Interoperability in WWII

I'm currently re-watching the - still excellent - BBC series The World at War from the 1970s. In this day and age of multi-national military alliances and buzzwords like 'interoperability', I was amused to hear this from General Mark Clark, Commander of the US 5th Army, in reference to the campaign in Italy during WWII.

"[The Germans] were well-trained troops, tenacious and well-led... and they were homogenous. They were all of one nationality, they were all equipped with the same weapons and ammunition, they ate the same food, they believed pretty much in the same God.

I had sixteen different nationalities with me, some of whom couldn't eat this and that, some didn't want to fight on Fridays or some other day of the week and then we had the British with their infantry weapons and artillery completely different from ours. You couldn't move with ease from one front to another like the Germans could."

I don't know how much, if anything, we should read into a statement like that (although I'd be curious to know what the sixteen nationalities were). It just struck me as quite ironic when viewed from an early 21st century perspective. I doubt we'll hear an American general (much less a European) say this kind of thing publicly anymore... but I wonder how many of them think this way.

<div align="justify">I'm currently re-watching the - still excellent - BBC series <em>The World at War</em> from the 1970s. In this day and age of multi-national military alliances and buzzwords like 'interoperability', I was amused to hear this from <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_W._Clark">General Mark Clark</a>, Commander of the US 5th Army, in reference to the campaign in Italy during WWII.<br /><span class="fullpost"><blockquote><em>"[The Germans] were well-trained troops, tenacious and well-led... and they were homogenous. They were all of one nationality, they were all equipped with the same weapons and ammunition, they ate the same food, they believed pretty much in the same God.<br /><br />I had sixteen different nationalities with me, some of whom couldn't eat this and that, some didn't want to fight on Fridays or some other day of the week and then we had the British with their infantry weapons and artillery completely different from ours. You couldn't move with ease from one front to another like the Germans could."</em></blockquote>I don't know how much, if anything, we should read into a statement like that (although I'd be curious to know what the sixteen nationalities were). It just struck me as quite ironic when viewed from an early 21st century perspective. I doubt we'll hear an American general (much less a European) say this kind of thing publicly anymore... but I wonder how many of them think this way.<br /></div></span>

Obama the Commander-in-Chief

The fall-out from Bob Woodward's latest book, Obama's Wars, has seen much heated debate on President Obama's handling of national security and relations with the military. The following two articles highlight some interesting aspects of that debate. One is critical, the other is favourable. Both address the fundamentals of the role of the US Commander-in-Chief and how Obama is measuring up.

Firstly, this article, by comparing Barack Obama to Abraham Lincoln, makes a thinly-veiled attack on the former's handling of the war in Afghanistan, an attack which fails because it is based on a very poor understanding of Abraham Lincoln's approach to the role of wartime Commander-in-Chief.

In a nutshell, the article claims that Lincoln had the good fortune to find a highly competent general in Ulysses S. Grant and did what every good President should do - delegate the entire conduct of the war to his General and protect him from his detractors, regardless of the potential political consequences. On the other hand, Barack Obama has found a highly competent general in David Petraeus but continuously meddles in his conduct of the Afghan war and places his own party political agenda above national security.

Its a neat comparison, one that will undoubtedly find favour among the readers of this particular newspaper (although it's doubtful that the readers of The Republican-American would need much convincing that Barack Obama is not a very good Commander-in-Chief). However, the pseudo-historical basis for the article is all too easy to disprove and this in turn undermines the article's whole conclusion.

In Supreme Command, Eliot Cohen's seminal work on top-level civil-military relations, the author convincingly argues against the notion (which for a long time was the received wisdom in academic and political circles) that Lincoln merely found a good general and let him get on with his job. In fact, Cohen shows that Lincoln strove to i/ keep a very close eye on what his generals were doing and ii/ become just as knowledgeable, if not more so, than his generals on every detail pertaining to the conduct of the war (for example, technological innovations). Moreover, Lincoln was acutely aware of the unavoidable influence of politics in the conduct of war.

"Lincoln had to educate his generals about the purposes of the war and to remind them of its fundamental political characteristics. He had not merely to create a strategic approach to the war, but to insist that the generals adhere to it... It was Lincoln's understanding of the interplay of war and politics, no less than his ability to absorb military detail and to read human character, that made him the greatest of American war presidents."

The truth is that Abraham Lincoln was a much better war leader than this article gives him credit for and the same may yet prove to be true for Barack Obama. That remains to be seen but the point is that the conclusions of this article are plain wrong, simply because it exhorts Obama to be more like Lincoln but in fact criticises Obama for trying to do the very things that Lincoln did. Obama might be making mistakes but his intentions are sound.

Secondly, on a very closely-related theme, this article from Foreign Policy, aside from being an insightful look at the interplay between politics and strategy, directly addresses Obama's most famous quote from the book - "I can't lose the whole Democratic Party" - in reference to his decision to begin withdrawing US troops from Afghanistan in July 2011. Needless to say, even though few people have actually read the book, the vultures are already circling.

Of course the likes of John Bolton are not really advocating that President Obama completely ignore domestic party politics when making national security decisions. What John Bolton is really doing is making a not-very-subtle attempt to score political points - the truth is that the "cold-blooded, cynical, grotesquely political manipulation of national security" is Bolton's, not Obama's.

However, taking the accusation at face value (for the sake of argument), any serious student of history would not even countenance the notion that strategy and politics should be kept separate.

As Tip O'Neill famously said, "all politics is local". As Stephen Biddle explains, there have been countless examples of the importance of domestic politics in strategic decision-making. To expect otherwise is simply unrealistic.

"Good strategy is politically sustainable strategy. Anything else is unrealistic and self-defeating. And any president who did not worry about the domestic politics of his strategy would be a very poor commander in chief indeed."

We may disagree with Obama's decisions but the fact remains that, in demonstrating his keen awareness of the fundamental link between politics and strategy, he is behaving just as a President - and a Commander-in-Chief - should.

<div align="justify">The fall-out from Bob Woodward's latest book, <em>Obama's Wars</em>, has seen much heated debate on President Obama's handling of national security and relations with the military. The following two articles highlight some interesting aspects of that debate. One is critical, the other is favourable. Both address the fundamentals of the role of the US Commander-in-Chief and how Obama is measuring up.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />Firstly, this <a href="http://www.rep-am.com/articles/2010/09/25/opinion/509740.txt">article</a>, by comparing Barack Obama to Abraham Lincoln, makes a thinly-veiled attack on the former's handling of the war in Afghanistan, an attack which fails because it is based on a very poor understanding of Abraham Lincoln's approach to the role of wartime Commander-in-Chief.<br /><br />In a nutshell, the article claims that Lincoln had the good fortune to find a highly competent general in Ulysses S. Grant and did what every good President should do - delegate the entire conduct of the war to his General and protect him from his detractors, regardless of the potential political consequences. On the other hand, Barack Obama has found a highly competent general in David Petraeus but continuously meddles in his conduct of the Afghan war and places his own party political agenda above national security.<br /><br />Its a neat comparison, one that will undoubtedly find favour among the readers of this particular newspaper (although it's doubtful that the readers of <em>The Republican-American</em> would need much convincing that Barack Obama is not a very good Commander-in-Chief). However, the pseudo-historical basis for the article is all too easy to disprove and this in turn undermines the article's whole conclusion.<br /><br />In <em>Supreme Command</em>, Eliot Cohen's seminal work on top-level civil-military relations, the author convincingly argues against the notion (which for a long time was the received wisdom in academic and political circles) that Lincoln merely found a good general and let him get on with his job. In fact, Cohen shows that Lincoln strove to i/ keep a very close eye on what his generals were doing and ii/ become just as knowledgeable, if not more so, than his generals on every detail pertaining to the conduct of the war (for example, technological innovations). Moreover, Lincoln was acutely aware of the unavoidable influence of politics in the conduct of war.<blockquote>"<em>Lincoln had to educate his generals about the purposes of the war and to remind them of its fundamental political characteristics. He had not merely to create a strategic approach to the war, but to insist that the generals adhere to it... It was Lincoln's understanding of the interplay of war and politics, no less than his ability to absorb military detail and to read human character, that made him the greatest of American war presidents</em>."</blockquote>The truth is that Abraham Lincoln was a much better war leader than this article gives him credit for and the same may yet prove to be true for Barack Obama. That remains to be seen but the point is that the conclusions of this article are plain wrong, simply because it exhorts Obama to be more like Lincoln but in fact criticises Obama for trying to do the very things that Lincoln did. Obama might be making mistakes but his intentions are sound.<br /><br />Secondly, on a very closely-related theme, this article from <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/27/war_by_other_means">Foreign Policy</a>, aside from being an insightful look at the interplay between politics and strategy, directly addresses Obama's most famous quote from the book - "I can't lose the whole Democratic Party" - in reference to his decision to begin withdrawing US troops from Afghanistan in July 2011. Needless to say, even though few people have actually read the book, the <a href="http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2010/09/22/bolton_obama_is_cold-blooded_cynical_and_manipulates_national_security.html">vultures</a> are already circling.<br /><br />Of course the likes of John Bolton are not really advocating that President Obama completely ignore domestic party politics when making national security decisions. What John Bolton is really doing is making a not-very-subtle attempt to score political points - the truth is that the "cold-blooded, cynical, grotesquely political manipulation of national security" is Bolton's, not Obama's.<br /><br />However, taking the accusation at face value (for the sake of argument), any serious student of history would not even countenance the notion that strategy and politics should be kept separate.<br /><br />As Tip O'Neill famously said, "all politics is local". As Stephen Biddle explains, there have been countless examples of the importance of domestic politics in strategic decision-making. To expect otherwise is simply unrealistic.<blockquote><em>"Good strategy is politically sustainable strategy. Anything else is unrealistic and self-defeating. And any president who did not worry about the domestic politics of his strategy would be a very poor commander in chief indeed."</em></blockquote>We may disagree with Obama's decisions but the fact remains that, in demonstrating his keen awareness of the fundamental link between politics and strategy, he is behaving just as a President - and a Commander-in-Chief - should.<br /></div></span>

Going PowerPoint deep in Afghanistan

Major-General Flynn's report on US intelligence in Afghanistan made the headlines earlier this year, most notably for his claim that the United States had only gone 'PowerPoint deep' in their understanding of the complex situation in Afghanistan.

As reported by the New York Times (and many others), it seems the US military have taken their attachment to PowerPoint just a little too far.

Upon seeing it, General McChrystal is said to have remarked “When we understand that slide, we’ll have won the war.”

As comical as this slide might look, there is a serious point to make here, as illustrated by Julian Borger of the Guardian.

"On a recent tour of the region, [British Foreign Minister] David Miliband was treated to an upbeat PowerPoint slideshow about the battle for hearts and minds in Helmand, neatly condensed into bullet points.

Everyone walked out energised and enthused, until an official with long experience of the region took us aside and told us, in old-fashioned paragraphs, why Helmand was a disaster."

The NY Times article gives a number of examples of how misuse of PowerPoint can have harmful effects, such as over-simplifying complex problems or encouraging group-think. This is dangerous.

“It’s dangerous because it can create the illusion of understanding and the illusion of control... Some problems in the world are not bullet-izable.”

In the dystopian world described by George Orwell in Nineteen Eighty-Four, Big Brother reduced the English language to the minimal lexicon of 'newspeak'. The pretext was greater efficiency, the real intention - and the result - was reducing people's ability to think by simply reducing the number of words available to them.

Reading the various accounts of military misuse of PowerPoint, it begins to look disturbingly like newspeak.

PowerPoint is not all bad though...

"Senior officers say the program does come in handy when the goal is not imparting information, as in briefings for reporters."

PS: For tips on how to make a good PowerPoint presentation, try this from the BBC.

<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi8fBEerQP3JF7gHMBQrrTU9lkXcSws_GOb8iKukm3wxvNgefPBEj-7sdPEDB5ZSb_21X9wLygljUOm5ATY7rznQ7RwWdIHiCH_VKwV1Dh0U1pz7FQGHtIOe7fReCyzALii8GdsLy7exLaQ/s1600/American-military-strateg-001.jpg"><img alt="" border="0" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5468086577831012690" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi8fBEerQP3JF7gHMBQrrTU9lkXcSws_GOb8iKukm3wxvNgefPBEj-7sdPEDB5ZSb_21X9wLygljUOm5ATY7rznQ7RwWdIHiCH_VKwV1Dh0U1pz7FQGHtIOe7fReCyzALii8GdsLy7exLaQ/s320/American-military-strateg-001.jpg" style="cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;width: 320px; height: 234px;" /></a><br /><br />Major-General Flynn's <a href="http://www.cnas.org/node/3924">report </a>on US intelligence in Afghanistan made the headlines earlier this year, most notably for his claim that the United States had only gone 'PowerPoint deep' in their understanding of the complex situation in Afghanistan.<br /><br />As reported by the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/world/27powerpoint.html?hp">New York Times</a> (and many others), it seems the US military have taken their attachment to PowerPoint just a little too far.<br /><span class="fullpost"><br />Upon seeing it, General McChrystal is said to have remarked “When we understand that slide, we’ll have won the war.”<br /><br />As comical as this slide might look, there is a serious point to make here, as illustrated by <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2010/apr/27/afghanistan-microsoft">Julian Borger </a>of the Guardian.<br /><br />"On a recent tour of the region, [British Foreign Minister] David Miliband was treated to an upbeat PowerPoint slideshow about the battle for hearts and minds in Helmand, neatly condensed into bullet points. <br /><br />Everyone walked out energised and enthused, until an official with long experience of the region took us aside and told us, in old-fashioned paragraphs, why Helmand was a disaster."<br /><br />The NY Times article gives a number of examples of how misuse of PowerPoint can have harmful effects, such as over-simplifying complex problems or encouraging group-think. This is dangerous.<br /><br />“It’s dangerous because it can create the illusion of understanding and the illusion of control... Some problems in the world are not bullet-izable.”<br /><br />In the dystopian world described by George Orwell in <em>Nineteen Eighty-Four</em>, Big Brother reduced the English language to the minimal lexicon of 'newspeak'. The pretext was greater efficiency, the real intention - and the result - was reducing people's ability to think by simply reducing the number of words available to them. <br /><br />Reading the various accounts of military misuse of PowerPoint, it begins to look disturbingly like newspeak.<br /><br />PowerPoint is not all bad though...<br /><br />"Senior officers say the program does come in handy when the goal is not imparting information, as in briefings for reporters."<br /><br />PS: For tips on how to make a good PowerPoint presentation, try this from the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/8207849.stm">BBC</a>.<br /></span>