UK-France cooperation on nuclear warheads

Given the theme of this blog, it is worth highlighting the recent defence cooperation agreement between the UK and France. On 2 November, an overarching agreement was signed outlining a package of initiatives that will result in greater interoperability between the two countries' conventional forces. In a subordinate treaty, the two governments also agreed to cooperate in the stewardship of their nuclear warheads. It is this latter accord - including motive and effects - that I will focus on here.

Under the agreement, a joint simulation facility will be constructed in Valduc, France, where scientists from both countries will conduct work on the safety and security of their respective country’s nuclear warheads. In addition, a joint Technology Development Center will be established at the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment, which will develop simulation technology for the center at Valduc. Construction costs will be split equally between the two governments.

Just to unpack this a second: the moratorium on testing under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) means that nuclear weapon states have to find other ways to ensure the viability of their nuclear warheads. This is done through advanced facilities that use computer simulations to test various components and implosion capabilities. Needless to say, such facilities are expensive. In a bid to save money and pool resources, the two countries will share a single facility without exchanging sensitive information regarding warhead design. In other words, they will work independently instead of actually assisting one another.

Although the timing of this agreement is certainly down to money, it is worth looking at it from a slightly different angle as well. Engaging in defence cooperation with France at this time is (perhaps) a way for David Cameron to outflank some of the more Eurosceptic members of his own party. He can display his European credentials while arguing the decision's merits solely from an economic standpoint. While this is unlikely to have been the motive, it can certainly be used as an example of his government engaging constructively with France in an area where the Labour Party ultimately failed to deliver.

There is, however, one interesting consideration regarding this agreement: the potential effect it will have on the special nuclear relationship between the UK and US. Of course the term "special" is overused when it comes to US-UK relations, but in the context of nuclear weapons the relationship certainly is special. Weapon designers from both countries exchange a range of information, ideas and materials. Best practices in terms of warhead design are frequently discussed in a series of joint working groups that date back to the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement.

Given that the 1958 agreement strictly limits the sharing of information with third parties without the other's consent, what effect will the UK-French agreement have on UK-US cooperation? Under the current agreement the answer is not much. However, David Cameron did state that "this is the start of something new, not an end in itself." So the question is, how far can the UK and France go in this area before officials in Washington start shifting awkwardly in their chairs? The answer probably lies somewhere between nowhere and not very far at all.

Given the theme of this blog, it is worth highlighting the recent defence cooperation agreement between the UK and France. On 2 November, an overarching agreement was signed outlining a package of initiatives that will result in greater interoperability between the two countries' conventional forces. In a subordinate <a href="http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm79/7975/7975.pdf">treaty</a>, the two governments also agreed to cooperate in the stewardship of their nuclear warheads. It is this latter accord - including motive and effects - that I will focus on here.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />Under the agreement, a joint simulation facility will be constructed in Valduc, France, where scientists from both countries will conduct work on the safety and security of their respective country’s nuclear warheads. In addition, a joint Technology Development Center will be established at the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment, which will develop simulation technology for the center at Valduc. Construction costs will be split equally between the two governments.<br /><br />Just to unpack this a second: the moratorium on testing under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) means that nuclear weapon states have to find other ways to ensure the viability of their nuclear warheads. This is done through advanced facilities that use computer simulations to test various components and implosion capabilities. Needless to say, such facilities are expensive. In a bid to save money and pool resources, the two countries will share a single facility without exchanging sensitive information regarding warhead design. In other words, they will work independently instead of actually assisting one another.<br /><br />Although the timing of this agreement is certainly down to money, it is worth looking at it from a slightly different angle as well. Engaging in defence cooperation with France at this time is (perhaps) a way for David Cameron to outflank some of the more Eurosceptic members of his own party. He can display his European credentials while arguing the decision's merits solely from an economic standpoint. While this is unlikely to have been the motive, it can certainly be used as an example of his government engaging constructively with France in an area where the Labour Party ultimately failed to deliver.<br /><br />There is, however, one interesting consideration regarding this agreement: the potential effect it will have on the special nuclear relationship between the UK and US. Of course the term "special" is overused when it comes to US-UK relations, but in the context of nuclear weapons the relationship certainly is special. Weapon designers from both countries exchange a range of information, ideas and materials. Best practices in terms of warhead design are frequently discussed in a series of joint working groups that date back to the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement.<br /><br />Given that the 1958 agreement strictly limits the sharing of information with third parties without the other's consent, what effect will the UK-French agreement have on UK-US cooperation? Under the current agreement the answer is not much. However, David Cameron did state that "this is the start of something new, not an end in itself." So the question is, how far can the UK and France go in this area before officials in Washington start shifting awkwardly in their chairs? The answer probably lies somewhere between nowhere and not very far at all.<br /><br /><br /></span>

Israel's nuclear deterrent

In his latest talk, Professor John Mearsheimer analyses the costs and benefits of the Israeli nuclear deterrent.

He argues that since Israel's conventional military forces are superior, no neighbour would dare attacking it. Hence, the nuclear deterrent has no added value.

I tend to disagree. The 2006 war with Hizbollah in Lebanon did indicate, that asymmetric militias can pose a serious challenge to conventional forces. Israel will probably make sure that the next round in Lebanon will not end in a similar defeat by changing training, tactics and equipment. However, proliferation of advanced weapons systems can turn a strategic inferiority of irregular forces into a tactical superiority. In 2006 Hizbollah managed to do so when it lured Israeli tanks in an ambush and destroyed several of them.

I would argue that the current military dominance of Israel is not guaranteed forever. Therefore, it is simply good statesmanship to maintain a nuclear deterrent.

Mearsheimer also points out that the posture of Egypt has changed profoundly since the 1950's and 1960's and today is no more a hostile state. Israelis tend to agree but argue that nobody knows what will happen next in Egypt. I concur with this assessment. To speculate that Egypt will remain friendly and, therefore, one main reason for the need of a nuclear deterrent became redundant, would not convince me, if I were Israeli.

I would argue that the situation in the Middle East is much too volatile for Israel to get rid of its nuclear weapons. There are the ultimate defensive weapon and hence necessary in the armoury of every country that feels threatened.

In his latest <a href="http://original.antiwar.com/john-mearsheimer/2010/07/08/israels-nukes-harm-us-national-interests/">talk</a>, Professor John Mearsheimer analyses the costs and benefits of the Israeli nuclear deterrent.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />He argues that since Israel's conventional military forces are superior, no neighbour would dare attacking it. Hence, the nuclear deterrent has no added value.<br /><br />I tend to disagree. The 2006 war with Hizbollah in Lebanon did indicate, that asymmetric militias can pose a serious challenge to conventional forces. Israel will probably make sure that the next round in Lebanon will not end in a similar defeat by changing training, tactics and equipment. However, proliferation of advanced weapons systems can turn a strategic inferiority of irregular forces into a tactical superiority. In 2006 Hizbollah managed to do so when it lured Israeli tanks in an ambush and destroyed several of them.<br /><br />I would argue that the current military dominance of Israel is not guaranteed forever. Therefore, it is simply good statesmanship to maintain a nuclear deterrent.<br /><br />Mearsheimer also points out that the posture of Egypt has changed profoundly since the 1950's and 1960's and today is no more a hostile state. Israelis tend to agree but argue that nobody knows what will happen next in Egypt. I concur with this assessment. To speculate that Egypt will remain friendly and, therefore, one main reason for the need of a nuclear deterrent became redundant, would not convince me, if I were Israeli.<br /><br />I would argue that the situation in the Middle East is much too volatile for Israel to get rid of its nuclear weapons. There are the ultimate defensive weapon and hence necessary in the armoury of every country that feels threatened.<br /></span>

The box in the jungle

There have been a number of rumours in recent weeks regarding the possibility that Myanmar may be embarking upon an illicit nuclear weapons programme. Reports from Burmese dissidents have added fuel to the fire but there is no conclusive evidence. Much of the suspicion has focused on a box-shaped building which, from aerial footage, appears similar to the site the Israelis attacked in Syria. However, the building in Myanmar is much larger than the Syrian facility (which is said to have been based on the North Korean reactor at Yongbyon). Several analysts have also suggested that the box may be linked to a Burmese attempt at indigenous missile production. While I will not go into too much detail about what has been said, I would like to point out why Myanmar may choose to go down this path.

First, there is good reason for us to question the rationality of the military junta that rules Myanmar, primarily due to its acute sense of paranoia. A good example was its decision to move the capital from Yangon (formerly Rangoon) inland to Naypyidaw in 2005. This was a move that was done in secret and for reasons of isolation and protection; its location is very remote and most Burmese citizens had no idea that it was being built.

By disengaging itself from Yangon, the junta disengages itself from the people -- something that it appears to want. But another reason for moving the capital is that it fears a U.S. led invasion of the country. As a result, the junta may look at the North Korean example and see nuclear weapons as the most effective means of preventing such an invasion from taking place.

Second, Myanmar is believed to have close links with North Korea and there have been several reports of North Korean ships docking in Burmese ports. In order for Myanmar to kick-start any nuclear programme it would need substantial external assistance as it simply does not have the infrastructure to carry out such a feat alone. If it did seek this support, then it would almost certainly turn to Pyongyang.

Although this is all currently unsubstantiated, it does appear that Burmese paranoia regarding a U.S. led invasion has been heightened since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. If this is the case, then we have yet another negative effect of the conflict. Given that the justification for the war was to dismantle Saddam's supposed WMD capability, it would be ironic if the invasion turns out to be the trigger for another country to start its own programme (note that this same argument has been used with North Korea). It would be interesting to know whether the possibility of this happening was ever discussed prior to the 2003 invasion. If it wasn't then it certainly should have been.

Myanmar presents an interesting case study and one that is very different from Iran. The main difference seems to be rationality: while the Iranian leadership, with its multiple power bases, can be considered to be rational, this is not necessarily the case with the Burmese junta. If it were, then the junta should conclude that while an invasion is pretty much an impossibility as things stand today, this could all change if there was conclusive evidence that it was trying to construct a nuclear weapon. That said, it should be much easier for the West to use peaceful measures to prevent it from succeeding; due primarily to the regime's international isolation (China would be a key actor again). After all, another invasion of a country suspected of having a nuclear weapons programme could add further value to the weapons' value, precipitating further proliferation......and so it goes on.

There have been a number of rumours in recent weeks regarding the possibility that Myanmar may be embarking upon an illicit nuclear weapons programme. <a href="http://www.dvb.no/news/expert-says-burma-%E2%80%98planning-nuclear-bomb%E2%80%99/9527">Reports</a> from Burmese dissidents have added fuel to the fire but there is no conclusive evidence. Much of the suspicion has focused on a box-shaped building which, from aerial footage, appears similar to the site the Israelis attacked in Syria. However, the building in Myanmar is much larger than the Syrian facility (which is said to have been based on the North Korean reactor at Yongbyon). Several analysts have also <a href="http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2720/now-it-can-be-told-inside-bob">suggested</a> that the box may be linked to a Burmese attempt at indigenous missile production. While I will not go into too much detail about what has been said, I would like to point out why Myanmar may choose to go down this path.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />First, there is good reason for us to question the rationality of the military junta that rules Myanmar, primarily due to its acute sense of paranoia. A good example was its decision to move the capital from Yangon (formerly Rangoon) inland to Naypyidaw in 2005. This was a move that was done in secret and for reasons of isolation and protection; its location is very remote and most Burmese citizens had no idea that it was being built.<br /><br />By disengaging itself from Yangon, the junta disengages itself from the people -- something that it appears to want. But another reason for moving the capital is that it fears a U.S. led invasion of the country. As a result, the junta may look at the North Korean example and see nuclear weapons as the most effective means of preventing such an invasion from taking place.<br /><br />Second, Myanmar is believed to have close links with North Korea and there have been several <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124571192210838865.html">reports</a> of North Korean ships docking in Burmese ports. In order for Myanmar to kick-start any nuclear programme it would need substantial external assistance as it simply does not have the infrastructure to carry out such a feat alone. If it did seek this support, then it would almost certainly turn to Pyongyang.<br /><br />Although this is all currently unsubstantiated, it does appear that Burmese paranoia regarding a U.S. led invasion has been heightened since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. If this is the case, then we have yet another negative effect of the conflict. Given that the justification for the war was to dismantle Saddam's supposed WMD capability, it would be ironic if the invasion turns out to be the trigger for another country to start its own programme (note that this same argument has been used with North Korea). It would be interesting to know whether the possibility of this happening was ever discussed prior to the 2003 invasion. If it wasn't then it certainly should have been.<br /><br />Myanmar presents an interesting case study and one that is very different from Iran. The main difference seems to be rationality: while the Iranian leadership, with its multiple power bases, can be considered to be rational, this is not necessarily the case with the Burmese junta. If it were, then the junta should conclude that while an invasion is pretty much an impossibility as things stand today, this could all change if there was conclusive evidence that it was trying to construct a nuclear weapon. That said, it should be much easier for the West to use peaceful measures to prevent it from succeeding; due primarily to the regime's international isolation (China would be a key actor again). After all, another invasion of a country suspected of having a nuclear weapons programme could add further value to the weapons' value, precipitating further proliferation......and so it goes on.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /></span>

Open Saudi skies for Israel (?)

The enemy of my enemy is my friend... and his bombers shall have open skies to attack my enemy's nuclear facilities.

The Times reports that Saudi Arabia has been conducting tests to stand down its air defences and allow Israeli bombers through unharmed. Granting Israeli jets free passage through a narrow corridor of northern Saudi airspace would considerably reduce the distance of the bombing run.

The Kingdom has officially denied this claim, calling it "slanderous and false" and reiterating its "position of opposition and rejection of the violation of its sovereignty and the use of its airspace or territory by anyone to attack any country".

According to The Times, the four main targets are said to be the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Qom, the gas storage development at Isfahan and the heavy-water reactor at Arak. These targets lie up to 2,250km from Israel, which is the outer limit of their bombers’ range, even with aerial refuelling. An air strike would involve multiple waves of bombers, presumably crossing Jordan, northern Saudi Arabia and Iraq - which would require at least tacit approval from Washington for the strike.

The article quotes a US defence source who claims that the understanding between Israel and Saudi Arabia has been done with the agreement of the US State Department.

An interesting aspect of this issue is the regional dimension - the article refers to a claim by 'Israeli intelligence sources' that Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan are just as concerned (to put it mildly) as Israel and the west over the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran.

If this story is true - and we should not consider it a foregone conclusion - then it raises many questions. Is a strike on Iran a question of when not if? Is the ongoing diplomatic effort genuinely intended to bring about a peaceful resolution to the issue or is it merely a smokescreen intended to convince the world that a military solution is the only solution? If the diplomatic effort is genuine then at what point do we decide that it is not working and an air strike is the only solution?

Also, to what extent is Israel doing this at its own behest or as a US (and Saudi) proxy? What would be the repercussions of using Israel as a blunt instrument, diplomatically or otherwise?

<div align="justify">The enemy of my enemy is my friend... and his bombers shall have open skies to attack my enemy's nuclear facilities.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article7148555.ece">The Times</a> reports that Saudi Arabia has been conducting tests to stand down its air defences and allow Israeli bombers through unharmed. Granting Israeli jets free passage through a narrow corridor of northern Saudi airspace would considerably reduce the distance of the bombing run.<br /><br />The Kingdom has officially <a href="http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=2010061375182">denied</a> this claim, calling it "slanderous and false" and reiterating its "position of opposition and rejection of the violation of its sovereignty and the use of its airspace or territory by anyone to attack any country".<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />According to The Times, the four main targets are said to be the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Qom, the gas storage development at Isfahan and the heavy-water reactor at Arak. These targets lie up to 2,250km from Israel, which is the outer limit of their bombers’ range, even with aerial refuelling. An air strike would involve multiple waves of bombers, presumably crossing Jordan, northern Saudi Arabia and Iraq - which would require at least tacit approval from Washington for the strike.<br /><br />The article quotes a US defence source who claims that the understanding between Israel and Saudi Arabia has been done with the agreement of the US State Department.<br /><br />An interesting aspect of this issue is the regional dimension - the article refers to a claim by 'Israeli intelligence sources' that Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan are just as concerned (to put it mildly) as Israel and the west over the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran.<br /><br />If this story is true - and we should not consider it a foregone conclusion - then it raises many questions. Is a strike on Iran a question of when not if? Is the ongoing diplomatic effort genuinely intended to bring about a peaceful resolution to the issue or is it merely a smokescreen intended to convince the world that a military solution is the only solution? If the diplomatic effort is genuine then at what point do we decide that it is not working and an air strike is the only solution?<br /><br />Also, to what extent is Israel doing this at its own behest or as a US (and Saudi) proxy? What would be the repercussions of using Israel as a blunt instrument, diplomatically or otherwise?<br /></div></span>

DNI report: "We do not know whether Iran Tehran eventually will decide to produce nuclear weapons."

The Director of National Intelligence, who heads the 16 US intelligence services, published it's annual report to Congress on WMD developments in foreign countries. It contains some interesting information on what we know about the Iranian nuclear programme. Here we go:

"We continue to assess that Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons though we do not know whether Tehran eventually will decide to produce nuclear weapons. Iran continues to develop a range of capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so.

During the reporting period, Iran continued to expand its nuclear infrastructure and continued uranium enrichment and activities related to its heavy water research reactor, despite multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions since late 2006 calling for the suspension of those activities. Although Iran made progress in expanding its nuclear infrastructure during 2009, some obstacles slowed progress during this period."

The report goes on with the description of technical details of the Iranian nuclear activities.

So, what do we learn?
1) Iran acts in violation of several UN SC resolutions.
2) Iran has not yet made the decision to build the bomb.
3) We do not know whether the decision to build the bomb will ever be taken.

Well, that means that Iran is not building the bomb, I guess.

I think once that is clear, we can stop threatening Iran with sanctions or military intervention.

The Director of National Intelligence, who heads the 16 US intelligence services, published it's annual <a href="http://www.dni.gov/reports/2009_721_Report.pdf">report</a> to Congress on WMD developments in foreign countries. It contains some interesting information on what we know about the Iranian nuclear programme. Here we go:<br /><blockquote></blockquote><blockquote>"We continue to assess that Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons though we do not know whether Tehran eventually will decide to produce nuclear weapons. Iran continues to develop a range of capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so.<br /><br />During the reporting period, Iran continued to expand its nuclear infrastructure and continued uranium enrichment and activities related to its heavy water research reactor, despite multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions since late 2006 calling for the suspension of those activities. Although Iran made progress in expanding its nuclear infrastructure during 2009, some obstacles slowed progress during this period."</blockquote><blockquote></blockquote>The report goes on with the description of technical details of the Iranian nuclear activities.<br /><br />So, what do we learn?<br />1) Iran acts in violation of several UN SC resolutions.<br />2) Iran has not yet made the decision to build the bomb.<br />3) We do not know whether the decision to build the bomb will ever be taken.<br /><br />Well, that means that Iran is not building the bomb, I guess.<br /><br />I think once that is clear, we can stop threatening Iran with sanctions or military intervention.<br /><br /><span dir="right"></span>

Iran proposes new nuclear swap deal

The Kuala Lumpur News report:

"The head of the Iranian atomic energy agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, has told local television the country will make concessions to the West by exchanging Tehran's low-grade uranium for highly enriched uranium that it needs for its medical research. Salehi said the new proposal for a nuclear deal could involve 60 percent of Iran's low enriched uranium being shipped to the West, all in one batch directly from Iran.

Iran failed to accept a draft nuclear deal by the West last November. Part of Iran's low-grade stockpile was to have been sent to France and Russia for further enrichment before eventually being sent back to Iran. Eventually, Iran made a counter-offer calling for the exchange to take place gradually in 400 kilogram batches.

Atomic energy chief Salehi has now said Iran will be willing to deliver the total amount of fuel in one go, on the condition that the exchange take place inside Iran and simultaneously. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced in February that Tehran would produce around 20 percent of highly enriched uranium fuel itself."

This proposal is similar to Iran's last proposal. The only differerence is that Iran proposes to swap all material it needs at once. Iran still insists that the exchange of the material is done on its own territory. The US offered to do the exchange outside of Iran, which was unacceptable for Iran. The Iranians simply do not trust its antagonists that they will abide to the deal.

Since the US and its Western allies did not even discuss Iran's last proposal, it is very likely that they will disregard this offer as well.

The Kuala Lumpur News <a href="http://www.kualalumpurnews.net/story/613360">report</a>:<br /><blockquote>"The head of the Iranian atomic energy agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, has told local television the country will make concessions to the West by exchanging Tehran's low-grade uranium for highly enriched uranium that it needs for its medical research. Salehi said the new proposal for a nuclear deal could involve 60 percent of Iran's low enriched uranium being shipped to the West, all in one batch directly from Iran.<br /><br />Iran failed to accept a draft nuclear deal by the West last November. Part of Iran's low-grade stockpile was to have been sent to France and Russia for further enrichment before eventually being sent back to Iran. Eventually, Iran made a counter-offer calling for the exchange to take place gradually in 400 kilogram batches.<br /><br />Atomic energy chief Salehi has now said Iran will be willing to deliver the total amount of fuel in one go, on the condition that the exchange take place inside Iran and simultaneously. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced in February that Tehran would produce around 20 percent of highly enriched uranium fuel itself."</blockquote>This proposal is similar to Iran's last proposal. The only differerence is that Iran proposes to swap all material it needs at once. Iran still insists that the exchange of the material is done on its own territory. The US offered to do the exchange outside of Iran, which was unacceptable for Iran. The Iranians simply do not trust its antagonists that they will abide to the deal.<br /><br />Since the US and its Western allies did not even discuss Iran's last proposal, it is very likely that they will disregard this offer as well.<br /><blockquote></blockquote>