The sovereign can no longer say, "You shall think as I do on pain of death;" but he says, "You are free to think differently from me, and to retain your life, your property, and all that you possess; but if such be your determination, you are henceforth an alien among your people."

(Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835)
Showing posts with label ETA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ETA. Show all posts

Tuesday, 7 September 2010

ETA declare a ceasefire... again.

For the second time in four years (and the fourth time overall), the armed Basque separatist group ETA have announced a ceasefire... or rather they have announced that they will "not carry out armed actions."

There is little political substance in their statement and certainly nothing new, although one can almost admire their audacity for claiming that "ETA has contributed to proposals for cooperative actions and resolutions of the conflict."

The immediate reaction in Spain and elsewhere is that ETA are calling a ceasefire because they have no choice, because they are too weak to do otherwise and that this announcement is simply window-dressing to make it seem like they retain the initiative.

Indeed, the basic facts speak for themselves. When Mikel Karrera Sarbe - a.k.a Ata - was arrested in May this year, he became the sixth suspected ETA leader to have been arrested since November 2008. ETA has tried (and supposedly failed) to move its support and logistics infrastructure from France to Portugal. They provoked outrage (and the ire of Nicolas Sarkozy) by killing a French policeman in March this year. Quite simply, ETA had nowhere else to go.

An interesting aspect to this story is the claim by Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams that Irish republicans played an important role in persuading ETA to put down their guns. While it is hard to ascertain just how influential Irish voices were in the Basque decision-making process, Adams does make a very necessary point about the role of the Spanish government:
"There is also a heavy responsibility on the Spanish government to grasp this opportunity for peace and progress. It needs to be farsighted, to think strategically and to ignore those voices that seek a resolution in terms of victory and defeat."
Unfortunately that seems highly unlikely given the initial reaction from Madrid in the shape of Interior Minister Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba:
"Eta kills in order to impose itself, so that means one cannot dialogue. Eta has stopped because it cannot do anything ... and also in order to rebuild itself."
While the second part of the statement is undoubtedly true, the first reflects a deeply ingrained mindset within the Spanish State - regardless of which political party happens to be in power. By way of contrast, when the British government was accused by the SDLP (moderate Irish nationalist party) of only talking to the political wings of Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups because they had guns, Jonathan Powell responded "and your point is?"

Having said that, Pérez did no more than articulate the feelings of probably a large majority of Spaniards so, purely from a political point of view, he arguably couldn't have said anything else.

However, it is to be hoped that behind the scenes the Spanish State will indeed be astute enough to take a long-term, strategic approach to this opportunity. For example, if it is indeed true, as alleged, that ETA are merely calling a temporary ceasefire in order to regroup then now is exactly the time, during their period of inactivity, to try and reintegrate ETA militants and their support base (what's left of it) into mainstream society and political life, as I have argued before. Above all, Madrid must positively respond to the Basque left and legalise those parties which do genuinely seek political solutions through peaceful, democratic means and always have done.

This entails 'legalising' the very concept of Basque nationalism, which historically has been an existential non-starter for the Spanish State which has too often sought to taint all Basque nationalists with ETA's violence. However this is very definitely a "democratic minimum" for a political process and the best way to render ETA completely irrelevant and seal their defeat. If Madrid fails to seize this opportunity, then their statements in response to ETA's announcement will very likely become a self-fulfilling prophesy.

PS: Anybody puzzled by the face-masks and berets on display can find answers here.

Thursday, 29 July 2010

How to talk to the Kurds?

The Economist reports on increased tension in the Kurdish populated areas of Turkey and Iraq. This is not a new problem but any increase in tension - and potentially violence - would come at a very difficult time for the Turkish government and the AKP ruling party.

From an international perspective, the concern has always been that Turkey - which has the second-largest standing army in NATO - could become too distracted by its campaign against Kurdish guerrillas to fulfil its international commitments. Having said that, while Turkish troops play important roles in ISAF, KFOR and EUFOR Althea, in terms of numbers their contributions are not (proportionately) among the most significant.

There are other - very real - possibilities which could arise from increased tension and/or violence between the Turkish Army and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). There is the fear of increased conflict between Turkey and Kurds across the border in Iraq, just as the US is drawing down its presence in Iraq. Moreover, as the Economist article points out, any PKK resurgence would leave Prime Minister Erdogan in a very difficult position.
As next July’s parliamentary elections draw nearer, Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is unlikely to risk nationalist ire by openly talking to a group deemed by Turkey and its Western allies to be terrorists. On the other hand, as Mr Erdogan knows, abandoning reform in favour of war will only strengthen the hand of his opponents within the army. He is, as an old Turkish saying goes, holding a stick with shit at both ends.
That is reason enough for the international community to be concerned at this potential development - and also reason enough for the international community to encourage and/or pressure Turkey to solve this as reasonably and effectively as possible, admittedly not an easy task.

On that subject, there are some questions to raise. The article states that secret talks have been going on with Abdullah Ocalan. While it may well be true that he retains huge support and affection from the rank-and-file, the fact remains that he has been in solitary confinement for eleven years. How can he be expected to have a clear understanding of the situation on the ground as it is now? Does he know the mood among the Kurdish rank-and-file (a different generation from the one he knew)? Does he know the key players on his side and on the Turkish side? Does he know the public mood in Turkey, notably in the context of next year's elections?

Furthermore, these secret talks have apparently been led by security and intelligence operatives and the PKK have - understandably and rightly - stated that they want to talk to politicians.

One could make a comparison to the discussions held in Algiers in 1989 between ETA and the Spanish government. ETA were represented by Antonio Etxebeste, who was released from prison for the occasion. The Spanish government was represented by the Interior Minister, José Luis Corcuera, but also by Rafael Vera, director of State security, who was said to have close links to the government black ops unit known as the GAL. Vera had previously participated in discussions with ETA, also in Algiers, accompanied by Jorge Argote, a lawyer who had defended men accused of torturing ETA prisoners, and Jesus Martinez Torres, chief of intelligence for the national police, who was suspected of actually having participated in torture.

With interlocutors like that, it is no surprise that the talks went nowhere but the real point is that the Spanish government and ETA alike displayed a failure to recognise the political nature of the problem. Both sides sent in security and/or intelligence operatives (on the ETA side, Etxebeste was accompanied by two operatives from the Madrid commando) who neither understood nor cared to understand the political realities of the situation or public opinion in the Basque country and in Spain (ETA's lack of political nous is a subject previously covered on this blog).

That is an approach which the Turkish government would do well to avoid - assuming that it is serious about finding some kind of solution to the Kurdish issue - but also because, as the Economist points out, if they let the military and security apparatus of the State take the lead then the civilian government could find itself undermined in the ongoing existential debate over what kind of State Turkey should be.

Thursday, 20 May 2010

Policework or politics?

French police have arrested the suspected military leader of the Basque separatist group ETA, an individual named Mikel Karrera Sarobe, or 'Ata'.

Five ETA leaders have been arrested in France over the past two years. Indeed, Ata has only been leader of the organisation since February of this year when his predecessor, Ibon Gogeascoechea, was arrested. That particular fact is interesting because it raises certain questions.

Question 1/
What are the objectives of the Spanish and French police and intelligence services? Are they seeking to eradicate ETA altogether or merely reduce ETA's 'campaign' to a manageable or acceptable level of violence?
1a/ If the former is the case then can ETA really be eradicated solely through police and/or intelligence action?
1b/ If the latter is the case then how do we define manageable or acceptable?

Nicolas Sarkozy would appear to have already answered the first part of that question following ETA's fatal shooting of a French policeman in March but is that a realistic aim or merely political posturing for the benefit of a - justifiably - angry French public?

Question 2/
Should there not be some attempt to reach a political solution? More specifically, should there not be some attempt to find credible interlocutors on the other side in order to work towards some kind of political solution? Incidentally, that question applies as much to ETA as towards Madrid and Paris.

Many would argue, not entirely without justification, that ETA are simply not credible interlocutors, that they have neither the requisite level of political sophistication nor of public support to be regarded as an important party in the Spanish and Basque political scenes.

However, while there may be a considerable degree of truth in those statements, ETA do remain in existence and they do remain a threat, not to the monopoly of legitimate violence in Vitoria-Gasteiz, Madrid or Paris but to ordinary people's lives.

Therefore, they must be persuaded/forced to put away their guns and work towards their goals, such as they are, through some other (non-violent) method and that is what we should mean when we refer to a 'political solution' in the Basque Country, not a Basque version of the Good Friday Agreement.

In that context, when leaders keep being arrested every few months then the repercussions on any further attempt at a political solution are usually negative.

There are certain simple, practical factors that make this the case: the over-riding priority of the individual concerned will simply be to evade capture and, moreover, a few months is not enough time to convince a movement like ETA that a change of strategy is necessary, let alone to actually implement such a change. Above all, the strong likelihood is that each new leader will be more hard-line than the last.

ETA are very often compared to the IRA and many people have attempted to draw lessons from the peace process in Northern Ireland and apply them to the Basque Country. There is a big difference however.

Any political solution requires a degree of political understanding, or intelligence, among the leadership of the organisation in conflict with the State. That was the case among certain IRA leaders, Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, throughout the peace process in Northern Ireland. That has never been the case with ETA.

Partly this is linked to the fact that, as described above, leaders keep being arrested and their successors have to go into hiding (before inevitably being arrested anyway) and are thus even further removed from the society in which they live and for which they claim to fight. If you apply Mao Zedong's metaphor on guerrilla armies, these fish no longer swim in the water of the people. Instead, they are floundering in increasingly shallow water, struggling for oxygen.

A case in point was ETA's murder, in December 2008, of 71-year-old Ignacio Uria Mendizabal simply because his family's construction business was involved in building a controversial high-speed rail link through the Basque Country. How not to win hearts and minds.

ETA may be dying a slow, suffocating death but they seem determined to take others down with them. In order to minimise the harm done to ordinary people, arresting individual leaders is not enough. Should these measures not be accompanied by sustained engagement at street level with the marginalised urban youth from which ETA draws its dwindling number of recruits? Can a purely security-based solution ever be enough on its own?

NB: This post touches on a number of issues which deserve more in-depth examination. Anyone keen to learn more about how the Spanish and French authorities sought to fight fire with fire should start by reading this interview with Irish journalist Paddy Woodworth, who investigated exactly how this was done during the 1980s and the harmful consequences these measures incurred.