Sec&Def Europe

The Petraeus lobby

2010-12-20T14:46:00.001+01:00

It is worth drawing attention to this article in the Washington Post, entitled 'Our best chance in Afghanistan'. The key messages are these:

- military progress in Afghanistan is undeniable (and we shouldn't worry about the seemingly increased insurgent presence in the north)
- Islamabad must do more to clear insurgent safe havens in Pakistan and Washington must put more pressure on Islamabad
- we should not rush transition
- counter-terrorism operations (SOF raids, drone strikes) are an integral part of COIN and we should not scale them back

However, the most interesting element of the article is the authors, Frederick and Kimberley Kagan. They are referred to as "independent military analysts who have conducted research for commanders in Afghanistan" which somewhat glosses over the fact that they work closely with General Petraeus and serve as his 'telescopes' - independent, out-of-the-box analysts whose insights reach from the political and strategic levels down to the ground truth at the tactical level.

That being the case, it is reasonable to suppose that Petraeus had some say in this article and that the main messages are in fact his own.

In that light, the description of US strategic goals in Afghanistan becomes especially noteworthy.

"From the Afghan border we have a unique vantage point on the groups that most directly threaten the American homeland and the stability of the entire nuclear-armed subcontinent... The ultimate goal of American strategy in the region must be ensuring that Afghanistan is sufficiently stable and friendly so that we can make the best use of that vantage point. The president's strategy gives us the best chance of doing that."

This is a clear statement that this war is not merely about chasing al Qaida operatives. This is about US geostrategic interests and about establishing a long-term physical presence in Afghanistan and in the wider region.

Furthermore, calling it the "president's strategy" is a subtle way of putting Obama on a hook and ensuring that he does not go back on his commitments. Rather less subtle is the forthright statement that President Obama must "make good on his words to American soldiers in Afghanistan last month: "We will prevail."

In short, the messages conveyed here equate to a clear statement of intent by General Petraeus. In this war, winning in Washington is as important as winning in Helmand and Kandahar.

Winning hearts and minds - lesson 1

2010-12-18T10:17:00.004+01:00

Under the code-name Operation Christmas, the Colombian Army are erecting giant Christmas trees in FARC-held territory in an attempt to persuade the guerrillas to demobilise.

A novel idea (and the Colombian government have in fact had some success in demobilising/reintegrating rank-and-file FARC members over the past few years) but probably not one which could be replicated in, say, Afghanistan... for obvious reasons.

Perception is reality

2010-12-16T14:35:00.006+01:00

As we approach the end of the year and as the Americans release their Strategic Review of the campaign in Afghanistan, many will take stock and examine what (genuine) progress has really been made as a result of the west's reinforced COIN strategy.

Small Wars Journal features an interesting critique of COIN in which the interviewee, Colonel Gian Gentile, who served two tours in Iraq and is a visiting fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, takes issue with certain premises of COIN, or not so much COIN itself but the perceptions surrounding it... which is an important distinction to make.

The most striking example of this is when Gentile takes issue with "the idea that better tactics can rescue a failed policy and strategy". Many people would undoubtedly agree that such an idea is deeply flawed [insert compulsory Sun Tzu quote here] but Gentile touches on an important problem by stating that "we see this narrative playing itself out in how contemporary memory has been created toward the Iraq War and it shapes action and the creation of the perception of progress today in Afghanistan".

Had Gentile just held that thought, he may well have exposed the truth of the matter but instead Gentile misses the target - although only just - with his next sentence.

"When General David Petraeus talks of the "right inputs finally being in place" he betrays a deep seated adherence to the COIN narrative that better generals and reinvented armies can rescue failed strategy and policy. Unfortunately, upon inspection history demolishes this myth."

There is a considerable argument to be made that this is not 'myth' at all but in fact 'the creation of perception', the intended perception being that COIN worked in Iraq and is working in Afghanistan.

On the former, Tom Ricks concluded in The Gamble that the surge succeeded tactically (in improving security) but fell short strategically (failure to achieve an Iraqi political settlement). Given the extensive contribution of David Petraeus (and his cohorts) to that book and given the intellect of the man it is unthinkable that he will not have seriously reflected on those conclusions. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that he would have factored this into his thinking with regard to Afghanistan and even concluded that a similar scenario could play out there also. Indeed, when we look at the tactics and measures employed by Petraeus since he replaced Stan McChrystal in July, it is reasonable to conclude that he has decided that 'tactical success/strategic shortfall' is the most realistic of all potential desired outcomes (ie. the best we can hope to achieve) and is actively executing the campaign on that basis.

The most striking tactical example is the extensive - and rapid - formation of 'Afghan Local Police' units. Although Petraeus has never directly compared these to the Sons of Iraq, it is reasonable to make precisely that link given how often he uses the Iraq campaign as a point of reference. However, while many (e.g. Ricks) have pointed out that while the Awakening militias were clearly a major factor in the perceived success of COIN and the surge in Iraq, the variables on the ground in Afghanistan are very different.

The Sunni Awakening militias in Iraq turned against foreign jihadists as a result of the latter's brutal and indiscrimate methods and, furthermore, these militias had relatively strong command and control set-ups. In contrast, the village militias in Afghanistan are intended to protect against the Taliban who, despite the presence of some foreigners fighting among them, are very much an indigenous organisation firmly rooted in Afghan - primarily Pashtun - society and territory. Furthermore, these local police units are nominally under the control of the Ministry of the Interior but, in a country where tribal structures have been badly fragmented by thirty years of war, there are no obvious checks and balances at the village level. There is therefore a real danger that these 'local police' units could very quickly start to function as the private militias of the local warlord and, according to the New York Times, that already appears to be the case in some areas.

That is not a recipe for long-term stability but perhaps it is not intended to be. Perhaps this is simply a means of dissipating the strength of the insurgency in the villages, weakening their supply chains and reducing their pool of potential recruits. The long-term effects for the country - and the State - of Afghanistan may not be good but if the Afghan Local Police facilitate a number of tactical victories for ISAF across the country, then they will have achieved their goal (from a strictly western perspective).

Another example is the incredible intensity of Special Forces operations against mid-level Taliban commanders, which has caused a fair amount of debate among coindinistas and others over the difference, if any, between counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.

However, this concerted SOF campaign is arguably more significant in the context of reconciliation and reintegration. While reintegration of low-level Taliban foot soldiers is ongoing at the same time as high-level, back-channel discussions are (apparently) ongoing in (apparently) an attempt to 'reconcile' the Taliban leadership, operational-level Taliban commanders are being killed and captured in significant numbers. It has been previously been argued on this blog that serious negotiation with the Taliban - in a conflict resolution sense of the term - is just not feasible and recent farcical episodes such as the involvement of an imposter certainly do nothing to alter that perception.

In short, at the same as we are seeking to 'reintegrate' low-level foot-soldiers and pursuing less than convincing discussions with the high-level leadership, we are kinetically targetting the mid-level commanders in an attempt to break the operational back of the Taliban. Is the objective really, as is claimed, for ISAF and the Afghan government to be in a position of strength when the (apparently) inevitable political process of reconciliation begins in earnest? Or is it in fact intended to hit the Taliban hard enough for them to do the smart thing and lay low for a while, allowing us to declare victory and go home?

So, again, we could argue that these tactical measures are intended to achieve a good enough level of operational success (ie. relative short-term security and stability) to be portrayed as a victory to our publics back home. The second part is achieved through an aggressive strategic communications campaign, aimed at politicians and publics alike and backed up by semi-convincing proof like, for example, this week's US strategic review. Bloggers, academics and rogue journalists may pick holes in these arguments but the point is that the vast majority of people on the home front (for 'people' read 'voters') constitute a very receptive audience.

While Americans and Europeans alike struggle through a financial crisis (not to mention that many European nations have never figured out why they went to Afghanistan to begin with), the notion that we've won in Afghanistan and can begin to draw-down is not going to be a hard sell - quite the opposite in fact. Of course, in reality many western troops will remain and large amounts of western money will continue to be spent for some time yet. However, another lesson from Iraq is that this doesn't really matter as all these problems will very quickly disappear from the front pages.

Gentile is right to warn against placing too much faith in "the idea that better tactics can save a failed strategy or policy" (and Ricks is probably right to assert that Gentile represents the silent majority of Army officers who are less than content with the Petraeus cult) but only from a purely military perspective. In the grander scheme of things, in a political and highly mediatised context, it is absolutely possible to 'rescue' a failed strategy or policy with better, or different tactics, both on the battlefield and on the airwaves and it is reasonable to assert that this is what will happen to the campaign in Afghanistan.

Wikileaks as self-fulfilling prophesy

2010-12-06T15:20:00.004+01:00

Much has already been said and written about Wikileaks, not just about the diplomatic cables themselves but indeed about the very notion of divulging such large amounts of sensitive information to the public.

The cable containing a list of vital US facilities has been described as the most controversial of all the leaked documents. Frankly, it's hard to disagree with Malcolm Rifkind, the former British Foreign Minister, that this degree of irresponsiblity borders on criminal.

However, it could be argued that there is another - perhaps greater - danger in releasing this kind of information into the public domain in that it will change peoples attitudes and probably not for the better.

Using the highly publicised example of Arab states urging the US to attack Iran, anyone with a basic knowledge of Middle Eastern politics will probably not be surprised. It is hardly a secret that Saudi Arabia sees Iran as its main rival in the region and vice-versa.

However, when these positions are laid out so starkly in the public domain, is there not a real risk that positions will harden on all sides? Will Iranian hardliners - and perhaps even the Iranian people - see enemies all around them and react like a cornered animal? Will Saudi Arabia, and the other Arab states involved, redouble their efforts to cut off the head of the snake in the fear that the snake will strike first? Will warmongers in the US and/or Israel attempt to use these Arab states to apply even more pressure on their governments and militaries and force them to strike Iran?

In short, by releasing these documents have Wikileaks made a military strike on Iran more likely? Have they created a self-fulfilling prophesy?

Did the people at Wikileaks ask themselves any of these questions before divulging all that information? If not, why not? If yes, then how do they justify their actions which can only cause heightened tensions and reduce the chances of a diplomatic solution?

The truth is that with information comes responsibility. Wikileaks obtain and release masses of information, apparently without thought to the consequences and certainly with no responsibility or accountability. Unlike investigative journalism for example, there are no corroborating facts, no second opinions, no explanations of context. They simply dump huge amounts of information for people to digest, usually through headlines and at-a-glance summaries.

This is not freedom of information or freedom of speech in any real sense and the consequences of such recklessness are not likely to be good.

UK-France cooperation on nuclear warheads

2010-11-20T07:19:00.011+01:00

Given the theme of this blog, it is worth highlighting the recent defence cooperation agreement between the UK and France. On 2 November, an overarching agreement was signed outlining a package of initiatives that will result in greater interoperability between the two countries' conventional forces. In a subordinate treaty, the two governments also agreed to cooperate in the stewardship of their nuclear warheads. It is this latter accord - including motive and effects - that I will focus on here.

Under the agreement, a joint simulation facility will be constructed in Valduc, France, where scientists from both countries will conduct work on the safety and security of their respective country’s nuclear warheads. In addition, a joint Technology Development Center will be established at the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment, which will develop simulation technology for the center at Valduc. Construction costs will be split equally between the two governments.

Just to unpack this a second: the moratorium on testing under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) means that nuclear weapon states have to find other ways to ensure the viability of their nuclear warheads. This is done through advanced facilities that use computer simulations to test various components and implosion capabilities. Needless to say, such facilities are expensive. In a bid to save money and pool resources, the two countries will share a single facility without exchanging sensitive information regarding warhead design. In other words, they will work independently instead of actually assisting one another.

Although the timing of this agreement is certainly down to money, it is worth looking at it from a slightly different angle as well. Engaging in defence cooperation with France at this time is (perhaps) a way for David Cameron to outflank some of the more Eurosceptic members of his own party. He can display his European credentials while arguing the decision's merits solely from an economic standpoint. While this is unlikely to have been the motive, it can certainly be used as an example of his government engaging constructively with France in an area where the Labour Party ultimately failed to deliver.

There is, however, one interesting consideration regarding this agreement: the potential effect it will have on the special nuclear relationship between the UK and US. Of course the term "special" is overused when it comes to US-UK relations, but in the context of nuclear weapons the relationship certainly is special. Weapon designers from both countries exchange a range of information, ideas and materials. Best practices in terms of warhead design are frequently discussed in a series of joint working groups that date back to the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement.

Given that the 1958 agreement strictly limits the sharing of information with third parties without the other's consent, what effect will the UK-French agreement have on UK-US cooperation? Under the current agreement the answer is not much. However, David Cameron did state that "this is the start of something new, not an end in itself." So the question is, how far can the UK and France go in this area before officials in Washington start shifting awkwardly in their chairs? The answer probably lies somewhere between nowhere and not very far at all.

EU budget fiasco

2010-11-16T14:20:00.003+01:00

This story is not one that would be immediately associated with the subjects usually covered by this blog but, ultimately, money has repercussions on everything.

In a nutshell, the European Parliament had requested a 5.9% increase in the European Union's budget for 2011. Many countries opposed this - notably the Netherlands, Denmark and Britain (David Cameron being especially vocal) - which, frankly, is understandable in these hard financial times. Nations would find it extremely difficult to justify to their electorates how the EU can be granted a 6% budget increase while domestic budgets are being slashed across the board, while individual nations are being bailed-out and while unemployment figures remain high.

It was therefore agreed to compromise at 2.9%. However, as a trade-off for accepting 3% less, MEPs demanded a greater role in talks on future spending, including finding new income for the EU budget.

What is most striking in this whole affair is the political ineptitude of the Europeam Parliament and its Members. Firstly, to ask for a 5.9% budget increase in the current climate simply defies belief. Of course, as in any negotiation, the likelihood is that they demanded an exaggerated increase in the full knowledge that they would have to compromise. However, that in itself demonstrates either a lack of political nous or, simply, a complete disconnect between the Brussels bubble and the people they claim to serve. In this financial climate, any demand for any sort of budget increase is inappropriate and unacceptable to the vast majority of voters across the continent.

To ask for a 0.59% increase would have been unrealistic while Ireland (and perhaps soon Portugal) is due to follow Greece in being bailed out by the EU. To ask for 5.9% is downright insulting to electorates who feel disconnected from faraway institutions in Brussels at the best of times, let alone in the current climate of financial hardship.

In that light, to 'accept' a compromise of 2.9% while insisting on a greater decision-making role is simply naive, in fact shockingly so. It basically presented Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden with an open goal to torpedo the whole exercise and keep the budget frozen at 2010 levels. The Parliament has achieved none of its objectives but still appears out of touch and intransigeant, whereas the member States have achieved more than they hoped to while still appearing flexible and willing to compromise.

In short, the European Parliament has shown itself to be very far removed with the people it claims to represent and, furthermore, tactically incompetent in terms of basic negotiating skills. If the European project is going to make progress then we need at least a semi-decent legislative branch. This is not it.

Hillary misspeaks on AfPak

2010-11-14T17:21:00.004+01:00

Hillary Clinton has made some interesting and fairly forthright statements on Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, most notably on Islamabad's use of proxies against hostile regimes in Kabul and New Delhi. (the interview was originally given to ABC but, not surprisingly, was quickly picked up by Indian media).

Of particular note is her seemingly candid assessment that similar use of proxies by the US against the Soviets during the 1980s had backfired, the less-than-subtle implication being that Pakistan should learn from American mistakes and not do likewise.

“Part of what we are fighting against right now, the United States created. We created the Mujahideen force against the Soviet Union [in Afghanistan]. We trained them, we equipped them, we funded them, including somebody named Osama bin Laden. And it didn't work out so well for us.”

It's an interesting statement: honest and circumspect. The one problem is that it isn't actually true.

While it is undoubtedly true that America's covert action towards the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s created blowback, her very specific claims that the US trained, equipped and funded Osama Bin Laden's network are not accurate, if we are to believe the evidence presented by Steve Coll in Ghost Wars. Coll states that Bin Laden (who at the time was a financier and not an operator) never received money from the US, or from Pakistan for that matter. Indeed, he had plenty of his own.

In fact, Coll's research makes it very clear that the US funnelled its cash and weapons through Pakistan - more specifically the ISI - rather than directly fund and equip mujahideen units, bearing in mind that this was after all a covert war. Over time the CIA would begin to directly supply certain mujahideen - notably Ahmed Shah Massoud - who were marginalised by the ISI but Coll presents no evidence that the US directly funded Arab jihadists generally, or Osama Bin Laden specifically.

However, the trade-off for running a covert war through Pakistan was that the ISI decided which muj received the money and arms. These were invariably the most radical Islamists in Afghanistan, as the ISI argued they were the more effective fighters. Not only did this empower the likes of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, it also meant that the ISI itself - and hardline elements within it - were empowered and emboldened to pursue their security interests through proxies in Afghanistan and in Kashmir, the result being the major instability we see across the region today.

In short, the US may not have directly supported Osama Bin Laden but they did help create a situation where he and other equally malign - if not more so - elements were radicalised and strengthened during the war against the Soviets and its aftermath.

Why is this distinction important? Taking Hillary Clinton's statement at face value, we might conclude that the US was simply careless and/or misguided in choosing the wrong ally against the Soviets. The truth is both more complex and more serious than that and it would be both deeply disappointing and (potentially) highly dangerous if that important lesson were lost.

Achilles in the trench

2010-11-11T17:55:00.001+01:00

By Patrick Shaw-Stewart

I saw a man this morning
Who did not wish to die;
I ask, and cannot answer,
if otherwise wish I.

Fair broke the day this morning
Upon the Dardanelles:
The breeze blew soft, the morn's cheeks
Were cold as cold sea-shells.

But other shells are waiting
Across the Aegean Sea;
Shrapnel and high explosives,
Shells and hells for me.

Oh Hell of ships and cities,
Hell of men like me,
Fatal second Helen,
Why must I follow thee?

Achilles came to Troyland
And I to Chersonese;
He turned from wrath to battle,
And I from three days' peace.

Was it so hard, Achilles,
So very hard to die?
Thou knowest, and I know not;
So much the happier am I.

I will go back this morning
From Imbros o'er the sea.
Stand in the trench, Achilles,
Flame-capped, and shout for me.

NGOs in a conflict environment

2010-10-27T19:31:00.002+02:00

The following musings are on a subject which seems to arouse strong feelings in certain quarters. The role of NGOs in a conflict environment is a complex issue, one which is more deserving of a thesis than a blog post. However, I merely want to touch on the issue of NGO neutrality as this was discussed at some length in a forum I attended recently.

Since that forum was conducted under Chatham House rules, I won't give too many details. Suffice to say that the round-table was chaired by a western government official and attended by representatives of many different humanitarian NGOs, some well known and some less well known, as well as government and military personnel. The theme was ostensibly the 'humanitarian space' in a specific conflict environment and the intersection of NGO and military development activities in the areas where both work. However, the discussion was quickly monopolised by the issue of NGO neutrality.

I could understand the NGOs' complaint that government/military stabilisation contractors asked them for ideas but then expected the NGOs to implement those ideas on their behalf. However, I cannot quite get my head round their seemingly pathological fixation with neutrality, especially when it would seem to call into question what they actually hope to achieve through their work.

For example, the NGOs at the round-table explained that they shied away from stabilisation activities, which they defined as strengthening the government and therefore making them party to the conflict.

That may be true but it makes me wonder exactly what they hope to achieve. There may very well be clear theoretical differences - even practical differences - between stabilisation on the one hand and 'pure' development activities on the other. However, what happens if stabilisation fails and a government falls? Will development be possible in the ensuing chaos? NGOs may have preserved their neutrality during all this but if in the long-run they aren't able to bring sustainable development (not stabilisation but 'real' development) to the people they hoped to help then what was the point?

I freely admit I have no experience of working in an NGO but that is one question - perhaps even a contradiction - regarding their self-proclaimed neutrality that I just cannot get my head round.

On top of that, I read a rather more cutting assessment of NGO neutrality in Punishment of Virtue by Sarah Chayes, drawn from her observations in and around Kandahar from 2001 to 2005. The basic premise is that whereas neutrality may have been a valid concept in Bosnia or Rwanda, it is not valid in the honour culture of southern Afghanistan.

Chayes argues that in Afghanistan, or at least in the Pashtun belt, it is better to belong to one side and advertise your affiliations. The reason? That side can take revenge if harm is done to you and that fact affords a certain amount of protection. In short, Mutually Assured Destruction is a valid concept there.

However, Chayes essentially accuses many aid organisations of not recognising the reality of their surroundings and the society they were working in. Many aid workers simply took their own good intentions for granted and expected others to do the same, regarding their self-proclaimed neutrality as their power and their safe conduct. When some aid workers were killed, it was regarded as either an accident or an abberation caused by the US military presence in Afghanistan which they regarded as an inherent part of the problem.

In the context of a clash of civilisations, this rationale doesn't stand up. We may not accept the clash of civilisations thesis but the point is that the Taliban and certainly al Qaida do. Consequently there is little or no difference between a US soldier and a western aid worker and, in fact, the latter may be even more threatening as they extend olive branches by building schools, hospitals, bridges etc.

Put together, those two questions make me wonder about the role of NGOs in a conflict environment, more specifically what they can look to achieve long-term if their attachment to neutrality might actually work against them.

What really makes me wonder is that when the chairperson of the round-table repeatedly asked what governments and/or militaries could do to operationally create a greater or better humanitarian space for NGOs, the NGOs present were unable to provide a single concrete answer.

The UK's SDR

2010-10-24T03:16:00.012+02:00

This week the UK revealed its Strategic Defence Review (SDR), a much anticipated document due to the inevitable defence cuts it would contain. As expected, it received mixed reviews.

This isn't an attempt, on my part, to comment on the merits and weaknesses of the SDR, but I do want to draw people's attention to the arguments that have been made on both sides. For more of an insider's view (given that he has to sell it in Washington), this Foreign Policy article from Sir Nigel Sheinwald - British Ambassador to the US - advocates the merits of the document. On the opposite side (and from an American no less) see Max Boot's op-ed in the Wall Street Journal.

Although you can't hide from the fact that parts of the Review are a little embarrassing - aircraft carriers with no aircraft for ten years being a case in point - you also can't hide from the fact that these cuts were necessary. A document like this has to predict the future while dealing with today's realities; not an easy task. Only time will tell if it leaves the U.K. military in a position to deal with tomorrow's security challenges.

Chechnya's creeping Islamism

2010-10-24T01:11:00.013+02:00

Chechnya is rarely headline news nowadays, but an attack last week shows that the province's problems are far from over.

In a coordinated attack on the parliament, Ministry of Agriculture, and office of the Parliamentary Speaker, gunmen managed to kill six people and injure another seventeen. Those behind it are Islamic insurgents who in recent years have largely operated in the neighbouring republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia.

Although Chechnya is synonymous with North Caucasian violence, it has been one of the region's quieter republics since the current president, Ramzan Kadyrov, was installed in 2007. The dictatorial way in which he's ruled, and the crack-down on militants that he's orchestrated, has suppressed much of the insurgency and pushed it into Dagestan and Ingushetia. Russia's Interior Minister, Rashid Nurgaliyev, sought to promote this perception by claiming "The situation we saw today is extremely rare. Here, there is stability and security." Nurgaliyev then went on to say:

"The leadership of the insurgent underground has practically been taken out. A significant portion of its arms supplies and financial resources have been cut off. The work of emissaries from foreign terrorist centers has been contained."

This may be true, to a large extent, but at what cost? It certainly hasn't been done by winning the hearts and minds of the Chechen population. In what can be considered a paradox between a government that crushes fundamentalism while encouraging creeping Islamism, Kadyrov himself appears to be backing a crack-down on women dressed "provocatively" in public. This raises some interesting questions about the way in which Kadyrov is ruling Chechnya. For instance, will backing more puritanical Islamic customs help him win support from young males that may otherwise join fundamentalist militant groups? Or will it store up more trouble for the future if Moscow ever decides to throw Kadyrov over-board? It's very difficult to say but today's Chechnya certainly offers an interesting case study in counter-insurgency and the type of political model required to contain militant populations.

PTSD in Afghanistan

2010-10-12T16:09:00.002+02:00

This story from the AFP deserves comment - it states that some 60% of the population of Afghanistan suffers from some kind of mental health problem.

The WHO notes that there is a particularly high number of cases of post-traumatic stress disorder. In her book Punishment of Virtue, Sarah Chayes stated that the whole of Afghan society suffers from PTSD, a legacy of the Soviet occupation and the terror this brought above all to rural areas of Afghanistan.

Chayes identified some of the symptoms of PTSD as being commonplace in her dealings with the people of Kandahar during her time there. These include an inability to bond emotionally, an inability to plan for the future, an inability to think beyond one's own needs for the collective good and excessive guile.

This subject would be worthy of some in-depth research by real experts in this field. That being said, it seems impossible to think that the thirty years of conflict in Afghanistan would not have had profound psychological effects on the people involved.

The question today is how much is this a factor in their behaviour towards ISAF, the broader international community and their own government (and looking at the symptoms Chayes highlights one might be inclined to say it is a real factor). More importantly, has any one stopped for a moment to consider this and factor it into our strategy for building governance and development in Afghanistan today?

Reclaiming hearts and minds in Pakistan

2010-10-09T18:46:00.004+02:00

The BBC tells the story of Dr Mohammad Farooq Khan, who was shot dead by the Taliban in Swat last week. Dr Farooq ran a school - or more accurately a rehabilitation centre - for teenage boys who had previously served (voluntarily or otherwise) with the Taliban. See also this obituary and video tribute in the New York Times, also featuring Dr Farooq's mission statement in his own words.

Well worth reading and also worth asking the question - how many similar centres exist in Pakistan and Afghanistan and what is the international community doing to help them?

PS: See also this story about the Turi tribe in Kurram who expelled the Taliban from their small corner of the FATA.

British Troops vs. British Nukes

2010-10-05T08:05:00.008+02:00

The title is taken from this New York Times editorial, which suggests the UK should scale-back its plans for a like-for-like Trident replacement in order to maintain current troop numbers. Swingeing cuts mean something in the MoD has got to give, but what should it be?

The ongoing Strategic Defence and Security Review (to be completed by October 20th) will certainly inform cuts to the U.K. defence budget. One outcome may be along the lines of the NYT article above, in which the U.K. security and defence establishment concludes that current threats require maintaining troop levels. This may mean scaling-back the Trident replacement. Another argument is that scaling-back Trident would mean planning for the future on the basis of today's threats. Tomorrow's threat could be a nuclear Iran. How can these two arguments be reconciled? One suggestion is that defence be ring-fenced, just like overseas aid.

There is a real argument to be made for cutting the Trident replacement to three submarines instead of four. The question is how much money this will actually save. A great deal of the cost in developing a new fleet of submarines is at the research and design phase. It's also basic economies-of-scale that the more vessels you build the cheaper each will be. So although there is a saving to be made in going to three, it's unlikely to be 25%.

So what else can be cut? A big problem the UK faces is that so many procurement projects have been bunched together into a relatively short period. These include the purchase of Typhoon aircraft, two new aircraft carriers, 135 F-35 strike fighters (for the aircraft carriers), and seven new Astute-class submarines. This is on top of the Trident replacement, which will cost around £20 billion. Something clearly has to give. It may be that they decide to cut the Trident replacement to three submarines in combination with the purchase of a reduced number of F-35s and Astute submarines. Another possibility is scrapping the aircraft carriers, but the amount of money already spent, coupled with how far along they are with construction, makes that unlikely.

So although the NYT article raises an interesting question, it's simply too simplistic to paint the argument as 'Troops vs. Trident'. Doing so ignores the delicate balance that needs to be found between fighting today's war and ensuring you are prepared for tomorrows, whatever it may be.

Measuring success in Afghanistan

2010-10-04T17:56:00.008+02:00

That's the real question after all - how do we measure success in Afghanistan? The Rand Corporation have provided a tool to do just that in the shape of an in-depth report on sources of success in counterinsurgency campaigns, entitled Victory has a Thousand Fathers.

Among the key findings, as summarised on the US Army and US Marine Corps COIN blog, are the following:
- The balance of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ practices perfectly predicts outcomes.
- Repression wins phases of a campaign, but usually not the campaign itself.
- Tangible support trumps popular support.
- Poor beginnings do not necessarily lead to poor endings.

As the USA/USMC blog states, the Rand report is not a completely infallible tool but it does add a degree of scientific analysis to the existing body of knowledge on COIN - which as a subject and, above all, as a practice is notoriously difficult to quantify in anything like a scientific manner.

That being the case, purely out of intellectual curiousity I have conducted a little experiment. The very last page of the report shows a scorecard of Good vs Bad COIN practices and factors and I have graded the current campaign in Afghanistan using that scorecard.

I have done so without fully reading the report and using only my own knowledge and perceptions (professional, anecdotal and random) of the current situation in Afghanistan. In other words, I am using the scorecard to quantify my perception of the war in Afghanistan. At a later stage, I will repeat the exercise having actually thoroughly read the report and having fully researched each individual point in order to confirm (or not) my assessment of each criterion named in the scorecard.

The objective right now is, I repeat, to measure my perception of the campaign because, as we all know, perception is reality and public support for the ISAF mission will stand or fall based on people's perceptions and not the reality.

So, without further ado...

SCORECARD OF GOOD VERSUS BAD COIN PRACTICES AND FACTORS

Good factors

1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors
(Score 1 if sum of a through g is at least 2 positive responses)
a. COIN force and government actions consistent with messages (delivering on promises) NO
b. COIN force maintains credibility with population in the area of conflict (includes expectation management) ??
c. Messages/themes coherent with overall COIN approach ??
d. COIN force avoids creating unattainable expectations NO
e. Themes and messages coordinated for all involved government agencies NO
f. Earnest IO/PSYOP/strategic communication/messaging effort NO
g. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained NO

2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors
(Score 1 if sum of a through j is at least 3 positive responses)
a. Flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly decreased, remains dramatically reduced, or largely absent ??
b. Important external support to insurgents significantly reduced ??
c. Important internal support to insurgents significantly reduced ??
d. Insurgents’ ability to replenish resources significantly diminished YES
e. Insurgents unable to maintain or grow force size NO
f. COIN force efforts resulting in increased costs for insurgent processes ??
g. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent recruiting ??
h. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent materiel acquisition YES
i. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent intelligence YES
j. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent financing ??

3. Government realizes at least two government legitimacy factors
(Score 1 if sum of a through e is at least 2 positive responses)
a. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict NO
b. Government leaders selected in a manner considered just and fair by majority of population in area of conflict NO
c. Majority of citizens in the area of conflict view government as legitimate NO
d. Government provides better governance than insurgents in area of conflict NO
e. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control NO

4. Government realizes at least one democracy factor
(Score 1 if sum of a through d is at least 1 positive response)
a .Government a functional democracy NO
b. Government a partial or transitional democracy YES
c. Free and fair elections held NO
d. Government respects human rights and allows free press YES

5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor
(Score 1 if at least 1 positive response)
a. Intelligence adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on COIN force’s terms YES
b. Intelligence adequate to allow COIN force to disrupt insurgent processes or operations YES

6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas (Score 1 if YES) YES

7. Government/state is competent NO

8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force ??

9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict YES

10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force YES

11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces ??

12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas YES

13. COIN force has and uses uncontested air dominance YES

14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control ??

15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control ??

Total positive score (Sum of 1–15) 8 points

So far, not a bad score for ISAF although what this shows us is that the military side is fine but the civilian side - above all strategic communications and the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government - still presents enormous challenges as little progress would appear to have been made. So basically we haven't learned anything new here.

Bad Factors

1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression
(Score 1 if at least 1 positive response)
a. COIN force employs escalating repression NO
b. COIN force employs collective punishment NO

2. Primary COIN force is an external occupier YES

3. COIN force or government actions contribute to substantial new grievances claimed by insurgents YES

4. Militias work at cross-purposes with COIN force/government NO

5. COIN force resettles/removes civilian populations for population control NO

6. COIN force collateral damage perceived by population in area of conflict as worse than insurgents’ NO

7. In area of conflict, COIN force perceived as worse than insurgents NO

8. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics NO

9. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents NO

10. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated NO

11. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustainment NO

12. COIN force and government have different goals/level of commitment YES

Total negative score (Sum of 1–12) 3 points

FINAL SCORE (Good minus Bad) 8 - 3 = 5 points

Key:
Total > 5 = History says, “You are on the path to victory.”
Total < 0 = History says, “You are in trouble.”
Total between 0 and 5 = History is equivocal: “Do you feel lucky?”

Conclusion: History says ISAF is almost on the path to victory, at least based on my assessments of each specific criterion and I'm sure many people would challenge these. Interestingly, I have arrived at essentially the same conclusion that I had before beginning the exercise, a conclusion (or an opinion) which my many previous posts on Afghanistan have outlined in some detail.

However, while the results would seem to give cause for optimism, I would add some caveats to this scorecard.

Firstly, the large number of question marks is due to the fact that I was simply unable to answer some questions. The two reasons for this were i/ that I do not have access to intelligence on, for example, insurgent financing and external support (and if I did I wouldn't reveal it, this blog is not Wikileaks); and ii/ I think it is simply impossible to establish the real views of the Afghan population, for example on the credibility of the Kabul government. Opinion polls are never completely accurate, even less so if the people responding risk their lives by speaking out against the Taliban. On top of that, the very concept of government (as we know it) barely exists in some remote areas of Afghanistan so the question is too generic (and too western) to be truly useful in an Afghan context.

A second caveat would be that I have tried to lean towards the worst-case scenario and be very miserly in handing out positive responses (I accept that here I'm slightly undermining the original intention to base this scorecard on perception and not reality). So for example, although the government does provide better governance than insurgents in some areas of the conflict, this is not the case in all areas. So no points here. By the same token, I don't believe ISAF contributes to substantial new grievances and although the Afghan government has done so on occasions and in certain places, this is not a universal picture. However, neither ISAF nor the Afghan government have fully resolved old grievances so, for that reason, they don't win any points.

In other words, where the question requires a black or white response I have chosen black. This is important because it could be that the score is actually better than I have made out.

A third caveat would be that this scorecard is a study of COIN based on a great many examples, whereas I'm specifically looking at Afghanistan. I doubt whether many Afghans, especially in rural areas, are really concerned about whether or not the government allows a free press. So although that counts as a positive on the scorecard, it may not count as a positive in reality.

Fourth and final caveat: history may be leaning in favour of an ISAF victory but, again, the report is not Afghanistan-specific. The evidence is drawn from around 30 case studies of insurgencies from all over the world. The three case studies from Afghanistan all registered as a victory for insurgents. In other words, there is a difference between world history and Afghan history.

In summary, the war in Afghanistan is not the disaster that many people believe it to be. It would seem to be going in the right direction - according to the criteria used here - and it could be that ISAF is very close to taking a decisive grip on the initiative, at least tactically, if the numerous question marks can be converted into points gained - although those specific criteria (ie. governance) are probably the hardest to achieve.

However, in addition to the caveats I outlined, I have to identify what I perceive to be actual problems with the study bearing in mind that I have deliberately not yet read it.

Firstly, I have referred to the so-called reconciliation process in Afghanistan on several previous occasions but the scorecard makes no mention of anything along these lines, any kind of criteria for a political settlement between the government and/or COIN force and their insurgent opponents. I find this to be a glaring omission given that the received wisdom is that there is no such thing as a decisive conventional victory in a COIN scenario and, therefore, some kind of political settlement with the insurgency must be reached.

Secondly, the scorecard suggests that the military aspect of the ISAF campaign is going fine but that the governance side is not. Of course we knew this already but we also know that victory - I mean a real victory, not a PR victory - is not possible unless achieved on all fronts. The study does not take this into account: instead, the COIN force wins simply by amassing a total of more than 5 points. In reality, or at least in Afghanistan, the COIN force must not just reach a certain amount of points but must score them across all categories.

I would therefore take issue with Rand's first key finding, that 'the balance of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ practices perfectly predicts outcomes', as I think there's more to it than simple arithmetic. Perhaps this finding makes sense in most of the other case studies but in Afghanistan today the picture is of ISAF scoring many points against insurgents but none with the Karzai government and that just isn't good enough.

Finally, most of the criteria in the scorecard are from the tactical level. This kind of methodology makes it very easy to conclude that we're winning because we're scoring tactical points, all the while losing sight of the bigger strategic and political picture. It is fashionable these days to quote Sun Tzu (especially among people who haven't actually read his book - myself included) and one of his most famous maxims is applicable here: "Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory; tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat."

In conclusion, I have tried to apply the scorecard to the current COIN campaign in Afghanistan which is much larger in scale and in geostrategic importance than all of the case studies in the report... except of course the Soviet Union's COIN campaign in Afghanistan. Even though I cannot claim to have learned anything new or had my perceptions changed in any way, I find the scorecard to be a semi-useful tool in highlighting certain strengths and weaknesses of a COIN campaign and certainly a very interesting intellectual exercise.

Arms control and political capital in the U.S.

2010-10-02T23:37:00.009+02:00

As the U.S Senate moves closer to a vote on the new START agreement with Russia, many observers are beginning to ask questions about where this leaves the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The CTBT was voted down by the Senate in 1999, towards the end of the Clinton Administration, and has been in a state of limbo ever since. Although President Obama says he will seek ratification of the treaty during his presidency, a vote before the 2012 election is looking increasingly unlikely. This raises a number of questions concerning political capital, choice of battles, and limiting the number of fronts on which you fight them.

For those who are unaware, the new-START treaty limits U.S. and Russian deployed strategic weapons to 1,550 warheads and 700 active nuclear delivery vehicles. These are modest numbers considering the previous limit was 2,200 warheads by 2012. However, ratification of the treaty has been a harder fought affair than many had expected. Sceptics make two main arguments against ratification 1) that it may limit deployment of U.S. missile defence systems and 2) not enough money is being invested in ensuring the safety and reliability of the existing U.S. stockpile. These are weak arguments considering the treaty contains only a fleeting mention of the link between offensive and defensive arms and the Obama Administration has provided the NNSA with a substantial increase in budget to ensure effective stockpile stewardship.

Nevertheless, countering these arguments has made START ratification difficult, and the more difficult it becomes, the harder it will be to put CTBT back on the legislative agenda. One thing the Obama Administration wants to avoid, at all costs, is seeking ratification of the CTBT only to have it rejected for the second time, which could kill the treaty.

The difficulty in ratifying START shows just how challenging the Obama arms control and disarmament agenda is. His 2009 Prague speech laid out ambitious goals and created high metrics for success, but it may be that overall success is now judged on his ability to ratify CTBT. That is not to say Obama did the wrong thing in seeking ratification of START first, the old START agreement expired in December of last year and negotiations have formed part of a relatively successful re-set policy with Russia.

The problem, however, is that political capital is everything in the United States and there is only so much to go around. This means that a trade-off between the two treaties is virtually inevitable (at least in the short-term), which raises the question of whether Obama should have gone further to limit expectations in order to avoid eventual international disappointment and condemnation.

That's a difficult question to answer. His disarmamnet agenda needed to be clear in order to avoid complete meltdown of the nonproliferation regime. But what is clear, is that the U.S. Senate needs to take responsibility and ensure the meltdown has not simply been delayed. That will require it to look beyond party politics. Something that is easier said than done.

Germany pays off WWI debt

2010-10-02T12:51:00.003+02:00

It may seem incredible but Germany has only just finished paying off the war debt imposed on it after its defeat in the First World War. This week-end will see a final payment of €70m - from an original demand of 269bn gold marks (or 100,000 tonnes of gold).

Of course Germany has not continually paid reparations during the 89 years since the sum was fixed in 1921. The original sum of 269bn gold marks was later to reduced to 112bn by the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan during the 1920s. At various stages during the 1920s the Weimar government was not able to pay and during the 1930s Hitler was flat out not willing to pay - although the same was true of the Weimar government. In 1953 the London Treaty suspended payments until Germany was reunited, at which point a reduced amount of payments was reactivated.

John Maynard Keynes was among the many prominent voices criticising the Treaty of Versailles, arguing that it would not achieve its objectives and, needless to say, he was proved absolutely right. At least the Allies made a better fist of it twenty years later.

"After WWII they decided to hang the leaders and not to punish the nation but in WWI it was the other way around." ... "The lesson was learned eventually. Unfortunately, it required another 20 or so million people to be killed."

NB: It's a little strange that this story does not seem to have been reported very widely. Aside from the BBC, a cursory search via Google News reveals not much more than this report on (US) National Public Radio.

Talking to the Taliban

2010-10-01T15:50:00.006+02:00

Asia Times reports once again on the reconciliation process in Afghanistan, which at the moment appears to be little more than back-channel negotiations between the US and the Taliban through Saudi and Pakistani mediators.

If true, the assertions made by the Asia Times would appear to justify concerns previously expounded on this blog about the notion of talking to the Taliban.

"Taliban sources in the southern regions of Pakistan confirmed to Asia Times Online that while different Taliban groups had been approached, the Americans would prefer to talk to one of the major anti-US forces in Afghanistan, the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) led by former Afghan premier Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The HIA is likely to strike a deal with the Americans before the Taliban... In the Taliban camp, the activity in the HIA camp is viewed as a bid to divide the resistance."

In other words, there are many different factions and it appears very difficult to ascertain if any of them would be able to secure buy-in from all or most of the others if an agreement was reached. The Taliban can be forgiven for thinking this is an attempt at divide-and-conquer... as they are very probably right.

In the meantime, President Karzai has set up his own High Peace Council but since it is far from clear where they fit in to the US/Saudi/Pakistani process, he in turn can be forgiven for thinking that his position is being undermined once again.

The African front

2010-09-30T10:58:00.001+02:00

I recently wrote about the ongoing debate in Uganda over the country's participation in AMISOM, the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia. This article in the Guardian argues that Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda, has less than altruistic reasons for sending Ugandan troops to Somalia and that he is quite happy to be used as an American pawn in the war on terror.

The argument goes that, through Ugandan participation in AMISOM, Museveni's regime is seeking to portray itself as a responsible member of the international community in order to i/ divert attention from its military interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and its alleged human rights abuses against rebels in northern Uganda and ii/ maintain the flow of western aid into the country (amounting to one third of the government's annual budget), not to mention US military training and logistical support, despite the widespread corruption of the regime.

On top of this, since al-Shabaab bombed Kampala in July and killed over 70 people, the government has introduced extremely restrictive security measures. In the words of the Kampala police chief:

“We are sounding a warning. No gathering of more than five people, even if it is in your compound, should be held without clearance from the Inspector General of Police. People intending to hold wedding parties, music galas, football matches and road processions should notify the IGP first.”

From a wider perspective, the article takes a swipe at Washington, insinuating that the US is content to turn a blind eye to all this as Uganda is proving a useful proxy in the war on terror through its engagement in Somalia. Aside from a brief reference to DynCorp (which equips and trains the peacekeeping force in Somalia with State Department funding), there is little attempt to delve into the detail of what the US is doing in Somalia (or Africa generally) or to construct an argument as to why intervention in Somalia is such an inherently bad idea.

As a matter of fact, African leaders at last week's UN General Assembly argued for more western intervention in Somalia and Africa more generally. Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, President of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (which physically controls only a small corner of Mogadishu), said progress was being made in many areas but that ultimately the solution to both terrorism and piracy lies in greater international engagement on land, notably by training national security forces and providing support to AMISOM. In other words, don't just send ships to patrol the Gulf of Aden, help us build a proper State.

Mwai Kibaki, President of Kenya, went so far as to claim that the deteriorating security situation in Somalia poses a "threat to international peace and security greater than in any other conflict in the world" and that more opportunities should not be lost through benign neglect.

Specifically, Kibaki exhorted the United Nations and the international community to to support the appointment of an eminent high-level personality for Somalia, effectively deploy 2,000 troops and review the current mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to enhance its peace enforcement capacity. He also urged the world to fully support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan ahead of the secession referendum in January.

In other words, more engagement not less. Taking swipes at the US is not going to help anybody here. This is precisely the time when the international community should be seeking to engage constructively in Africa and with so much attention fixed on Afghanistan there is an opportunity for other actors, notably the European Union, to step up to the plate. The EU has already begun to set up its Somalia Training Mission - ironically based in Uganda - but, if Messrs Sharif and Kibaki are to be believed, much more needs to be done.

The best way to avoid Africa - and specifically Somalia - becoming a full-blown front in the 'war on terror' would be to engage properly now. In Afghanistan, the golden hours were wasted and the west has consequently found itself fighting a full-blown counter-insurgency campaign. We should hope that the wider international community will have the foresight to avoid repeating that mistake in Africa.

Interoperability in WWII

2010-09-29T13:27:00.001+02:00

I'm currently re-watching the - still excellent - BBC series The World at War from the 1970s. In this day and age of multi-national military alliances and buzzwords like 'interoperability', I was amused to hear this from General Mark Clark, Commander of the US 5th Army, in reference to the campaign in Italy during WWII.

"[The Germans] were well-trained troops, tenacious and well-led... and they were homogenous. They were all of one nationality, they were all equipped with the same weapons and ammunition, they ate the same food, they believed pretty much in the same God.

I had sixteen different nationalities with me, some of whom couldn't eat this and that, some didn't want to fight on Fridays or some other day of the week and then we had the British with their infantry weapons and artillery completely different from ours. You couldn't move with ease from one front to another like the Germans could."

I don't know how much, if anything, we should read into a statement like that (although I'd be curious to know what the sixteen nationalities were). It just struck me as quite ironic when viewed from an early 21st century perspective. I doubt we'll hear an American general (much less a European) say this kind of thing publicly anymore... but I wonder how many of them think this way.

Obama the Commander-in-Chief

2010-09-28T17:00:00.004+02:00

The fall-out from Bob Woodward's latest book, Obama's Wars, has seen much heated debate on President Obama's handling of national security and relations with the military. The following two articles highlight some interesting aspects of that debate. One is critical, the other is favourable. Both address the fundamentals of the role of the US Commander-in-Chief and how Obama is measuring up.

Firstly, this article, by comparing Barack Obama to Abraham Lincoln, makes a thinly-veiled attack on the former's handling of the war in Afghanistan, an attack which fails because it is based on a very poor understanding of Abraham Lincoln's approach to the role of wartime Commander-in-Chief.

In a nutshell, the article claims that Lincoln had the good fortune to find a highly competent general in Ulysses S. Grant and did what every good President should do - delegate the entire conduct of the war to his General and protect him from his detractors, regardless of the potential political consequences. On the other hand, Barack Obama has found a highly competent general in David Petraeus but continuously meddles in his conduct of the Afghan war and places his own party political agenda above national security.

Its a neat comparison, one that will undoubtedly find favour among the readers of this particular newspaper (although it's doubtful that the readers of The Republican-American would need much convincing that Barack Obama is not a very good Commander-in-Chief). However, the pseudo-historical basis for the article is all too easy to disprove and this in turn undermines the article's whole conclusion.

In Supreme Command, Eliot Cohen's seminal work on top-level civil-military relations, the author convincingly argues against the notion (which for a long time was the received wisdom in academic and political circles) that Lincoln merely found a good general and let him get on with his job. In fact, Cohen shows that Lincoln strove to i/ keep a very close eye on what his generals were doing and ii/ become just as knowledgeable, if not more so, than his generals on every detail pertaining to the conduct of the war (for example, technological innovations). Moreover, Lincoln was acutely aware of the unavoidable influence of politics in the conduct of war.

"Lincoln had to educate his generals about the purposes of the war and to remind them of its fundamental political characteristics. He had not merely to create a strategic approach to the war, but to insist that the generals adhere to it... It was Lincoln's understanding of the interplay of war and politics, no less than his ability to absorb military detail and to read human character, that made him the greatest of American war presidents."

The truth is that Abraham Lincoln was a much better war leader than this article gives him credit for and the same may yet prove to be true for Barack Obama. That remains to be seen but the point is that the conclusions of this article are plain wrong, simply because it exhorts Obama to be more like Lincoln but in fact criticises Obama for trying to do the very things that Lincoln did. Obama might be making mistakes but his intentions are sound.

Secondly, on a very closely-related theme, this article from Foreign Policy, aside from being an insightful look at the interplay between politics and strategy, directly addresses Obama's most famous quote from the book - "I can't lose the whole Democratic Party" - in reference to his decision to begin withdrawing US troops from Afghanistan in July 2011. Needless to say, even though few people have actually read the book, the vultures are already circling.

Of course the likes of John Bolton are not really advocating that President Obama completely ignore domestic party politics when making national security decisions. What John Bolton is really doing is making a not-very-subtle attempt to score political points - the truth is that the "cold-blooded, cynical, grotesquely political manipulation of national security" is Bolton's, not Obama's.

However, taking the accusation at face value (for the sake of argument), any serious student of history would not even countenance the notion that strategy and politics should be kept separate.

As Tip O'Neill famously said, "all politics is local". As Stephen Biddle explains, there have been countless examples of the importance of domestic politics in strategic decision-making. To expect otherwise is simply unrealistic.

"Good strategy is politically sustainable strategy. Anything else is unrealistic and self-defeating. And any president who did not worry about the domestic politics of his strategy would be a very poor commander in chief indeed."

We may disagree with Obama's decisions but the fact remains that, in demonstrating his keen awareness of the fundamental link between politics and strategy, he is behaving just as a President - and a Commander-in-Chief - should.

African parallels

2010-09-11T20:41:00.006+02:00

Just as many European nations debate what course of action to take in Afghanistan, with troop withdrawal becoming an increasingly serious option, there is a similar debate ongoing in Uganda with regard to that country's participation in AMISOM, the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

Uganda has maintained 2500 troops under AMISOM since 2007 - 33 have been killed in action and, in July of this year, over 70 people were killed by al-Shabab bombs in the Ugandan capital Kampala, that group's first attack outside Somalia and in direct reprisal for the participation of Ugandan troops in AMISOM.

It's interesting to note that the debate in Uganda features similar arguments to those we're used to hearing in Europe and in other ISAF nations - that sending troops to Somalia has made Uganda less secure, that Uganda should withdraw its troops if other nations don't pull their weight (only Uganda and Burundi currently contribute troops).

On the other hand, there is also a strong body of opinion in Uganda (and elsewhere in Africa) that AMISOM's mandate should be expanded (despite United Nations' objections) and that troops be allowed to undertake proactive military operations... just like in Afghanistan.

Karzai good, America bad

2010-09-09T10:26:00.002+02:00

For all the varied western interpretations of the current situation in Afghanistan, this critique from former Indian diplomat M. K. Bhadrakumar (who counts Kabul and Islamabad among his postings) is strikingly different to any strand of western opinion.

Bhadrakumar's opinion of the role of Pakistan and the ISI in Afghan politics, more specifically the reconciliation process, is what one would probably expect from an Indian observer and, moreover, his opinion is one which would very likely find favour among many western observers too. What is different, however, is Bhadrakumar's view of Hamid Karzai who, far from being an American puppet, he depicts as their victim.

On the former point, Bhadrakumar is damning in his assessment of malign Pakistani influence, American doublespeak and their joint sabotage of Karzai's reintegration plan - most notably through the arrest of Taliban leader Mullah Baradar in Karachi early this year.

The bizarre operation was undertaken despite the CIA and the ISI being aware that in Mr. Baradar (who is credited with moderate views), Mr. Karzai had a key interlocutor and the two were at an advanced stage of negotiations regarding the Taliban's participation in the upcoming Loya Jirga in April, which, of course, would have become a defining moment of the war. The ISI's detention of Mr. Baradar can only be seen as a move to ensure that Mr. Karzai did not have any top-level interlocutor among the Taliban leadership and to drive home the message that any dealings between the Taliban and Kabul should be conducted through the “proper channels,” namely, Rawalpindi and Washington.

A frustrating aspect of this article is that Bhadrakumar does not explain this in greater detail, either by citing evidence that Baradar was in advanced negotiations with Karzai or by explaining why the US would sabotage Karzai in such a way.

The notion that the Pakistani authorities arrested Baradar, along with several other alleged members of the Quetta Shura, in order to install their own people in their place is hardly unique to Indian conspiracy theorists - it appeared for example on CNN and in the New York Times. In the same vein, Bhadrakumar's assertion that the ISI is playing a long game, willing to bet that Afghanistan's western-style, pluralist democratic system will not last and that eventually the Taliban will come out on top once again, is also not entirely alien to western audiences.

What is less comprehensible is Bhadrakumar's depiction of concerted American efforts to fatally undermine Hamid Karzai and have him replaced as the Afghan leader during last year's Presidential elections. For all the (very public) disagreements between Karzai and the international community, above all the US, the long-term investment in Karzai's political (and actual) survival is surely too great to be ignored. Moreover, if regime change truly is the objective, then who is being lined up to replace Karzai? The list of realistic candidates is not long.

Incidentally, Bhadrakumar alleges that "the U.S. does not want a strong Afghan leader in Kabul with an independent power base" but some informed westerners have previously argued for precisely this scenario.

There are clear reasons, therefore, to call into question's Bhadrakumar's belief that Karzai (along with his family) is the victim of American sniping and manipulation, which should not mean dismissing it altogether. However, where Bhadrakumar's case really starts to fall into place is when he touches (all too briefly) on regional geopolitics.

"The U.S. strategy will be to keep up the pressure on Mr. Karzai in the coming period even as the mother of all questions concerning the U.S. military presence is yet to be addressed. The Afghans will oppose a permanent U.S. military presence, while the Pentagon is bent on getting a status of forces agreement with the powers that be in Kabul so as to retain long-term access, which is needed to effectively pursue the containment strategy toward China."

That line of argument makes more sense - in fact, it would be very difficult to disagree with it - but it still warrants greater explanation and analysis. As interesting and thought-provoking as this article is, Bhadrakumar raises as many questions as answers on several issues, all worth revisiting in the very near future.

Post-scriptum: On a different note, the IWPR report that the Taliban have imposed a maximum price of $3,800 on brides (yes, you read that correctly), which has made one future groom very happy:

“Now my father-in-law can’t charge me too much because this Taleban order isn’t like one from the Karzai government - it’s a strict order which no one can disobey.”

Now that is how to win hearts and minds.

Iran and the IAEA

2010-09-09T04:18:00.009+02:00

An IAEA Board of Governors Report, made public this week by the Institute for Science and International Security, claims that Iran is interfering with the IAEA's mission in the country by blocking the appointment of particular inspectors -- those that possess knowledge and experience of its nuclear fuel cycle. More specifically, they prevented the return of inspectors who highlighted what they believed was unreported nuclear activity.

This report is significant as it's yet another example of the IAEA drawing attention to its own institutional weakness; on this occasion the inability to select its own inspectors. Instead, the agency presents a list of individuals to the country it's inspecting, which can then object to any names it's unhappy with. And in the end it's the state (not the IAEA) that has the final say.

As a result, the IAEA's work is made difficult by Iran throwing obstacles in the way of individuals who are attempting to build expertise. This is particularly true at the facility level, where experience gained from previous visits to Natanz enables a level of knowledge that can not be gained from reading briefing books. But Iran certainly isn't breaking any rules by these actions, it's just not acting in good faith. So what can be done? Answer: nothing. And if the international community did try to reform the selection process then it will be rightly accused of double standards.

So does this report highlight anything new with regards to Iranian compliance?

Well, not really. Once again it shows Tehran isn't willing to go out of its way to prove its compliance, but under the current rules it doesn't need to. So it's just another example of it dragging its feet, even though there is no real evidence it's diverted nuclear material to a weapons programme. So unless a) there is evidence in the future that a significant quantity of material has been diverted; b) all IAEA inspectors are thrown out; or c) additional uranium enrichment facilities are discovered, then the West and Israel are going to find it difficult to prove what Iran's intentions really are.

Supplying Afghanistan

2010-09-08T13:22:00.002+02:00

This study by the IISS provides an interesting snapshot of the bigger geostrategic picture surrounding the war in Afghanistan. It takes a look at supply lines leading to Afghanistan and asks how instability in Pakistan has forced ISAF to diversify and make considerably greater use of northern routes.

Whereas previously 80% of ISAF supplies went through Karachi (and then either to Kandahar via Chaman or to Kabul via the Khyber Pass) that figure has now fallen to 50% since the opening of the northern route in May 2009. Taken in isolation, that statistic is quite striking and would seem to be clear proof that incidents such as the torching of 50 ISAF trucks at a depot near Islamabad in June have had a significant impact on the war effort.

On the other hand, it should be noted that, even with this diversification of supply lines (which is basic common sense, whatever the circumstances), supplies through Peshawar and by extension the Khyber Pass have doubled this year alone, presumably matching the surge in troop numbers. Furthermore, it is also worth pointing out that some countries along the northern routes place caveats on the use of their territory and/or airspace, notably forbidding the transport of lethal cargo, so the importance of Pakistan to the ISAF logistical effort remains uncontested.

Looking at the map makes one wonder though - the US and NATO had to strike deals with all those countries along the northern route and it would be interesting to gain more insight into the financial and geopolitical implications of this. This is yet another example of how the war in Afghanistan is having a significant effect across a very large, important and unstable region.

The article even mentions that the US is looking into the possibility of opening a land route through China, all the way from its eastern seaboard. Aside from the physical challenge of hauling supplies across the Tibetan Himalayas and the Karakorum Range, one wonders what price China would demand for such a service.

ETA declare a ceasefire... again.

2010-09-07T07:51:00.004+02:00

For the second time in four years (and the fourth time overall), the armed Basque separatist group ETA have announced a ceasefire... or rather they have announced that they will "not carry out armed actions."

There is little political substance in their statement and certainly nothing new, although one can almost admire their audacity for claiming that "ETA has contributed to proposals for cooperative actions and resolutions of the conflict."

The immediate reaction in Spain and elsewhere is that ETA are calling a ceasefire because they have no choice, because they are too weak to do otherwise and that this announcement is simply window-dressing to make it seem like they retain the initiative.

Indeed, the basic facts speak for themselves. When Mikel Karrera Sarbe - a.k.a Ata - was arrested in May this year, he became the sixth suspected ETA leader to have been arrested since November 2008. ETA has tried (and supposedly failed) to move its support and logistics infrastructure from France to Portugal. They provoked outrage (and the ire of Nicolas Sarkozy) by killing a French policeman in March this year. Quite simply, ETA had nowhere else to go.

An interesting aspect to this story is the claim by Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams that Irish republicans played an important role in persuading ETA to put down their guns. While it is hard to ascertain just how influential Irish voices were in the Basque decision-making process, Adams does make a very necessary point about the role of the Spanish government:

"There is also a heavy responsibility on the Spanish government to grasp this opportunity for peace and progress. It needs to be farsighted, to think strategically and to ignore those voices that seek a resolution in terms of victory and defeat."

Unfortunately that seems highly unlikely given the initial reaction from Madrid in the shape of Interior Minister Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba:

"Eta kills in order to impose itself, so that means one cannot dialogue. Eta has stopped because it cannot do anything ... and also in order to rebuild itself."

While the second part of the statement is undoubtedly true, the first reflects a deeply ingrained mindset within the Spanish State - regardless of which political party happens to be in power. By way of contrast, when the British government was accused by the SDLP (moderate Irish nationalist party) of only talking to the political wings of Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups because they had guns, Jonathan Powell responded "and your point is?"

Having said that, Pérez did no more than articulate the feelings of probably a large majority of Spaniards so, purely from a political point of view, he arguably couldn't have said anything else.

However, it is to be hoped that behind the scenes the Spanish State will indeed be astute enough to take a long-term, strategic approach to this opportunity. For example, if it is indeed true, as alleged, that ETA are merely calling a temporary ceasefire in order to regroup then now is exactly the time, during their period of inactivity, to try and reintegrate ETA militants and their support base (what's left of it) into mainstream society and political life, as I have argued before. Above all, Madrid must positively respond to the Basque left and legalise those parties which do genuinely seek political solutions through peaceful, democratic means and always have done.

This entails 'legalising' the very concept of Basque nationalism, which historically has been an existential non-starter for the Spanish State which has too often sought to taint all Basque nationalists with ETA's violence. However this is very definitely a "democratic minimum" for a political process and the best way to render ETA completely irrelevant and seal their defeat. If Madrid fails to seize this opportunity, then their statements in response to ETA's announcement will very likely become a self-fulfilling prophesy.

PS: Anybody puzzled by the face-masks and berets on display can find answers here.

Rational debate on Afghanistan

2010-09-06T18:54:00.002+02:00

There is a lot of noise on Afghanistan these days and not much of it seems balanced or reasoned. Jim Molan's article in the Australian Herald Sun at least asks some rational questions and attempts to encourage a reasoned debate.

When the article appeared last week I thought the notion that more troops would be requested was rather unlikely... and yet that is precisely what has happened this week as ISAF push hard to fill the strategic shortfall of international trainers for the Afghan National Security Forces.

However, the real value of this article lies not in the potential solutions Molan hints at but in his call for proper debate based on assessment of facts, as opposed to knee-jerk 'ideologically prejudiced' reactions which fail to consider the situation as it is and the options available to us.

"If there were to be a debate, then it needs to preceded by an open assessment of where the war is now, where the war is likely to go, and what Australia could do that might be of value... Any debate must primarily address what we should actually and physically do."

The article is specific to Australia but the principle can and should be applied to every ISAF nation individually and the international community collectively.

"There are now 21 very good reasons for re-examining what we are doing, what we should be doing and what we could achieve in Afghanistan."

In other words, that is no less than the fallen deserve.

Political Courage and the New York Mosque

2010-08-20T06:16:00.014+02:00

During the past week, President Obama has stirred a great deal of emotion in the United States after lending support to the construction of a mosque close to Ground Zero. Were Obama's comments an act of political courage? Did he inadvertently politicise an issue that should have been dealt with at the local level? Has he opened a door that the Democrats should have kept firmly shut? These are all questions that many people are asking.

First, what constitutes an adequate distance from Ground Zero? There's a huge difference between building a mosque on the actual site and building one two streets away. If two streets is not far enough, then what is? Four? Six? You simply can't claim there is a two mile exclusion zone around the site within which no Islamic establishment can be built. Not only is that argument offensive to all Muslims, it's particularly offensive to the families of those Muslims that were killed on 9/11.

So, although Obama's comments were morally and constituionally correct, will they have negative political consequences? There are numerous reports that suggest his popularity has declined sharply over the last week. There is also the question of whether this was an act of political courage or a move to shore-up support from minority groups.

Even if it was a courageous statement, was it the right thing to do? While the content of the statement was certainly correct, addressing the issue so directly has turned it into a national debate, perhaps reinforcing divisions rather than healing them. This will be a conundrum for many politicians that seek to address ethnic tension - should they speak out in defence of religious freedom, or should they avoid these discussions for fear of what may be said in the ensuing debate?

Talking to the enemy - post scriptum

2010-08-13T16:29:00.006+02:00

The BBC has an interesting story on alleged back-channel communications between dissident Irish Republicans and the British and Irish governments respectively. The claim was made by Sinn Féin chief negotiator Martin McGuinness, who must be considered a credible source given his own considerable experience of just this kind of back-channel communication. Having said that, it would be interesting to know why he chose to reveal this as I'm not quite sure what purpose he is serving in doing so.

I just wanted to highlight this briefly as an illustration of some points I made earlier this week. The Continuity IRA would be just the organisation who, according to the notions I expounded in my previous post, would not really be worth talking to on account of their lack of political nous.

However, this news raises a point which I probably should have dwelled on more in my previous post. The IRA in the early 1970s also had zero political nous - their entire political manifesto was 'Brits Out'. Some have argued that the political path on which the republican movement would eventually embark began at the Cheyne Walk talks in London in July 1972, which Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness attended and at which they realised that armed struggle alone would not be enough to achieve their objectives.

[NB: Peter Taylor's books Provos and Brits gives an in-depth and highly informative account of these initial talks. Ed Moloney's A Secret History of the IRA gives an excellent account of the way in which Adams and McGuinness would subsequently lead the republican movement down a political path.]

In short, by opening dialogue with armed groups you might be able to get them to think differently about their position, their methods and their objectives. That would have to be the aim of these back-channel contacts with dissident republicans, as Martin McGuinness has said. Incidentally, I think this quote answers the earlier question as to why he chose to reveal these talks - he's trying to put public pressure on dissidents to accept the inevitable, that the armed struggle is long over and to stop stirring up trouble which might hinder the perceived mainstream republicans from achieving their political goals.

"That suggests to me that these groups are recognising that at some stage they are going to have to wake up and smell the roses in terms of their inability to destroy the peace process," he said."

Ordinarily, the success of this kind of outreach would depend on many factors - for example, the leadership of the armed group itself, the background of the government negotiators (who must also be politically aware) - but it could be a worthwhile enterprise, albeit one that usually does not bear fruit immediately and the IRA are a prime example of precisely that.

Of course, this outreach must be done in such a way that it is easy deniable - note the strenuous British and Irish denials in the article, e.g. "it has never been our practice to speak to these people" - and indeed, according to some people mentioned in the article, these contacts have been very indirect and carried out by people from government bodies representing the intelligence agencies. In other words, this is not an official government policy.

However, the comparative lack of public or political outcry (aside from the occasional blustery comment from unionist politicians) perhaps shows to what extent people have accepted that talking to the enemy is a necessary and inevitable part of any kind of peace process.

Obama's Georgian success

2010-08-11T05:35:00.023+02:00

President Obama's attempted re-set of relations with Russia was criticised by many U.S. Republicans who claimed the policy would leave Georgia and Saakashvili out in the cold. Brian Whitmore argues in Foreign Policy that the re-set has enabled the United States to gain much needed leverage over Moscow, thereby restraining Russian policy towards Tbilisi.

There is real merit to this argument. Russia has much more to lose by attacking Georgia today than it did in 2008. This is primarily due to the economic benefits that Russia seems set to gain if the bi-lateral relationship continues on its current trajectory. One key area of potential economic cooperation, as Whitmore points out, is the proposed U.S. investment in Russia's high-tech sector, coupled with Moscow's need for U.S. support in its application to the World Trade Organisation. As a result, any return to military means against Georgia would be a blow to its economic development.

Georgia appears to welcome this breathing space.

However, there is one additional element that Whitmore doesn't mention: Russia's primary policy aim in the 2008 conflict - preventing Georgia's accession to NATO - has been largely achieved. Of course, this is a questionable statement - one that many will disagree with. But Georgia's membership of NATO has, at the very least, been indefinitely delayed and the conflict with Russia appears to have been a key contributor to that delay. Therefore, how much can the Obama re-set really take the credit for Russia's more restrained policy towards Georgia? It's likely that the truth is a combination of Russia having achieved its objective and it having more to lose today than it did in 2008.

Talking to the enemy

2010-08-09T19:13:00.006+02:00

Jonathan Powell, former Chief of Staff to Tony Blair, has featured on this blog on more than one occasion, each time on the subject of conflict resolution - more specifically its methodology (if such a thing exists) and the importance of talking to the enemy.

This week he is to be found arguing - not for the first time - in favour of dialogue with the Taliban and al Qaida.

It is hard to object with much of Powell says here, above all because his argument is based on his long-standing personal experience in Northern Ireland, contacts with mediators in other late 20th century conflict zones and a pragmatic look at history.

"There seems to be a pattern to the west's behaviour when we face terrorist campaigns. First we fight them militarily, then we talk to them, and eventually we treat them as statesmen. That is what Britain did with Menachem Begin and the Irgun in Israel, with Jomo Kenyatta and the Mau Mau in Kenya and with Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus."

While there are many differences between these three cases alone, there is one common thread that runs through them and countless other 'terrorist' groups - it was once heresy to even suggest talking to these people but talk to them we (eventually) did.

I would hope that's a given for any serious student of history but for anyone who argues that it is morally reprehensible to talk to the likes of the Taliban and al Qaida, I would simply answer that we (the west) have talked and in fact actively supported worse characters than them in most parts of the world.

I don't therefore have any problems with Jonathan Powell's argument on moral grounds. My question is this - is it practical?

One could argue that talking to extremists is more than just practical, it is necessary. For example, as Powell realised in Northern Ireland, only extremes can build a lasting peace because there will be nobody left to outflank them. The British and Irish governments original intention was to build peace from the centre (ie. the moderate nationalist and unionist parties) and, while this was enough to reach a settlement, it was not enough to implement it. Only the extremes could do that.

That was the case in Northern Ireland but that lesson is not easily applicable to other situations, such as Afghanistan. We are obliged to keep in mind the basic question - is it practical? - and it is here that we must raise doubts on the notion of talking to the Taliban.

On a previous occasion (in 2008), Powell stated that:

"It's very difficult for democratic governments to do - talk to a terrorist movement that's killing your people," he said. "[But] if I was in government now I would want to have been talking to Hamas, I would be wanting to communicate with the Taliban; and I would want to find a channel to al-Qaida."

This is where I have a problem. Powell gives three examples of organisations which bear almost no resemblance to each other whatsoever. Say what you like about Hamas but they have a hierarchy, clear political objectives and unity of effort within the ranks. On that basis, you have some kind of starting point for negotiation.

Al Qaida, on the other hand, has none of those elements. Who would we talk to? What would we talk about? Even if we could find a credible interlocutor from among their ranks, there is no way he could win over the multitude of disparate al Qaida - or 'al Qaida inspired' - cells strung out across the world and bring them into a process of negotiation. Talking to al Qaida is simply a non-starter and I am amazed that Powell would compare them to Hamas.

The case of the Taliban is more complex and, of course, very topical. Much of what I have just said about al Qaida applies to them also. Who would we talk to? The most obvious answer here is Mullah Omar and/or the Quetta Shura but would they carry the entire movement with them?

The apparent generational divide within the new Taliban has featured on this blog before. As far as I can tell, amid all the ongoing talk of reconciliation and reintegration, nobody has thought to ask if we are dealing with one organisation or several, or if we are dealing with a leadership that truly controls its rank-and-file.

Even if they do - and that is a big 'if' - does Mullah Omar, who presumably has spent much of the past nine years in hiding, have a clear understanding of the domestic politics within Afghanistan and of the regional and global dimensions to this conflict? In my recent post on the alleged talks between Ankara and the Kurdish Workers' Party, I raised similar concerns about Abdullah Ocalan. To be credible, an interlocutor has to understand his own movement and the environment in which it resides.

Next question - what do we talk about? Do the Taliban have negotiable aims that the whole movement agrees on? On this issue, Powell raises some very pertinent issues:

"For the IRA, as long as the objective was "troops out", little discussion was needed. The same is true in Afghanistan. The Taliban will need to move beyond the single demand that foreign forces must leave first, and consider what they really want to achieve. What changes do they want in the Afghan constitution? What sort of power sharing should there be between the Pushtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and other minorities? How would they demonstrate that they had separated themselves from al-Qaida? What attitude would they take to women's rights and girls' education? They probably haven't thought these questions through themselves, but opening a channel would help them to start elaborating answers. And experience from other conflicts suggests this can take a long time."

All good points but I would add to them by saying that the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara and other minorities must be consulted and their fears must be allayed. That is paramount, assuming that it is even possible. Memories of inter-ethnic massacres during the 1990s civil war - notably in Mazar-e-Sharif between the Taliban and the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras - will not have been forgotten.

The fact that very few people have asked these questions must raise some concerns about the increasing chatter on reconciliation. Reintegration is different and, although still problematic, it does seem to have been more thought out than reconciliation. Until the Afghan government and the international community have asked hard questions about the very notion of talking to - and ultimately reconciling with - the Taliban, then we could perhaps be forgiven for thinking this smacks of a smokescreen as we start edging towards the exit door in Afghanistan.

"AfPInd"

2010-08-08T21:07:00.004+02:00

So according to Wikileaks, Pakistan is apparently supporting the Taliban. Grateful as we all are for that particular revelation, it seems to have kicked off a renewed round of discussion on the regional dimension to the conflict in Afghanistan, such as this article in the Washington Post which argues that the real problem in Afghanistan is Kashmir.

Many have made this argument before - Robert Fisk for example - and there is undoubtedly a degree of truth in the image of Afghanistan as a regional chessboard but there is a tendency to take that line of thought too far, as in the WP article.

"Fighting terrorists or fighting the Taliban -- or indeed, fighting in Afghanistan at all -- addresses symptoms rather than the disease in South Asia: the horrific, wasteful, tragic and dangerous six-decade confrontation between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

This confrontation ravages Afghanistan, where the Northern Alliance, which was organized to fight the Taliban, is backed by money and weapons from India, and militant groups among the southern Pashtuns are backed by Pakistan. It is a big part of why peace eludes the country, even though the Soviets left a generation ago."

That line of thought mirrors the current debate in the United States between those who argue that American presence needs only to be properly mobilised to bring about a decisive end to the conflict and those who argue that the American presence is the whole problem. Abu Muqawama recently addressed that particular debate and, to my mind, made a rather strong case against attaching excessive importance to the actions of external actors.

By that same token, is it realistic to think that improved relations between New Delhi and Islamabad - on that subject, see this interview with Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao - would lead to an exponential improvement in the security situation in Afghanistan?

The quote above would have us believe that the various sides in the Afghan civil war of the 1990s were nothing more than Indian and Pakistani proxies. That conflict saw greater destruction (notably of Kabul) and more horrific massacres than have been seen under both the Soviets and ISAF... and yet, taken to its logical conclusion, that overly simplistic rationale would have us believe that if the regional and global powers who have a stake in the Afghan conflict can come to an agreement, then we can all pack our bags and go home.

Just one question - has anyone asked the Taliban, or the Afghan people in general for that matter, what they think about all this?

Interesting approach to the same old question

2010-08-04T19:49:00.003+02:00

"The question is not what to do in Afghanistan, the question is how to respond to an organised international criminal conspiracy." I found this quote in an interview with Andrew Bacevich, professor at Boston University. Bacevich argues that militant Islamism is not an existential threat and should be treated as organised crime, rather than an enemy that we have to defeat militarily.

An international police effort is, according to Bacevich, the appropriate response. He makes a comparison with the (police-)fight against the Mafia that obviously does not include the military occupation of countries.

Bacevich, a retired Colonel of the US Army, shares many more interesting ideas, so make sure to check out the rest of the interview at the Democracy Now! website, or click here.

New Nato HQ Brussels

2010-08-03T17:41:00.000+02:00

Check out NATO's new headquarters. To be completed in 2015. It will be located just across the street from the current NATO compound.

With such an impressive building, NATO will certainly not become irrelevant any time soon.

Chronomap IEDs in Afghanistan 2004-2009

2010-08-02T12:14:00.003+02:00

I came across a fascinating chronomap, indicating all IED attacks in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2009. You can find it over a liveleak.

A clear proof how the insurgency gained momentum over the years.

A shout out to all our boys and girls currently serving in Afghanistan, particularly the ones who recently deployed.

How to talk to the Kurds?

2010-07-29T09:39:00.005+02:00

The Economist reports on increased tension in the Kurdish populated areas of Turkey and Iraq. This is not a new problem but any increase in tension - and potentially violence - would come at a very difficult time for the Turkish government and the AKP ruling party.

From an international perspective, the concern has always been that Turkey - which has the second-largest standing army in NATO - could become too distracted by its campaign against Kurdish guerrillas to fulfil its international commitments. Having said that, while Turkish troops play important roles in ISAF, KFOR and EUFOR Althea, in terms of numbers their contributions are not (proportionately) among the most significant.

There are other - very real - possibilities which could arise from increased tension and/or violence between the Turkish Army and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). There is the fear of increased conflict between Turkey and Kurds across the border in Iraq, just as the US is drawing down its presence in Iraq. Moreover, as the Economist article points out, any PKK resurgence would leave Prime Minister Erdogan in a very difficult position.
As next July’s parliamentary elections draw nearer, Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is unlikely to risk nationalist ire by openly talking to a group deemed by Turkey and its Western allies to be terrorists. On the other hand, as Mr Erdogan knows, abandoning reform in favour of war will only strengthen the hand of his opponents within the army. He is, as an old Turkish saying goes, holding a stick with shit at both ends.
That is reason enough for the international community to be concerned at this potential development - and also reason enough for the international community to encourage and/or pressure Turkey to solve this as reasonably and effectively as possible, admittedly not an easy task.

On that subject, there are some questions to raise. The article states that secret talks have been going on with Abdullah Ocalan. While it may well be true that he retains huge support and affection from the rank-and-file, the fact remains that he has been in solitary confinement for eleven years. How can he be expected to have a clear understanding of the situation on the ground as it is now? Does he know the mood among the Kurdish rank-and-file (a different generation from the one he knew)? Does he know the key players on his side and on the Turkish side? Does he know the public mood in Turkey, notably in the context of next year's elections?

Furthermore, these secret talks have apparently been led by security and intelligence operatives and the PKK have - understandably and rightly - stated that they want to talk to politicians.

One could make a comparison to the discussions held in Algiers in 1989 between ETA and the Spanish government. ETA were represented by Antonio Etxebeste, who was released from prison for the occasion. The Spanish government was represented by the Interior Minister, José Luis Corcuera, but also by Rafael Vera, director of State security, who was said to have close links to the government black ops unit known as the GAL. Vera had previously participated in discussions with ETA, also in Algiers, accompanied by Jorge Argote, a lawyer who had defended men accused of torturing ETA prisoners, and Jesus Martinez Torres, chief of intelligence for the national police, who was suspected of actually having participated in torture.

With interlocutors like that, it is no surprise that the talks went nowhere but the real point is that the Spanish government and ETA alike displayed a failure to recognise the political nature of the problem. Both sides sent in security and/or intelligence operatives (on the ETA side, Etxebeste was accompanied by two operatives from the Madrid commando) who neither understood nor cared to understand the political realities of the situation or public opinion in the Basque country and in Spain (ETA's lack of political nous is a subject previously covered on this blog).

That is an approach which the Turkish government would do well to avoid - assuming that it is serious about finding some kind of solution to the Kurdish issue - but also because, as the Economist points out, if they let the military and security apparatus of the State take the lead then the civilian government could find itself undermined in the ongoing existential debate over what kind of State Turkey should be.

Think before you talk

2010-07-22T10:32:00.003+02:00

It has not been a particularly good week for the British Prime Minister and his Deputy, as each have made rather unfortunate public remarks.

Speaking in the US, David Cameron referred to Britain as the junior partner in the fight against Nazi Germany in 1940. Meanwhile, during a formal session of Parliament, Nick Clegg (standing in for the absent Cameron) referred to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as illegal.

Apparently David Cameron forgot that the United States did not enter World War II until December 1941 as, when discussing the 'special relationship' between Britain and America he said that "We were the junior partner in 1940 when we were fighting the Nazis."

The remark has naturally been seized upon by opposition politicians but has also drawn criticism from veterans' organisations, which won't help Cameron's stated aim of a new covenant between the British military and the people.

This has been a difficult trip for Cameron who has already had to deal with a storm of controversy over the release of the Lockerbie bomber, Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi, by the Scottish government in August last year.

In the case of Clegg, the remark was significant because, while it may well have been accurate, he is no longer a politician in opposition but a Cabinet Minister.

While one could argue that Clegg was merely expressing his own and his party's long-held view, when standing at the government dispatch box in a formal meeting of Parliament he represents the government and not the Liberal Democrat party. Claiming to be speaking in a personal capacity is not an option and it is in that context that the remark was unfortunate.

The Guardian quotes Philippe Sands, professor of law at University College London: "A public statement by a government minister in parliament as to the legal situation would be a statement that an international court would be interested in, in forming a view as to whether or not the war was lawful."

Cameron's remark, on the other hand, was simply wrong and also quite bizarre considering the pervasiveness in Britain of the 'we stood alone' historical narrative regarding the summer of 1940. For a head of government to betray such a tenuous grasp of history is rather worrying.

Russian 'Black Widows' and the culture of revenge

2010-07-19T07:56:00.022+02:00

Last week the Russian security services arrested six women in Dagestan who they claim were preparing suicide attacks against the Russian heartland. It's long been established practice for North Caucasian militants to use female suicide bombers against Russian cities - the most recent example being the March attacks on the Moscow metro system. And while female bombers are not unique to the North Caucasus, the use of 'Black Widows' as the 'face' of a terror campaign is fairly unprecedented.

It's true that the majority of Dagestani and Ingushetian militants that carry-out armed attacks within the North Caucasus are male, but the face of the bombing campaign in Russian cities over the last decade has been distinctly female. In addition to the attacks on the metro, Black Widows were also responsible for the bombing of Russian passenger planes in 2004, and were present at both Beslan and the Dubrovka Theatre siege.

The motivation of these women has been largely attributed to revenge. Blood feud runs deep in the Caucasus and is not confined to the male population alone. As a result, many women whose husbands or sons are killed by the security forces end up exacting revenge. But the question that many have asked is why are women, and not men, being used to carry out the attacks on Moscow? One answer is that female suicide bombers are used precisely because the practice raises significant questions regarding their individual motives. It contains a greater 'shock' factor, which would explain why female bombers were carefully inserted into the sieges of Dubrovka and Beslan.

However, while the use of Black Widows may increase the short-term psychological impact of a suicide attack, it doesn't appear to have had a long-term effect on the resilience of the Russian people. In fact, the more that female bombers are used, the less of an impact they have. Should a suicide attack be carried out against a Russian city tomorrow then it's almost expected that the perpetrators will be female.

It's clear that a number of cultural factors are at play when a Dagestani woman volunteers for such an operation, but there is a lesson that can be taken from the use of female suicide bombers: its psychological impact is directly related to the number of times it's used. As a result, Muscovites now appear more hardened to the tactic than they were at the beginning of the decade.

Iran & the West III

2010-07-17T13:43:00.000+02:00

In the last part of the BBC documentary, following details are worth noting:

After 9/11, Iran offered to cooperate unconditionally with the US in its 'War on Terror'. This was because Al Qaeda as well as the Taliban were enemies of both the US and Iran.

In the 6+1 talks at the UN, Iran provided the US with crucial intelligence about the situation in Afghanistan, such as targets for the bombing campaign. Furthermore, Iran helped the US create a new Afghan government.

In light of those events, the US state department advocated a policy of rapprochement. But George W. Bush opted for the goal of regime change in Iran.

Nine months later, British foreign minister Jack Straw went to Teheran to gather support for the invasion of Iraq. Chatami promised help and advice. He suggested to repeat the successful cooperation of the times of the Afghanistan operation. But Bush torpedoed the deal, again against the advice of the state department.

The famous letter that addressed all of the mutual grievances between Iran and the US and that was conveyed by the Swiss ambassador, was rejected by the top of the US state department, not the US president.

When the foreign ministers of the UK, France and Germany (E3) went to negotiate with Iran the halt of their enrichment programme, they agreed to apply the definition of "suspension of the enrichment programme" of the IAEA. The question was whether that would mean a total stop, the Western demand, or no infusion of Uran into the centrifuges, the Iranian interpretation. Iran had met El Baradei the day before the E3 meeting. In this meeting, El Baradei supported the Iranian interpretation. He later changed his mind and adopted the Western interpretation.

The Iranians offered a deal in which they would stop killing Western troops in Iraq if in return they could pursue their nuclear programme. That was the first time that Iran admitted responsibility for coalition deaths in Iraq.

In June 2006, Javier Solana offered the Iranians to keep centrifuges for research purposes. Something that Jack Straw had rejected two years earlier. This time, Ahmadinejad turned the offer down. In return, the West imposed more sanctions.

Iran & The West II

2010-07-16T22:48:00.002+02:00

In the second part of the BBC documentary on Iran and the West, I noted following things:

The UN did not condemn Iraq for attacking Iran, nor did it demand an Iraqi withdrawal from Iranian territory

The UN did not condemn the use of chemical weapons against Iran, despite the fact that it was a violation of the Geneva convention

When the Israel-Lebanon war started in 1982, Iran send 1000 soldiers to Lebanon, in order to gather support for Iran and the revolution in the Muslim world. The Lebanese who received training by those Iranians became known as Hezbollah

Iran intervened to liberate the French hostages (in return the French agreed to stop selling arms to Saddam Hussein and payed a considerable amount of money). This deal was called off, because the French opposition (led by Jaques Chirac) offered the hostage takers of Hezbollah more favorable conditions under the precondition that the release of the hostages was delayed until after the French election

Rafsandjani forced Khomenei to accept the ceasefire offered by Iraq

After the death of Khomenei, Rafsandjani guided the assembly of religious scholars to elect Khamenei as new supreme leader

In August 1998, the Taliban killed nine Iranian diplomats in Masar-i-Sharif. In response, Iran prepared to go to war with the Taliban. In order to really international support, they addressed the Afghanistan committee at the UN, the only forum where Iran and the US both sat together. For the first time, a US foreign minister met with a foreign minister of the Islamic Republic. At least that's what the US believed. Actually, nobody of the US delegation knew the Iranian foreign minister. Finally, Kofi Annan revealed the Americans that it was not the foreign minister but his deputy. Khatami, the Iranian president, had downgraded the level, to appease his domestic rivals.

The Afghan Awakening

2010-07-16T13:46:00.004+02:00

Much has been said this week about the decision to create local defence units in Afghanistan, along similar lines (broadly speaking) to the Sunni militias - known as the Awakening - who turned against Al Qaida in Iraq and are recognised as being a major factor in the success of the US surge from 2006 onwards.

Tom Ricks' take on this issue is one of the more level-headed and informed, given his knowledge of the surge in Iraq. He has described that campaign as a strategic military success but a political failure. This apparent paradox is largely down to the fact that, while working with and/or recruiting local (Sunni) militias helped improve security, it also weakened the (Shia) central government and the political and institutional development of the Iraqi State.

In Iraq that was a price the Americans were willing to pay. Given the increased nervousness in the US and elsewhere about the direction of the war in Afghanistan, it is not unreasonable to suggest that many (in the US and elsewhere) would be willing to pay that price again, a fact which will not be lost on Hamid Karzai.

Ricks however puts his finger on the dilemma - while arming local militias can provide sustainable security, it takes a long time. Time, as we all know, is the one thing the international community does not have in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai knows this too.

In that context, it will be extremely interesting to see if this issue crops up during next week's Kabul conference intended to symbolise greater Afghan ownership.

These local militias are probably not quite the kind of Afghan ownership that Karzai had in mind and his reaction to this initiative may well prove crucial.

Iran & The West

2010-07-14T23:11:00.001+02:00

If you are interested in learning about Iranian history, I recommend you the BBC documentary 'Iran & The West: The Man Who Changed The World'. It is a three part series, featuring interviews with most of the relevant actors.

First part: the revolution and hostage crisis

interesting points:

Ahmadinejad, the current President of Iran, was the only one out of four student leaders who opposed the occupation of the US embassy

The occupation of the US embassy started without Khomeini being informed. When he learned the news, he was first against the occupation and ordered the Foreign Minister to get the students out of the US embassy. But then flipped and gave his blessing to the occupation. This move, which forced the entire Iranian government to resign, pushed the moderates out of the revolution. Khomeini became supreme leader.

The hostage taking was initially undertaken to force the US to send the Shah, who was at the time in the US, back to Iran. But it continued after the Shah left the US. For the release of the hostages, the US returned assets to Iran that President Carter had frozen before.

The monkey insurgency

2010-07-14T14:35:00.006+02:00

The Taliban have taken asymmetric warfare to new levels, according to the Chinese media and amid great consternation in Washington.

In a major blow to ISAF's counter-insurgency strategy, the Taliban are training monkeys as insurgents in the hope that these trigger-happy, Kalashnikov-wielding primates will turn the tide in the Taliban's favour.

Naturally this poses many serious questions for the ISAF mission.

Should there be a special 'simian clause' in the rules of engagement? How will western public opinion react if ISAF kills a monkey in combat?

The Taliban think they have the answer to that question. "If a person who loves animals knows the monkeys may be injured in the war, they might pressure the government to force the withdrawal of western forces in Afghanistan," said one (human) Taliban insider.

In the context of reconciliation and reintegration, how can we persuade these monkey jihadists to put down their guns and reintegrate into Afghan society? Will the monkey Talibs be amenable to a negotiated settlement with the Karzai government?

The seriousness of this new threat must not be under-estimated. The most obvious short-term solution would be for ISAF to ban the import of bananas into Afghanistan.

Two Big Questions

2010-07-13T22:47:00.000+02:00

In response to Prof. Stephen Walt's post on the five big questions for the future, I commented the following:

As a matter of fact, the EU overtook the US already in terms of population (450 million to 320 million) and GDP (16 trillion to 14 trillion). Of course, whereas the US is a nation state, the EU is a ...let's say... a nameless beast.

However, bearing in mind the size of China or India, it is fair to say that the sheer size is not the decisive factor. So why is the US dominating the world?

First, because the US spends roughly a quarter of its budget on the military (EU average less than 2%).

Second, the world commodities, particularly Oil, are traded in US Dollars. Because of that, every nation needs dollars, which in turn stabilizes the dollar and allows the US government to borrow large amounts of money.

Hence my two biggies:

1) Will the political class in the US accept that the US is not capable of keeping the defence budget as high as it currently is? Will it accept a drastic cut, which will lead to the consequence of the US losing influence in the world? Will the US democracy survive a decline? Will some US politician gather the hundreds of thousands of Veterans and march against Washington? (Prof. Galtung wrote an interesting piece about this option)

2) When will the emerging powers of the world refuse to trade in US dollars? When will the BRIC and France go ahead with their project of an alternative world lead currency? How will the US react to this move?

Europe's direction (or lack thereof)

2010-07-13T11:12:00.004+02:00

European Voice asks the very valid question of why Europe did not do more at the recent G20 summit. The article is framed very much within a G20 context and does not therefore directly address the security and defence issues which are the main focus of this blog.

However, the question of the European Union and its current and future role on the world stage has arisen many times in our posts so its worth dwelling on the broader question of where Europe is going.

Paola Subacchi outlines four areas where Europe could potentially help move the G8/G20 agenda(s) forward - i/ help the resumption of the Doha Development Agenda; ii/ help switch attention from the G8 aid agenda to the G20 development agenda; iii/ address the issue of rebalancing the world economy; and iv/ address the issue of its own representation by collapsing the four European seats into an EU one.

While the recommendations made by Subacchi are valid (although perhaps a little vague and, in the case of the final point, highly ambitious to the point of being unrealistic), do they address the real existential question of where Europe is heading? Are the four specific areas where Europe can move the agenda forward a means to an end - if so, which end? - or an end in themselves?

Too often in Brussels that crucial distinction is not made. Too often it seems that action, any form of action, will do and questions such as 'where are we going with this?' can be left for later.

Stephen Walt gets rather closer to the crux of the matter by asking where the EU project is headed... and, crucially, stating that "the answer matters".

As an example he refers to two diametrically opposed viewpoints from the other side of the Atlantic. Rosato goes very far in stating that "nothing can be done to salvage the [European] dream" for, as Moravcsik says, people have predicted the demise of the EU since before its inception and yet its still here. I do however find it very striking that Rosato makes exactly the same point about the European Union that many make about NATO - that without the Soviet threat it has no raison d'etre.

However, I digress for the real issue is this:

Walt is not the first person these days to ask where Europe is heading but he is one of the few to suggest that merely conjuring up an answer is not enough - it has to be a good answer.

I'm reminded here of Jonathan Powell's warning on political negotiation. Ambiguity in negotiations is complicated and needs careful handling. Although almost always necessary at the beginning, 'constructive ambiguity' must be squeezed out (painfully and over time) as a project cannot endure on the basis of an ambiguous understanding.

The building of the European Union is one big project in political negotiation but after 50+ years can we really say that constructive ambiguity is being squeezed out?

I think few will disagree that the European Union needs a greater sense of direction but how many leaders and policy-makers have given serious thought to what the direction should be? How many have weighed up the different options, run a cost-benefit analysis on each of them and decided what direction they want to pursue, either for their own nations, for Europe as a whole or for both?

I have said it before and will undoubtedly say it again but it is high time that hard questions were asked in Brussels... because the answers matter.

Facts about Afghanistan

2010-07-12T22:26:00.003+02:00

We are in Afghanistan to defeat Al Qaeda (see Obama's speech at West Point, Dec. 2009)
There are between 50 and 100 Al Qaeda members in Afghanistan (interview with CIA Director Leon Panetta, July 2010)
102 NATO troops have been killed in June 2010 alone
That's roughly one dead NATO soldier for each Al Qaeda member in Afghanistan
In 2010, operations in Afghanistan will cost the US taxpayer alone more than 100 billion US$
That's roughly one billion Dollar per Al Qaeda member in Afghanistan per year
At least 4.2 billion US$ in cash left Kabul airport in the past three-and-a-half years (AFP)
That means that more money is legally flown out of Afghanistan each year than that the country collects in taxes

Is there not a more efficient way to keep Al Qaeda on the run?

How to interpret civilian casualties in Afghanistan?

2010-07-12T11:28:00.006+02:00

A report out today suggests that civilian casualties in Afghanistan are rising slightly - but that the number of those killed by ISAF is dropping. The mid-year study from Afghanistan Rights Monitor confirms a trend evident for some time now, again proving that the Taliban and friends are responsible for the majority of civilian deaths and injuries in Afghanistan.

This would appear to be encouraging news for the international community's engagement in Afghanistan and, more specifically, serves to vindicate General McChrystal's tightening of the ISAF rules of engagement last year. It shows that ISAF has greater regard for civilian life than the Taliban does.

However, is that really the point?

In all probability that is the spin that will be put on this story but that attitude will not help to win the war. The statistics may show that ISAF has greater regard for civilian life than the Taliban does but that is supposed to be a given. The real question, the real hearts and minds issue, is the extent to which ISAF is able to protect civilians.

If we are to use the American surge in Iraq from 2006 onwards as an example then we see that, within the context of a population-centric COIN approach, a decrease in civilian casualties is an indicator of progress. Even as American fatalities rose in Iraq during the surge, Iraqi civilian casualties were decreasing. Essentially, US troops were putting themselves between the insurgents and the people - which is one of the objectives within the population-centric approach and a fundamental pre-condition to any kind of military success.

While it would be wrong to judge from afar, this report and others before it suggest that ISAF has not yet achieved that crucial objective.

From a public diplomacy perspective, I can understand that reports such as these could be useful to show people on the home front (assuming of course that they're still listening) that i/ ISAF tries very hard to limit civilian casualties and ii/ the Taliban are evil. However, that interpretation can be - in fact is - counter-productive because we miss the point. Not killing civilians is not enough, we're supposed to protect them.

I would add that the timing of the report is important in that it seems to vindicate General McChrystal's tightened rules of engagement, just as General Petraeus is said to be reconsidering these (in reality, that remark at his Senate confirmation hearing was really for domestic consumption and any minor changes to the RoE will be in interpretation rather than in letter and certainly not in spirit).

Worryingly, there was a demonstration this week-end in Mazar-e-Sharif (not exactly a Taliban stronghold) against civilian casualties and Petraeus' potential loosening of the rules of engagement, showing that ISAF is rightly being held responsible by the Afghans no matter what the statistics say. The facts as we know them tell us that ISAF is not the main culprit and that General Petraeus will not suddenly undo all the good work of his predecessor. The demonstration tells us that Afghan perception is more important than statistical reality.

In short, this report does not entitle the international community to a pat on the back. In actual fact, it only increases the urgency to get things right in Afghanistan as soon as possible.

Israel's nuclear deterrent

2010-07-10T12:21:00.000+02:00

In his latest talk, Professor John Mearsheimer analyses the costs and benefits of the Israeli nuclear deterrent.

He argues that since Israel's conventional military forces are superior, no neighbour would dare attacking it. Hence, the nuclear deterrent has no added value.

I tend to disagree. The 2006 war with Hizbollah in Lebanon did indicate, that asymmetric militias can pose a serious challenge to conventional forces. Israel will probably make sure that the next round in Lebanon will not end in a similar defeat by changing training, tactics and equipment. However, proliferation of advanced weapons systems can turn a strategic inferiority of irregular forces into a tactical superiority. In 2006 Hizbollah managed to do so when it lured Israeli tanks in an ambush and destroyed several of them.

I would argue that the current military dominance of Israel is not guaranteed forever. Therefore, it is simply good statesmanship to maintain a nuclear deterrent.

Mearsheimer also points out that the posture of Egypt has changed profoundly since the 1950's and 1960's and today is no more a hostile state. Israelis tend to agree but argue that nobody knows what will happen next in Egypt. I concur with this assessment. To speculate that Egypt will remain friendly and, therefore, one main reason for the need of a nuclear deterrent became redundant, would not convince me, if I were Israeli.

I would argue that the situation in the Middle East is much too volatile for Israel to get rid of its nuclear weapons. There are the ultimate defensive weapon and hence necessary in the armoury of every country that feels threatened.

Timing of the Russian spy scandal

2010-07-08T08:41:00.003+02:00

Following the FBI's uncovering of eleven Russian spies last week, an interesting issue (beyond the photographs of Anna Chapman) comes to mind: the timing of the arrests. An article in the Economist poses a number of questions that many people have been asking themselves: was the timing an attempt by hard-line individuals in Washington to undermine the improving relationship with Moscow? Was it an attempt by Moscow hard-liners to undermine Medvedev? Or, could it have been a policy of collusion between Obama and Medvedev to undermine Vladimir Putin and strengthen the hand of the current Russian president?

The final question is particularly interesting given that the ineptitude of the spies has embarassed the Russian secret services and made them look amateurish. As a result, it may weaken the political constituency that has been so dominant since the resignation of President Yeltsin, the siloviki, and with it the position of Vladimir Putin. Although this theory is a little far-fetched, it shouldn't be entirely discounted.

Two issues make at least one of the above hypotheses likely: first, the agents don't appear to have suddenly become a security threat - they were unable to pass any useful information to Moscow; second, there were more politically expedient moments in the recent past in which to make the arrests - most notably during, and immediately following, Russia's war with Georgia in 2008. So why now? Well, it's unlikely to have been an attempt to undermine President Obama as he is said to have sanctioned the arrests. But was there a political rationale for his decision? Or, had some of the agents become more of a concern than the press is giving them credit for?

Michael Scheuer's take on Afghanistan

2010-07-05T20:52:00.001+02:00

I can't think of many arguments that would undermine Michael Scheuer's outspoken criticism of what we are doing in Afghanistan...

Ron Paul makes also a good point, again...

CENTCOM report: talking to Hamas and Hezbollah

2010-07-01T20:00:00.000+02:00

Seems like the US military is leading innovative thinking: in a report by the Central Command (CENTCOM), Gen. Petraeus old working place, a study group called Red Team evaluated the pains and gains of talking to Hamas and Hezbollah.

The reason why Israel is furiously blocking this move is also mentioned in the report:

The Red Team also claims that reconciliation with Fatah, when coupled with Hamas's explicit renunciation of violence, would gain "widespread international support and deprive the Israelis of any legitimate justification to continue settlement building and delay statehood negotiations."

Turkey and the S-300

2010-06-23T07:14:00.011+02:00

Recent reports suggest that Russia is lining up a sale of the highly capable S-300 air-defence system to Turkey. While it's not surprising that Russia is seeking alternative customers for the S-300 (given that a lucrative deal to supply the system to Iran has now been canceled), the involvement of Turkey as recipient is potentially significant.

An article in UPI (which takes quite a negative tone) points out what it considers to be some of the possible implications of this speculative deal:

1) It would mark an eastward shift in Ankara's geopolitical orientation;

2) Turkey may end up supplying the S-300 to Iran;

3) Russia is using arms sales to "bolster" its influence in the Middle East.

Although the deal would be the latest of several indications that Turkey is reorientating itself towards the East, the assertion that it may supply the system to Iran seems like pure fantasy. If it did, then Ankara would not only undermine its position within NATO, but it would also aggravate Russia. However, point 3 is valid -- Turkey usually buys its weapons systems from the West and purchasing the S-300 may lead to more extensive arms procurements from Russia.

Nevertheless, there does appear to be a contradiction in the article: it claims that Anatoly Isaikin, director of Rosoboronexport, suggested that "Russia was prepared to participate in a Turkish tender for missile systems along with Western arms manufacturers." If this is true, and it's done in partnership with Western firms, then it changes the nature of the deal entirely. Rather than it being yet another indication of an increasingly precarious U.S.-Tukey relationship, it becomes a good example of U.S./NATO-Russian cooperation. Furthermore, if NATO members/allies purchase the S-300 system then it may help relieve pressure coming from Russian arms manufacturers to supply air-defence systems and other armaments to Iran.

It's clear that the United States and the West can't have the best of both worlds, it cannot stop Russia from supplying the S-300 to Iran while at the same time blocking sales to alternative (friendly) buyers. Given Russia's substantial arms industry there is an argument to be made, from a security standpoint, for allowing it to sell arms to allies. Moreover, if firms from Russia and the West actually partner with each other then it may help to maintain some semblance of control over Russian arms exports.

Stabilising Kyrgyzstan

2010-06-17T07:06:00.012+02:00

After the events that have taken place in Kyrgyzstan this week I'd like to follow-on from Patrick's previous post - "Realpolitik in Central Asia" - by highlighting that the current ethnic violence is, in part, a side-effect of the political vacuum left by the removal of President Bakayev. Following the Tulip revolution, both Russia and the United States failed to promote good governance in Kyrgyzstan, which has resulted in history repeating itself. However, there is now an opportunity - for the United States in particular - to help stabilise the country and show the Kyrgyz people that it cares about more than just the Manas air base. The U.S. and its allies need to demonstrate that they seek the creation of a stable and viable government that doesn't enrich itself at the expense of its own people.

As is often the case with Central Asia, the International Crisis Group's most recent report offers valid recommendations on what direction Western policy towards Kyrgyzstan should take. The report is particularly critical of the policy adopted by the Obama Administration, an approach that it claims can be summed-up in one word: "Afghanistan."

In an effort to address the mistakes of the Bush era (and its attempts to spread democracy), the current U.S administration may have swung too far in the other direction and, in doing so, is laying the seeds for future unrest. As the ICG rightly point out "ignoring major problems such as political brutality and institutionalised corruption is seen by the populace as condoning them."

The United States needs to find a policy that avoids both the imposition of a particular system and the propping up of a corrupt leader. The ICG sums this up as follows:

Future policies towards authoritarian regimes in Central Asia need to be encased in a clear framework, where obligations, undertakings and needs are carefully articulated, but where the U.S. speaks out clearly but politely, in a spirit of dialogue, when a host nation deviates from fundamental values of governance or human rights.

This may be easier said than done. But the current state of political limbo in Kyrgyzstan does offer an opportunity to introduce visible civilian personnel that can help ensure the creation of a stable government. It seems fundamental that the majority of U.S./allied resources shouldn't be devoted to the training of a military that the Kyrgyz government can then turn on its own people - as may have been the case on 7 April. Visibility seems to be important and the people of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, in particular, will need to be able to associate the West with more than just counter-terrorism and the war in Afghanistan.

While Russia will continue to be an impediment to some policies, it is in Moscow's interest to see Kyrgyzstan stabilised. This is also true of China, whose concerns over the Uighurs in Xinjiang mean that it wants to avoid any upswirl in Central Asian radicalism.

No doubt the Kyrgyz leadership will continue to play the U.S. and Russia off against each other, but its important for Moscow and Washington to at least try and concentrate on what unites them in central Asia rather than what divides them. In this case what unites them is the need for stability. Unless they achieve this aim then the rise of a young male population that's disenchanted and militant may be difficult to prevent.

Who is misreading Iran now? On facts and opinions

2010-06-15T23:01:00.002+02:00

A very interesting piece on Iran appeared in Foreign Policy today. Claiming that much of the reporting on Iran is based on political preferences and ideologies, the authors argue that the West has a distorted image of the realities on the ground. Those distorted perceptions lead to bad policy decisions.

Fact-based reporting and writing has been replaced by ideology-driven reporting, where facts are disregarded or not properly investigated. The authors focus on the reporting of the Green Movement in Iran, which has been portrayed as a democratic uprising against an evil dictator.

As a little known fact I would like to add that Mousavi accused Ahmadinejad in the pre-election presidential debates that he was too soft on the British when he returned the sailors that were captured in Iranian waters.

Although I'm sure that all writers of the spectrum, from Noam Chomskey to Bill Kristol (and Dustin Dehez, I might add) have good intentions, I wonder why some disregard facts. What is the benefit? Could anything good come out of a policy recommendation that only considers facts selectively?

In my friend's Dustin case, he wrote a piece on Iran (in German) without even mentioning the three negotiation offers by Iran. Obviously, he did not mention them because they do not fit in the picture. But shouldn't the picture change when facts undermine them?

Another example is the Israeli Ambassador here in Brussels: I saw him at a lecture the other night, where he outlined the Israeli policy that led to the Freedom Flotilla incident. In order to prove his point, he wilfully misrepresented historical facts (Hamas came to power by a coup d'etat), inaccuracies (there is no shortage of anything in Gaza, they even have shoes. Well, that is correct, but Israel let shoes into Gaza only in April 2010) and terminology (the siege is no blockade, the blockade is legitimate, there is no blockade etc.).

Instead of winning support, he clearly lost support in the audience. He did not help Israel that night. Instead of explaining the reasons for Israel's behaviour, he twisted facts to prove his point and lost sympathies of people who felt fooled by his statements.

Seems to be an evident thing to say but we all would be better off if we would base our opinion on facts and not vice versa.

Bloody Sunday - conclusions and lessons

2010-06-15T16:43:00.004+02:00

As mentioned here last week, the Saville report into the events in Derry, Ireland, in January 1972 has been published after a twelve-year investigation.

Whenever the peace process in Northern Ireland has been mentioned on this blog (indeed it has been the subject of three separate posts) it has been with a view to discussing what lessons of that process may be applicable, directly or indirectly, to other conflict resolution situations elsewhere in the world.

It is with a similar principle in mind that the investigation into Bloody Sunday is of interest now - in other words, what warnings from that particular catastrophe should be heeded today?

The Saville report concludes that there was "a serious and widespread loss of fire discipline among the soldiers of support company [1 Para]." No warning had been given to any civilians before the soldiers opened fire. None of the soldiers fired in response to attacks by petrol bombers or stone throwers. Some of those killed or injured were clearly fleeing or going to help those injured or dying. The report stops short, however, of using the term "unlawful killing", contrary to the Guardian report referred to here last week.

The report also exonerates the victims of any wrongdoing, stating that they were not posing a threat of causing death or serious injury. This is hugely significant, above all for the victims' families, as the original investigation into Bloody Sunday - the Widgery report of April 1972 - accused the marchers of being armed and of firing the first shots - an accusation completely refuted by the Saville report which states that the Army fired first.

So what lessons are to be drawn? What warnings are to be heeded?

In the first instance there are immediate political ramifications for the British government. Today's publication of the report poses an extremely delicate challenge for David Cameron, who has barely got his feet under the table in 10 Downing Street. Like almost all British Prime Ministers, with the possible exception of Tony Blair, Cameron does not take office intending to devote much time to Northern Ireland. Like almost all British Prime Ministers however, he has quickly found that the choice is not his to make.

Cameron's problem is twofold - firstly, the Tory Party which he leads (full name the Conservative and Unionist Party) has an electoral pact and very strong historical links with the Ulster Unionist Party, which has been very critical of the Saville report on the grounds that it is too expensive (£192m) and accords 'special treatment' to some victims of the Troubles but not to those killed by the IRA.

Moreover, as discussed here last week, the findings of the Saville report will inevitably put the Public Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland under pressure to prosecute the soldiers involved in the shootings and their commanders. This comes at a very important moment in the relationship between government and armed forces in Britain, in large part due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is in this context that David Cameron only last week called for a new "covenant" between the British people and the British Armed Forces.

Although it is not Cameron's decision to prosecute - or not - the guilty soldiers, the issue clearly will require some very careful handling by his administration, starting with his speech in the House of Commons the afternoon.

"The Government is ultimately responsible for the conduct of the armed forces. And for that, on behalf of the Government, indeed on behalf of our country, I am deeply sorry."

Cameron also that said that you do not defend the British Army by defending the indefensible. All in all, these are strong words and, although some would (rightly) argue that he had no choice but to react in this way, it seems that his initial handling of a potentially explosive issue has been good.

In terms of lessons or warnings, the penultimate sentence of the report encapsulates the incalculable damage incurred by the British Army's loss of control.

"What happened on Bloody Sunday strengthened the Provisional IRA, increased nationalist resentment and hostility towards the army and exacerbated the violent conflict of the years that followed."

This is a warning applicable to any counter-insurgency situation. If a State is supposed to hold the monopoly of legitimate violence, then any violence which it chooses to administer must be absolutely and unquestionably legitimate. If it is not then the legitimacy of the State itself is undermined. In a counter-insurgency situation, this can potentially be a fatal blow and all because of a loss of discipline by a company of soldiers.

NB: This entire issue is worth revisiting in the near future. For the time being, the report of the British Army into their forty-year engagement in Northern Ireland - known as Operation Banner - shows that conclusions drawn from that experience were applied elsewhere, with the caveat that few were "directly exportable". Be that as it may, the report should feature on the reading list of any study in modern counter-insurgency.

The box in the jungle

2010-06-15T07:12:00.010+02:00

There have been a number of rumours in recent weeks regarding the possibility that Myanmar may be embarking upon an illicit nuclear weapons programme. Reports from Burmese dissidents have added fuel to the fire but there is no conclusive evidence. Much of the suspicion has focused on a box-shaped building which, from aerial footage, appears similar to the site the Israelis attacked in Syria. However, the building in Myanmar is much larger than the Syrian facility (which is said to have been based on the North Korean reactor at Yongbyon). Several analysts have also suggested that the box may be linked to a Burmese attempt at indigenous missile production. While I will not go into too much detail about what has been said, I would like to point out why Myanmar may choose to go down this path.

First, there is good reason for us to question the rationality of the military junta that rules Myanmar, primarily due to its acute sense of paranoia. A good example was its decision to move the capital from Yangon (formerly Rangoon) inland to Naypyidaw in 2005. This was a move that was done in secret and for reasons of isolation and protection; its location is very remote and most Burmese citizens had no idea that it was being built.

By disengaging itself from Yangon, the junta disengages itself from the people -- something that it appears to want. But another reason for moving the capital is that it fears a U.S. led invasion of the country. As a result, the junta may look at the North Korean example and see nuclear weapons as the most effective means of preventing such an invasion from taking place.

Second, Myanmar is believed to have close links with North Korea and there have been several reports of North Korean ships docking in Burmese ports. In order for Myanmar to kick-start any nuclear programme it would need substantial external assistance as it simply does not have the infrastructure to carry out such a feat alone. If it did seek this support, then it would almost certainly turn to Pyongyang.

Although this is all currently unsubstantiated, it does appear that Burmese paranoia regarding a U.S. led invasion has been heightened since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. If this is the case, then we have yet another negative effect of the conflict. Given that the justification for the war was to dismantle Saddam's supposed WMD capability, it would be ironic if the invasion turns out to be the trigger for another country to start its own programme (note that this same argument has been used with North Korea). It would be interesting to know whether the possibility of this happening was ever discussed prior to the 2003 invasion. If it wasn't then it certainly should have been.

Myanmar presents an interesting case study and one that is very different from Iran. The main difference seems to be rationality: while the Iranian leadership, with its multiple power bases, can be considered to be rational, this is not necessarily the case with the Burmese junta. If it were, then the junta should conclude that while an invasion is pretty much an impossibility as things stand today, this could all change if there was conclusive evidence that it was trying to construct a nuclear weapon. That said, it should be much easier for the West to use peaceful measures to prevent it from succeeding; due primarily to the regime's international isolation (China would be a key actor again). After all, another invasion of a country suspected of having a nuclear weapons programme could add further value to the weapons' value, precipitating further proliferation......and so it goes on.

Open Saudi skies for Israel (?)

2010-06-14T08:15:00.005+02:00

The enemy of my enemy is my friend... and his bombers shall have open skies to attack my enemy's nuclear facilities.

The Times reports that Saudi Arabia has been conducting tests to stand down its air defences and allow Israeli bombers through unharmed. Granting Israeli jets free passage through a narrow corridor of northern Saudi airspace would considerably reduce the distance of the bombing run.

The Kingdom has officially denied this claim, calling it "slanderous and false" and reiterating its "position of opposition and rejection of the violation of its sovereignty and the use of its airspace or territory by anyone to attack any country".

According to The Times, the four main targets are said to be the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Qom, the gas storage development at Isfahan and the heavy-water reactor at Arak. These targets lie up to 2,250km from Israel, which is the outer limit of their bombers’ range, even with aerial refuelling. An air strike would involve multiple waves of bombers, presumably crossing Jordan, northern Saudi Arabia and Iraq - which would require at least tacit approval from Washington for the strike.

The article quotes a US defence source who claims that the understanding between Israel and Saudi Arabia has been done with the agreement of the US State Department.

An interesting aspect of this issue is the regional dimension - the article refers to a claim by 'Israeli intelligence sources' that Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan are just as concerned (to put it mildly) as Israel and the west over the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran.

If this story is true - and we should not consider it a foregone conclusion - then it raises many questions. Is a strike on Iran a question of when not if? Is the ongoing diplomatic effort genuinely intended to bring about a peaceful resolution to the issue or is it merely a smokescreen intended to convince the world that a military solution is the only solution? If the diplomatic effort is genuine then at what point do we decide that it is not working and an air strike is the only solution?

Also, to what extent is Israel doing this at its own behest or as a US (and Saudi) proxy? What would be the repercussions of using Israel as a blunt instrument, diplomatically or otherwise?

Bloody Sunday report imminent

2010-06-11T09:56:00.005+02:00

The Saville enquiry into the Bloody Sunday massacre will publish its findings on Tuesday, twelve years after the enquiry began. According to The Guardian, the report will conclude that the fatal shooting of fourteen unarmed civilians by the British Army in Derry in 1972 was "unlawful". The British government has described the Guardian's claim as speculation.

Until the findings are actually published on Tuesday, it would perhaps be premature to draw any firm conclusions. For the time being, suffice to say that the repercussions could potentially be considerable.

If the Guardian has its story right then the Public Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland will be under heavy pressure to put soldiers in the dock for manslaughter or even murder - and this the day after David Cameron promised a "new covenant" with the Armed Forces.

It remains to be seen what will happen on Tuesday but the anonymous unionist MP who described the report as a "hand-grenade with the pin pulled out" may not be too far from the truth.

NB: For anyone unfamiliar with the events of Bloody Sunday, the excellent CAIN web service must be the first port of call.

Do counter-terrorists make us safer?

2010-06-10T19:50:00.002+02:00

I went to an event at the European Parliament on terrorism today. On the panel were Vikram Sood, former head of the Research and Analysis department of the Indian external intelligence service, Efraim Halvey, the former head of Israel's Mossad, and Gilles Van Kerkhove, the counter-terrorism Coordinator of the EU Council.

After giving the Israeli interpretation of the events around the Gaza aid flotilla, Halevy went on to single out Hizbollah as main terrorist threat.

Sood identified Pakistan as the main security threat and outlines the connections between terrorism and the Pakistani government.

Of course, working in counter-terrorism means fighting the bad guys. But after these polarising statements by the two gentlemen, I couldn't help to wonder whether intelligence officers in counter-terrorism are the right people to rely on when it comes to our safety.

The reasoning is quite simple: an intelligence officer fights an enemy. But this enemy is the result of realities on the ground, which in turn are created by politicians. Understandably, the ex-chief of Mossad justifies the killing of alleged terrorists disguised as peace-activist on vessels carrying humanitarian aid. But did this action make Israel safer?

Of course, the former Indian senior intelligence officer threatens Pakistan with retaliation, if an event like the Mumbai attacks would reproduce itself. But does he make the Indian population safer?

Terrorism has a reason. As Robert Fisk put it: if you don't want terrorism, you should stop killing Muslims. Is it as simple as that? Not according to the Mossad or Indian intelligence service, as it seems.

The root causes for the Gaza flotilla disaster is not that Turkey joined the rogue states club, nor that a handful of alleged IHH activists were on board. The reason is the situation in Gaza.

The root cause for the Hizbollah is not that Muslims hate Jews, nor that Hizbollah seeks to destroy Israel. The reason is the ongoing occupation of Lebanese territory by Israel.

The root causes for the Mumbai attacks are not that Muslims hate Hindus, nor that Pakistan is becoming a jihadi state. The reason is the conflict in Kashmir.

Intelligence officers cannot tackle those issues. There job is to take out the enemy. They need help by politicians. Where is the political initiative to solve the Kashmir situation? Where is the political initiative to end the collective punishment of 1,5 million Palestinians in Gaza? And where is the political initiative to solve the "border-dispute" at the Lebanese-Israeli border?

As long as we don't face those issues, we will have terrorism.

Is Europe pushing Turkey eastward?

2010-06-10T11:22:00.003+02:00

The Free Gaza flotilla debacle has led many to question Israel's direction and its strategic thinking. The flip side of this is that many are doing the same for Turkey - with equally good reason.

Bob Gates has made rather strident comments in this regard, essentially accusing the European Union of pushing Turkey away from the west and away from Israel.

"I personally think that if there is anything to the notion that Turkey is, if you will, moving eastward, it is, in my view, in no small part because it was pushed, and pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that Turkey sought."

While developments such as the sharp deterioration of Israel-Turkey relations are clearly a source of concern, is it accurate to say that this forms part of an eastward movement from Ankara?

The article quotes a senior US State Department official involved in U.S. policy toward Turkey, who argues that Turkey continues to attach importance to its relationship with the West and that its new found role in the region is part of "the most activist Turkish foreign policy that we've probably ever seen," rather than a conscious effort to break with Europe and the U.S.

"I don't think it's accurate to say they're turning away from the West. What they are doing is adding on a much more activist role in their neighbourhood to their traditional strategic relationship with us and Europe and the West."

If this is indeed the case then it would be perfectly logical from Ankara's point of view. Turkey's biggest selling point is its strategic location - the more good relationships Turkey has with as many of its neighbours as possible the more added value it can bring to its relationship with the west - both the U.S. and the EU.

However, let us accept for a moment that there is indeed an eastward trend in Ankara's foreign policy, just as Gates says. Is it fair to apportion all the blame to the EU? According to Turkish diplomat Tuncay Babali, it is indeed fair.

"What Secretary Gates said is right on target. Turks are sick and tired of being judged on individual issues such as whether they support certain Western policies, rather than being accepted as a significant partner."

There is possibly a degree of truth in that - the public debate on Turkey's potential EU membership does focus heavily on specific issues, rather than the broader strategic picture. Given that Turkey's biggest contribution would be geostrategic reach and influence, an issue-specific lens is the wrong one through which to look at the bigger picture.

However, this is a two-way street. What makes Turkey a significant partner is, again, its geostrategic reach. While Turkey is doing good work with Afghanistan and Pakistan through the tripartite commission, this is overshadowed by its increasingly acrimonious relations with Israel. Furthermore, the success of Turkey's attempt to establish itself as a mediator between, for example, Syria and the west remains open for debate. In short, what added value would Turkey bring to the EU right now?

In any case, even if we are to adopt the narrow perspective, Turkey has not delivered on the specific issues in question - above all Cyprus, an EU member. If the EU were to compromise on the Cypriot question then what kind of signal does it send to its other newer members? Incidentally, I do not include recognition of the Armenian genocide among those issues. Turkey has not delivered on that either but the west has been complicit for too long in Turkey's failure to acknowledge what happened. To use that against Turkey now is shameless hypocrisy.

In short, its true that Turkey has some reason to feel aggrieved at its treatment from the European Union but only to a certain extent. The European Union would indeed do well to re-evaluate its approach to the Turkish question but, at the same time, the bloc is perfectly entitled to defend its interests and set its own threshold for membership.

Integrating Turkey would be a huge step and conditions must be right. At the moment, conditions are clearly not right for obvious economic reasons within Europe but, as the Ergenekon trial continues into its third year, they are not right in Turkey either. Is Gates seriously telling Europe that it should countenance bringing Turkey into the fold while grave questions remain over the possible existence of a 'deep State' which plotted to overthrow a democratically-elected government through chaos and mayhem?

In the light of all this, Gates' criticism appears unjustified and rather one-sided in fact. Perhaps some in Europe are indeed refusing to give Turkey the 'organic link' that Turkey wants but the reverse is equally true.

The EU and Gaza

2010-06-09T09:37:00.004+02:00

A recurring theme on this blog is the role - actual, potential or (usually) imagined - of the European Union in situations beyond its borders. This article in European Voice accuses the EU of not doing enough to end the blockade of Gaza and by extension contributing indirectly to the flotilla fiasco last week.

It's a familiar pattern: strongly worded statements from commissioners but with very little follow-through. Far from sending ambiguous messages to Israel, as Herremans asserts, the message from Brussels is very clear - inaction. The EU condemns the blockade policy but does not use its potentially considerable leverage to bring about change.

It was not for nothing that the International Crisis Group described the flotilla assault as "a symptom of an approach that has been implicitly endorsed by many."

Nuclear fusion: the EU in a bind

2010-06-08T07:03:00.017+02:00

There have been rumours in recent days - not particularly surprising rumours - that the EU debt crisis could have a negative impact on the attempt to commercialise nuclear fusion at Cadarache in France. The project, named the International Thermonuclear Experiment Reactor (ITER), includes the EU, United States, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea. In 2005, France narrowly won the right to host the project ahead of Japan, primarily because the EU pledged to pay 45 percent of the site's construction. However, scientists have revealed that the initial £5bn cost of the project has trebled over the last three years. As a result, the timeline has been pushed back from 2015 to 2019 and the project could end up being cancelled entirely. Although this topic is slightly outside the usual scope of this blog, I thought it might be worth discussing given that there would be real benefits for the European Union if the project produces results -- not least for energy security.

So what are the benefits to be gained from commercialising nuclear fusion? I'm no scientist, but here is what I've been told:

1) Unlike nuclear fission reactors, those based on fusion are inherently safe, which means that the major argument against nuclear energy - safety - would be undermined;

2) Fusion does not produce large amounts of radioactive waste for which states need to devise unpopular long-term disposal plans;

3) In comparison to current nuclear reactors, those based on fusion could produce far more energy.

But, of course, there are problems. This process entails recreating the conditions at the centre of the sun where elements are able to fuse together under intense heat. Creating that heat requires vast amounts of electricity and all prototype fusion plants to date have consumed more energy than they have generated. So, the aim of ITER is to create excess power and pave the way for
innovative new reactor designs -- an ambitious and expensive goal that could take decades.

If the current funding crisis in Europe continues then the EU may be unable to continue financing 45 percent of the total cost, perhaps placing the whole project in jeopardy. It's understandable that the project has its critics. After all, this is an extravagance at a time when most EU states are battling against mounting debt burdens.

Clearly the EU finds itself in a very difficult position and this raises important questions about whether ambitious projects that could, potentially, change the nature of energy security should be off limits to budget cuts. Although the possible gains (if successful) are significant, we could be throwing money into a black hole. Of course the EU should be at the center of pioneering projects such as these, but the rationale for pledging to pay 45 percent of the project has to be severely questionned. Safe and affordable nuclear fusion could reduce European dependency on oil imports while taking away the risk of future Chernobyls. But at the same time, did we really need to insist that the experimental reactor be based in Europe? The liability that European tax payers now face suggests that the answer is no.

The fall-out from Kohlergate

2010-06-03T16:49:00.001+02:00

Following Frederik's post last week on the comments made by the now former German President Horst Kohler, I'd like to highlight this article from the Wall Street Journal, Germany needs to grow up.

Horst Kohler resigned on Monday following the controversy stirred up by his comment on Germany's engagement in Afghanistan:

"A country of our size, with its focus on exports and thus reliance on foreign trade, must be aware that military deployments are necessary in an emergency to protect our interests, for example, when it comes to trade routes, for example, when it comes to preventing regional instabilities that could negatively influence our trade, jobs and incomes."

That statement is a fairly succinct summary of the reason's for the international community's engagement in Afghanistan. Moreover, the same reason applies to the international community's counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa (under NATO, EU and national flags). Do we send ships to the Gulf of Aden to help the people of Somalia or because 7% of the world's oil passes through those straits alone?

I think the basic message of the WSJ article - that Kohler was merely stating an obvious truth and a failure to understand that is a failure to understand the world we live in - is basically right, although perhaps the tone is unnecessarily caustic and greater empathy for the context of German history would have been appropriate. Moreover, the article misses the point that Frederik made in his post, that Kohler's comment has considerable legal implications in Germany.

However, if I were to internationalise this debate then I would have to challenge the assertion, made both by Frederik and the WSJ, that such a comment would have passed unnoticed in most other countries. It may well be true that only Germans could find Kohler's words incendiary but many other Europeans (especially those with a poor grasp of history) would find them at least controversial.

For example, Gordon Brown regularly linked the war in Afghanistan to the fight against terrorism, stating that the vast majority of terrorist plots uncovered in Britain were conceived or planned or organised in the Afghan-Pakistan border regions.

Barack Obama directly links the war in Afghanistan to the fight against al-Qaida. Although it was not the Obama administration that made that link and although Obama himself is probably too smart to really believe that, the fact remains that the war continues to be sold to the American public on that basis.

My point here is not to claim that the international community is engaged in Afghanistan under false pretences. My point is that, for some reason, publics seem to need more stark reasons for military engagement abroad than mere protection of trade and national interests through prevention of regional instabilities.

If an American politician or decision-maker made the same statement as Horst Kohler, what kind of reaction would he/she receive? Probably in America this kind of statement would - indeed does - go largely unnoticed, simply because it is relatively commonplace.

The real question is if a European (other than German) politician or decision-maker made the same statement as Horst Kohler, what kind of reaction would he/she receive?

While the German context is a unique one for obvious historical reasons, I think that its not only the Germans who need to accept certain realities. I think the same applies to many Europeans, albeit to varying degrees depending on nationality, demography or even political allegiance.

The simple fact is that Kohler spoke the truth and a perfectly valid truth at that. The sooner Europe accepts this and bases foreign and security policy around it, the more effective Europe will be on the world stage.

British and French nuclear submarine sharing

2010-05-31T22:28:00.015+02:00

There have been discussions in recent months about the possibility of the United Kingdom and France sharing nuclear submarine patrols. Both countries maintain a policy of 'continuous at-sea deterrence' whereby at least one ballistic missile nuclear submarine is at-sea at any given time, usually in the Atlantic. The theory goes that by maintaining a continuous at-sea presence you ensure invulnerability and enhance deterrence. This is an expensive exercise (as was noted in the recent U.K. general election campaign) that drains significant resources from defence budgets. Many have also argued, with good reason, that it's an anachronistic cold war policy that has little utility against modern day threats.

As a possible alternative, individuals in France have suggested that the two nuclear states begin 'deterrence-sharing', with officials from both countries having discussed the proposal. However, it appears that the U.K., in particular, has been lukewarm to the idea. This is surprising given that it's the U.K. where the debate over the cost of nuclear deterrence has been raging. Here are some of the arguments for and against this proposal:

Arguments for:

1) Shared threats

Both countries face the same threats -- something that is widely acknowledged. This makes the plan conceivable from an operational standpoint as a nuclear threat to one is almost certainly a nuclear threat to the other.

2) Financial savings

The most obvious advantage appears to be cost. If the two countries share patrols - perhaps on an alternating basis - then they don't need to maintain four nuclear submarines each (as is currently the case). However, although there are savings to be made from operational costs, it should be remembered that much of the expense in building a fleet of submarines comes from the research and design phase. This means that the net saving from building three submarines instead of four is significantly less than 25 percent.

3) Advancing the multilateral disarmament agenda

Although the financial savings may not be huge, we should also consider the symbolic significance of further reducing submarine fleets and nuclear warheads. It would provide a boost to the perception among non-nuclear weapon states that the recognised nuclear powers are living up to their end of the NPT nuclear bargain. Therefore, the fact that the proposal would allow for a further draw-down in warhead numbers means it should be given serious thought.

Arguments against:

1) Operational questions

Although the proposal is conceivable in theory, there are some serious operational questions that would need to be answered. For instance: who would give the launch order? Could the French government overrule a U.K. order to one of its Trident submarines? This last question is especially pertinent if the crews of each submarine continued to be manned entirely by one nation. These problems could be overcome, but they represent a significant bureaucratic obstacle.

2) Sovereignty and domestic opinion

What is surprising about this proposal is that it came from France. Historically, Paris has been very attached to its nuclear deterrent as a symbol of national independence that enables it to conduct an autonomous foreign policy -- a well-known fact that has been acknowledged by a number of respected French scholars such as Bruno Tertrais. As a result, I don't think we can assume that this proposal enjoys wide support throughout the French government. Nor is it likely to be supported by the majority of the French public, who are also attached to the country's independent nuclear deterrent (I could be wrong on this point). Of course, similar questions apply within the United Kingdom as well, but I suspect that the opposition there primarily comes from governing officials rather than the general public.

3) Anglo-American nuclear cooperation

A further obstacle standing in the way of effective implementation on the British side is the country's Mutual Defence Agreement with the United States. This agreement forms the back-bone of extensive nuclear cooperation between the two countries, which includes scientific cooperation, warhead design, and the British purchase of the Trident missile. While it is possible that the proposal can be framed in a way that does not lead to any sharing of expertise between London and Paris, the United States may still have some concerns.

Overall this seems to be an interesting concept for which there are clear arguments on both sides. Time will tell if it gets any traction and is debated more widely, particularly in the context of the upcoming U.K. Strategic Defence Review. To be honest, it's probably unlikely. But if a wider debate does come about then the key argument in favour should be the furtherance of the multilateral disarmament agenda and not financial savings.

Is trust a necessary prerequisite in international relations?

2010-05-31T20:49:00.001+02:00

The PBS journalist Charlie Rose went to Damascus to interview Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal. In this interview, Meshaal said that if 1) Israel withdraws to the 1967 border, 2) Jerusalem becomes the Palestinian capital and 3) the refugees are granted the right to return, the Palestinian resistance will end.

Except the right of return perhaps, this package of a peace agreement is accepted virtually by the whole world, except the USA and Israel. It basically reflects the outcome of the Geneva initiative, an Israeli-Palestinian peace coalition with prominent supporters on both sides.

Proponents of the position of the Israeli government are very likely to dismiss Meshaal's proposal, as they did reject the Geneva initiative. From their point of view, Hamas is not to be trusted. Hamas would use the gained sovereignty to re-arm and prepare the attack on Israel proper. Therefore, the survival of Israel demands a tight grip on the West Bank and Gaza.

Let's disregard for a moment other possible explanations of the Israeli policy, namely the ideology of a greater Israel (Eretz Israel) stretching from the Jordan to the Mediterranean or messianic Judeo-Christian ideologies. If we disregard those possible explanations, the Meshaal offer could be considered by the Israeli government as a good basis for a future peace agreement. If it wouldn't be for the fear and distrust, we could welcome Meshaal's statement as a first step to real peace negotiations.

It is understandable that Israel feels threatened, being surrounded by Arab states. But is this feeling of fear a good adviser in matters of national security? Master Yoda says that fear leads to anger, anger leads to hate and hate leads to suffering - and those are the dark side of the force. On that he is in line with Noam Chomsky in its latest interview, who stated that Israeli policy was dominated by paranoia and irrationality (This interview is very worth watching because the interviewer confronts Chomsky with the arguments of the Israeli government).

Although I have sympathy with the Israeli concerns and woes, it is difficult to envisage a positive development for all parties involved when feelings dictate their behaviour. Let's put it differently: is trust a necessary ingredient in international relations? And if yes, what could the EU do to build trust between the various antagonists?

Current developments in German defence policy I

2010-05-28T20:10:00.005+02:00

The last couple of days, some interesting developments took place in the German defence policy. To begin with, the German president, Horst Kohler, said in an interview that the German participation at ISAF is also due to economic and trade reasons.

In an interview with a German radio station, Kohler made a statement that stirred up the political establishment. He said:

"I guess that we are making good progress to understand that a country such as ours with its export driven economy and, therefore, dependency on exports has in emergency situations to rely on military force to protect its interests, for instance trading routes or prevention of regional instabilities that could have a negative impact on trade, employment or income."

This statement that would hardly even be noticed in other countries, opened a Pandora's box in Germany. Most of the German politicians claim that we are in Afghanistan to bring peace and stability. In her speech to the parliament, Chancellor Angela Merkel stated the fact that Afghan children can return to school as a first reason for our engagement.

Stating that national economic interest is also a reason for the deployment of the BUNDESWEHR, poses two major problems: first, we Germans don't this kind of stuff. We Germans want to help others and altruism is our primary motivation. Taking of national interest always has a taste of something that we thought we left behind 65 years ago. The reasons for our engagement vary from enabling Afghan children going to school to solidarity with the NATO alliance. The economy as a reason has never been mentioned before by any prominent politician.

Second, there is a legal problem with this statement: according to the German constitution, the armed forces cannot be deployed for economic reasons. Also, the mandate of the German parliament for the participation at ISAF does not cover for economic interests, but only security reasons.

The German president has only representative functions. He is nominated by the parties and elected by the federal assembly, a body where the parliament and representatives of the local governments are represented. He has no political power. However, he can influence the political discourse with speeches, as he did with this latest interview.

NB: For the first time, a German warship has been integrated into a US Carrier Strike Group (CSG). The Frigate HESSEN is currently part of the HARRY S. TRUMAN CSG, which is on its way to the waters off the coast of Iran. The German government did not release any statement concerning the reasons for this deployment, yet.

Foreign Fighters in Afghanistan

2010-05-25T19:59:00.002+02:00

Patrick and I talked about the scale of the jihadi network in Central Asia. There is some literature about the subject available, with a general consensus that Uzbeks and Tadjiks and even Bosnians and Germans joined the ranks of the Taliban. Whether the network extends to Chechnya seems not to be quite clear. In this article, however, a Canadian "veteran infantryman" points out that Chechen fighters are the toughest enemy confronting the Canadians in Afghanistan.

As nationalities who are involved in the insurgency he mentions Egyptians, Saudis, Pakistanis, and Yemenites. "Asked whether he had personally encountered foreigners on the battlefield, the sergeant (...) replied with a grin and classic military jargon: “I have not interacted verbally with them.” Remains the question how he could determine the insurgent's nationality.

Canada's top ranking general confirms that more and more foreigners are joining the fight. He explains it with the improved living conditions of the Afghans who would prefer to stay home. "This may be because less people from Afghanistan are joining the fight. They are not getting the numbers they need here. They are not regenerating forces. What is their pool? It is not extremists but people who feel they don’t have a choice. And that pool is reducing."

If this depiction is accurate, it could indicate that McChrystal's strategy change bears some fruit.

Israel, South Africa and the Bomb (2)

2010-05-24T20:42:00.003+02:00

For those of you that are interested in this issue it's worth reading Julian Borger's commentary. He includes the views of Avner Cohen, which are particularly interesting. For those of you that don't know, Cohen is an Israeli that has written two books on Israel's atomic weapons programme. He has often been critical of Israeli policy so his comments shouldn't be taken as biased.

Israel, South Africa and the Bomb

2010-05-24T18:02:00.027+02:00

The Guardian claimed yesterday that in 1975 Israel - through its Defence Minister Shimon Peres - offered to sell South Africa nuclear weapons. If this evidence (uncovered by American academic Sasha Polakow-Suransky) proves to be true then it has two implications: 1) it provides further confirmation that Israel has nuclear weapons despite its policy of ambiguity; and 2) that it was previously willing to transfer this technology to a non-nuclear weapon state.

These claims come at an unfortunate time for Israel. Last week it found itself under increasing pressure at the Review Conference for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT RevCon) and there have been reports today that another of its diplomats has been expelled from an allied nation - this time Australia. If the conclusions that have been drawn are true, then Tel Aviv will look hypocritical in claiming that Iran can not be trusted with nuclear weapons when Israel itself previously offered the bomb to apartheid South Africa.

But, at this stage at least, there is cause to question some of the article's conclusions. Although it's difficult without seeing the original documents, the information provided by the Guardian does not appear as conclusive as the article's headline suggests. There seems to be ambiguity as to whether Israel was actually offering South Africa Jericho missiles armed with nuclear warheads, or was simply offering them nuclear-capable Jericho missiles that South Africa could arm with its own nuclear warheads. Selling nuclear-armed missiles is not the same as selling nuclear-capable missiles.

However, when placed in the context of earlier claims made by Dieter Gerhardt, the South African naval commander who spied for the Soviets, it does seem more likely that there was some form of offer from Shimon Peres - albeit in code. If this is true then why did Peres do it? A more likely scenario would have been for Israel to assist South Africa in building its own nuclear weapon (there is evidence to suggest that it did do this).

Something else that should be remembered: the deal did not actually go ahead. As the article points out, "Botha did not go ahead with the deal in part because of the cost. In addition, any deal would have to have had final approval by Israel's prime minister and it is uncertain it would have been forthcoming." This last point is important as it isn't clear whether or not Peres had the backing of the Israeli Prime Minister or any other government ministers. If there is evidence to suggest that he did, then this revelation will be even worse for Israel.

In the context of the current NPT RevCon it is known and assumed by all parties that Israel does have nuclear weapons. However, it has been politically convenient for Israel not to confirm their existence. This latest revelation may lead to greater pressure being placed on Israel to be transparent about its nuclear weapons stockpile. Untill it does, it will be impossible to make progress on the Middle Eastern Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, which has been a topic of discussion at the RevCon - although both Israeli transparency and progress towards a MENWFZ seem unlikely over the short-term.

Clash in Kashmir

2010-05-23T21:47:00.002+02:00

There has been a fatal exchange of fire between India and Pakistan along the de facto border in Kashmir. It is not clear how the firing started - both sides are accusing the other of firing the first shots - but the Pakistani army has stated that one of their soldiers has been killed.

Clearly, this is not a welcome development and will distract attention from the campaign in Afghanistan... or perhaps we've got that the wrong way round? Perhaps Afghanistan has distracted too much attention from other problems in the region, of which Kashmir is one of the longest-lasting and most intractable.

Chomsky, Israel, Palestine and me

2010-05-21T20:30:00.003+02:00

The reports that US Professor Noam Chomsky was denied entry into Israel are somewhat inaccurate. In fact, Prof. Chomsky wanted to enter the occupied Palestinian Territories and give a speech at the Bir Zeit University in Ramallah, the provisional capital of the Palestinian Territories. The difference between Israel and the Palestinian Territories seem to be unclear to quite a few Israeli border guards, as I can report from personal experience.

When I was travelling from Amman to Jerusalem a couple of years ago, I was asked by the border guard why I wanted to travel to Israel. I felt the need to explain that it wasn't my intention to travel to Israel, but to Palestine. As a consequence, I spend the next five hours or so enjoying a nice conversation with a very attractive female Israeli officer who was very interested in all aspects of my professional as well as personal life.

She asked me to strip down to my underwear, and she was only lucky that I'm so progressive and did not insist on a male guard to supervise my undressing. In the meantime, her colleagues search my bags. They performed their job very thoroughly, which confronted my with the unusual challenge of how to get my tooth past back in the tube.

Apparently, I made a good impression upon the border guards, because they let me, as opposed to Prof. Chomsky, continue my journey. The inconvenience to find a taxi and pay for the ride to Jerusalem, the last bus was long gone, was dwarfed by my gratitude towards the Israeli border guards to let me enter Palestine.

"Keep your friends close but your enemies closer"

2010-05-21T02:54:00.007+02:00

Earlier this week I attended a talk by Brenda Shaffer, the author of the book Energy Politics, who gave an interesting interpretation of Russian policy towards Iran. Her explanation was almost entirely based on energy policy, or, more specifically, natural gas. Given that I was discussing this issue in my previous post, I thought it might be worth revisiting.

Shaffer pointed out that Iran sits on the world's second largest reserves of natural gas (Russia being the largest), yet it continues to be a net importer. This situation is explained by a lack of investment from western companies, which prevents Tehran from exploiting its reserves. Although this lack of investment is partly due to sanctions, it is also a result of the difficult business environment in Iran, which discourages any extensive FDI. If this obstacle was overcome, however, then Iran's most obvious export market would be Europe (once a viable transit infrastructure was constructed through the South Caucasus). This is where Russia comes in. As is widely known, Moscow and Gazprom have a significant hold over the European gas market, something they wish to maintain. In this respect, their biggest potential rival is Iran.

This means it's in Russia's interest to do two things:

1) Maintain a certain level of tension in the political relationship between Tehran and the West - making any significant investment in Iran unlikely.

2) Avoid an Iraq scenario in Iran - Russia certainly doesn't want any western occupation of the country (not that it's really conceivable) as it would open the door to western investment in Iranian gas fields.

I found this an interesting argument and one that certainly fits with Russian policy towards Iran. Reminds me of that famous saying "keep your friends close but your enemies closer."

But the Iran crisis is reaching the latter stages now and if you extrapolate Shaffer's argument to the end then there is one outcome that Russia doesn't want: an Iran that suddenly sees the error of its ways, comes clean about its nuclear programme and prior intentions, and then reengages with the international community. A likely outcome of this would be that western companies compete to gain lucrative Iranian contracts.

So how would Russia like to see it turn out? Very difficult to say but one things is for sure: Russian policy towards Iran is extremely complex and can't just be boiled down to economic factors alone.

Policework or politics?

2010-05-20T13:36:00.006+02:00

French police have arrested the suspected military leader of the Basque separatist group ETA, an individual named Mikel Karrera Sarobe, or 'Ata'.

Five ETA leaders have been arrested in France over the past two years. Indeed, Ata has only been leader of the organisation since February of this year when his predecessor, Ibon Gogeascoechea, was arrested. That particular fact is interesting because it raises certain questions.

Question 1/
What are the objectives of the Spanish and French police and intelligence services? Are they seeking to eradicate ETA altogether or merely reduce ETA's 'campaign' to a manageable or acceptable level of violence?
1a/ If the former is the case then can ETA really be eradicated solely through police and/or intelligence action?
1b/ If the latter is the case then how do we define manageable or acceptable?

Nicolas Sarkozy would appear to have already answered the first part of that question following ETA's fatal shooting of a French policeman in March but is that a realistic aim or merely political posturing for the benefit of a - justifiably - angry French public?

Question 2/
Should there not be some attempt to reach a political solution? More specifically, should there not be some attempt to find credible interlocutors on the other side in order to work towards some kind of political solution? Incidentally, that question applies as much to ETA as towards Madrid and Paris.

Many would argue, not entirely without justification, that ETA are simply not credible interlocutors, that they have neither the requisite level of political sophistication nor of public support to be regarded as an important party in the Spanish and Basque political scenes.

However, while there may be a considerable degree of truth in those statements, ETA do remain in existence and they do remain a threat, not to the monopoly of legitimate violence in Vitoria-Gasteiz, Madrid or Paris but to ordinary people's lives.

Therefore, they must be persuaded/forced to put away their guns and work towards their goals, such as they are, through some other (non-violent) method and that is what we should mean when we refer to a 'political solution' in the Basque Country, not a Basque version of the Good Friday Agreement.

In that context, when leaders keep being arrested every few months then the repercussions on any further attempt at a political solution are usually negative.

There are certain simple, practical factors that make this the case: the over-riding priority of the individual concerned will simply be to evade capture and, moreover, a few months is not enough time to convince a movement like ETA that a change of strategy is necessary, let alone to actually implement such a change. Above all, the strong likelihood is that each new leader will be more hard-line than the last.

ETA are very often compared to the IRA and many people have attempted to draw lessons from the peace process in Northern Ireland and apply them to the Basque Country. There is a big difference however.

Any political solution requires a degree of political understanding, or intelligence, among the leadership of the organisation in conflict with the State. That was the case among certain IRA leaders, Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, throughout the peace process in Northern Ireland. That has never been the case with ETA.

Partly this is linked to the fact that, as described above, leaders keep being arrested and their successors have to go into hiding (before inevitably being arrested anyway) and are thus even further removed from the society in which they live and for which they claim to fight. If you apply Mao Zedong's metaphor on guerrilla armies, these fish no longer swim in the water of the people. Instead, they are floundering in increasingly shallow water, struggling for oxygen.

A case in point was ETA's murder, in December 2008, of 71-year-old Ignacio Uria Mendizabal simply because his family's construction business was involved in building a controversial high-speed rail link through the Basque Country. How not to win hearts and minds.

ETA may be dying a slow, suffocating death but they seem determined to take others down with them. In order to minimise the harm done to ordinary people, arresting individual leaders is not enough. Should these measures not be accompanied by sustained engagement at street level with the marginalised urban youth from which ETA draws its dwindling number of recruits? Can a purely security-based solution ever be enough on its own?

NB: This post touches on a number of issues which deserve more in-depth examination. Anyone keen to learn more about how the Spanish and French authorities sought to fight fire with fire should start by reading this interview with Irish journalist Paddy Woodworth, who investigated exactly how this was done during the 1980s and the harmful consequences these measures incurred.

Taliban video of attack on an ANA outpost in Nuristan

2010-05-19T23:30:00.000+02:00

By watching Taliban videos, one can learn much about the enemy that ISAF is fighting in Afghanistan.

In this video, the Taliban show a coordinated attack on a Afghan National Army outpost. No US or other coalition forces are to be seen; however, an A-10 and at least one Attack-Helicopter show up on the scene.

The attack is coordinated and engages the outpost from two sides. One group provides fire support with mortars, recoilless guns and RPGs, whereas the infantry attack is launched on the other side of the outpost.

Throughout the video, no wounded or killed ANA soldiers are to be seen, although the attack seems to be successful. The Taliban occupy the outpost and capture ammunition, weapons and some pick-ups.

At 7:20 of part 3, the Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers surrender.

In part 5 the Taliban commander and his fighters arrive in a village and are being greeted by the villagers.

In Mudjahedin-ideology, martyrs die with a smile on their faces because they are happy to go to Paradise. That's why the faces of the killed Taliban are shown in detail in part 6. It is remarkable that in this Taliban propaganda video no dead enemies, but plenty of dead Taliban are featured. In Western propaganda quite the opposite is the case.

Why is that?

In the ideology of the Mudjahedin, the martyr (Shahid) wages Jihad for the glory of God. In return, God grants the Shahid access to the highest rank of Paradise. So when a Shahid dies, he fulfilled his part of the deal and can expect to go to the highest rank of Paradise, which explains the smile of some of the faces of the ones killed.

Whereas Mudjahedin fight for this selfish and apparently appealing ideology, ISAF troops fight to defeat terrorism at best but more commonly to stabilise a far away country (lets disregard for a moment that most of the ISAF troops are professionals and volunteers who fight for other reasons, such as for a living or because they signed a contract etc.).

Why is this important?

Sending soldiers to war requires to provide them with a strong motivation, such as nationalism, protection of their family, fight against a perceived threat etc. Is the cause of the mission unclear or not convincing, the moral erodes. In Vietnam, the consequence was alcohol and drug abuse. The consequence for the lack of a cause in Afghanistan has to be seen. But the widespread Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome could be one of them.

Turkish Air Defense System Deployed to Syrian Border

2010-05-18T20:17:00.000+02:00

Interesting news reach us from Turkey: the Turkish newspaper Hurryet reports that air defence systems have been deployed to the Syrian border. A source within the Turkish military was quoted that "this move aims at repelling a US or Israeli attack against Iran or Syria".

Al Manar TV, the Hizbollah media outlet, quotes a Turkish political analyst who said "“The news in Hurriyet daily is true. The air defense system was moved from Istanbul to Iskenderun to counter any surprise Israeli air raid, because in 2007 Israeli warplanes used the Turkish airspace to carry out air raids on Syrian targets. Thus Turkey took this precautionary measure so that what happened in 2007 would not happen again.”

In light of Turkey's role in the Iran nuclear fuel swap, it seems that Turkey is determined to support Iran's aspirations to master the nuclear fuel cycle. I think it's reasonable to ask when Turkey itself will declare activities to master the nuclear fuel cycle.

The greatest shortcoming of the human race is our inability to understand the exponential function

2010-05-17T22:47:00.003+02:00

Information Clearing House posted a link to a fascinating lecture by US physicist Albert Bartlett. Although it is slightly off the scope of this blog, I found it very helpful to understand the underlying arithmetic of many statistics we read about every day. The subject of the lecture are population growth and the consumption of fossil fuels.

Here are the main points:

1. An average population growth of 7% per year means that the population doubles in 35 years. In order to get the doubling time for any given growth rate you have to divide 70 by the growth rate. See the lecture for the mathematics.

2. Steady growth in a finite environment: you put a bacterium that grows by doubling every minute in a bottle. If you put the first bacterium in the bottle at 11.00 am, at 12.00 noon the bottle is full. Note: at 11.59 am the bottle is only half full.

3. "Democracy cannot survive overpopulation. Human dignity cannot survive overpopulation. Convenience and decency cannot survive overpopulation. As you put more and more people into the world, the value of life not only declines, it disappears. It doesn't matter if someone dies, the more people there are, the less one individual matters." (quoted from Isaac Asimov)

What does that mean in the context of security and defence? Population growth is not sustainable, it has to stop at one point. That's an arithmetic certainty. Also economic growth is finite. It will stop as well since it cannot be sustained indefinitely.

I guess that we are moving towards dangerous times with less democracy and human rights but more conflict, internal and external.

Iran, Sanctions, and Russia's Southern Flank

2010-05-17T02:35:00.014+02:00

When the western media discusses Russia's position on international sanctions against Iran, it usually focuses its attention on the level of bilateral trade that the two countries enjoy. Two areas, in particular, are consistently noted: the sale of arms (particularly surface-to-air missile systems) and Russia's lucrative contract to construct two nuclear reactors at Bushehr.

But Russia's arms sales only go so far. It hasn't, for instance, followed-through on its agreement to supply Iran with the S-300 anti-aircraft system - something that would complicate any future air strikes against Iran's nuclear sites. Progress on the Bushehr reactor has also been slow, precipitating claims in Tehran that Moscow is deliberately delaying the project's completion. Furthermore, bilateral trade with Iran only represents a very small proportion of Russia's international total.

There is, however, another key issue that factors into the relationship between Tehran and Moscow: security. The proximity of the two countries, and Iran's position just across the Caspian Sea, means that Tehran could have considerable influence in the North Caucasus - should it wish to do so. It didn't exercise this influence during the two Chechen Wars - something for which Moscow is eternally grateful - and this was largely due to the congenial nature of relations between the two governments at that time. But Moscow continues to face instability in Dagestan and Ingushetia, a situation that has the potential to deteriorate rapidly in the future. If Russia supports stronger sanctions against Tehran then it's certainly possible Iran will act differently next time around.

So my question is: can the re-set in relations between the United States and Russia prove enough of an incentive to off-set the security fears that Moscow has regarding external meddling in the North Caucasus? Possibly. But the extent to which the re-set is likely to result in substantial economic benefits for Russia may be significant in explaining how strong any additional sanctions against Iran will be. One other determining factor - China.

Four options for Israel and Palestine

2010-05-11T20:21:00.000+02:00

John J. Mearsheimer came forward (in an article and in a speech) with a compelling outline of four scenarios the Israel-Palestine conflict could result in:

the two-state solution: Israel withdraws from the occupied territories, abandons the settlements, and Jerusalem is shared capital of both Israel and Palestine.
the one-state solution, option 1: Israel stays in the occupied territories, grants equal civil rights to the Palestinians and becomes the democratic state of both Israelis and Palestinians.
the one-state solution, option 2: Israel expels all remaining Palestinians from the occupied territories and claims the entire area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan river.
the status quo: Israel controls the West Bank and proceeds down the road towards an apartheid state.

Mearsheimer points out that the Israel lobby pushes the Israeli and US governments towards option 4, which would likely end the Western support for Israel and ultimately lead to the end of Israel as such.

I would favour option 2, mainly because I like the idea of states being not exclusively for one particular denomination, but for all their inhabitants.

Who are the (young) Taliban?

2010-05-11T15:05:00.003+02:00

According to Newsweek, there is a clear generational divide within the Taliban. Young fighters apparently have nothing but contempt for older leaders based in Pakistan and are not afraid to show it.

This article makes for an interesting follow-up to the report by Anne Stenersen (largely based on Antonio Giustozzi's book Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop) which Frederik posted recently.

Amidst all the talk of reconciliation and reintegration, this article raises two questions:

1/ What is the point of reconciling with a leadership that does not control its rank-and-file?

2/ How do you reintegrate young fighters who have never been integrated into anything... and who apparently don't want to be?

Realpolitik in Central Asia

2010-05-10T15:04:00.009+02:00

The so-called regional dimension to the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan is largely taken to refer primarily to Pakistan and, by extension, India. This is understandable but Central Asia deserves more attention (beyond practical matters such as lines of communication and air bases) so I was interested to come across this report from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (dating from March this year).

Few strategic thinkers would argue with the assertion that "Washington’s AfPak policy needs to expand its field of vision to include Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan" but the question is how and for what purpose. We should be extremely cautious of seeking to support the COIN effort in Afghanistan without seriously considering potential repercussions.

Although very specific in its focus - namely the evolving threat of Central Asian jihadists - this report is coherent with much of the editorial commentary on the region in that it views the question through the AfPak prism, a prism which could very easily become a trap.

"We argue that the U.S. strategy to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda” in Afghanistan and Pakistan should be expanded to include Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Our thesis rests on the judgment that Central Asia’s jihadists pose a potentially grave threat to regional stability and international security. They operate in a geographically contiguous and increasingly interlinked environment that stretches from Pakistan’s safe havens up through the Ferghana Valley. Ongoing hostilities and deteriorating conditions in Afghanistan and Pakistan could transform what has been a relatively minor problem into a potent destabilizing factor in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The time to address this issue is now, before it metastasizes."

Instead of worrying that the Afghan conflict might spill over into Central Asia, we should perhaps be more concerned with severe unrest and growing militancy developing organically in that region and all as a result of the west turning a blind eye to government repression there just to secure some air bases - such as Manas and Termes - and supply routes for the campaign in Afghanistan.

These warnings are not new. For example, the scathing report of Craig Murray, formerly British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, on the Karimov regime - and US support for it - has been well-documented. In the words of Tahulbat Yuldashev, former Uzbek government official turned dissident: "Democracy in Uzbekistan has no financial support any more from the United States. It only cares about Afghanistan."

The following extract of the CSIS report shows just how problems may emerge organically in Central Asia, no matter the outcome in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

"The return of these [jihadist] fighters does not pose an existential threat to Central Asian stability — they lack popular support. But a militant influx could set off a destabilizing cycle of terrorist action and government overreaction amid deteriorating socioeconomic conditions in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan."

Incidentally, I find that extract to contain a glaring contradiction. If a destabilising cycle of terrorism, government repression and deteriorating socio-economic conditions - not to mention human rights violations - does not qualify as an existential threat then I'd be keen to know what does.

Today it is often said - rightly - that Pakistan is facing an existential threat. We should never forget that this threat began during the 1980s when the west supported a dictatorial regime in order to further its own interests in Afghanistan. There are some differences - the west was supporting Afghan insurgents then, not fighting them, and Pakistan was funding and arming jihadists, not clamping down on them - but the point remains that short-term expediency can unleash even worse consequences in the future.

In that vein, I find it especially disconcerting that the CSIS report outlines a number of key recommendations, all of which target the existing Islamist groups in Central Asia but none of which address the conditions which produce incubators of militant jihadists in places like the Ferghana valley.

Measure such as enhancing U.S. intelligence capacity on Central Asian target sets, launching a border interdiction initiative and focusing more attention on travel documents may address the symptoms of militant islamism in Central Asia but not the root causes.

The one exception is the recommendation to push to bring the counterterrorism legislation of Central Asian countries in line with EU directives and human rights laws. The EU reference is interesting and I'll return to that shortly.

The key question would appear to be to what extent should we balance short-term realpolitik against medium- to long-term consequences?

The fact is we should avoid that distinction as far as possible. Granted, this is not easy in practice but the war in Afghanistan is being fought, ostensibly, because the repressive regime in that country destabilised the region and harboured international terrorists. So what is the point if the measures we take produce the same effect elsewhere?

The international community must surely have the necessary mechanisms at its disposal to find a balance. For example, the European Union has an opportunity to - at last - play a meaningful role in western foreign policy. By encouraging, as far as possible, reform of institutions (police, judiciary) and promoting democracy and human rights through legislative reform (as mentioned above), the much-vaunted soft-power capacities of the EU would be a useful counterweight to the Afghan-based realpolitik of the US and other ISAF nations.

Thus the member nations of ISAF would, with one hand, do what is necessary for the campaign in Afghanistan and, with the other hand, seek to bring about a degree of positive influence in the same region.

The goal is simple - to prevent the storing up in Central Asia of similar and equally serious problems as those which continue to beset Afghanistan.

Even if that specific suggestion requires closer and more in-depth examination, the Central Asian question indisputably requires immediate attention and some kind of workable solution.

Cameron and Hague: the last thing Europe needs right now

2010-05-09T23:49:00.011+02:00

The Conservative Party victory (well... almost) in Thursday's UK election could not have come at a worse time for the EU. Given that the Eurozone is grappling with the effects of the Greek debt crisis, it could do without a British government that seems set to push the "little England" agenda.

The feelings of many Europeans (including many British) were summed up by the comments of Pierre Lellouche - France's Minister for European Affairs - in November last year when he branded the Conservative Party's European policies as "autistic" and "pathetic."It can be assumed that the more cordial comments that he made in the New York Times last Tuesday were purely out of pragmatism.

For me, and many others in the UK, the Conservative attitude towards the EU is an embarrassment that will damage the ability of future governments to influence and shape the Union. While Conservatives regularly argue that the UK shouldn't 'relinquish' any more of its sovereign powers to Brussels, they seem to forget that a combative EU policy will inevitably lead to a lessening of Britain's international influence. What is even more surprising is that David Cameron and William Hague appear reluctant to pursue the level of Anglo-American cooperation that was apparent in the Blair-Bush area. This is surprising, but you could argue the Conservatives are being cohesive - Washington has stated time and time again that the transatlantic relationship is best served by a Britain at the centre of Europe. And, as there now appears to be no chance of that happening, relations between London and Washington seem destined to become more distant. The result: A UK that lives firmly up to its geographical isolation and forgets that a train from London to Brussels takes a similar amount of time as one from London to Bristol.

A leaked memo written by William Hague to David Cameron, and published by the Guardian, provides a good indication of what is to come. In this document, Hague lays out the line he suggests taking at the Foreign Affairs Council. Two issues that stand out are: the statement that the UK will never join the Euro (a needless comment and poor timing given recent events); and the intention to return powers to London on the Charter of Fundamental Rights, criminal justice, and social and employment legislation. Although EU leaders would have seen this coming, the process of negotiation on these issues is likely to be infuriating.

While it may be true that the Conservatives turn out to be more pragmatic once actually governing, it seems certain they will be an obstacle to much EU legislation. There is also their unfortunate alliance with the Kaczynski brothers in the European Parliament.

Clearly I am not a supporter of the Conservatives, but the reasoning behind this position is far more to do with their EU policy than it is domestic issues. This may all seem a bit one-sided. Perhaps it is. But one thing is for certain: these are worrying times for anyone who wants Britain to be a cooperative partner at the centre of Europe.

How the West was won

2010-05-06T15:21:00.006+02:00

Some consider the Native Americans of the Great Plains to have been among the most effective guerrilla fighters in history... and yet they were eventually beaten.

While this episode of history was not one which western civilisation can regard with much pride, there may be some interesting lessons here which could perhaps be applied in a modern counter-insurgency campaign, such as Afghanistan.

These musings are intended to precede a more in-depth - and perhaps more scientific - look at the much-vaunted reconciliation and reintegration efforts currently underway in Afghanistan. I'll write more on that early next week but for now I wanted to look at one historical episode which provides food-for-thought - and not direct parallels - on this particular issue.

Obviously some of the factors in the defeat of the Plains nations cannot be transplanted to Afghanistan: there are no buffalo herds to eradicate and its more than a little unlikely that white settlers will drive into Helmand province in horse-drawn wagons in the pursuit of manifest destiny. These factors were probably more important than the military campaign as they undermined the entire way of life of the nomadic Plains nations.

A further factor must be acknowledged: whereas in Afghanistan one civilian casualty is one too many (although unfortunately it doesn't always work out that way), the US Army had no such restraints when fighting the nations of the Plains, as illustrated most infamously by Custer's massacre of a Cheyenne village at the Washita river in 1868.

Those three factors are (very obviously) entirely irrelevant to the situation in Afghanistan. However, there were two factors in the defeat of the Lakota specifically that might be integrated into a counter-insurgency strategy.

Drown them in baby milk

The fighting strength of the Lakota was sapped by the numbers of young men who, with their families, eschewed the old way of life and instead lived on hand-outs from soldiers living in what we would now call Forward Operating Bases, such as Fort Laramie on the Oregon Trail. These people were dubbed the 'Laramie Loafers' and they posed a major problem for the Lakota as i/ they reduced what was already a small pool of young men who could take up arms and ii/ they sapped the morale of those who chose to follow the old way of life.

Drowning insurgents in baby milk (ie. throwing money and material goods at them in order to undermine their motivation to fight) is hardly a new suggestion. I believe this particular metaphor first appeared in Vietnam but the method is as old as time. The example of the Laramie Loafers shows that such an approach can have a big impact.

The modern 'equivalent' in Afghanistan would be to simply provide jobs for people in Afghanistan. It is often said that many Taliban foot-soldiers only joined the insurgency because they would make more money there than elsewhere. Therefore, in simple terms the theory is that by creating licit sources of income (ie. anything other than joining the Taliban and/or growing poppies), many of the rank-and-file would drop their weapons and return home peacefully.

I can see the sense in such a theory and it may well have some impact in its implementation. The question is to what extent and will this be enough to irreversibly weaken the insurgency? That remains to be seen and I would have some questions (and doubts) here, notably concerning the received wisdom that most Taliban fighters are simply in it for the money.

Certain well-respected observers - I'm thinking of Ahmed Rashid and Robert Fisk - have highlighted the origins of the Taliban in the poverty-stricken refugee camps to which Afghans fled in great numbers (3.5m in Pakistan, 1m in Iran) during the Soviet occupation. Fisk argues that the extreme austerity of the Taliban regime stemmed from the fact that, in the refugee camps and madrasas, poverty was all they knew. In similar vein, Rashid describes the Taliban in these terms:

"These boys were a world apart from the Mujaheddin I had got to know during the 1980s - men who could recount their tribal and clan lineages, remembered their abandoned farms and valleys with nostalgia and recounted legends and stories from Afghan history... They were literally the orphans of the war, the rootless and the restless, the jobless and the economically deprived with little self-knowledge. They admired war because it was the only occupation they could possibly adapt to. Their simple belief in a messianic, puritan Islam which had been drummed into them by simple village mullahs was the only prop they could hold on to and which gave their lives some meaning."

I will look at this in greater detail next week. Suffice to say for now that it might not be a foregone conclusion to drown people in baby milk if their basic worldview rejects wealth and material possessions.

Divide and conquer

Another factor in sapping both the fighting strength and the morale of the Lakota was the lack of unity within their ranks. Factions did not so much emerge along tribal lines (the Lakota nation was composed of several sub-groups) as around individuals. Most notably, the personal antipathy of the Oglala leader Red Cloud and the Brulé leader Spotted Tail towards the famous warrior Crazy Horse was a factor which prevented young warriors from rallying behind him and mounting a concerted and organised resistance campaign.

These differences were skilfully exploited by the US Army, or more accurately by their civilian agents, who rewarded the older chiefs with material goods and political recognition (Red Cloud was received at the White House several times by President Ulysses Grant). Red Cloud did not take part in the escalating guerrilla campaign led by Crazy Horse and the Hunkpapa medicine man Sitting Bull. Red Cloud's weight among the people split the fighting strength of the Lakota, in terms of numbers, logistic support and morale.

In this vein, Anne Stenersen argues that, instead of negotiating directly with the Taliban leadership, it would be more realistic to weaken the Taliban's coherence by negotiating with - and offering incentives to - low-level commanders and tribal leaders in Afghanistan (see report posted here by Frederik on 27 April). The wide variety of actors that make up the 'opposing militant forces' (the official ISAF term) is a strength that could be turned into a weakness "if properly and systematically exploited."

I can understand the thinking behind this and hopefully I've shown, using one specific historical example, that such an approach can serve a purpose when fighting an insurgency. However, next week I'll raise some questions (and doubts) about the practical implementation of reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan.

Going PowerPoint deep in Afghanistan

2010-05-06T11:23:00.007+02:00

Major-General Flynn's report on US intelligence in Afghanistan made the headlines earlier this year, most notably for his claim that the United States had only gone 'PowerPoint deep' in their understanding of the complex situation in Afghanistan.

As reported by the New York Times (and many others), it seems the US military have taken their attachment to PowerPoint just a little too far.

Upon seeing it, General McChrystal is said to have remarked “When we understand that slide, we’ll have won the war.”

As comical as this slide might look, there is a serious point to make here, as illustrated by Julian Borger of the Guardian.

"On a recent tour of the region, [British Foreign Minister] David Miliband was treated to an upbeat PowerPoint slideshow about the battle for hearts and minds in Helmand, neatly condensed into bullet points.

Everyone walked out energised and enthused, until an official with long experience of the region took us aside and told us, in old-fashioned paragraphs, why Helmand was a disaster."

The NY Times article gives a number of examples of how misuse of PowerPoint can have harmful effects, such as over-simplifying complex problems or encouraging group-think. This is dangerous.

“It’s dangerous because it can create the illusion of understanding and the illusion of control... Some problems in the world are not bullet-izable.”

In the dystopian world described by George Orwell in Nineteen Eighty-Four, Big Brother reduced the English language to the minimal lexicon of 'newspeak'. The pretext was greater efficiency, the real intention - and the result - was reducing people's ability to think by simply reducing the number of words available to them.

Reading the various accounts of military misuse of PowerPoint, it begins to look disturbingly like newspeak.

PowerPoint is not all bad though...

"Senior officers say the program does come in handy when the goal is not imparting information, as in briefings for reporters."

PS: For tips on how to make a good PowerPoint presentation, try this from the BBC.

Burden sharing at home as well as abroad

2010-05-03T06:50:00.009+02:00

Over the last twelve months momentum has been building for the withdrawal of NATO's forward deployed nuclear weapons from Europe. Pressure is being gently applied by a group of western European states that include Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Luxembourg. Although it would be positive for the reenergizing of disarmamnet efforts that this withdrawal takes place, there is a real possibility that the issue may pit the above nations against new NATO members such as Poland and the Baltics.

At the root of this argument is the need to provide a symbolic assurance to Eastern European states that NATO is serious about their security, as well as the need to maintain Alliance cohesion in the form of burden sharing. This suggests that although withdrawal would be a boost to the non-proliferation regime, it is preferable that there be some form of replacement that performs the political role currently carried out by non-strategic nuclear weapons. My point is simple: couldn't this be done by phased and adaptive missile defence deployments? And isn't it about time we linked missile defence directly to non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe?

Missile defence offers the possibility of shifting the burden east towards those states that are skeptical of any sympolic weakening of the U.S. commitment to defend Europe. The fact that assets can be surged into regions at times of crisis also creates the need for regular political and military consultations - something that will help maintain NATO influence over U.S. defence policy.

There is, of course, one big problem: Russia's entrenched opposition to missile defence. But this can be overcome with enough political will and commitment towards the goal of establishing a joint missile defence architecture. If successful, this cooperation will help redefine the NATO-Russia relationship and end the current stalemate on tactical nuclear wepaons. If the argument is articulated in a way that qualms the fears of Poland and the Baltic states (probably Turkey as well), as well as Russia, then missile defense could well be the future of NATO burden sharing.

German troops back in France!

2010-04-30T20:27:00.000+02:00

At the Munich Security Conference in February 2009, French President Sarkozy and German Chancellor Merkel agreed to permanently station a German Battalion of Light Infantry in Illkirch-Graffenstaden, France, 5km south of Strasbourg. The first German troops arrived beginning of April and by Summer 2010 the Battalion will reach its full strength.

The Light Infantry Battalion 291 (Jaeger Battalion in German) will complement the German component of the German-French Brigade, which so far consists of the Jaeger Battalion 292 in Donaueschingen, the Artillery Battalion 295 and the Tank Engineer Battalion 550. The French component is represented by the 110the Infantry Battalion and the 3rd Hussar Regiment, both stationed in Germany. Last, the German-French Supply Battalion, which is as opposed to the above mentioned units the only truly bi-national unit.

As the only unit of the German Army, the Jaeger Battalion 291 will consist of two Jaeger Companies and one Reconnaissance Company. Supplied with the most advanced weapon systems, such as the Armoured Personnel Carrier BOXER, Light Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicle FENNEK, machine gun MG 4, sniper rifle G 82 and sub-machine gun MP 7, the Battalion is specifically designed for out-of-area missions.

Lessons from Ireland - the bicycle theory

2010-04-30T11:00:00.007+02:00

When riding a bicycle, if you stop pedalling then the bicycle falls over. Conclusion - if you want to go somewhere you have to keep pedalling.

The same is true of a process of conflict resolution, according to Jonathan Powell, formerly Chief of Staff to Tony Blair and the latter's main adviser/negotiator on the Northern Ireland peace process.

Powell wrote a book, called 'Great Hatred, Little Room' (from a poem by W.B. Yeats), about his decade-long experience. Aside from being a highly-readable account of personalities and anecdotes, it also provides a few salient points which I would like to draw out for my third and final post on the lessons we can learn from the peace process in Northern Ireland.

- talking is not a reward to be withdrawn but a basic necessity for any peace process. Moreover, to make peace you must talk to your enemies, not just to your friends. That might seem obvious but look at other past or ongoing processes and you quickly discover that this pre-condition is far from a foregone conclusion.

- in that vein, they realised that only extremes can build peace as there is nobody left to outflank them. NB: the original intention was to build peace from the moderate parties in the centre and, while this was enough to reach a settlement, it was not enough to implement it. Only the extremes could do that.

- maintain strategic focus, do not get distracted by tactical games.

- ambiguity in negotiations is complicated and needs careful handling. Although almost always necessary at the beginning, 'constructive ambiguity' must be squeezed out (painfully and over time) as a durable peace cannot rest on an ambiguous understanding.

- widen the focus when you reach an absolute impasse.

- the stage of a breakthrough agreement is exactly the moment to redouble your efforts and try to implement (ie. sell) the agreement to both/all sides.

- dealing with criminality is not easy, as it can be a (local) cultural phenomenon. The trick is to force a divorce between those who opt for crime and those who opt for a political path.

- on hearts and minds, by investing effort/money/jobs into the water in which your enemies swim (metaphor c/o Mao Zedong) you can reduce pressure in a conflict.

Powell is careful to state very clearly that Northern Ireland was a unique, a sui generis, situation and that we should be very careful about drawing parellels with other process of conflict resolution (for example in the Middle East where George Mitchell is now the US Special Envoy just as he was previously in Northern Ireland - see my first post on this subject).

To that end, Powell highlights certain underlying factors which created the conditions for reaching - and implementing, albeit extremely slowly - a peace settlement in Ireland.

- a generational change in the leadership of i/ Irish Republicans, ii/ in London and Dublin and iii/ the 'securocrats' within the British State (military and intelligence) apparatus
- the Celtic Tiger economic boom in Ireland
- 911, which showed Irish Republicans that their brand of physical force was simply outdated
- the US factor (see previous post on the 'out of the box' theory)

Above all, he states very clearly that conflict resolution can only succeed when both/all sides have realised that they cannot win.

However, it is for those reasons that in these three posts I have been careful to consider Northern Ireland as a case study for a 'methodology' (for want of a better word) of conflict resolution, and not a blueprint. Lessons therefore refers to process and I'd be interested to see to what extent people think some of these lessons could, or should, be applied elsewhere.

"Out of Ireland have we come, great hatred, little room, maimed us at the start. I carry from my mother's womb a fanatic heart." (W.B. Yeats)

Some worrying developments in the Middle East

2010-04-28T21:53:00.002+02:00

It is difficult to assess whether the situation in the Middle East is getting worse or whether it is stable and all current developments are just a smoke screen. Here are some news that combined could lead to a new situation in the region:

EGYPT:
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak went to Germany to get a surgery. He is 81 years, so the question of succession becomes interesting. So far, no successor has been designated. A future president has to meet certain criteria, such as loyalty towards the US, collaboration with Israel, willingness to suppress brutally the population. The most prominent contender for the post is Muhammad Al Baradei, the former head of the IAEA.

Judging upon his performance in his previous job, Al Baradei is unlikely to continue the Mubarak's policy of suppression and compliance. And this would render him an opponent of the US and Israel, who were already not happy with him at the IAEA. It is likely that they will do everything to take him out of the campaign.

However, it seems that the West will loose with Mubarak also its grip on Egypt. The Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmend Aboul Gheit was quoted of calling Israel an 'enemy state'. Although he said that he was misunderstood, this small incident could be a first sign of Egypt moving away from Western domination.

Another problem of Egypt is the Western value of democracy or rather the necessity of dictatorship. So far, the problem doesn't exist because there is no democracy whatsoever. If the West would ask for democratic elections the outcome would very probably be a landslide victory of the Muslim Brotherhood. That would be a problem for Israel, because they could not count on the complicity of Egypt in their fight against the Palestinians. But it would surely also pose problems to the West as a whole, bearing in mind the crucial position that Egypt holds as the most important country of the Muslim world, the Suez Canal, adjacency to the Gaza strip etc.

One positive effect of sticking to Western values and demanding free elections would be that an Egyptian government lead by the Muslim Brotherhood would ease tensions with Al Qaeda and affiliates. Ayman Al Zawahiri, the second in command and chief ideologue, is Egyptian himself. He was very active in the resistance against the Egyptian dictatorship before endorsing the violent international struggle against the "far enemy" that was soon to become the ideology of Al Qaeda.

HEZBOLLAH:
Israel alleged that Syria supplied Hezbollah with Scud missiles. No other government support Israel in this claim, but it was stated by US and other officials that Hezbollah has an improved arsenal of missiles. Israel and the US said that Scuds for Hezbollah could "turn or disrupt the very delicate balance in Lebanon", as Ehud Barack expressed it. Of course, with "delicate balance" Barack means the overwhelming military superiority of Israel. The US even threatened Syria with its "full range of tools" available to halt any smuggling of Scuds.

May there be Scuds or not, fact is that Hezbollah acquired an organisational structure and military capabilities that bother Israel. So far, Israel regularly violates Lebanese airspace in defiance of UN resolution 1701, but also Hezbollah violates this resolution by acquiring sophisticated weapons. Both sides seem to prepare for the inevitable showdown.

THE AXIS BEIRUT-DAMASCUS-TEHRAN:
In case of a showdown between Hebollah and Israel, the Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri stated that an attack on Hezbollah would be regarded as an attack on Lebanon. End of February 2010, Hezbollah General Secretary Nasrallah met Syrian President Assad and Iranian President Ahmadinejad in Damascus.

It looks like the coordinated resistance against Israel and its Western supporters is forming. Statements, such as "the next military conflict should solve the Israel question once and for all" or "the next war will be a regional war", indicate that Israel's enemies are confident that they can prevail in a war. The predominant feeling towards Israel used to be the feeling of inferiority - if that changed to a feeling of equality, it could change the tides in the Middle East.

ISRAEL AND THE WEST:
A lot has been written on the rift between Israel and the US. Recently, also France made headlines when President Sarkozy criticised Netanyahu for foot-dragging on the peace process. Although it is unlikely that the Western criticism of Israel will change its attitude towards Israel, it could empower the militant forces in the Middle East.

OUTLOOK:
I think that the situation for many participants is good as long as the conflict is boiling on a small flame. But the accumulation of developments could set fire to the fuse. The EU should start talking about what to do when the situation is going belly up.

Who are the Taliban?

2010-04-27T22:03:00.000+02:00

I would like to draw your attention to a study by Anne Stenersen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. She seeks to understand who the Taliban are, what they do fight for and how they see themselves.

There is not much debate going on about the enemy that we are fighting in Afghanistan. Governments and NATO usually refer to ISAF as a stabilisation mission to strengthen the Karzai-Government. But only rarely questions about our enemy are discussed. For instance, the Mullah Omar's negotiation offer and his peace proposal was hardly ever discussed publicly.

But how can we defeat an enemy that we don't understand? Sun Tzu famously said: "Know yourself, know your enemy - a thousand battles, a thousand victories". I think we are falling short of knowing our enemy and that might be one of the reasons why we have a hard time winning. Stenersen's paper sheds some light and explains what we are up against.

"Keep Calm and Carry On"

2010-04-27T06:08:00.009+02:00

Nigel Inkster, the former deputy director of MI6, issued some pointed criticism today of what he sees as the United States' continued overreaction to terrorism. Although Inkster's argument is not a new one, his previous position at MI6 makes his opinion both intriguing and significant.

Before taking up his current post at IISS, Inkster was being groomed by Sir Richard Dearlove (the former head of MI6) as his potential successor. In the end, Inkster was passed over by Tony Blair's appointment of John Scarlett, the former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Although Scarlett had previously been an MI6 officer, and Moscow station chief, his selection as head of the service was seen as a reward for providing political cover to Tony Blair's decision to join the Iraq invasion.

Some may claim this episode has left Inkster a wounded animal, but there is no evidence to support this assertion. Instead, his critique of U.S. policy should be seen as a sensible assessment from a man that previously served on the front line in the fight against terrorism.

Ron Paul speaks out against the sanctions bill on Iran

2010-04-26T21:11:00.002+02:00

Congressman Ron Paul from Texas is one of the few that publicly criticise the US Iran policy from within the US political system.

Last Thursday, the Congress passed the 'Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act', which effectively prohibits US firms to trade with countries that trade with Iran. Listen here to his 5 minute intervention, in which he compares the current developments regarding Iran with the build up to the war with Iraq in 2002.

Why I would vote for Clegg

2010-04-23T12:38:00.004+02:00

Clegg questions US ties. I think it's about time that the UK emancipates itself form the US. As should all the rest of Europe, by the way. It is hard to understand that the relationship to the country that brought down the mighty British Empire is considered to be 'special' to begin with. Clegg said that the Iraq invasion "was a war about Tony Blair and Gordon Brown doing America's bidding". I couldn't agree more.
Clegg speaks out against the "like-for-like" replacement of the Trident submarines capable of carrying nuclear ICBMs. During the first of the leaders' debates Nick Clegg repeatedly asked how Gordon Brown or David Cameron "could justify or afford £100bn over 25 years on a nuclear missile system, which was designed specifically to flatten St Petersburg or Moscow", and said "the world has moved on and I think you two need to move with it". I think that is a valid point. Furthermore, I would argue that capabilities such as nuclear deterrence as well as aircraft carriers should become EU assets anyway.
On the Middle East, Clegg said: "On Israel, my view has always been that whilst the ideology of Israel's enemies in Hamas . . . is odious, and the use of terror . . . unacceptable, I also feel that it is simply not in Israel's long-term interests to have 1.5-1.8 million people in a state of wretched grinding poverty in a tiny, tiny sliver of land in Gaza seething with ever greater radicalism, extremism and hatred right on your doorstep and that the military methods used in Operation Cast Lead were disproportionate." Making peace in the Middle East is simple: total withdrawal of Israel to the borders of 1967, Jerusalem capital of both Israel and Palestine and compensation for the refugees. Time to put pressure on the parties to get their act together.
He is a graduate of the College of Europe.

"We honour the commisars and we condemn the dissidents"

2010-04-21T22:06:00.001+02:00

Sometimes it just happens that I read someone's ideas and I think that this idea is pretty obvious and plausible - why didn't it come to me myself? Well, here is another of those examples, this time in an interview with Noam Chomsky. In line with the basic idea of this blog and the quote on top, two ideas struck me most:

Firstly, Chomsky speaks about the reasons why he was never invited to a popular talk-show called 'Nightline'. The reason is, he explains, that he lacks concision. If you want to repeat the mainstream opinion, you can do that between two commercials. The kinds of things that Chomskey would say cannot be said in one sentence, because they depart from standard mainstream. If you want to question the mainstream you are expected to give evidence, which is per se good, but too time consuming for talk-shows.

It's terrific technique of propaganda. To imposing concision is a way of virtually guaranteeing that the party line gets repeated over and over again, says Chomsky.

Breaching this 'censorship' is difficult but separates the intellectuals from the courtiers. When it comes to our enemies, such as the Soviet Union, we understand this principle easily: we honour the dissidents and condemn the commissars. When we turn around at home, we honour the commissars and condemn the dissidents.

Secondly, Chomsky speaks of double standards. We accept those because we lack knowledge of particular issues. He outlines the examples of Iraq (the interview was recorded in 2002), South-Eastern Turkey, Kosovo and Indonesia. We support dictatorships, such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi-Arabia, who commit atrocities against their own people, and agitate against Iran, or Iraq at the time, blaming them that they commit atrocities against their own people.

Apart form corrupting our moral and integrity, I believe that this hypocrisy does not do us any good. It will come back to us and haunt us. And it doesn't do any good to the countries that we uncritically support. We deprive these people of their chance to choose their own fate and antagonise people who will in return seek revenge. In order to continue with this policy we have to accept that it requires a massive military power and the suppression of the majority of the people of the world who do not have the privilege of having be born in the West.

Take an hour and watch the interview!

Ramzan Vs. Dmitry?

2010-04-20T18:44:00.019+02:00

Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Chechen Republic, has long been known for his harsh and often brutal counter-insurgency policies. As a result, many have wondered how the relationship between Kadyrov and Dmitry Medvedev would evolve. This article in Radio Free Europe gives an indication that the two men have differing perspectives on what direction security policies in the North Caucasus should take.

Following the recent bombings on the Moscow metro system Medvedev offered a five point plan for countering militancy in the region:

1) Strengthen the police and security forces
2) Continue to hunt down and eliminate terrorists
3) Provide material aid to militants that lay down their arms
4) Address the socioeconomic problems that are facilitating the recruitment of young men and women to militant groups
5) Enhance the role of the Muslim clergy

While hunting down and killing militants is nothing new, placing a greater emphasis on the socioeconomic problems perhaps is. This 'emphasis' may create divisions between Medvedev and Kadyrov with the latter prioritising the catching and killing of militants while the former favours the provision of social programmes and material support.

If a rift between the two does begin to emerge then Medvedev will be faced with a dilemma: socioeconomic problems are perhaps the root cause of North Caucasian militancy and this has to be addressed, but at the same time Kadyrov has presided over a normalization of the Chechen security situation - something that Medvedev will not want to risk unraveling. There is also the question of Vladimir Putin, whose meteoric rise to power is partly explained by the role he played in orchestrating the Second Chechen War. Is the North Caucasus one area where Putin's word will always reign supreme?

Israel, Bin Laden and Alaskan rabbits

2010-04-20T17:31:00.003+02:00

Michael Scheuer, a retired CIA agent, didn't pull any punches during his speech to a town-hall meeting this week, raising a considerable number of questions.

The main thrust of Scheuer's speech was that the United States should return to the Founding Fathers' foreign policy (ie. self-defence) which, in practice, entails withdrawing from the Middle East "to the greatest extent compatible with our national interest."

The two questions here are i/ what is the greatest extent possible and ii/ how can this withdrawal be achieved in practical terms?

On Israel, Scheuer doesn't miss the mark either. "The idea that 300 million Americans are bound to bleed because God gave a group of people a deed to a plot of land 3,000 years ago is quite mad."

Given recent and ongoing debates, one wonders if either a growing number of people share his view or, alternatively, people always thought this way but now feel able to speak out. The question in both cases is why is this and what will it mean?

On Bin Laden, Scheuer says there is next to no chance of ever catching him - a particularly striking comment given that Scheuer was previously head of the CIA unit charged with hunting him down. The question here is would it really make much difference if Bin Laden was ever caught?

On Afghanistan, defeat is not an option but the means (ie. troop numbers) to win are not there. On Iran, a first-strike would only provoke terrorist attacks on US soil.

Finally, the US must achieve energy independence or face going to war for oil (I thought they already did) and must prioritise this over other considerations. In simple terms - "Demands for protection for Arctic rabbits, Gulf shrimp or the sunny beaches of California at the cost of dead Marines or soldiers should be ignored."

A Mudjahideen's tale

2010-04-19T21:44:00.005+02:00

The Taliban complain for quite a while now that the narrative of the war in Afghanistan is dominated by the interpretation of Western media outlets. In order to counter that trend, some Mujahideen started their own history writing project. This piece (part I, part II) is the first product of the effort that I'm aware of. It tells the story of Jalaluddin Haqqani and his emergence as one of the most prominent isurgency leaders in the pre-Soviet and Soviet phase of the Afghanistan war. Today, he is the leader of the Haqqani-Network that is loosely affiliated with the Shura Council of Mullah Omar. Well, nobody really knows how close the ties between these two organisations are. Anyway, it's a fascinating read for everybody who likes legends - and beyond that for everybody who seeks to understand what the Taliban think of themselves.

Medvedev's speech in the U.S. highlights his personal qualities and practical approach to policy

2010-04-19T04:39:00.013+02:00

President Medvedev's speech at Brookings last week demonstrated that the Russian leader has three significant characteristics: candour, humour and foresight. All of which appear to have laid a strong foundation for the effective working relationship that he has developed with Barack Obama. But between the quips about texting the U.S. president, and honesty over being shocked by the economic crisis, Medvedev's comments at Brookings highlighted the practicality and vision that informs his political thinking. This was evident in the straight answers that he gave with regards to the Russian economy, Terrorism and Iran.

With regards to the Russian economy, Medvedev's remarks showed that the economic crisis has focused his attention on the urgent need for diversification. He went as far as to say that it "was outrageous [. . .] how our economy depends on raw materials." But, perhaps more importantly, he discussed in some detail the need to address the current woeful state of bi-lateral trade with the United States, which amounts to only 5 percent of that which is currently being traded between Washington and the Netherlands. It was the emphasis that Medvedev placed on this issue, as opposed to security concerns such as missile defense, that was important. Reading daily news reports will lead many to believe that missile defense and NATO expansion are the defining issues for the bi-lateral relationship. Well, while these issues certainly raise tensions, Medvedev appeared to convey that the best way to solidify a 're-set' in the U.S.-Russian relationship is for both sides to make a greater effort to boost trade. Encouraging? Yes. Why? Because a greater concentration on economics, as opposed to strategic defence, may help take some tension out of the relationship.

Medvedev's comments on terrorism, brought about by the recent bombings in Moscow, were restrained and measured. He steered away from the 'over-the-top' language that Vladimir Putin has used in the past and instead focused on how it can be difficult to push back against public pressure (when Russian citizens are calling for revenge). This is reflective of the way in which the Kremlin dealt with the recent attack. They have been criticised for diproportionate responses in the past, but perhaps a greater emphasis is now being placed on law enforcement as the first line of defence - as opposed to the military. The problem, however, is that 'law enforcement' has been responsible for many of the arbitrary sweep operations and kidnappings that take place in the North Caucasus on a daily basis. So while there may be a change in the presidential rhetoric, this is unlikely to have any impact on the situation on the ground in Ingushetia and Dagestan.

It may be Medvedev's comments on Iran that please Americans most. While he did not accept the premise of the question that his government is "on the same page when it comes to sanctions", he did make it very clear that Russia is becoming increasingly frustrated with Iran's inability to prove its innocence. This may be a sign that they will back sanctions if Iran doesn't make any concilliatory moves before that time comes.

So what does all this mean? Well, it could all change, but at the moment it seems that the relationship is on a trajectory that will continue to produce concrete results. An improvement in economic relations could be on the horizon and the U.S. should do its utmost to makes this happen. Furthermore, the election of Yanukovych in Ukraine appears to have taken the sting out of NATO expansion - something that may have been welcomed in Washington for this very reason.

One question that the Brookings speech raises is just how much this cordial relationship is down to the personalities of the U.S. and Russian Presidents? Another interesting point to consider is how different things would be right now if the 2008 war in Georgia had taken place twelve months later?

Fighting an enemy who does not exist

2010-04-15T21:43:00.003+02:00

In this article, Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA's Bin Laden unit, turns against the perception in many Western media outlets that Al Qaeda attacks us because they hate what we are and what we stand for. "This contention is a fantasy." This simplistic interpretation of the motivation of terrorists would not be accurate and misrepresent the intentions of the enemy we are fighting all over the world.

Al Qaeda and affiliates have a clear motivation for their attacks on our societies. They are: unconditional support for Israel, the presence of Western troops in Muslim lands and the continuous killing of Muslims all over the world.

Those reasons have been identified by the 9/11 commission and various experts on terrorist groups. Sending our troops into battle against an enemy who irrationally hates us is misleading our soldiers, writes Scheuer. Furthemore, "the current slate of U.S. foreign policies toward the Islamic world generates the basic and most compelling and uniting motivation for our Islamist enemies." Here, European foreign policy could easily be added.

"If we fail to understand that motivation, America cannot shape a war-fighting strategy to either defend those policies or defeat the tenacious, talented, religiously motivated, and growing foe our soldiers, Marines, and CIA officers are now losing to in the field."

We send our troops into war against an enemy that they do not only not understand, but we keep deceiving them about the nature of this very enemy. By doing so, we do not only shed our blood, or Muslim blood, we do also embark on a mission that we cannot win.

Inside a suicide bomber training camp

2010-04-14T20:53:00.002+02:00

I just came across a very interesting description of training camps for suicide bombers in Waziristan. Published in the March edition of the CTC Sentinel, the article outlines the motovation, background, and training of future suicide bombers.

Particularly interesting is the fact that the compensation package for the family of a suicide bomber is apparently a myth.

In this context, don't miss the Asian Times Online recount of the failed suicide operation against the CIA HQ in Pershawar on April 5.

Lessons from Ireland - the 'out of the box' theory

2010-04-12T14:52:00.012+02:00

Arguably the most interesting lesson from the Northern Ireland peace process is the role of the United States as an 'out of the box' player, a deus ex machina.

Whereas previously the US had been little more than a place for the IRA to procure high-grade weapons (both legally and illegally), when Bill Clinton was elected President in 1992 this changed - for two reasons:

Firstly, as the first non-veteran to become President since 1945, Clinton brought a post-Cold War vision in which the State Department's hands-off policy on Northern Ireland - in deference to Britain's role as America's most important military ally - no longer held sway.

Secondly, Clinton the uber-politician was very aware of the unavoidable influence of Irish-America at the polls.

It was in that context that a number of prominent Irish-Americans launched an energetic lobbying campaign. One of their number, Jim Reilly, a former top executive with IBM, is credited with the 'out of the box' theory which best sums up US involvement in Northern Ireland during the 1990s.

According to Reilly, all the parties to the conflict in Northern Ireland were frozen in the same box and any move was immediately countered by a check-mating move from the other side. The introduction of an 'out of the box' player would completely change the dynamic inside the box.

So it proved. Without going into the finer details here, constructive US involvement - notably granting visas to Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams and veteran IRA member Joe Cahill - showed the republican movement that politics could open doors and subsequently led to IRA ceasefires in 1996-96 and from 1997 onwards, ultimately leading to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.

I must add a caveat at this stage. London and Dublin had increasingly worked together over the previous years, even decades, to build a conflict resolution process and the triangular Belfast-London-Dublin dynamic was already an improvement on the confrontational IRA vs London dynamic. So while Washington's involvement helped to change the dynamic and open up new possibilities for political settlement, this was only possible thanks to the solid foundations which had already been laid over many years in Belfast, London and Dublin.

American involvement in Northern Ireland, although partly motivated by genuine good intentions, was not entirely devoid of the interests of national security. Many US policy-makers were concerned about the implications of the resources that Britain committed long-term to the north of Ireland. In simple terms, they wondered how long Britain would be able to endure the conflict without compromising its commitments elsewhere.

However, self-interest is to be expected. Interests - be they strategic, economic or whatever else - have to be accounted for when considering to what extent the 'out of the box' theory is applicable to other conflicts.

An obvious question is why American involvement elsewhere during the Clinton administration - or since - did not necessarily result in similarly positive effects as in Northern Ireland. Much of that has to do with the long-standing connections between America and Ireland, between America and Britain and, above all, the efforts and intentions of the Irish-American lobby. Much of that also has to do with the American interests at stake in other given situations.

Conclusion - if the US role as an 'out of the box' player in Northern Ireland is to serve as an example for a potentially successful approach to conflict resolution elsewhere then two key pre-conditions must be established:

i/ the 'out of the box' player is ideally regarded as impartial and reliable, or at the very least each party to the conflict must believe it to be in their best interest to cooperate with the 'out of the box' player;

ii/ that the 'out of the box' player sees a peaceful resolution to the conflict as being in its own best interests.

The Afghan patient

2010-04-09T13:39:00.004+02:00

"Rather than describing Afghanistan with the language of war and battles, we have come to think of the country as an ailing patient - in many ways analogous to a weakened person under attack by an aggressive infection."

General Caldwell, commander of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, and Captain Hagerott make novel use of medical terminology to describe the current situation in Afghanistan.

In a nutshell, the doctor (ie. the international community) misdiagnosed the patient, didn't administer strong enough medicine, the infection grew stronger and now we need to administer a very strong dose of medicine to combat the infection and allow the patient's immune system to build up its strength.

Full article in Foreign Policy.

NB: Interesting to see another NATO and/or US official going outside the official channels for an on-the-record statement about the war in Afghanistan. This article can't be compared with Maj-Gen Flynn's CNAS report on intelligence failures in terms of content and repercussions... but is this now a recurring pattern/tactic in the war for public opinion?