The sovereign can no longer say, "You shall think as I do on pain of death;" but he says, "You are free to think differently from me, and to retain your life, your property, and all that you possess; but if such be your determination, you are henceforth an alien among your people."

(Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835)
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts

Thursday, 16 December 2010

Perception is reality

As we approach the end of the year and as the Americans release their Strategic Review of the campaign in Afghanistan, many will take stock and examine what (genuine) progress has really been made as a result of the west's reinforced COIN strategy.

Small Wars Journal features an interesting critique of COIN in which the interviewee, Colonel Gian Gentile, who served two tours in Iraq and is a visiting fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, takes issue with certain premises of COIN, or not so much COIN itself but the perceptions surrounding it... which is an important distinction to make.

The most striking example of this is when Gentile takes issue with "the idea that better tactics can rescue a failed policy and strategy". Many people would undoubtedly agree that such an idea is deeply flawed [insert compulsory Sun Tzu quote here] but Gentile touches on an important problem by stating that "we see this narrative playing itself out in how contemporary memory has been created toward the Iraq War and it shapes action and the creation of the perception of progress today in Afghanistan".

Had Gentile just held that thought, he may well have exposed the truth of the matter but instead Gentile misses the target - although only just - with his next sentence.
"When General David Petraeus talks of the "right inputs finally being in place" he betrays a deep seated adherence to the COIN narrative that better generals and reinvented armies can rescue failed strategy and policy. Unfortunately, upon inspection history demolishes this myth."
There is a considerable argument to be made that this is not 'myth' at all but in fact 'the creation of perception', the intended perception being that COIN worked in Iraq and is working in Afghanistan.

On the former, Tom Ricks concluded in The Gamble that the surge succeeded tactically (in improving security) but fell short strategically (failure to achieve an Iraqi political settlement). Given the extensive contribution of David Petraeus (and his cohorts) to that book and given the intellect of the man it is unthinkable that he will not have seriously reflected on those conclusions. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that he would have factored this into his thinking with regard to Afghanistan and even concluded that a similar scenario could play out there also. Indeed, when we look at the tactics and measures employed by Petraeus since he replaced Stan McChrystal in July, it is reasonable to conclude that he has decided that 'tactical success/strategic shortfall' is the most realistic of all potential desired outcomes (ie. the best we can hope to achieve) and is actively executing the campaign on that basis.

The most striking tactical example is the extensive - and rapid - formation of 'Afghan Local Police' units. Although Petraeus has never directly compared these to the Sons of Iraq, it is reasonable to make precisely that link given how often he uses the Iraq campaign as a point of reference. However, while many (e.g. Ricks) have pointed out that while the Awakening militias were clearly a major factor in the perceived success of COIN and the surge in Iraq, the variables on the ground in Afghanistan are very different.

The Sunni Awakening militias in Iraq turned against foreign jihadists as a result of the latter's brutal and indiscrimate methods and, furthermore, these militias had relatively strong command and control set-ups. In contrast, the village militias in Afghanistan are intended to protect against the Taliban who, despite the presence of some foreigners fighting among them, are very much an indigenous organisation firmly rooted in Afghan - primarily Pashtun - society and territory. Furthermore, these local police units are nominally under the control of the Ministry of the Interior but, in a country where tribal structures have been badly fragmented by thirty years of war, there are no obvious checks and balances at the village level. There is therefore a real danger that these 'local police' units could very quickly start to function as the private militias of the local warlord and, according to the New York Times, that already appears to be the case in some areas.

That is not a recipe for long-term stability but perhaps it is not intended to be. Perhaps this is simply a means of dissipating the strength of the insurgency in the villages, weakening their supply chains and reducing their pool of potential recruits. The long-term effects for the country - and the State - of Afghanistan may not be good but if the Afghan Local Police facilitate a number of tactical victories for ISAF across the country, then they will have achieved their goal (from a strictly western perspective).

Another example is the incredible intensity of Special Forces operations against mid-level Taliban commanders, which has caused a fair amount of debate among coindinistas and others over the difference, if any, between counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.

However, this concerted SOF campaign is arguably more significant in the context of reconciliation and reintegration. While reintegration of low-level Taliban foot soldiers is ongoing at the same time as high-level, back-channel discussions are (apparently) ongoing in (apparently) an attempt to 'reconcile' the Taliban leadership, operational-level Taliban commanders are being killed and captured in significant numbers. It has been previously been argued on this blog that serious negotiation with the Taliban - in a conflict resolution sense of the term - is just not feasible and recent farcical episodes such as the involvement of an imposter certainly do nothing to alter that perception.

In short, at the same as we are seeking to 'reintegrate' low-level foot-soldiers and pursuing less than convincing discussions with the high-level leadership, we are kinetically targetting the mid-level commanders in an attempt to break the operational back of the Taliban. Is the objective really, as is claimed, for ISAF and the Afghan government to be in a position of strength when the (apparently) inevitable political process of reconciliation begins in earnest? Or is it in fact intended to hit the Taliban hard enough for them to do the smart thing and lay low for a while, allowing us to declare victory and go home?

So, again, we could argue that these tactical measures are intended to achieve a good enough level of operational success (ie. relative short-term security and stability) to be portrayed as a victory to our publics back home. The second part is achieved through an aggressive strategic communications campaign, aimed at politicians and publics alike and backed up by semi-convincing proof like, for example, this week's US strategic review. Bloggers, academics and rogue journalists may pick holes in these arguments but the point is that the vast majority of people on the home front (for 'people' read 'voters') constitute a very receptive audience.

While Americans and Europeans alike struggle through a financial crisis (not to mention that many European nations have never figured out why they went to Afghanistan to begin with), the notion that we've won in Afghanistan and can begin to draw-down is not going to be a hard sell - quite the opposite in fact. Of course, in reality many western troops will remain and large amounts of western money will continue to be spent for some time yet. However, another lesson from Iraq is that this doesn't really matter as all these problems will very quickly disappear from the front pages.

Gentile is right to warn against placing too much faith in "the idea that better tactics can save a failed strategy or policy" (and Ricks is probably right to assert that Gentile represents the silent majority of Army officers who are less than content with the Petraeus cult) but only from a purely military perspective. In the grander scheme of things, in a political and highly mediatised context, it is absolutely possible to 'rescue' a failed strategy or policy with better, or different tactics, both on the battlefield and on the airwaves and it is reasonable to assert that this is what will happen to the campaign in Afghanistan.

Monday, 12 July 2010

How to interpret civilian casualties in Afghanistan?

A report out today suggests that civilian casualties in Afghanistan are rising slightly - but that the number of those killed by ISAF is dropping. The mid-year study from Afghanistan Rights Monitor confirms a trend evident for some time now, again proving that the Taliban and friends are responsible for the majority of civilian deaths and injuries in Afghanistan.

This would appear to be encouraging news for the international community's engagement in Afghanistan and, more specifically, serves to vindicate General McChrystal's tightening of the ISAF rules of engagement last year. It shows that ISAF has greater regard for civilian life than the Taliban does.

However, is that really the point?

In all probability that is the spin that will be put on this story but that attitude will not help to win the war. The statistics may show that ISAF has greater regard for civilian life than the Taliban does but that is supposed to be a given. The real question, the real hearts and minds issue, is the extent to which ISAF is able to protect civilians.

If we are to use the American surge in Iraq from 2006 onwards as an example then we see that, within the context of a population-centric COIN approach, a decrease in civilian casualties is an indicator of progress. Even as American fatalities rose in Iraq during the surge, Iraqi civilian casualties were decreasing. Essentially, US troops were putting themselves between the insurgents and the people - which is one of the objectives within the population-centric approach and a fundamental pre-condition to any kind of military success.

While it would be wrong to judge from afar, this report and others before it suggest that ISAF has not yet achieved that crucial objective.

From a public diplomacy perspective, I can understand that reports such as these could be useful to show people on the home front (assuming of course that they're still listening) that i/ ISAF tries very hard to limit civilian casualties and ii/ the Taliban are evil. However, that interpretation can be - in fact is - counter-productive because we miss the point. Not killing civilians is not enough, we're supposed to protect them.

I would add that the timing of the report is important in that it seems to vindicate General McChrystal's tightened rules of engagement, just as General Petraeus is said to be reconsidering these (in reality, that remark at his Senate confirmation hearing was really for domestic consumption and any minor changes to the RoE will be in interpretation rather than in letter and certainly not in spirit).

Worryingly, there was a demonstration this week-end in Mazar-e-Sharif (not exactly a Taliban stronghold) against civilian casualties and Petraeus' potential loosening of the rules of engagement, showing that ISAF is rightly being held responsible by the Afghans no matter what the statistics say. The facts as we know them tell us that ISAF is not the main culprit and that General Petraeus will not suddenly undo all the good work of his predecessor. The demonstration tells us that Afghan perception is more important than statistical reality.

In short, this report does not entitle the international community to a pat on the back. In actual fact, it only increases the urgency to get things right in Afghanistan as soon as possible.

Tuesday, 15 June 2010

The box in the jungle

There have been a number of rumours in recent weeks regarding the possibility that Myanmar may be embarking upon an illicit nuclear weapons programme. Reports from Burmese dissidents have added fuel to the fire but there is no conclusive evidence. Much of the suspicion has focused on a box-shaped building which, from aerial footage, appears similar to the site the Israelis attacked in Syria. However, the building in Myanmar is much larger than the Syrian facility (which is said to have been based on the North Korean reactor at Yongbyon). Several analysts have also suggested that the box may be linked to a Burmese attempt at indigenous missile production. While I will not go into too much detail about what has been said, I would like to point out why Myanmar may choose to go down this path.

First, there is good reason for us to question the rationality of the military junta that rules Myanmar, primarily due to its acute sense of paranoia. A good example was its decision to move the capital from Yangon (formerly Rangoon) inland to Naypyidaw in 2005. This was a move that was done in secret and for reasons of isolation and protection; its location is very remote and most Burmese citizens had no idea that it was being built.

By disengaging itself from Yangon, the junta disengages itself from the people -- something that it appears to want. But another reason for moving the capital is that it fears a U.S. led invasion of the country. As a result, the junta may look at the North Korean example and see nuclear weapons as the most effective means of preventing such an invasion from taking place.

Second, Myanmar is believed to have close links with North Korea and there have been several reports of North Korean ships docking in Burmese ports. In order for Myanmar to kick-start any nuclear programme it would need substantial external assistance as it simply does not have the infrastructure to carry out such a feat alone. If it did seek this support, then it would almost certainly turn to Pyongyang.

Although this is all currently unsubstantiated, it does appear that Burmese paranoia regarding a U.S. led invasion has been heightened since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. If this is the case, then we have yet another negative effect of the conflict. Given that the justification for the war was to dismantle Saddam's supposed WMD capability, it would be ironic if the invasion turns out to be the trigger for another country to start its own programme (note that this same argument has been used with North Korea). It would be interesting to know whether the possibility of this happening was ever discussed prior to the 2003 invasion. If it wasn't then it certainly should have been.

Myanmar presents an interesting case study and one that is very different from Iran. The main difference seems to be rationality: while the Iranian leadership, with its multiple power bases, can be considered to be rational, this is not necessarily the case with the Burmese junta. If it were, then the junta should conclude that while an invasion is pretty much an impossibility as things stand today, this could all change if there was conclusive evidence that it was trying to construct a nuclear weapon. That said, it should be much easier for the West to use peaceful measures to prevent it from succeeding; due primarily to the regime's international isolation (China would be a key actor again). After all, another invasion of a country suspected of having a nuclear weapons programme could add further value to the weapons' value, precipitating further proliferation......and so it goes on.










Wednesday, 7 April 2010

In defence of surging?

Abu Muqawama argues that the surge in Iraq worked, contrary to the seemingly widely-held opinion that it succeeded tactically but failed strategically. He bases his opinion on the following definition of the objectives of a military intervention:

“We intervene in … a conflict in order to establish a condition in which the political objective can be achieved by other means and in other ways. We seek to create a conceptual space for diplomacy, economic incentives, political pressure and other measures to create a desired political outcome of stability, and if possible democracy.” (General Rupert Smith)

In other words, a military intervention (surge included) can only create the conditions for the successful establishment of an indigenous political process. A military intervention can not and should not successfully create the political process itself. Therefore an imperfect political process does not mean the surge in Iraq did not work.

In that light, what conclusions can we draw on the ongoing 'surge' in Afghanistan? I stress ongoing because let us remind ourselves that not all of the extra 37,000 ISAF troops have actually been deployed yet. Very far from it.

It is very, very early to draw any meaningful conclusions given that the 'clear' phase of Operation Moshtarak has barely been completed in Helmand and has not even begun in Kandahar. However, time is short and some questions must be asked now.

Perhaps Smith's definition serves as a timely yardstick for what we should realistically expect from ISAF this summer? Perhaps it also could serve as a timely wake-up call to other international actors to get their act together and do their bit to fill the newly-created conceptual space?

Alternatively, perhaps even these objectives are too ambitious in the context of Afghanistan? Perhaps the international community simply does not agree on a common definition of the conceptual space? Perhaps Smith's definition is faulty or just plain wrong?