As the U.S Senate moves closer to a vote on the new START agreement with Russia, many observers are beginning to ask questions about where this leaves the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The CTBT was voted down by the Senate in 1999, towards the end of the Clinton Administration, and has been in a state of limbo ever since. Although President Obama says he will seek ratification of the treaty during his presidency, a vote before the 2012 election is looking increasingly unlikely. This raises a number of questions concerning political capital, choice of battles, and limiting the number of fronts on which you fight them.
For those who are unaware, the new-START treaty limits U.S. and Russian deployed strategic weapons to 1,550 warheads and 700 active nuclear delivery vehicles. These are modest numbers considering the previous limit was 2,200 warheads by 2012. However, ratification of the treaty has been a harder fought affair than many had expected. Sceptics make two main arguments against ratification 1) that it may limit deployment of U.S. missile defence systems and 2) not enough money is being invested in ensuring the safety and reliability of the existing U.S. stockpile. These are weak arguments considering the treaty contains only a fleeting mention of the link between offensive and defensive arms and the Obama Administration has provided the NNSA with a substantial increase in budget to ensure effective stockpile stewardship.
Nevertheless, countering these arguments has made START ratification difficult, and the more difficult it becomes, the harder it will be to put CTBT back on the legislative agenda. One thing the Obama Administration wants to avoid, at all costs, is seeking ratification of the CTBT only to have it rejected for the second time, which could kill the treaty.
The difficulty in ratifying START shows just how challenging the Obama arms control and disarmament agenda is. His 2009 Prague speech laid out ambitious goals and created high metrics for success, but it may be that overall success is now judged on his ability to ratify CTBT. That is not to say Obama did the wrong thing in seeking ratification of START first, the old START agreement expired in December of last year and negotiations have formed part of a relatively successful re-set policy with Russia.
The problem, however, is that political capital is everything in the United States and there is only so much to go around. This means that a trade-off between the two treaties is virtually inevitable (at least in the short-term), which raises the question of whether Obama should have gone further to limit expectations in order to avoid eventual international disappointment and condemnation.
That's a difficult question to answer. His disarmamnet agenda needed to be clear in order to avoid complete meltdown of the nonproliferation regime. But what is clear, is that the U.S. Senate needs to take responsibility and ensure the meltdown has not simply been delayed. That will require it to look beyond party politics. Something that is easier said than done.
Saturday, 2 October 2010
Arms control and political capital in the U.S.
Wednesday, 11 August 2010
Obama's Georgian success
President Obama's attempted re-set of relations with Russia was criticised by many U.S. Republicans who claimed the policy would leave Georgia and Saakashvili out in the cold. Brian Whitmore argues in Foreign Policy that the re-set has enabled the United States to gain much needed leverage over Moscow, thereby restraining Russian policy towards Tbilisi.
There is real merit to this argument. Russia has much more to lose by attacking Georgia today than it did in 2008. This is primarily due to the economic benefits that Russia seems set to gain if the bi-lateral relationship continues on its current trajectory. One key area of potential economic cooperation, as Whitmore points out, is the proposed U.S. investment in Russia's high-tech sector, coupled with Moscow's need for U.S. support in its application to the World Trade Organisation. As a result, any return to military means against Georgia would be a blow to its economic development.
Georgia appears to welcome this breathing space.
However, there is one additional element that Whitmore doesn't mention: Russia's primary policy aim in the 2008 conflict - preventing Georgia's accession to NATO - has been largely achieved. Of course, this is a questionable statement - one that many will disagree with. But Georgia's membership of NATO has, at the very least, been indefinitely delayed and the conflict with Russia appears to have been a key contributor to that delay. Therefore, how much can the Obama re-set really take the credit for Russia's more restrained policy towards Georgia? It's likely that the truth is a combination of Russia having achieved its objective and it having more to lose today than it did in 2008.
Monday, 19 July 2010
Russian 'Black Widows' and the culture of revenge
Last week the Russian security services arrested six women in Dagestan who they claim were preparing suicide attacks against the Russian heartland. It's long been established practice for North Caucasian militants to use female suicide bombers against Russian cities - the most recent example being the March attacks on the Moscow metro system. And while female bombers are not unique to the North Caucasus, the use of 'Black Widows' as the 'face' of a terror campaign is fairly unprecedented.
It's true that the majority of Dagestani and Ingushetian militants that carry-out armed attacks within the North Caucasus are male, but the face of the bombing campaign in Russian cities over the last decade has been distinctly female. In addition to the attacks on the metro, Black Widows were also responsible for the bombing of Russian passenger planes in 2004, and were present at both Beslan and the Dubrovka Theatre siege.
The motivation of these women has been largely attributed to revenge. Blood feud runs deep in the Caucasus and is not confined to the male population alone. As a result, many women whose husbands or sons are killed by the security forces end up exacting revenge. But the question that many have asked is why are women, and not men, being used to carry out the attacks on Moscow? One answer is that female suicide bombers are used precisely because the practice raises significant questions regarding their individual motives. It contains a greater 'shock' factor, which would explain why female bombers were carefully inserted into the sieges of Dubrovka and Beslan.
However, while the use of Black Widows may increase the short-term psychological impact of a suicide attack, it doesn't appear to have had a long-term effect on the resilience of the Russian people. In fact, the more that female bombers are used, the less of an impact they have. Should a suicide attack be carried out against a Russian city tomorrow then it's almost expected that the perpetrators will be female.
It's clear that a number of cultural factors are at play when a Dagestani woman volunteers for such an operation, but there is a lesson that can be taken from the use of female suicide bombers: its psychological impact is directly related to the number of times it's used. As a result, Muscovites now appear more hardened to the tactic than they were at the beginning of the decade.
Thursday, 8 July 2010
Timing of the Russian spy scandal
Following the FBI's uncovering of eleven Russian spies last week, an interesting issue (beyond the photographs of Anna Chapman) comes to mind: the timing of the arrests. An article in the Economist poses a number of questions that many people have been asking themselves: was the timing an attempt by hard-line individuals in Washington to undermine the improving relationship with Moscow? Was it an attempt by Moscow hard-liners to undermine Medvedev? Or, could it have been a policy of collusion between Obama and Medvedev to undermine Vladimir Putin and strengthen the hand of the current Russian president?
The final question is particularly interesting given that the ineptitude of the spies has embarassed the Russian secret services and made them look amateurish. As a result, it may weaken the political constituency that has been so dominant since the resignation of President Yeltsin, the siloviki, and with it the position of Vladimir Putin. Although this theory is a little far-fetched, it shouldn't be entirely discounted.
Two issues make at least one of the above hypotheses likely: first, the agents don't appear to have suddenly become a security threat - they were unable to pass any useful information to Moscow; second, there were more politically expedient moments in the recent past in which to make the arrests - most notably during, and immediately following, Russia's war with Georgia in 2008. So why now? Well, it's unlikely to have been an attempt to undermine President Obama as he is said to have sanctioned the arrests. But was there a political rationale for his decision? Or, had some of the agents become more of a concern than the press is giving them credit for?
Wednesday, 23 June 2010
Turkey and the S-300
Recent reports suggest that Russia is lining up a sale of the highly capable S-300 air-defence system to Turkey. While it's not surprising that Russia is seeking alternative customers for the S-300 (given that a lucrative deal to supply the system to Iran has now been canceled), the involvement of Turkey as recipient is potentially significant.
An article in UPI (which takes quite a negative tone) points out what it considers to be some of the possible implications of this speculative deal:
1) It would mark an eastward shift in Ankara's geopolitical orientation;
2) Turkey may end up supplying the S-300 to Iran;
3) Russia is using arms sales to "bolster" its influence in the Middle East.
Although the deal would be the latest of several indications that Turkey is reorientating itself towards the East, the assertion that it may supply the system to Iran seems like pure fantasy. If it did, then Ankara would not only undermine its position within NATO, but it would also aggravate Russia. However, point 3 is valid -- Turkey usually buys its weapons systems from the West and purchasing the S-300 may lead to more extensive arms procurements from Russia.
Nevertheless, there does appear to be a contradiction in the article: it claims that Anatoly Isaikin, director of Rosoboronexport, suggested that "Russia was prepared to participate in a Turkish tender for missile systems along with Western arms manufacturers." If this is true, and it's done in partnership with Western firms, then it changes the nature of the deal entirely. Rather than it being yet another indication of an increasingly precarious U.S.-Tukey relationship, it becomes a good example of U.S./NATO-Russian cooperation. Furthermore, if NATO members/allies purchase the S-300 system then it may help relieve pressure coming from Russian arms manufacturers to supply air-defence systems and other armaments to Iran.
It's clear that the United States and the West can't have the best of both worlds, it cannot stop Russia from supplying the S-300 to Iran while at the same time blocking sales to alternative (friendly) buyers. Given Russia's substantial arms industry there is an argument to be made, from a security standpoint, for allowing it to sell arms to allies. Moreover, if firms from Russia and the West actually partner with each other then it may help to maintain some semblance of control over Russian arms exports.
Tuesday, 20 April 2010
Ramzan Vs. Dmitry?
Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Chechen Republic, has long been known for his harsh and often brutal counter-insurgency policies. As a result, many have wondered how the relationship between Kadyrov and Dmitry Medvedev would evolve. This article in Radio Free Europe gives an indication that the two men have differing perspectives on what direction security policies in the North Caucasus should take.
Following the recent bombings on the Moscow metro system Medvedev offered a five point plan for countering militancy in the region:
1) Strengthen the police and security forces
2) Continue to hunt down and eliminate terrorists
3) Provide material aid to militants that lay down their arms
4) Address the socioeconomic problems that are facilitating the recruitment of young men and women to militant groups
5) Enhance the role of the Muslim clergy
While hunting down and killing militants is nothing new, placing a greater emphasis on the socioeconomic problems perhaps is. This 'emphasis' may create divisions between Medvedev and Kadyrov with the latter prioritising the catching and killing of militants while the former favours the provision of social programmes and material support.
If a rift between the two does begin to emerge then Medvedev will be faced with a dilemma: socioeconomic problems are perhaps the root cause of North Caucasian militancy and this has to be addressed, but at the same time Kadyrov has presided over a normalization of the Chechen security situation - something that Medvedev will not want to risk unraveling. There is also the question of Vladimir Putin, whose meteoric rise to power is partly explained by the role he played in orchestrating the Second Chechen War. Is the North Caucasus one area where Putin's word will always reign supreme?
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