How to talk to the Kurds?

The Economist reports on increased tension in the Kurdish populated areas of Turkey and Iraq. This is not a new problem but any increase in tension - and potentially violence - would come at a very difficult time for the Turkish government and the AKP ruling party.

From an international perspective, the concern has always been that Turkey - which has the second-largest standing army in NATO - could become too distracted by its campaign against Kurdish guerrillas to fulfil its international commitments. Having said that, while Turkish troops play important roles in ISAF, KFOR and EUFOR Althea, in terms of numbers their contributions are not (proportionately) among the most significant.

There are other - very real - possibilities which could arise from increased tension and/or violence between the Turkish Army and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). There is the fear of increased conflict between Turkey and Kurds across the border in Iraq, just as the US is drawing down its presence in Iraq. Moreover, as the Economist article points out, any PKK resurgence would leave Prime Minister Erdogan in a very difficult position.

As next July’s parliamentary elections draw nearer, Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is unlikely to risk nationalist ire by openly talking to a group deemed by Turkey and its Western allies to be terrorists. On the other hand, as Mr Erdogan knows, abandoning reform in favour of war will only strengthen the hand of his opponents within the army. He is, as an old Turkish saying goes, holding a stick with shit at both ends.

That is reason enough for the international community to be concerned at this potential development - and also reason enough for the international community to encourage and/or pressure Turkey to solve this as reasonably and effectively as possible, admittedly not an easy task.

On that subject, there are some questions to raise. The article states that secret talks have been going on with Abdullah Ocalan. While it may well be true that he retains huge support and affection from the rank-and-file, the fact remains that he has been in solitary confinement for eleven years. How can he be expected to have a clear understanding of the situation on the ground as it is now? Does he know the mood among the Kurdish rank-and-file (a different generation from the one he knew)? Does he know the key players on his side and on the Turkish side? Does he know the public mood in Turkey, notably in the context of next year's elections?

Furthermore, these secret talks have apparently been led by security and intelligence operatives and the PKK have - understandably and rightly - stated that they want to talk to politicians.

One could make a comparison to the discussions held in Algiers in 1989 between ETA and the Spanish government. ETA were represented by Antonio Etxebeste, who was released from prison for the occasion. The Spanish government was represented by the Interior Minister, José Luis Corcuera, but also by Rafael Vera, director of State security, who was said to have close links to the government black ops unit known as the GAL. Vera had previously participated in discussions with ETA, also in Algiers, accompanied by Jorge Argote, a lawyer who had defended men accused of torturing ETA prisoners, and Jesus Martinez Torres, chief of intelligence for the national police, who was suspected of actually having participated in torture.

With interlocutors like that, it is no surprise that the talks went nowhere but the real point is that the Spanish government and ETA alike displayed a failure to recognise the political nature of the problem. Both sides sent in security and/or intelligence operatives (on the ETA side, Etxebeste was accompanied by two operatives from the Madrid commando) who neither understood nor cared to understand the political realities of the situation or public opinion in the Basque country and in Spain (ETA's lack of political nous is a subject previously covered on this blog).

That is an approach which the Turkish government would do well to avoid - assuming that it is serious about finding some kind of solution to the Kurdish issue - but also because, as the Economist points out, if they let the military and security apparatus of the State take the lead then the civilian government could find itself undermined in the ongoing existential debate over what kind of State Turkey should be.

<div align="justify"><a href="http://www.economist.com/node/16646014">The Economist</a> reports on increased tension in the Kurdish populated areas of Turkey and Iraq. This is not a new problem but any increase in tension - and potentially violence - would come at a very difficult time for the Turkish government and the AKP ruling party.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />From an international perspective, the concern has always been that Turkey - which has the second-largest standing army in NATO - could become too distracted by its campaign against Kurdish guerrillas to fulfil its international commitments. Having said that, while Turkish troops play important roles in ISAF, KFOR and EUFOR Althea, in terms of numbers their contributions are not (proportionately) among the most significant.<br /><br />There are other - very real - possibilities which could arise from increased tension and/or violence between the Turkish Army and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). There is the fear of increased conflict between Turkey and Kurds across the border in Iraq, just as the US is drawing down its presence in Iraq. Moreover, as the Economist article points out, any PKK resurgence would leave Prime Minister Erdogan in a very difficult position.<br /><em><blockquote>As next July’s parliamentary elections draw nearer, Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is unlikely to risk nationalist ire by openly talking to a group deemed by Turkey and its Western allies to be terrorists. On the other hand, as Mr Erdogan knows, abandoning reform in favour of war will only strengthen the hand of his opponents within the army. He is, as an old Turkish saying goes, holding a stick with shit at both ends.</blockquote></em>That is reason enough for the international community to be concerned at this potential development - and also reason enough for the international community to encourage and/or pressure Turkey to solve this as reasonably and effectively as possible, admittedly not an easy task.<br /><br />On that subject, there are some questions to raise. The article states that secret talks have been going on with Abdullah Ocalan. While it may well be true that he retains huge support and affection from the rank-and-file, the fact remains that he has been in solitary confinement for eleven years. How can he be expected to have a clear understanding of the situation on the ground as it is now? Does he know the mood among the Kurdish rank-and-file (a different generation from the one he knew)? Does he know the key players on his side and on the Turkish side? Does he know the public mood in Turkey, notably in the context of next year's elections?<br /><br />Furthermore, these secret talks have apparently been led by security and intelligence operatives and the PKK have - understandably and rightly - stated that they want to talk to politicians.<br /><br />One could make a comparison to the discussions held in Algiers in 1989 between ETA and the Spanish government. ETA were represented by Antonio Etxebeste, who was released from prison for the occasion. The Spanish government was represented by the Interior Minister, José Luis Corcuera, but also by Rafael Vera, director of State security, who was said to have close links to the government black ops unit known as the GAL. Vera had previously participated in discussions with ETA, also in Algiers, accompanied by Jorge Argote, a lawyer who had defended men accused of torturing ETA prisoners, and Jesus Martinez Torres, chief of intelligence for the national police, who was suspected of actually having participated in torture.<br /><br />With interlocutors like that, it is no surprise that the talks went nowhere but the real point is that the Spanish government and ETA alike displayed a failure to recognise the political nature of the problem. Both sides sent in security and/or intelligence operatives (on the ETA side, Etxebeste was accompanied by two operatives from the Madrid commando) who neither understood nor cared to understand the political realities of the situation or public opinion in the Basque country and in Spain (ETA's lack of political nous is a subject previously covered on this <a href="http://secdefeurope.blogspot.com/2010/05/policework-or-politics.html">blog</a>).<br /><br />That is an approach which the Turkish government would do well to avoid - assuming that it is serious about finding some kind of solution to the Kurdish issue - but also because, as the Economist points out, if they let the military and security apparatus of the State take the lead then the civilian government could find itself undermined in the ongoing existential debate over what kind of State Turkey should be.<br /><br /></div></span>

Turkey and the S-300

Recent reports suggest that Russia is lining up a sale of the highly capable S-300 air-defence system to Turkey. While it's not surprising that Russia is seeking alternative customers for the S-300 (given that a lucrative deal to supply the system to Iran has now been canceled), the involvement of Turkey as recipient is potentially significant.

An article in UPI (which takes quite a negative tone) points out what it considers to be some of the possible implications of this speculative deal:

1) It would mark an eastward shift in Ankara's geopolitical orientation;

2) Turkey may end up supplying the S-300 to Iran;

3) Russia is using arms sales to "bolster" its influence in the Middle East.

Although the deal would be the latest of several indications that Turkey is reorientating itself towards the East, the assertion that it may supply the system to Iran seems like pure fantasy. If it did, then Ankara would not only undermine its position within NATO, but it would also aggravate Russia. However, point 3 is valid -- Turkey usually buys its weapons systems from the West and purchasing the S-300 may lead to more extensive arms procurements from Russia.

Nevertheless, there does appear to be a contradiction in the article: it claims that Anatoly Isaikin, director of Rosoboronexport, suggested that "Russia was prepared to participate in a Turkish tender for missile systems along with Western arms manufacturers." If this is true, and it's done in partnership with Western firms, then it changes the nature of the deal entirely. Rather than it being yet another indication of an increasingly precarious U.S.-Tukey relationship, it becomes a good example of U.S./NATO-Russian cooperation. Furthermore, if NATO members/allies purchase the S-300 system then it may help relieve pressure coming from Russian arms manufacturers to supply air-defence systems and other armaments to Iran.

It's clear that the United States and the West can't have the best of both worlds, it cannot stop Russia from supplying the S-300 to Iran while at the same time blocking sales to alternative (friendly) buyers. Given Russia's substantial arms industry there is an argument to be made, from a security standpoint, for allowing it to sell arms to allies. Moreover, if firms from Russia and the West actually partner with each other then it may help to maintain some semblance of control over Russian arms exports.

Recent reports suggest that Russia is lining up a sale of the highly capable S-300 air-defence system to Turkey. While it's not surprising that Russia is seeking alternative customers for the S-300 (given that a lucrative deal to supply the system to Iran has now been canceled), the involvement of Turkey as recipient is potentially significant.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />An <a href="http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2010/06/21/Iran-out-but-Russia-eyes-Turkey-for-S-300/UPI-72321277143005/">article</a> in <span style="font-style: italic;">UPI</span> (which takes quite a negative tone) points out what it considers to be some of the possible implications of this speculative deal:<br /><br />1) It would mark an eastward shift in Ankara's geopolitical orientation;<br /><br />2) Turkey may end up supplying the S-300 to Iran;<br /><br />3) Russia is using arms sales to "bolster" its influence in the Middle East.<br /><br />Although the deal would be the latest of several indications that Turkey is reorientating itself towards the East, the assertion that it may supply the system to Iran seems like pure fantasy. If it did, then Ankara would not only undermine its position within NATO, but it would also aggravate Russia. However, point 3 is valid -- Turkey usually buys its weapons systems from the West and purchasing the S-300 may lead to more extensive arms procurements from Russia.<br /><br />Nevertheless, there does appear to be a contradiction in the article: it claims that Anatoly Isaikin, director of Rosoboronexport, suggested that "Russia was prepared to participate in a Turkish tender for missile systems along with Western arms manufacturers." If this is true, and it's done in partnership with Western firms, then it changes the nature of the deal entirely. Rather than it being yet another indication of an increasingly precarious U.S.-Tukey relationship, it becomes a good example of U.S./NATO-Russian cooperation. Furthermore, if NATO members/allies purchase the S-300 system then it may help relieve pressure coming from Russian arms manufacturers to supply air-defence systems and other armaments to Iran.<br /><br />It's clear that the United States and the West can't have the best of both worlds, it cannot stop Russia from supplying the S-300 to Iran while at the same time blocking sales to alternative (friendly) buyers. Given Russia's substantial arms industry there is an argument to be made, from a security standpoint, for allowing it to sell arms to allies. Moreover, if firms from Russia and the West actually partner with each other then it may help to maintain some semblance of control over Russian arms exports.<br /></span>

Is Europe pushing Turkey eastward?

The Free Gaza flotilla debacle has led many to question Israel's direction and its strategic thinking. The flip side of this is that many are doing the same for Turkey - with equally good reason.

Bob Gates has made rather strident comments in this regard, essentially accusing the European Union of pushing Turkey away from the west and away from Israel.

"I personally think that if there is anything to the notion that Turkey is, if you will, moving eastward, it is, in my view, in no small part because it was pushed, and pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that Turkey sought."

While developments such as the sharp deterioration of Israel-Turkey relations are clearly a source of concern, is it accurate to say that this forms part of an eastward movement from Ankara?

The article quotes a senior US State Department official involved in U.S. policy toward Turkey, who argues that Turkey continues to attach importance to its relationship with the West and that its new found role in the region is part of "the most activist Turkish foreign policy that we've probably ever seen," rather than a conscious effort to break with Europe and the U.S.

"I don't think it's accurate to say they're turning away from the West. What they are doing is adding on a much more activist role in their neighbourhood to their traditional strategic relationship with us and Europe and the West."

If this is indeed the case then it would be perfectly logical from Ankara's point of view. Turkey's biggest selling point is its strategic location - the more good relationships Turkey has with as many of its neighbours as possible the more added value it can bring to its relationship with the west - both the U.S. and the EU.

However, let us accept for a moment that there is indeed an eastward trend in Ankara's foreign policy, just as Gates says. Is it fair to apportion all the blame to the EU? According to Turkish diplomat Tuncay Babali, it is indeed fair.

"What Secretary Gates said is right on target. Turks are sick and tired of being judged on individual issues such as whether they support certain Western policies, rather than being accepted as a significant partner."

There is possibly a degree of truth in that - the public debate on Turkey's potential EU membership does focus heavily on specific issues, rather than the broader strategic picture. Given that Turkey's biggest contribution would be geostrategic reach and influence, an issue-specific lens is the wrong one through which to look at the bigger picture.

However, this is a two-way street. What makes Turkey a significant partner is, again, its geostrategic reach. While Turkey is doing good work with Afghanistan and Pakistan through the tripartite commission, this is overshadowed by its increasingly acrimonious relations with Israel. Furthermore, the success of Turkey's attempt to establish itself as a mediator between, for example, Syria and the west remains open for debate. In short, what added value would Turkey bring to the EU right now?

In any case, even if we are to adopt the narrow perspective, Turkey has not delivered on the specific issues in question - above all Cyprus, an EU member. If the EU were to compromise on the Cypriot question then what kind of signal does it send to its other newer members? Incidentally, I do not include recognition of the Armenian genocide among those issues. Turkey has not delivered on that either but the west has been complicit for too long in Turkey's failure to acknowledge what happened. To use that against Turkey now is shameless hypocrisy.

In short, its true that Turkey has some reason to feel aggrieved at its treatment from the European Union but only to a certain extent. The European Union would indeed do well to re-evaluate its approach to the Turkish question but, at the same time, the bloc is perfectly entitled to defend its interests and set its own threshold for membership.

Integrating Turkey would be a huge step and conditions must be right. At the moment, conditions are clearly not right for obvious economic reasons within Europe but, as the Ergenekon trial continues into its third year, they are not right in Turkey either. Is Gates seriously telling Europe that it should countenance bringing Turkey into the fold while grave questions remain over the possible existence of a 'deep State' which plotted to overthrow a democratically-elected government through chaos and mayhem?

In the light of all this, Gates' criticism appears unjustified and rather one-sided in fact. Perhaps some in Europe are indeed refusing to give Turkey the 'organic link' that Turkey wants but the reverse is equally true.

<div align="justify">The Free Gaza flotilla debacle has led many to question Israel's direction and its strategic thinking. The flip side of this is that many are doing the same for Turkey - with equally good reason.<br /><br />Bob Gates has made rather strident <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703890904575296900180727936.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsThird">comments</a> in this regard, essentially accusing the European Union of pushing Turkey away from the west and away from Israel.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br /><em>"I personally think that if there is anything to the notion that Turkey is, if you will, moving eastward, it is, in my view, in no small part because it was pushed, and pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that Turkey sought."</em><br /><br />While developments such as the sharp deterioration of Israel-Turkey relations are clearly a source of concern, is it accurate to say that this forms part of an eastward movement from Ankara?<br /><br />The article quotes a senior US State Department official involved in U.S. policy toward Turkey, who argues that Turkey continues to attach importance to its relationship with the West and that its new found role in the region is part of "the most activist Turkish foreign policy that we've probably ever seen," rather than a conscious effort to break with Europe and the U.S.<br /><br /><em>"I don't think it's accurate to say they're turning away from the West. What they are doing is adding on a much more activist role in their neighbourhood to their traditional strategic relationship with us and Europe and the West."</em><br /><br />If this is indeed the case then it would be perfectly logical from Ankara's point of view. Turkey's biggest selling point is its strategic location - the more good relationships Turkey has with as many of its neighbours as possible the more added value it can bring to its relationship with the west - both the U.S. and the EU.<br /><br />However, let us accept for a moment that there is indeed an eastward trend in Ankara's foreign policy, just as Gates says. Is it fair to apportion all the blame to the EU? According to Turkish diplomat Tuncay Babali, it is indeed fair. <br /><br /><em>"What Secretary Gates said is right on target. Turks are sick and tired of being judged on individual issues such as whether they support certain Western policies, rather than being accepted as a significant partner."</em><br /><br />There is possibly a degree of truth in that - the public debate on Turkey's potential EU membership does focus heavily on specific issues, rather than the broader strategic picture. Given that Turkey's biggest contribution would be geostrategic reach and influence, an issue-specific lens is the wrong one through which to look at the bigger picture.<br /><br />However, this is a two-way street. What makes Turkey a significant partner is, again, its geostrategic reach. While Turkey is doing good work with Afghanistan and Pakistan through the tripartite commission, this is overshadowed by its increasingly acrimonious relations with Israel. Furthermore, the success of Turkey's attempt to establish itself as a mediator between, for example, Syria and the west remains open for debate. In short, what added value would Turkey bring to the EU right now?<br /><br />In any case, even if we are to adopt the narrow perspective, Turkey has not delivered on the specific issues in question - above all Cyprus, an EU member. If the EU were to compromise on the Cypriot question then what kind of signal does it send to its other newer members? Incidentally, I do not include recognition of the Armenian genocide among those issues. Turkey has not delivered on that either but the west has been complicit for too long in Turkey's failure to acknowledge what happened. To use that against Turkey now is shameless hypocrisy.<br /><br />In short, its true that Turkey has some reason to feel aggrieved at its treatment from the European Union but only to a certain extent. The European Union would indeed do well to re-evaluate its approach to the Turkish question but, at the same time, the bloc is perfectly entitled to defend its interests and set its own threshold for membership.<br /><br />Integrating Turkey would be a huge step and conditions must be right. At the moment, conditions are clearly not right for obvious economic reasons within Europe but, as the <em><a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-208153-ergenekon-fact-vs-fiction-2-more-details-only-increase-belief-in-ergenekon-case.html">Ergenekon</a> </em>trial continues into its <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=finally-ergenekon-got-8216sexy8217-2010-06-08">third year</a>, they are not right in Turkey either. Is Gates seriously telling Europe that it should countenance bringing Turkey into the fold while grave questions remain over the possible existence of a 'deep State' which plotted to overthrow a democratically-elected government through chaos and mayhem? <br /><br />In the light of all this, Gates' criticism appears unjustified and rather one-sided in fact. Perhaps some in Europe are indeed refusing to give Turkey the 'organic link' that Turkey wants but the reverse is equally true.<br /></div></span>

Turkish Air Defense System Deployed to Syrian Border

Interesting news reach us from Turkey: the Turkish newspaper Hurryet reports that air defence systems have been deployed to the Syrian border. A source within the Turkish military was quoted that "this move aims at repelling a US or Israeli attack against Iran or Syria".

Al Manar TV, the Hizbollah media outlet, quotes a Turkish political analyst who said "“The news in Hurriyet daily is true. The air defense system was moved from Istanbul to Iskenderun to counter any surprise Israeli air raid, because in 2007 Israeli warplanes used the Turkish airspace to carry out air raids on Syrian targets. Thus Turkey took this precautionary measure so that what happened in 2007 would not happen again.”

In light of Turkey's role in the Iran nuclear fuel swap, it seems that Turkey is determined to support Iran's aspirations to master the nuclear fuel cycle. I think it's reasonable to ask when Turkey itself will declare activities to master the nuclear fuel cycle.

Interesting news reach us from Turkey: the Turkish newspaper Hurryet reports that air defence systems have been deployed to the Syrian border. A source within the Turkish military was quoted that "this move aims at repelling a US or Israeli attack against Iran or Syria".<br /><br />Al Manar TV, the Hizbollah media outlet, <a href="http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=137326&language=en">quotes a Turkish political analyst</a> who said "<span class="ArticleDetails">“The news in Hurriyet daily is true. The air defense system was moved from Istanbul to Iskenderun to counter any surprise Israeli air raid, because in 2007 Israeli warplanes used the Turkish airspace to carry out air raids on Syrian targets. Thus Turkey took this precautionary measure so that what happened in 2007 would not happen again.”<br /><br />In light of Turkey's role in the Iran nuclear fuel swap, it seems that Turkey is determined to support Iran's aspirations to master the nuclear fuel cycle. I think it's reasonable to ask when Turkey itself will declare activities to master the nuclear fuel cycle.<br /></span>