowhere but the real point is that the Spanish government and ETA alike displayed a failure to recognise the political nature of the problem. Both sides sent in security and/or intelligence operatives (on the ETA side, Etxebeste was accompanied by two operatives from the Madrid commando) who neither understood nor cared to understand the political realities of the situation or public opinion in the Basque country and in Spain (ETA's lack of political nous is a subject previously covered on this blog).

That is an approach which the Turkish government would do well to avoid - assuming that it is serious about finding some kind of solution to the Kurdish issue - but also because, as the Economist points out, if they let the military and security apparatus of the State take the lead then the civilian government could find itself undermined in the ongoing existential debate over what kind of State Turkey should be.

<div align="justify"><a href="http://www.economist.com/node/16646014">The Economist</a> reports on increased tension in the Kurdish populated areas of Turkey and Iraq. This is not a new problem but any increase in tension - and potentially violence - would come at a very difficult time for the Turkish government and the AKP ruling party.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />From an international perspective, the concern has always been that Turkey - which has the second-largest standing army in NATO - could become too distracted by its campaign against Kurdish guerrillas to fulfil its international commitments. Having said that, while Turkish troops play important roles in ISAF, KFOR and EUFOR Althea, in terms of numbers their contributions are not (proportionately) among the most significant.<br /><br />There are other - very real - possibilities which could arise from increased tension and/or violence between the Turkish Army and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). There is the fear of increased conflict between Turkey and Kurds across the border in Iraq, just as the US is drawing down its presence in Iraq. Moreover, as the Economist article points out, any PKK resurgence would leave Prime Minister Erdogan in a very difficult position.<br /><em><blockquote>As next July’s parliamentary elections draw nearer, Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is unlikely to risk nationalist ire by openly talking to a group deemed by Turkey and its Western allies to be terrorists. On the other hand, as Mr Erdogan knows, abandoning reform in favour of war will only strengthen the hand of his opponents within the army. He is, as an old Turkish saying goes, holding a stick with shit at both ends.</blockquote></em>That is reason enough for the international community to be concerned at this potential development - and also reason enough for the international community to encourage and/or pressure Turkey to solve this as reasonably and effectively as possible, admittedly not an easy task.<br /><br />On that subject, there are some questions to raise. The article states that secret talks have been going on with Abdullah Ocalan. While it may well be true that he retains huge support and affection from the rank-and-file, the fact remains that he has been in solitary confinement for eleven years. How can he be expected to have a clear understanding of the situation on the ground as it is now? Does he know the mood among the Kurdish rank-and-file (a different generation from the one he knew)? Does he know the key players on his side and on the Turkish side? Does he know the public mood in Turkey, notably in the context of next year's elections?<br /><br />Furthermore, these secret talks have apparently been led by security and intelligence operatives and the PKK have - understandably and rightly - stated that they want to talk to politicians.<br /><br />One could make a comparison to the discussions held in Algiers in 1989 between ETA and the Spanish government. ETA were represented by Antonio Etxebeste, who was released from prison for the occasion. The Spanish government was represented by the Interior Minister, José Luis Corcuera, but also by Rafael Vera, director of State security, who was said to have close links to the government black ops unit known as the GAL. Vera had previously participated in discussions with ETA, also in Algiers, accompanied by Jorge Argote, a lawyer who had defended men accused of torturing ETA prisoners, and Jesus Martinez Torres, chief of intelligence for the national police, who was suspected of actually having participated in torture.<br /><br />With interlocutors like that, it is no surprise that the talks went nowhere but the real point is that the Spanish government and ETA alike displayed a failure to recognise the political nature of the problem. Both sides sent in security and/or intelligence operatives (on the ETA side, Etxebeste was accompanied by two operatives from the Madrid commando) who neither understood nor cared to understand the political realities of the situation or public opinion in the Basque country and in Spain (ETA's lack of political nous is a subject previously covered on this <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/05/policework-or-politics.html">blog</a>).<br /><br />That is an approach which the Turkish government would do well to avoid - assuming that it is serious about finding some kind of solution to the Kurdish issue - but also because, as the Economist points out, if they let the military and security apparatus of the State take the lead then the civilian government could find itself undermined in the ongoing existential debate over what kind of State Turkey should be.<br /><br /></div></span>

Policework or politics?

French police have arrested the suspected military leader of the Basque separatist group ETA, an individual named Mikel Karrera Sarobe, or 'Ata'.

Five ETA leaders have been arrested in France over the past two years. Indeed, Ata has only been leader of the organisation since February of this year when his predecessor, Ibon Gogeascoechea, was arrested. That particular fact is interesting because it raises certain questions.

Question 1/
What are the objectives of the Spanish and French police and intelligence services? Are they seeking to eradicate ETA altogether or merely reduce ETA's 'campaign' to a manageable or acceptable level of violence?
1a/ If the former is the case then can ETA really be eradicated solely through police and/or intelligence action?
1b/ If the latter is the case then how do we define manageable or acceptable?

Nicolas Sarkozy would appear to have already answered the first part of that question following ETA's fatal shooting of a French policeman in March but is that a realistic aim or merely political posturing for the benefit of a - justifiably - angry French public?

Question 2/
Should there not be some attempt to reach a political solution? More specifically, should there not be some attempt to find credible interlocutors on the other side in order to work towards some kind of political solution? Incidentally, that question applies as much to ETA as towards Madrid and Paris.

Many would argue, not entirely without justification, that ETA are simply not credible interlocutors, that they have neither the requisite level of political sophistication nor of public support to be regarded as an important party in the Spanish and Basque political scenes.

However, while there may be a considerable degree of truth in those statements, ETA do remain in existence and they do remain a threat, not to the monopoly of legitimate violence in Vitoria-Gasteiz, Madrid or Paris but to ordinary people's lives.

Therefore, they must be persuaded/forced to put away their guns and work towards their goals, such as they are, through some other (non-violent) method and that is what we should mean when we refer to a 'political solution' in the Basque Country, not a Basque version of the Good Friday Agreement.

In that context, when leaders keep being arrested every few months then the repercussions on any further attempt at a political solution are usually negative.

There are certain simple, practical factors that make this the case: the over-riding priority of the individual concerned will simply be to evade capture and, moreover, a few months is not enough time to convince a movement like ETA that a change of strategy is necessary, let alone to actually implement such a change. Above all, the strong likelihood is that each new leader will be more hard-line than the last.

ETA are very often compared to the IRA and many people have attempted to draw lessons from the peace process in Northern Ireland and apply them to the Basque Country. There is a big difference however.

Any political solution requires a degree of political understanding, or intelligence, among the leadership of the organisation in conflict with the State. That was the case among certain IRA leaders, Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, throughout the peace process in Northern Ireland. That has never been the case with ETA.

Partly this is linked to the fact that, as described above, leaders keep being arrested and their successors have to go into hiding (before inevitably being arrested anyway) and are thus even further removed from the society in which they live and for which they claim to fight. If you apply Mao Zedong's metaphor on guerrilla armies, these fish no longer swim in the water of the people. Instead, they are floundering in increasingly shallow water, struggling for oxygen.

A case in point was ETA's murder, in December 2008, of 71-year-old Ignacio Uria Mendizabal simply because his family's construction business was involved in building a controversial high-speed rail link through the Basque Country. How not to win hearts and minds.

ETA may be dying a slow, suffocating death but they seem determined to take others down with them. In order to minimise the harm done to ordinary people, arresting individual leaders is not enough. Should these measures not be accompanied by sustained engagement at street level with the marginalised urban youth from which ETA draws its dwindling number of recruits? Can a purely security-based solution ever be enough on its own?

NB: This post touches on a number of issues which deserve more in-depth examination. Anyone keen to learn more about how the Spanish and French authorities sought to fight fire with fire should start by reading this interview with Irish journalist Paddy Woodworth, who investigated exactly how this was done during the 1980s and the harmful consequences these measures incurred.

<div align="justify">French police have <a href="http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ilgRFw0LrxsnhNfYcmuiNeZlYGzA">arrested </a>the suspected military leader of the Basque separatist group ETA, an individual named Mikel Karrera Sarobe, or 'Ata'.<br /><br />Five ETA leaders have been arrested in France over the past two years. Indeed, Ata has only been leader of the organisation since February of this year when his predecessor, Ibon Gogeascoechea, was arrested. That particular fact is interesting because it raises certain questions.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />Question 1/<br />What are the objectives of the Spanish and French police and intelligence services? Are they seeking to eradicate ETA altogether or merely reduce ETA's 'campaign' to a manageable or acceptable level of violence?<br />1a/ If the former is the case then can ETA really be eradicated solely through police and/or intelligence action?<br />1b/ If the latter is the case then how do we define manageable or acceptable?<br /><br />Nicolas Sarkozy would appear to have already <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8582965.stm">answered </a>the first part of that question following ETA's fatal shooting of a French policeman in March but is that a realistic aim or merely political posturing for the benefit of a - justifiably - angry French public?<br /><br />Question 2/<br />Should there not be some attempt to reach a political solution? More specifically, should there not be some attempt to find credible interlocutors on the other side in order to work towards some kind of political solution? Incidentally, that question applies as much to ETA as towards Madrid and Paris.<br /><br />Many would argue, not entirely without justification, that ETA are simply not credible interlocutors, that they have neither the requisite level of political sophistication nor of public support to be regarded as an important party in the Spanish and Basque political scenes.<br /><br />However, while there may be a considerable degree of truth in those statements, ETA do remain in existence and they do remain a threat, not to the monopoly of legitimate violence in Vitoria-Gasteiz, Madrid or Paris but to ordinary people's lives.<br /><br />Therefore, they must be persuaded/forced to put away their guns and work towards their goals, such as they are, through some other (non-violent) method and that is what we should mean when we refer to a 'political solution' in the Basque Country, not a Basque version of the Good Friday Agreement.<br /><br />In that context, when leaders keep being arrested every few months then the repercussions on any further attempt at a political solution are usually negative.<br /><br />There are certain simple, practical factors that make this the case: the over-riding priority of the individual concerned will simply be to evade capture and, moreover, a few months is not enough time to convince a movement like ETA that a change of strategy is necessary, let alone to actually implement such a change. Above all, the strong likelihood is that each new leader will be more hard-line than the last.<br /><br />ETA are very often compared to the IRA and many people have attempted to draw lessons from the peace process in Northern Ireland and apply them to the Basque Country. There is a big difference however.<br /><br />Any political solution requires a degree of political understanding, or intelligence, among the leadership of the organisation in conflict with the State. That was the case among certain IRA leaders, Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, throughout the peace process in Northern Ireland. That has never been the case with ETA.<br /><br />Partly this is linked to the fact that, as described above, leaders keep being arrested and their successors have to go into hiding (before inevitably being arrested anyway) and are thus even further removed from the society in which they live and for which they claim to fight. If you apply Mao Zedong's metaphor on guerrilla armies, these fish no longer swim in the water of the people. Instead, they are floundering in increasingly shallow water, struggling for oxygen.<br /><br />A case in point was ETA's <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8236471.stm">murder</a>, in December 2008, of 71-year-old Ignacio Uria Mendizabal simply because his family's construction business was involved in building a controversial high-speed rail link through the Basque Country. How <strong>not </strong>to win hearts and minds.<br /><br />ETA may be dying a slow, suffocating death but they seem determined to take others down with them. In order to minimise the harm done to ordinary people, arresting individual leaders is not enough. Should these measures not be accompanied by sustained engagement at street level with the marginalised urban youth from which ETA draws its dwindling number of recruits? Can a purely security-based solution ever be enough on its own?<br /><br /><em><strong>NB: </strong>This post touches on a number of issues which deserve more in-depth examination. Anyone keen to learn more about how the Spanish and French authorities sought to fight fire with fire should start by reading this <a href="http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-03-18-woodworth-en.html">interview </a>with Irish journalist Paddy Woodworth, who investigated exactly how this was done during the 1980s and the harmful consequences these measures incurred.</em><br /></div></span>

How the West was won

Some consider the Native Americans of the Great Plains to have been among the most effective guerrilla fighters in history... and yet they were eventually beaten.

While this episode of history was not one which western civilisation can regard with much pride, there may be some interesting lessons here which could perhaps be applied in a modern counter-insurgency campaign, such as Afghanistan.

These musings are intended to precede a more in-depth - and perhaps more scientific - look at the much-vaunted reconciliation and reintegration efforts currently underway in Afghanistan. I'll write more on that early next week but for now I wanted to look at one historical episode which provides food-for-thought - and not direct parallels - on this particular issue.

Obviously some of the factors in the defeat of the Plains nations cannot be transplanted to Afghanistan: there are no buffalo herds to eradicate and its more than a little unlikely that white settlers will drive into Helmand province in horse-drawn wagons in the pursuit of manifest destiny. These factors were probably more important than the military campaign as they undermined the entire way of life of the nomadic Plains nations.

A further factor must be acknowledged: whereas in Afghanistan one civilian casualty is one too many (although unfortunately it doesn't always work out that way), the US Army had no such restraints when fighting the nations of the Plains, as illustrated most infamously by Custer's massacre of a Cheyenne village at the Washita river in 1868.

Those three factors are (very obviously) entirely irrelevant to the situation in Afghanistan. However, there were two factors in the defeat of the Lakota specifically that might be integrated into a counter-insurgency strategy.

Drown them in baby milk

The fighting strength of the Lakota was sapped by the numbers of young men who, with their families, eschewed the old way of life and instead lived on hand-outs from soldiers living in what we would now call Forward Operating Bases, such as Fort Laramie on the Oregon Trail. These people were dubbed the 'Laramie Loafers' and they posed a major problem for the Lakota as i/ they reduced what was already a small pool of young men who could take up arms and ii/ they sapped the morale of those who chose to follow the old way of life.

Drowning insurgents in baby milk (ie. throwing money and material goods at them in order to undermine their motivation to fight) is hardly a new suggestion. I believe this particular metaphor first appeared in Vietnam but the method is as old as time. The example of the Laramie Loafers shows that such an approach can have a big impact.

The modern 'equivalent' in Afghanistan would be to simply provide jobs for people in Afghanistan. It is often said that many Taliban foot-soldiers only joined the insurgency because they would make more money there than elsewhere. Therefore, in simple terms the theory is that by creating licit sources of income (ie. anything other than joining the Taliban and/or growing poppies), many of the rank-and-file would drop their weapons and return home peacefully.

I can see the sense in such a theory and it may well have some impact in its implementation. The question is to what extent and will this be enough to irreversibly weaken the insurgency? That remains to be seen and I would have some questions (and doubts) here, notably concerning the received wisdom that most Taliban fighters are simply in it for the money.

Certain well-respected observers - I'm thinking of Ahmed Rashid and Robert Fisk - have highlighted the origins of the Taliban in the poverty-stricken refugee camps to which Afghans fled in great numbers (3.5m in Pakistan, 1m in Iran) during the Soviet occupation. Fisk argues that the extreme austerity of the Taliban regime stemmed from the fact that, in the refugee camps and madrasas, poverty was all they knew. In similar vein, Rashid describes the Taliban in these terms:

"These boys were a world apart from the Mujaheddin I had got to know during the 1980s - men who could recount their tribal and clan lineages, remembered their abandoned farms and valleys with nostalgia and recounted legends and stories from Afghan history... They were literally the orphans of the war, the rootless and the restless, the jobless and the economically deprived with little self-knowledge. They admired war because it was the only occupation they could possibly adapt to. Their simple belief in a messianic, puritan Islam which had been drummed into them by simple village mullahs was the only prop they could hold on to and which gave their lives some meaning."

I will look at this in greater detail next week. Suffice to say for now that it might not be a foregone conclusion to drown people in baby milk if their basic worldview rejects wealth and material possessions.

Divide and conquer

Another factor in sapping both the fighting strength and the morale of the Lakota was the lack of unity within their ranks. Factions did not so much emerge along tribal lines (the Lakota nation was composed of several sub-groups) as around individuals. Most notably, the personal antipathy of the Oglala leader Red Cloud and the Brulé leader Spotted Tail towards the famous warrior Crazy Horse was a factor which prevented young warriors from rallying behind him and mounting a concerted and organised resistance campaign.

These differences were skilfully exploited by the US Army, or more accurately by their civilian agents, who rewarded the older chiefs with material goods and political recognition (Red Cloud was received at the White House several times by President Ulysses Grant). Red Cloud did not take part in the escalating guerrilla campaign led by Crazy Horse and the Hunkpapa medicine man Sitting Bull. Red Cloud's weight among the people split the fighting strength of the Lakota, in terms of numbers, logistic support and morale.

In this vein, Anne Stenersen argues that, instead of negotiating directly with the Taliban leadership, it would be more realistic to weaken the Taliban's coherence by negotiating with - and offering incentives to - low-level commanders and tribal leaders in Afghanistan (see report posted here by Frederik on 27 April). The wide variety of actors that make up the 'opposing militant forces' (the official ISAF term) is a strength that could be turned into a weakness "if properly and systematically exploited."

I can understand the thinking behind this and hopefully I've shown, using one specific historical example, that such an approach can serve a purpose when fighting an insurgency. However, next week I'll raise some questions (and doubts) about the practical implementation of reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan.

Some consider the Native Americans of the Great Plains to have been among the most effective guerrilla fighters in history... and yet they were eventually beaten.<br /><br />While this episode of history was not one which western civilisation can regard with much pride, there may be some interesting lessons here which could perhaps be applied in a modern counter-insurgency campaign, such as Afghanistan.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />These musings are intended to precede a more in-depth - and perhaps more scientific - look at the much-vaunted <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/05/afghanistan-taliban-leaders-offered-exile-peace-plan/print">reconciliation and reintegration</a> efforts currently underway in Afghanistan. I'll write more on that early next week but for now I wanted to look at one historical episode which provides food-for-thought - and not direct parallels - on this particular issue.<br /><br />Obviously some of the factors in the defeat of the Plains nations cannot be transplanted to Afghanistan: there are no buffalo herds to eradicate and its more than a little unlikely that white settlers will drive into Helmand province in horse-drawn wagons in the pursuit of manifest destiny. These factors were probably more important than the military campaign as they undermined the entire way of life of the nomadic Plains nations.<br /><br />A further factor must be acknowledged: whereas in Afghanistan one civilian casualty is one too many (although unfortunately it doesn't always work out that way), the US Army had no such restraints when fighting the nations of the Plains, as illustrated most infamously by Custer's massacre of a Cheyenne village at the Washita river in 1868.<br /><br />Those three factors are (very obviously) entirely irrelevant to the situation in Afghanistan. However, there were two factors in the defeat of the Lakota specifically that might be integrated into a counter-insurgency strategy.<br /><br /><strong>Drown them in baby milk</strong><br /><br />The fighting strength of the Lakota was sapped by the numbers of young men who, with their families, eschewed the old way of life and instead lived on hand-outs from soldiers living in what we would now call Forward Operating Bases, such as Fort Laramie on the Oregon Trail. These people were dubbed the 'Laramie Loafers' and they posed a major problem for the Lakota as i/ they reduced what was already a small pool of young men who could take up arms and ii/ they sapped the morale of those who chose to follow the old way of life.<br /><br />Drowning insurgents in baby milk (ie. throwing money and material goods at them in order to undermine their motivation to fight) is hardly a new suggestion. I believe this particular metaphor first appeared in Vietnam but the method is as old as time. The example of the Laramie Loafers shows that such an approach can have a big impact.<br /><br />The modern 'equivalent' in Afghanistan would be to simply provide jobs for people in Afghanistan. It is often said that many Taliban foot-soldiers only joined the insurgency because they would make more money there than elsewhere. Therefore, in simple terms the theory is that by creating licit sources of income (ie. anything other than joining the Taliban and/or growing poppies), many of the rank-and-file would drop their weapons and return home peacefully.<br /><br />I can see the sense in such a theory and it may well have some impact in its implementation. The question is to what extent and will this be enough to irreversibly weaken the insurgency? That remains to be seen and I would have some questions (and doubts) here, notably concerning the received wisdom that most Taliban fighters are simply in it for the money.<br /><br />Certain well-respected observers - I'm thinking of Ahmed Rashid and Robert Fisk - have highlighted the origins of the Taliban in the poverty-stricken refugee camps to which Afghans fled in great numbers (3.5m in Pakistan, 1m in Iran) during the Soviet occupation. Fisk argues that the extreme austerity of the Taliban regime stemmed from the fact that, in the refugee camps and madrasas, poverty was all they knew. In similar vein, Rashid describes the Taliban in these terms:<br /><blockquote>"<em>These boys were a world apart from the Mujaheddin I had got to know during the 1980s - men who could recount their tribal and clan lineages, remembered their abandoned farms and valleys with nostalgia and recounted legends and stories from Afghan history... They were literally the orphans of the war, the rootless and the restless, the jobless and the economically deprived with little self-knowledge. They admired war because it was the only occupation they could possibly adapt to. Their simple belief in a messianic, puritan Islam which had been drummed into them by simple village mullahs was the only prop they could hold on to and which gave their lives some meaning</em>."</blockquote>I will look at this in greater detail next week. Suffice to say for now that it might not be a foregone conclusion to drown people in baby milk if their basic worldview rejects wealth and material possessions.<br /><br /><strong>Divide and conquer</strong><br /><br />Another factor in sapping both the fighting strength and the morale of the Lakota was the lack of unity within their ranks. Factions did not so much emerge along tribal lines (the Lakota nation was composed of several sub-groups) as around individuals. Most notably, the personal antipathy of the Oglala leader Red Cloud and the Brulé leader Spotted Tail towards the famous warrior Crazy Horse was a factor which prevented young warriors from rallying behind him and mounting a concerted and organised resistance campaign.<br /><br />These differences were skilfully exploited by the US Army, or more accurately by their civilian agents, who rewarded the older chiefs with material goods and political recognition (Red Cloud was received at the White House several times by President Ulysses Grant). Red Cloud did not take part in the escalating guerrilla campaign led by Crazy Horse and the Hunkpapa medicine man Sitting Bull. Red Cloud's weight among the people split the fighting strength of the Lakota, in terms of numbers, logistic support and morale.<br /><br />In this vein, Anne Stenersen argues that, instead of negotiating directly with the Taliban leadership, it would be more realistic to weaken the Taliban's coherence by negotiating with - and offering incentives to - low-level commanders and tribal leaders in Afghanistan (see <a href="http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00136/00359_136353a.pdf">report </a>posted here by Frederik on 27 April). The wide variety of actors that make up the 'opposing militant forces' (the official ISAF term) is a strength that could be turned into a weakness "if properly and systematically exploited."<br /><br />I can understand the thinking behind this and hopefully I've shown, using one specific historical example, that such an approach can serve a purpose when fighting an insurgency. However, next week I'll raise some questions (and doubts) about the practical implementation of reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan.<br /></span>

Lessons from Ireland - the bicycle theory

When riding a bicycle, if you stop pedalling then the bicycle falls over. Conclusion - if you want to go somewhere you have to keep pedalling.

The same is true of a process of conflict resolution, according to Jonathan Powell, formerly Chief of Staff to Tony Blair and the latter's main adviser/negotiator on the Northern Ireland peace process.

Powell wrote a book, called 'Great Hatred, Little Room' (from a poem by W.B. Yeats), about his decade-long experience. Aside from being a highly-readable account of personalities and anecdotes, it also provides a few salient points which I would like to draw out for my third and final post on the lessons we can learn from the peace process in Northern Ireland.

- talking is not a reward to be withdrawn but a basic necessity for any peace process. Moreover, to make peace you must talk to your enemies, not just to your friends. That might seem obvious but look at other past or ongoing processes and you quickly discover that this pre-condition is far from a foregone conclusion.

- in that vein, they realised that only extremes can build peace as there is nobody left to outflank them. NB: the original intention was to build peace from the moderate parties in the centre and, while this was enough to reach a settlement, it was not enough to implement it. Only the extremes could do that.

- maintain strategic focus, do not get distracted by tactical games.

- ambiguity in negotiations is complicated and needs careful handling. Although almost always necessary at the beginning, 'constructive ambiguity' must be squeezed out (painfully and over time) as a durable peace cannot rest on an ambiguous understanding.

- widen the focus when you reach an absolute impasse.

- the stage of a breakthrough agreement is exactly the moment to redouble your efforts and try to implement (ie. sell) the agreement to both/all sides.

- dealing with criminality is not easy, as it can be a (local) cultural phenomenon. The trick is to force a divorce between those who opt for crime and those who opt for a political path.

- on hearts and minds, by investing effort/money/jobs into the water in which your enemies swim (metaphor c/o Mao Zedong) you can reduce pressure in a conflict.

Powell is careful to state very clearly that Northern Ireland was a unique, a sui generis, situation and that we should be very careful about drawing parellels with other process of conflict resolution (for example in the Middle East where George Mitchell is now the US Special Envoy just as he was previously in Northern Ireland - see my first post on this subject).

To that end, Powell highlights certain underlying factors which created the conditions for reaching - and implementing, albeit extremely slowly - a peace settlement in Ireland.

- a generational change in the leadership of i/ Irish Republicans, ii/ in London and Dublin and iii/ the 'securocrats' within the British State (military and intelligence) apparatus
- the Celtic Tiger economic boom in Ireland
- 911, which showed Irish Republicans that their brand of physical force was simply outdated
- the US factor (see previous post on the 'out of the box' theory)

Above all, he states very clearly that conflict resolution can only succeed when both/all sides have realised that they cannot win.

However, it is for those reasons that in these three posts I have been careful to consider Northern Ireland as a case study for a 'methodology' (for want of a better word) of conflict resolution, and not a blueprint. Lessons therefore refers to process and I'd be interested to see to what extent people think some of these lessons could, or should, be applied elsewhere.

"Out of Ireland have we come, great hatred, little room, maimed us at the start. I carry from my mother's womb a fanatic heart." (W.B. Yeats)

When riding a bicycle, if you stop pedalling then the bicycle falls over. Conclusion - if you want to go somewhere you have to keep pedalling.<br /><br />The same is true of a process of conflict resolution, according to Jonathan Powell, formerly Chief of Staff to Tony Blair and the latter's main adviser/negotiator on the Northern Ireland peace process.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />Powell wrote a book, called 'Great Hatred, Little Room' (from a poem by W.B. Yeats), about his decade-long experience. Aside from being a highly-readable account of personalities and anecdotes, it also provides a few salient points which I would like to draw out for my third and final post on the lessons we can learn from the peace process in Northern Ireland.<br /><br />- talking is not a reward to be withdrawn but a basic necessity for any peace process. Moreover, to make peace you must talk to your enemies, not just to your friends. That might seem obvious but look at other past or ongoing processes and you quickly discover that this pre-condition is far from a foregone conclusion.<br /><br />- in that vein, they realised that only extremes can build peace as there is nobody left to outflank them. <strong>NB:</strong> the original intention was to build peace from the moderate parties in the centre and, while this was enough to reach a settlement, it was not enough to implement it. Only the extremes could do that.<br /><br />- maintain strategic focus, do not get distracted by tactical games.<br /><br />- ambiguity in negotiations is complicated and needs careful handling. Although almost always necessary at the beginning, 'constructive ambiguity' must be squeezed out (painfully and over time) as a <em>durable </em>peace cannot rest on an ambiguous understanding.<br /><br />- widen the focus when you reach an absolute impasse.<br /><br />- the stage of a breakthrough agreement is exactly the moment to redouble your efforts and try to implement (ie. sell) the agreement to both/all sides.<br /><br />- dealing with criminality is not easy, as it can be a (local) cultural phenomenon. The trick is to force a divorce between those who opt for crime and those who opt for a political path.<br /><br />- on hearts and minds, by investing effort/money/jobs into the water in which your enemies swim (metaphor c/o Mao Zedong) you can reduce pressure in a conflict.<br /><br />Powell is careful to state very clearly that Northern Ireland was a unique, a <em>sui generis</em>, situation and that we should be very careful about drawing parellels with other process of conflict resolution (for example in the Middle East where George Mitchell is now the US Special Envoy just as he was previously in Northern Ireland - see my first post on this subject).<br /><br />To that end, Powell highlights certain underlying factors which created the conditions for reaching - and implementing, albeit extremely slowly - a peace settlement in Ireland.<br /><br />- a generational change in the leadership of i/ Irish Republicans, ii/ in London and Dublin and iii/ the 'securocrats' within the British State (military and intelligence) apparatus<br />- the Celtic Tiger economic boom in Ireland<br />- 911, which showed Irish Republicans that their brand of physical force was simply outdated<br />- the US factor (see previous post on the 'out of the box' theory)<br /><br />Above all, he states very clearly that conflict resolution can only succeed when both/all sides have realised that they cannot win.<br /><br />However, it is for those reasons that in these three posts I have been careful to consider Northern Ireland as a case study for a 'methodology' (for want of a better word) of conflict resolution, and not a blueprint. Lessons therefore refers to process and I'd be interested to see to what extent people think some of these lessons could, or should, be applied elsewhere.<br /><br /><em>"Out of Ireland have we come, great hatred, little room, maimed us at the start. I carry from my mother's womb a fanatic heart." </em>(W.B. Yeats)<br /></span>

Lessons from Ireland - the 'out of the box' theory

Arguably the most interesting lesson from the Northern Ireland peace process is the role of the United States as an 'out of the box' player, a deus ex machina.

Whereas previously the US had been little more than a place for the IRA to procure high-grade weapons (both legally and illegally), when Bill Clinton was elected President in 1992 this changed - for two reasons:

Firstly, as the first non-veteran to become President since 1945, Clinton brought a post-Cold War vision in which the State Department's hands-off policy on Northern Ireland - in deference to Britain's role as America's most important military ally - no longer held sway.

Secondly, Clinton the uber-politician was very aware of the unavoidable influence of Irish-America at the polls.

It was in that context that a number of prominent Irish-Americans launched an energetic lobbying campaign. One of their number, Jim Reilly, a former top executive with IBM, is credited with the 'out of the box' theory which best sums up US involvement in Northern Ireland during the 1990s.

According to Reilly, all the parties to the conflict in Northern Ireland were frozen in the same box and any move was immediately countered by a check-mating move from the other side. The introduction of an 'out of the box' player would completely change the dynamic inside the box.

So it proved. Without going into the finer details here, constructive US involvement - notably granting visas to Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams and veteran IRA member Joe Cahill - showed the republican movement that politics could open doors and subsequently led to IRA ceasefires in 1996-96 and from 1997 onwards, ultimately leading to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.

I must add a caveat at this stage. London and Dublin had increasingly worked together over the previous years, even decades, to build a conflict resolution process and the triangular Belfast-London-Dublin dynamic was already an improvement on the confrontational IRA vs London dynamic. So while Washington's involvement helped to change the dynamic and open up new possibilities for political settlement, this was only possible thanks to the solid foundations which had already been laid over many years in Belfast, London and Dublin.

American involvement in Northern Ireland, although partly motivated by genuine good intentions, was not entirely devoid of the interests of national security. Many US policy-makers were concerned about the implications of the resources that Britain committed long-term to the north of Ireland. In simple terms, they wondered how long Britain would be able to endure the conflict without compromising its commitments elsewhere.

However, self-interest is to be expected. Interests - be they strategic, economic or whatever else - have to be accounted for when considering to what extent the 'out of the box' theory is applicable to other conflicts.

An obvious question is why American involvement elsewhere during the Clinton administration - or since - did not necessarily result in similarly positive effects as in Northern Ireland. Much of that has to do with the long-standing connections between America and Ireland, between America and Britain and, above all, the efforts and intentions of the Irish-American lobby. Much of that also has to do with the American interests at stake in other given situations.

Conclusion - if the US role as an 'out of the box' player in Northern Ireland is to serve as an example for a potentially successful approach to conflict resolution elsewhere then two key pre-conditions must be established:

i/ the 'out of the box' player is ideally regarded as impartial and reliable, or at the very least each party to the conflict must believe it to be in their best interest to cooperate with the 'out of the box' player;

ii/ that the 'out of the box' player sees a peaceful resolution to the conflict as being in its own best interests.

Arguably the most interesting lesson from the Northern Ireland peace process is the role of the United States as an 'out of the box' player, a <em>deus ex machina</em>.<br /><br />Whereas previously the US had been little more than a place for the IRA to procure high-grade weapons (both legally and illegally), when Bill Clinton was elected President in 1992 this changed - for two reasons:<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />Firstly, as the first non-veteran to become President since 1945, Clinton brought a post-Cold War vision in which the State Department's hands-off policy on Northern Ireland - in deference to Britain's role as America's most important military ally - no longer held sway.<br /><br />Secondly, Clinton the uber-politician was very aware of the unavoidable influence of Irish-America at the polls.<br /><br />It was in that context that a number of prominent Irish-Americans launched an energetic lobbying campaign. One of their number, Jim Reilly, a former top executive with IBM, is credited with the 'out of the box' theory which best sums up US involvement in Northern Ireland during the 1990s.<br /><br />According to Reilly, all the parties to the conflict in Northern Ireland were frozen in the same box and any move was immediately countered by a check-mating move from the other side. The introduction of an 'out of the box' player would completely change the dynamic inside the box.<br /><br />So it proved. Without going into the finer details here, constructive US involvement - notably granting visas to Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams and veteran IRA member Joe Cahill - showed the republican movement that politics could open doors and subsequently led to IRA ceasefires in 1996-96 and from 1997 onwards, ultimately leading to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.<br /><br />I must add a caveat at this stage. London and Dublin had increasingly worked together over the previous years, even decades, to build a conflict resolution process and the triangular Belfast-London-Dublin dynamic was already an improvement on the confrontational IRA vs London dynamic. So while Washington's involvement helped to change the dynamic and open up new possibilities for political settlement, this was only possible thanks to the solid foundations which had already been laid over many years in Belfast, London and Dublin.<br /><br />American involvement in Northern Ireland, although partly motivated by genuine good intentions, was not entirely devoid of the interests of national security. Many US policy-makers were concerned about the implications of the resources that Britain committed long-term to the north of Ireland. In simple terms, they wondered how long Britain would be able to endure the conflict without compromising its commitments elsewhere.<br /><br />However, self-interest is to be expected. Interests - be they strategic, economic or whatever else - have to be accounted for when considering to what extent the 'out of the box' theory is applicable to other conflicts.<br /><br />An obvious question is why American involvement elsewhere during the Clinton administration - or since - did not necessarily result in similarly positive effects as in Northern Ireland. Much of that has to do with the long-standing connections between America and Ireland, between America and Britain and, above all, the efforts and intentions of the Irish-American lobby. Much of that also has to do with the American interests at stake in other given situations.<br /><br />Conclusion - if the US role as an 'out of the box' player in Northern Ireland is to serve as an example for a potentially successful approach to conflict resolution elsewhere then two key pre-conditions must be established:<br /><br />i/ the 'out of the box' player is ideally regarded as impartial and reliable, or at the very least each party to the conflict must believe it to be in their best interest to cooperate with the 'out of the box' player;<br /><br />ii/ that the 'out of the box' player sees a peaceful resolution to the conflict as being in its own best interests.<br /></span>

Lessons from Ireland - key principles

I have long opined that the process of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland provides certain lessons which can be applied to other conflict situations elsewhere in the world - nonetheless taking into account the simple truth that each situation is unique and specific. There are many facets of the Irish peace process that I could highlight but, for now, I'll focus on the basic principles that must exist, according to US Senator George Mitchell, for any settlement to work.

Mitchell, the former Democrat Senator for Maine and House Majority Leader, was nominated in 1999 for the Nobel Peace Prize as a result of his work in Northern Ireland. Appointed in 1996 by the British and Irish governments as an impartial referee, Senator Mitchell chaired multi-party talks and set a deadline for 9 April 1998 for reaching an agreement. At the start of the final session, he said that they would not be leaving the room before without an agreement. Although the talks over-ran by 17 hours, the negotiations were successful and the Good Friday Agreement came into being in April 1998.

Senator Mitchell has stated that while all societies and all conflicts, like all humans, are distinct and that there is no magic formula for conflict resolution, certain principles arise from the story of Northern Ireland.

1/ All conflicts are created and sustained by human beings and thus all conflicts can be ended by human beings.

2/ There must be a clear and determined policy not to yield to violence. Specifically, there must not be a pre-condition that negotiations will end if violence flares up, as this simply invites men of violence to wreck attempts at a peaceful resolution.

3/ There must be a genuine willingness to understand opposing points of view and enter into principled compromise.

4/ It must be acknowledged that implementing an agreement is as hard as, if not harder than, reaching an agreement (as subsequent developments in Northern Ireland demonstrated all too plainly) and that this must be accepted, prepared for and dealt with accordingly.

It would be interesting to examine to what extent these principles hold true in other conflict situations, notably in the Middle East, where the same George Mitchell is currently the US President's Special Representative, and in Afghanistan and Pakistan where reconciliation and reintegration are currently high on the west's agenda.

I have long opined that the process of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland provides certain lessons which can be applied to other conflict situations elsewhere in the world - nonetheless taking into account the simple truth that each situation is unique and specific. There are many facets of the Irish peace process that I could highlight but, for now, I'll focus on the basic principles that must exist, according to US Senator George Mitchell, for any settlement to work.<br /><br />Mitchell, the former Democrat Senator for Maine and House Majority Leader, was nominated in 1999 for the Nobel Peace Prize as a result of his work in Northern Ireland. Appointed in 1996 by the British and Irish governments as an impartial referee, Senator Mitchell chaired multi-party talks and set a deadline for 9 April 1998 for reaching an agreement. At the start of the final session, he said that they would not be leaving the room before without an agreement. Although the talks over-ran by 17 hours, the negotiations were successful and the Good Friday Agreement came into being in April 1998.<br /><br />Senator Mitchell has stated that while all societies and all conflicts, like all humans, are distinct and that there is no magic formula for conflict resolution, certain principles arise from the story of Northern Ireland.<br /><br />1/ All conflicts are created and sustained by human beings and thus all conflicts can be ended by human beings.<br /><br />2/ There must be a clear and determined policy not to yield to violence. Specifically, there must not be a pre-condition that negotiations will end if violence flares up, as this simply invites men of violence to wreck attempts at a peaceful resolution.<br /><br />3/ There must be a genuine willingness to understand opposing points of view and enter into principled compromise.<br /><br />4/ It must be acknowledged that implementing an agreement is as hard as, if not harder than, reaching an agreement (as subsequent developments in Northern Ireland demonstrated all too plainly) and that this must be accepted, prepared for and dealt with accordingly.<br /><br />It would be interesting to examine to what extent these principles hold true in other conflict situations, notably in the Middle East, where the same George Mitchell is currently the US President's Special Representative, and in Afghanistan and Pakistan where reconciliation and reintegration are currently high on the west's agenda.